IR 05000285/1989015

Insp Rept 50-285/89-15 on 890403-07.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Startup Testing After Refueling & Followup to Previous Insp Findings

ML20245A589
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	04/14/1989
From:	Mckernon T, Murphy M, Seidle W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20245A559	List: IR 05000285/1989015 ML20245A558
References
50-285-89-15, NUDOCS 8904250283
Download: ML20245A589 (6)

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APPENDIX U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspectior, Report: 50-285/89-15 Operating License: DPR-40 Docket: 50-285 Licensee: Omaha Public Power District (OPPD)

1623 Harney Street Omaha, Nebraska 68102 Facility Name: FortCalhounStation(FCS)

Inspection At: FCS, Blair, Nebraska Inspection Conducted: April 3-7,1989 Inspectors: Ah 87 T. Cr. McKernon; Reactor Inspector, Test Dafe /

Programs Section, Division of Reactor Safety Y

M. E. Murphy? Reattof Inspector, Test Programs Date

't Section, Division of Reactor Safety Approved:b W. C. Seidle, I,hieM Jest Programs Section Wh Date q

Division of Reactor Safety Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted April 3-7, 1989 (Report 50-285/89-15)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of startup testing after refueling and followup to previous inspection finding Results: Within the two areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. Startup tests conducted at power were performed in accordance with current procedures and test results sufficiently evaluated. Followup to previous inspection findings resulted in the closure of three violations and one unresolved ite ADOCK 050 g S-

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4 - b-2-DETAILS Personnel Contacted OPPD

• C, F. Sininons, Licensing Engineer

• Holthaus, Manager, Nuclear Engineering

• R. Peterson, Assistant Manager

• J. Morris, Division Manager, Nuclear Operations

• J. C. Adams, Reactor Engineer

• C. J. Matthews, Supervisor. Station Licensing

• R. L. Jaworski, Manager, Station Engineering

• W. G. Gates, Plant Manager R. Ronning, Systems Engineer J. Vanecek, Operations Shift Supervisor

• Denotes those personnel attending the exit intervie . Followup on Previously Identified Inspection Items 2.1 Violations 2. (Closed) Violation 285/8725-01: Failure of licensee management to implement a corrective action program for correction of deficiencies related to nonfunctional fire door From March I through December 31, 1987, 12 deficiencies involving seven fire doors that did not properly latch were identified during NRC inspections. These continued deficiencies evidenced a failure on the part of licensee management to implement an effective corrective action progra The licensee's long-term corrective action program consisted of extensive replacement of fire doors, hardware standardization, and L initiation of a preventive maintenance program to keep fire doors {

operable. The completion of these commitments was documented in ]

OPPD Memorandum PED-SYE-89-2210, dated March 20, 198 i l

During a plant tour the NRC inspector noted the completion of a j number of fire door replacements. Establishment of engineering ]

requirements for hardware standardization was found in OPPD  ;

Memorandum FC-737-88, dated April 21, 1988. The NRC inspector also  !

reviewed Preventive Maintenance Procedure PM-FD-4, Revision 3, dated  !

September 2, 1988. This procedure provides for the routine j inspection and adjustment of fire door . (Closed) Violation 285/8828-01: The licensee failed to take prompt corrective action in response to an NRC identified concer I

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-3-To address the lack of response to NRC concerns, and the resulting failure to take prompt corrective action, the licensee has initiated the practice of holding postexit meeting conferences. These conferences document the licensee's verbal commitments and NRC concerns. Responsibilities for response and action are assigned at these meetings and subsequently entered in the licensee's formal commitment tracking process. This appears to be working satisfactoril As reported in NRC Inspection Report 50-285/88-45, the licensee retained a consultant to analyze the adequacy of the seismic gap fire seal. The consultant's efforts were scheduled to be complete January 31, 1989. The consultant's report was completed and submitted at the end of January. The consultant's conclusion was that the presence of the tendon grease will not compromise the ability of the seismic gap wall seal to perform as intended and is deemed to provide a 3-hour fire rating. The licensee's position is that the seismic fire gaps are operable and no further action is required. This resolution is considered acceptabl . (Closed) Violation 285/8828-02: Failure to have adequate emergency lighting. This item was reviewed in NRC Inspection Report 50-285/88-45. The items remaining were completion of the installation and testing of the control room area emergency lightin This modification has been completed ar.d teste The licensee has issued a special Procedure SP-EL-1, " Emergency Lighting Verification' dated March 30, 1989, for review of the adequacy of the postfire safe shutdown emergency lightin .2 Unresolved Items 2. (Closed) Unresolved Item 285/8835-02: Review of the loss of containment integrity event by the Management Investigative Safety Team (MIST).

