ML20235Y756

Insp Rept 50-285/89-05 on 890130-0203.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Previously Identified Insp Findings, Implementation of ATWS Requirements & LERs

ML20235Y756
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	03/03/1989
From:	Seidle W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235Y738	List: ML20235Y735 ML20235Y753 ML20235Y756
References
50-285-89-05, 50-285-89-5, GL-85-06, GL-85-6, IEB-88-004, IEB-88-4, NUDOCS 8903140551
Download: ML20235Y756 (11)

See also: IR 05000285/1989005

Text

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APPENDIX B

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-285/89-05 Operating License: DPR-40

Docket: 50-285

Licensee: Omaha Public Power District (OPPD)

1623 Harney Street

Omaha, Nebraska 68102

Facility Name: Fort Calhoun Station (FCS)

Inspection At: FCS, Blair, Nebraska

Inspection Conducted: January 30 through February 3,1989

Inspectors: M. E. Murphy, Reactor Inspector, Test Programs Section, Division-

of Reactor Safety

D. R. Hunter, Senior Reactor Inspector, Operations Program Section.

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Division of Reactor Safety

C. E. Johnson, Reactor Inspector, Plant Systems Section,

Division of Reactor Safety

Accompanying

Personnel: T. Stetka, Chief, Plant Systems Section, Division of Reactor

Safety (February 2-3,1989)

W. C. Seidle, Chief, Test Programs Section, Division of Reactor

Safety (February 2-3,1989)

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Approved: M < ,

. C. Seidle, Chief. Test Programs Section J

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ivision of Reactor Safety F

Inspection Summary ,

Inspection Conducted January 30 through February 3, 1989 (Report 50-285/89-05)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection of previously identified

inspection findings, implementation of the ATWS requirements - TI 2500/20

(10 CFR Part 50.62), and licensee event reports.

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Results: <Within the three areas inspected, one. violation was identified i

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(inadequate design activity, paragraph 2.8). Followup was conducted on 12 open

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items involving previous inspection findings; 9 items were, closed. The

remaining three items require completion of the licensee's committed actions.

- The licensee's. actions in compliance with ATWS requirements contained in 10 CFR

Part 50.62 were found satisfactory. Two LERs.were reviewed for adequate

corrective action and proper reporting and found satisfactory. _

The licensee's corrective actions regarding~ the cracks, identified in the

Limitorq)ue

actions ; initiation valve of operator. fomal incident gear housings (includingthe

reports regarding thereactor

root cause and generic

coolant

system weld radiographs; and formal documentation of evalutions regarding the.

- dispositions for conditions adverse to quality were not as comprehensive as

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expected by the NRC inspectors.

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DETAILS

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1. Persons Con'tacted.  !

OPPD l

• W. G. Gates, Plant Manager

• G. Peterson, Assistant Plant Manager

• J. H. McKinnon, Acting Division Manager, Nuclear Operations

• S. K. Gambhir, Division Manager, Production Engineering

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L. Jaworski,~ Manager, Station Engineering

• A. W. Richard, Manager. Quality Assurance and Quality Control

• S. Peterson, Manager, Mechanical Engineering

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• J. K. Gasper, Manager. Training

• L. T. Kusek, Manager, Safety Review Group

• F. C.-Scofield,. Manager, Nuclear Planning

• K..Holthaus, Manager, Nuclear Engineering

• M. Guinn, Supervisor, Reactor Physics

• D. J. Mathews, Supervisor, Station Licensing

• C. J. Simmons, Licensing Engineer

.S. Miller, Electrical Engineer

• R.-Lewis, Supervisor, Mechanical Engineering

D. O. Bye, Electrical System Engineer

• J. T. Smith,~ Assistant Manager, Security Services

• K. L. Henry, Lead Systems Engineer

• M. A. Ferdig, Nuclear Management Development

D. Hendry, Engineer, Special Services

C. N. Bloyd, Supervisor, Inservice Testing

NRC'

• P. H. Harrell, Senior Resident Inspector

The NRC inspectors also contacted other operations, technical, and

administrative personnel.

• Denotes personnel attending exit interview.

