ML20195J259

Insp Rept 50-285/99-04 on 990425-0531.Noncited Violations Identified.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint & Plant Support

ML20195J259
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	06/11/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20195J251	List: ML20195J248 ML20195J259
References
50-285-99-04, 50-285-99-4, NUDOCS 9906180154
Download: ML20195J259 (11)

See also: IR 05000285/1999004

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ENCLOSURE

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket No.:

50-285

License No.:

DPR-40

Report No.:

50-285/99-04

Licensee:

Omaha Public Power District

Facility:

Fort Calhoun Station

Location:

Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm., P.O. Box 399,

Hwy. 75 - North of Fort Calhoun

Fort Calhoun, Nebraska

Dates:

April 25 through May 31,1999

Inspectors:

W. C. Walker, Senior Resident inspector

V. G. Gaddy, Resident inspector

R. V. Azua, Project Engineer

R. A. Kopriva, Project Engineer

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Approved By:

C. S. Marschall, Chief, Project Branch C

ATTACHMENT:

Supplemental Information

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9906100154 9906'il

PDR

ADOCK 05000285

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY '

Fort Calhoun Station .

NRC Inspection Report No. 50-285/99-04

kOperations '

The inspectors reviewed licensee Procedure NOD-OP-36," Control of Switchyard at

FCS," and verified that appropriate controls were being maintained over construction

activities in the switchyard and that offsite power sources had been appropriately.-

protected (Section O6.1).

Maintenance

During the replacement of the east raw water supply header flow indicator, maintenance

personnel noted that the replacement flow indicator would not fit into the pipe.

Engineering personnel determined that the plant drawing used to develop the

modification package was incorrect. Because the drawing was incorrect, licensee

personnel exercised conservative decision making by stopping the activity until

engineers performed a thorough evaluation of the changes needed to successfully

comp!ste the activity.(Sectioa M1.3).

Plant Sucoort

A member of the engineering department improperly entered a restricted high radiation

area. The engineer's failure to sign in on the proper radiation work permit was in

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noncompliance with Standing Order SO-G-101 and, therefore, in violation of Technical Specification 5.8.1. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited

violation, consistent with Appendix C of the Enforcement Policy. This deficiency was

included in the corrective action program as Condition Report 19990077. Licensee

personnel responded appropriately to this occurrence (Section R4.1).

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Durint a spent resin transfer, licensee personnel failed to identify adequate contingency

actions for the potential to clog system piping with resin. This resulted in operations

personnel receiving approximately 20 percent more dose thar: anticipated, but all doses

were within the radiation work permit limits. The procedures used during a transfer of

resin from the Spent Fuel Pool Demineralizer Tank AC-7 were clear and concise. The

associated briefings were informative (Section R4.2).

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Report Details

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' Summarv of Plant Status

The Fort Calhoun Station began this inspection report period at 100 percent power and

maintained that level throughout the inspection period.

1. Operations

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Conduct of Operations:

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O1.1 General Comments (71707)

. The inspectors conducted frequent reviesa of ongoing plant operations, in general, the

conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious.; Plant status, operating

problems, and work plans were appropriately addressed during daily turnover and

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plan-of-the-day meetings. Plant testing and maintenance requiring control room

. coordination were properly controlled. The inspectors observed several shift tumovers

and noted no problems.

02' : Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment

~ O2.1 Safety Iniection System Walkdown (71707)

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The_ inspectors walked down those accessible portions of the safety injection system

located in the auxiliary building. All valves observed were in the appropriate position for

full power operations as indicated in Operations Instruction OI-SI-1, " Safety injection-

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Normal Operation," Revision 39. The overall observable material condition of the

equipment was found to be very good, with only a few instances noted where small

amounts of boric acid crystals were visible.

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Operations Organization and Administration .

06.1 - Control of Switchvard Activities (71707)

The inspectors reviewed licensee Procedure NOD-OP-36, " Control of Switchyard at

~ FCS," and verified that appropriate controls were being maintained over construction

activities in the switchyard and that appropriate offsite power sources had been

appropriately protected.