The safety significance of this item was reviewed and reported in NRC Inspection Report 50-285/88-36. The original concern for the isolated pressure switch was found not to be safety significant since the isolation affected only an alarm function. The item remained open pending revision of Procedure NPD-QP-18 by the license The NRC inspector reviewed Revision 2 of N0D-QP-18, " Management Investigative Safety Team (MIST)" issued January 16, 1989. This procedure now contains a requirement that an incident report will be initiated whenever a problem is encountered during an investigation that is nutside the scope of the investigatio _ - - _ _ _ - _

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-4-i Startup Testing - Refueling (72700) l This portion of the inspection involved.the review of data associated with refueling (Fuel Cycle 12) for surveillance tests and physics tests performed at power conditions. Core physics test data and other applicable tests were reviewed to verify compliance to licensee procedures and Technical Specification (TS) requirements. The NRC inspector reviewed the following documents:

Surveillance Test ST-MTC-1, Revision 1. " Moderator Temperature Coefficient," dated February 21, 1989

Special. Procedure SP-CTPC-1, Revision 1 " Core Thermal Power Calculation-NSSS Calorimetric," dated February 2,1989 I Surveillance Test ST-RPS-13, Revision 1, "Incore/Excore Calibration,"

dated February 10, 1989

Surveillance Test ST-SDM-1, Revision 1. " Shutdown Margin Verification," dated January 25, 1989 CECOR SNAPSH0T, 98 percent power level, dated February 14, 1989 The NRC inspector verified that procedural requirements were met and stated acceptance criteria satisfied. Specific portions of startup testing are discussed in further detail below, Surveillance of Core Power Distribution Limits (61702)

During this portion of the inspection, the NRC inspector reviewed the flux map. printout. A review of the flux map verified that control rod inspections, core power level, and burnup at the time of the flux map were a part of data input to the code analysis. Further, analytical data for the associated fuel batches was incorporated into the analysis. Nuclear uncertainty factors have been incorporated and augmentation factors for various detector levels were considere Values for axial shaping index, hot channel factors, local power )

densities, azimuthal power tilts, planar, axial, and radial peaking factors; and core 3-D power peaking are within TS limitations and no apparent anomalies were observe Incore/Excore Calibration (61705)

During this portion of the inspection, the NRC inspector verified l that calibration of the incore/excore detectors was perfomed in j accordance with the above procedure within the required TS frequency and the detectors sufficiently met the stated criteria. The surveillance test satisfied the prerequisites and calculations performed were correct. The internal axial shaping index (ASI) was within the tolerance of the calculated ASI and calibration results

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-5-were reviewed, approved, and documented in accordance with the licensee's administrative control procedures. In addition, identities of instrumentation used during the incore/excore calibration were recorded and verified to be valid, Core Thermal Power Evaluation (61706)

The NRC inspector reviewed the procedure to verify that the stated purpose was accomplished and the acceptance criteria satisfie A review of the data provided indicated that the calorimetric determination of reactor power corresponded with the plant computer point XC-105 within 0.37 percent of calculated value. The NRC inspector further verified that the data recorded was reasonable and consistent with previous data. In addition, it was verified that the procedure accounted for the condition of the steam generator blowdown system during the core thermal power evaluatio Determination of Reactor Shutdown Margin (61707)

This portion of the inspection involved the review of the licensee's shutdown margin calculations during hot zero power conditions and subsequent control room observations to verify that power dependent insertion limits (PDIL) are maintained in accordance with the T Shutdown margin calculations sufficiently accounted for reactivity contributions due to boron concentration, shutdown and regulating control element assemblies (CEA), part length CEAs, temperature, xenon concentration, fuel burnup, and burnable poison depletion. The results of the shutdown margin calculations were within the TS acceptance criteria. The licensee's TS requirements and operator guidelines adequately address necessary actions to be taken should the shutdown margin criteria not be satisfied. The licensee has performed the necessary review of fuel vendor data and incorporated it into the low power physics testing program calculation Furthermore, the NRC inspector observed operator actions in the control room and instrumentation panel indications to verify that the shutdown margin at power conditions is being maintained via the PDl Total power Coefficient of Reactivity at Pressurized Water Reactors (61709)

During this portion of the inspection, the NRC inspector verified that the procedural precautions, prerequisites, and initial conditions were met. Plant evolutions required to determine the power coefficient and isothermal temperature coefficients were performed in a controlled and satisfactory manner. The NRC inspector reviewed Surveillance Test ST-MTC-1 on data collected at 93 percent rated power level. The test was performed in a sufficient manner and results satisfied the stated acceptance criteria. The surveillance

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-6-test was satisfactorily reviewed, approved, and documented with all-necessary sign-offs and authorizations. complete Within the scope _of this inspection, no violations or deviat' ions were identifie . Exit Interview An exit interview was conducted with FCS personnel on April 7, 1989, at the conclusion of the onsite inspection, during which the inspection findings were summarized. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to, or. reviewed by, the NRC inspectors during the inspectio l l

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