2. Followup on Previously Identified Inspection Items (92701, 92702)

2.1 (Closed) Violation (285/8705-08): This violation dealt with the failure

to implement the appropriate procedure to test tie breakers; instead a

procedure for main breakers was used. Review of the licensee's response

indicated the following: 1) correct calibration procedure was obtained

and performed satisfactorily on the tie breakers, and 2) the preventive  ;

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maintenance (PM) sheets associated with the main breakers and tie breakers

were revised to specify the calibration procedures to be used.

The response appears to be adequate.

This item is closed.

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2.2 (0 pen) Violation (285/PR32-01): Failure to Submit Report on Inoperable  ;

Fire Barrier - The licesee is revising Standing Order G-58 to address i

fire door matters, in particular, and fire system impairments. The

planned training and procedure issue are not complete.

This item remains open pending completion of the training and issue of the

revised procedure.

2.3 (Closed) Violation (285/8832-03): Failure to Have Written Instructions

for Removal of Seismic Support - The licensee analyzed the auxiliary steam

line supported by AX5-10 in aTcordance with 10 CFR 50.59 to determine the

effect of removing the support. The analysis concluded that removal of

AXS-10 did not reduce the margin of safety. Maintenance Order 885358 was

issued to complete the removal of AXS-10. This work has been completed.

The plant manager issued Memorandum FC-260-88 to reemphasize the FCS

policy on verbatim compliance. Pemorandum FC-2188-88 on procedure use and

common sense was also issued by the plant manager.

This item is closed.

2.4 (Closed) Violation (285/8821-01): Failure to Establish Procedural Controls

in Regard to Conditional Release of Nonconformance Items - The licensee

has completed a general programmatic upgrade of procurement and storage

practices for safety-related material and services. The NRC inspectors

reviewed the following revised procedures: S.O. G-18, "Nonconformance

Control," Revision 12, now includes a separate dedicated section for

processing nonconformances for operational " Conditional Release Basis"

material; S.0. G-22, " Receiving, Shipping, Stores Control and Storage of

Critical Quality Elements, Radioactive Material Packaging, Fire Protection

Material, and Limited CQE Items," Revision 35, and QADP-13, " Control of

Nonconformance Items and Materials," Revision 6, now include provisions

for engineering review. This review also verified that these procedures

also cover the control of nonconforming material identified during receipt

inspection, provide administrative controls to limit the scope of

nonconformance reports, and provide clear authority as to who shall

authorize the release of the material for use.

This item is closed.

2.5 (0 pen) Violation (285/8529-11.H.2; Deficiency 285/8529/2.5-1): Inadequate

Welding, Preparation, and Inspection Associated With the Replacement of

Valve No. MS-100 - The licensee has not completed addressing the generic

corrective actions addressed in NRC Inspection Reports 50-285/88-25 and

50-285/88-46.

This item is open.

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2.6 (Closed) Violation (285/8529-II.F.2.d & e: Deficiency 285/8529/2.5-2):

Installation Procedure Did Not Contain Adequate Instructions Regarding

Tubing Configuration and Accumulator Tank Locations - The licensee

evaluated the installed tube spacing by alternate calculations. These

calculations are complete, verified, and were reviewed by the NRC

inspectors. These calculations confirmed that the installed tubing is

adequately and seismically supported.

A training program for the design groups in engineering was developed and

presented by the licensee. This program was intended to improve the

quality of instructions in the areas of routing and supporting seismic

instrument tubing, sizing and providing seismic support for air

accumulators, and preparing and checking calculations.

This item is closed.

2.7 (Closed) Unresolved Item (285/8825-02): This issue was a concern that

OPPD had no procedures in place that required a review of identified

inadequate or incorrect design base data for deportability. This item was

left as an unresolved issue pending development by the licensee of

procedures for review of design basis reconstitution (DBR) documents for

operability and deportability considerations. Review of Procedure OP-29,

" Evaluating, Reconstituting, and Closing Design Basis Document Open

Items," Revision 0, indicates that the licensee has developed a procedure

to address DBR documents for operability and deportability considerations.

This unresolved item is closed.