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II. Maintenance

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Conduct of Maintenance

M1.1 - General Comments - Maintenancg

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. Insoection Scoce (62707)

The inspectors observed or reviewed portions of the following work activities:

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Work Order 98-0030 Replacement of east raw water supply header flow

indicator

Work Order 22677

Clean, inspect, lubricate, adjust 4160V breaker for raw

water Pump AC-10C

b.

Observations and Findinos

With the exception of the maintenance described in Section M1.4, the inspectors

identified no substantive concerns. Workers performed all observed activities with the

work packages present and in active use. The inspectors frequently observed

supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control

personnel were present when required.

c.

Conclusions

The maintenance activities observed were conducted in a controlled and professional

manner.

M1.2 Surveillance Tests

a.

Insoection Scope (61726)

The inspectors observed or reviewed all or portions of the following surveillance

activities:

OP-ST-DG-0002," Diesel Generator 2 Check," Revision 27

IC-ST-RPS-0003," Quarterly Functional Test of Power Range Safety Channel B

Trip Unit," Revision 2

OP-PM-AFW-0004, " Third Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operability Verification,"

Revision 19

b.

Observations and Findinas

The plant staff conducted surveillance testing satisfactorily in accordance with the

licensee's approved programs and the Technical Specifications.

c.

Conclusions

Surveillance activities were completed thoroughly and professionally.

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M1.3 - East Raw Water Suoolv Header Flow Indicator Reolacement

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-Insoection Scope (62707)

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The inspectors followed up to determine why maintenance on the east raw water supply

header flow indicator could not be performed as expected.

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Observations and Findinas -

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On May.5,1999, maintenance personnel attempted to replace the existing east raw

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water supply header flow indicator with a new magnetic flow sensor. Although still

operable, the original flow indicator was degraded. The work was performed under

Modification Package 97-025.. Operators were required to remove the raw water system

from service for the replacement of the flow indicator.

~ The original flow indicator was removed from the supply header without incident. When

maintenance personnel attempted to insert the new magnetic flow sensor into the

header, it would not fit. The flow sensor was larger than the existing pipe-spool's inside

diameter. Plant drawings indicated that the bore measured 3.068 inches. However, the

actual bore measured 2.325 inches. The new flow sensor required a minimum opening -

of 2.6 inches.

Because the new flow sensor would not fit, licensee personnel considered counterboring

the existing fitting to enlarge the opening. This method would have required an

engineering analysis. Other methods of resolving the situation within the limiting

conoition for operation were evaluated and considered impractical. As a result,

maintenance personnel reinstalled the original flow indicator and the system was

retumed to service.

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Conclusions

During the replacement of the east raw water supply header flow indicator, maintenance

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personnel noted that the replacement flow indicator would not fit into the pipe.

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Engineering personnel determined that the plant drawing used to develop the

modification package was incorrect. Because the drawing was incorrect, licensee

personnel exercised conservative decision making by stopping the activity until

engineers performed a thorough evaluation of the changes needed to successfully

complete the activity.

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Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment

M2.1 Review of Material Condition Durina Plant Tours

a.

Insoection Scope (62707)

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The inspectors performed routine plant tours to evaluate plant material condition.

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b. -

Observations and Findinas '

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The inspectors observed that the material condition and housekeeping of accessible

. areas in the auxiliary building, the radwaste building, the intake structure, and most

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areas of the turbine building were good.

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During a tour of the turbine building,.the inspectors identified a pin-hole leak in the area

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_ of the weld seam on a 4-inch section of fire protection system piping. The inspectors

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discussed this with the fire protection system engineer to verify that workers were

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continuing to implement Preventive Maintenance Order 9803041. This order required a

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complete walkdown of the. fire protection system 4- and 5-inch piping, at 6-month

intervals to determine if further erosion / corrosion of the system was occurring.

' The inspectors verified that a condition report was written to document the additional

. leak and that a deficiency tag was placed to ensure a work request for repair of the leak

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would be initiated.

c.

Qgnclusions

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The inspectors concluded that the observable material condition of plant structures and

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equipment was good and verified that an action plan was in place to continue monitoring

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the condition of the fire protection system.