2.8 (Closed) Unresolved Item (285/8839-01): This item identified three

concerns regarding the adequacy of the design of Pipe Support SIS-8 and

any similar pipe support designs.

The NRC inspectors had discussions with the licensee on addressing the

adequacy of similar supports. The licensee stated that Commonwealth

Associates, Incorporated had performed their modification and review in

accordance with their approved quality assurance (QA) program and no

discrepancies, flaws, or damage to SIS-8 have occurred since the time it

was modified. The licensee also stated that Stone and Webster considered

SIS-97 (a similar design) to be adequate. Therefore, the licensee did not

consider the review of other similar supports to be necessary.

The NRC inspectors reviewed Calculation FC 02923 for Pipe Support SIS-8.

As the result of this review, the NRC inspectors identified a deficiency

in which an incorrect dimension was used to calculate the maximum moment,

even though the final results were within acceptable limits. As the

result of this finding, the NRC inspectors expressed concern that there

are similar pipe support designs at FCS which may have similar dimensional

errors in the calculation and, therefore, may not be within acceptable

design limits.

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Failure to have adequate design control measures is contrary to the

requirements of Criterion III of Appendix B to 10 CFR 50 and is considered

to be an apparent violation. (285/8905-01)

For record purposes, this unresolved item (285/8839-01) is considered to

be closed.

2.9 (0 pen) Open Item (285/8836-03): Cracks in Limitorque Valve Operator Gear

Hot. sings - The licensee identified numerous cracks in the motor operator

gear housing of four of eight safety injection (SI) valves as a result of

inspections of the valves during the 1988 refueling outage. The licensee

replaced the eight SI valve Limitorque operators with an upgraded valve

operator housing, which also included a new, different type torque switch.

Also, the new motor operator spring packs contained a grease relief path

to ensure proper operation when grease reached the valve spring pack.

The SI valves had been inspected to a lesser degree during the 1985 and

1987 outages with no cracks noted. Discussions and records review revealed

that the eight SI valves had been operated historically at the high thrust

condition on the valve stem, disc, and seat. The high thrust was also

translated to the upper gear housing of the motor operators. During the

1985 inspection, five of the eight SI valves had been discovered with

thrust values in the range of 20,000 psi. This value exceeded the maximum

target thrust value of 14,000 psi plus 10 percent. The licensee reset the

thrust values (torque switch setpoint) on the valves and commenced an .

evaluation of the as-found conditions.

Discussions and record reviews revealed that similar valves

(Limitorque SMB-00) were not operated routinely near the motor operator

thrust limits. The valves have been inspected routinely to ensure proper

operation, including thrust value setpoints and lubrication.

The cracks in the motor operator gear housings resulted from the high

thrust conditions applied routinely to the eight SI valves. Additionally,

the older model Limitorque SMR-00 motor operator housings were

manufactured from a lesser ductile steel than the newer valves. It is

speculated that the overstress conditions could have been caused by

operation of the valves near the limiting conditions, torque switches

which were difficult to adjust, valve grease migration to the spring pack

and hardening (prior to 1985), or valve grease migration to the spring

pack with no grease relief provided (after 1985).

The NRC inspectors have no further ouestions regarding this matter at this

time; however, the item remains open pending the completion of the

licensee's documentation of the final root cause analysis and reason for

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the valve operator gear housing cracks. Further, the evaluations, j

actions, and completion dates regarding the other SMB-00 valves need to be j

addressed and documented.

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2.10 (Closed) Open Item (285/8836-02): System Operability Determination Because i

of Weld Problems - The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's 10 CFR Part 21 I

evaluation and OSAR 88-53 evaluation. The NRC inspectors discussed the

determination that no substantial safety hazard was associated with the

specific welds and therefore, the system operability was not placed in {

question. The licensee had performed additional ultrasonic tests on l

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selected welds and reviewed weld package documentation. The NRC inspector

review of the licensee evaluation identified that the radiographs for

welds FF-3BR and F-3A on the pressurizer spray line (reactor coolant i

system) remained in question (film density and penetrometer position). .