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Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902) ,

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M8.1 (Closed) Unresolved item 50-285/99003-02: mechanical agitation of volume control

tank makeup inlet Check Valve CH-151. This item had remained open pending the

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completion of an analysis to evaluate whether the check valve should remain within the -

scope of the inservice testing program.

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As documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-285/99-03, the check valve failed to meet

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its acceptance criteria for backleakage and was declared inoperable as required by the

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surveillance procedure. The valve was mechanically agitated with a sledge hammer,

passed subsequent testing,~ and was declared operable. As corrective action, the check

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valve was retested and again failed its acceptance criteria. The valve was again

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declared inoperable as required by the surveillance test.

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On May 5,1999, engineers completed their evaluation and concluded that Check

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Valve CH-151 did not perform a safety function and was not required to prevent back

leakage from the volume control tank. The evaluation also referenced Updated Safety

Analysis Report Section 6.1.2.3 stating that the chemical and volume control system

was not required to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident.

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This evaluation was documented in Memorandum NE-CTD-99-024. Because no safety

function was performed by the valve, the engineers recommended that the current

quarterly test be deleted from the inservice testing program and also from Surveillance

Test Procedure OP-ST-CH-3002, " Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)

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~ Category C Valve Exercise Test." The inspectors concluded that the check valve was

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not required to be within the scope of the inservice testing program and no violation of :

the inservice. testing program had occurred.

IV, Plant Support

R1

Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls

R1.1 - General Comments (71750)

The inspectors observed health physics personnel, including supervisors, routinely

touring the radiologically controlled areas. Licensee personnel working in radiologically

controlled areas exhibited good radiation worker practices.

Contaminated areas and high radiation areas were properly posted. Area surveys

posted outside rooms in the auxiliary building were current. The inspectors checked a

sample of doors required to be locked for the purpose of radiation protection and found

no problems.

R4

Staff Knowledge and Performance

R4.1

Imorocer Entrv Into a Restricted Hiah Radiation Area

a.

Insoection Scooe (71750)

On April 29,1999, a member of the system engineering department entered a restricted

high radiation area without signing onto the proper radiation work permit. The

inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding this event.

b.

Observations and Findinas

The engineer entered the spent fuel pool cooling pump room (Room 5), posted as a

restricted high radiation area, during the resin transfer discussed in Section M1.4. The

door to Room 5 had been propped open to allow passing of hoses into the room. The

supervisor for this radiological operation had made the decision to post the room at the

open doorway. The room had been barricaded with a suspended rope bearing an

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appropriate posting, in addition, a radiological protection technician was assigned to

provide positive control of access to the room.

In support of the job, the engineer entered the room to observe the resin transfer. The

radiation work permit that the engineer was signed in on did not allow access into a

restricted high radiation area. .The engineer entered the room while the radiation

protection technician was observing work inside the room with a remote camera. As

soon as the engineer passed the technician, the radiation protection technician

immediately directed the engineer to exit the area.

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The engineer's electronic dosimetry recorded a maximum dose rate of 58 mrem /hr, and

his recorded dose for the entire duration of his radiological cont,olled area entry was

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2 mrem. The maximum measured radiation dose rate in the room where the engineer

stood was 80 mrem /hr.

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Radiation protection technicians initiated Condition Report 199900771 to document this

event, and the engineer was excluded from the radiologically controlled area. The

circumstances that resulted in the incident were discussed with all radiation protection

personnel.

The inspector reviewed Standing Order SO-G-101, " Radiation Worker Practices," and

noted that it required personnel to sign onto the proper radiation work permit prior to

entering into a restricted high radiation area. The failure of the engineer to follow this

standing order was in violation of Technical Specification 5.8.1 (50-285/99004-02). This

Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with

Appendix C of the Enforcement Policy. This deficiency was included in the corrective

action program as Condition Report 199900771.

c.

Conclusions

A member of the engineering department improperly entered a restricted high radiation

area. The engineer's failure to sign in on the proper radiation work permit was in

noncompliance with S anding Order SO-G-101 and, therefore, in violation of Technical Specification 5.8.1. Licensee personnel responded appropriately to this occurrence.

R4.2 Removina Resin from Soent Fuel Pool Demineralizer Tank AC-7

a.

Insoection Scope (62707)

The inspectors monitored efforts to remove resin from Spent Fuel Pool Demineralizer

Tank AC-7. Prejob briefings, equipment setup, resin transfer, and job critiques were

observed. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the work orders, work instructions, and

radiation work permits used to perform this effort.

b.

Observations and Findinos

The inspectors found that the prejob 6defing and the as low as reasonably achievable

briefing were both comprehensive and engaging, elicitiiig a number of questions and

suggestions by licensee personnel involved. Licensee efforts were appropriately

focused on minimizing personnel exposure during the high radiation conditions. The

work orders, work instructions and associated radiation work permits were clear and

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concise and had been reviewed and approved as noted by the appropriate signatures.

Overall, the work was performed in accordance with the work instructions and personnel

involved adhered to good radiation work practices. Health physics technicians closely

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monitored the radiation exposure received by the operations personnelinvolved in

manipulating the system valves and radiation levels emanating from Tank AC-7 and the

associated drainage piping.

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At one point during this activity, the system drainage piping became clogged with resin.

Licensee personnel had not prepared adequate contingency plans to address this issue.

As a result, operators had to stop the activity to determine the next course of action.

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This delayed the completion of the activity and prolonged the time that some of the -

. operators had to remain in areas with elevated radiation levels. During this time an

engineer involved in developing a method for dislodging the clogged resin entered the

spent fuel pool cooling room to observe the position of the piping. This room had been

designated as a restricted high radiation area. However, the engineer was signed in on

Radiation Work Permit 1014 that did not allow access into restricted high radiation areas

as documented in Section R4 of this inspection report.

Licensee engineers made a' decision to mechanically agitate the clogged section of

pipe. However, the line clogged again. As a result, the activity was suspended.

Operators issued Condition Report 199900772 to evaluate the poor planning for

potential resin clogging of the line. Delays in the activity resulted in operations

personnel receiving approximately 20 percent more dose than anticipated. However, all

doses were within the radiation work permit limits.

The job critique was very thorough and candid. The personnel involved clearly identified -

errors and made some good suggestions for improvement, Two condition reports were

issued during the meeting.

c.

Conclusions

During a resin transfer, licensee personnel failed to identify adequate contingency

actions for the potential to clog system piping with resin. This resulted in operations

personnel receiving approximately 20 percent more dose than anticipated, but all doses

were within the radiation work permit limits. The procedures used during a transfer of

resin from Spent Fuel Pool Demineralizer Tank AC-7 were clear and concise. The

associated briefings were informative.

V. Manaaement Meetinas

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Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at

the exit meeting on May 28,1999. The licensee acknowledged the finding as

presented.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the

inspection should be considerad proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

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ATTACHMENT

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

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Licensee

D. Bannister, Operations Supervisor

M. Core, Manager, System Engineering

M. Frans, Licensing Manager

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M. Puckett, Manager, Radiation Protection

R. Short, Assistant Plant Manager

J. Skiles, Manager, Design Engineering

J. Solymossy, Manager, Fort Calhoun Station

R. Clemens, Manager, Maintenance

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

37551

Onsite Engineering

61726

Surveillance Observations

62707

Maintenance Observations

71707

Plant Operations

71750

Plant Support Activities

92700

Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor

Facilities

92902

Followup - Maintenance

92903

Followup - Engineering

ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED

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Opened

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99004-01

NCV

Improper entry into a restricted high radiation area

(Section R4.1).

99004-02

NCV

Low pressure safety injection in an unanalyzed condition due

to potential for voiding (Section R4.2).

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Closed

99003-02

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' Mechanical agitation of volume control tank makeup inlet

check valve (Section M8.1).

.97010-03

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Low pressure safety injection in an unanalyzed condition due

to potential for voiding (Section E8.1).

97017;

'LER

Low pressure safety injection in an unanalyzed condition due -

to potential for voiding (Section E8.1).

99004-01.

NCV.

Low pressure safety injection in an unanalyzed condition due

to potential for voiding (Section E8.1).

99004-02

NCV

!mproper entry into a restricted high radiation area

(Section R4.1).

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