Further, the NRC review revealed that the supporting documented evaluations  :

were not included in the quality records program. This was an example j

where an incident report (IR) was not written for the specific condition (s) ^

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adverse

evaluation to of

quality and the supporting

the identified problem (s)could

documentation

have been more providing extensive. the detailed

This item is further addressed in NRC Inspection Report 50-285/89-08.

This open item 1s closed.

2.11 (Closed) Open Item (285/8836-04): Resolution of Safety Injection /

Containment Spray Pump Recirculation Flow Deficiency - The licensee l

identified a design deficiency associated with the common recirculation

header limited capacity for the eight safety injection and containment

spray pumps operating simultaneously. The pumps required a total of about

1105 gpm recirculation flow and the licensee's calculations indicated that

a maximum capacity of about 600 gpm flow through the common recirculation

line. The licensee's evaluation of the design deficiency determined that

the common recirculation was ade

pressure safety injection (HPSI)quate to allow flow from the three highpumps (

low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pumps (about 400 gpm total) operating

simultaneously (500 gpm recirculation flow total). One er all of the

three containment spray (CS) pumps (about 600 gpm total recirculation

flow) operating simultaneously with the HPSI/LPSI pumps could degrade the

recirculation flows for the pumps. The licensee modified the electrical

circuitry for the CS pumps such that the pumps will be started with the CS

valves open to eliminate the " choked flow" recirculation condition for the

CS pumps. The licensee also performed a special test (SP-SI/CS-3,

" Simultaneous Operation of LPSI/HPSI Pumps in Minimum Recirculation Mode")

on November 23, 1988, to ensure that adequate recirculation flow was

available for the SI pumps and the pumps exhibited normal conditions. The

test was deemed by the licensee to be acceptable.

The NRC inspectors reviewed selected emergency and abnormal procedures

(EOP-1, " Reactor Trip," Revision 2; E0P-2, " Electrical Emergency,"

Revision 3; E0P-3, " Loss of Coolant Accident," Revision 5; E0P-5,

" Uncontrolled Heat Extraction," Revision 3; and A0P-23, " Reset of

Engineered Safeguards," Revision 12) to ensure that the HPSI/LPSI pumps

and the CS pumps would not be operated on recirculation simultaneously,

which could result in degraded flow to the HPSI, LPSI, and CS pumps. T',e

procedural controls appeared to be acceptable with one minor exception:

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Step C.3.d of A0P-23 required that the CS valves (HCV-344 and

HCV-345) be closed, and then Step C.3.e required that the CS pumps

were to be shutdown. This sequence would place the CS pump on

recirculation with the operating HPSI and LPSI pumps.

Discussions with the licensee revealed that the CS pumps would be secured

quickly after the CS valves were closed; however, the procedure did not

specifically note this requirement to prevent operating the CS pumps in

parallel with the HPSI and LPSI pumps. The procedural weakness was

discussed

licensee and with

thethe licensee

necessary so the to

changes matter could beconsidered

the procedure evaluated by(the

e.g., shut

off the CS pumps and then close the CS valves), as appropriate.

The modification to the CS pump initiation logic and the performance of

the special test to verify adequate recirculation flows for the HPSI and

LPSI pumps appeared to be adequate to resolve the identified design

deficiency. The NRC inspectors have no further questions regarding the

HPSI, LPSI, and CS pumps recirculation flow deficiency at this time.

This open item is closed.

NOTE: The licensee event report (LER 88-32-01) will remain open pending

NRC review of the licensee response to this matter as required by

NRC Bulletin 88-04, dated May 5, 1988. (See paragraph 3.1)

During the running of Special Test SP-SI/CS-3, however, it was noted by

the licensee that the HPSI and LPSI pumps were extremely noisy.

Discussions and document reviews revealed that the high noise level was

attributed to potentially ungrouted or inadequately grouted motor / pump bed

plates. The licensee determined that no operability problem existed.

This matter is being further reviewed by the NRC resident inspector.

2.1? (Closed) Open Item (285/8836-05): Containment Spray (CS) Pump Initiation

Logic Changes - The licensee identified a problem related to the

electrical loads and the sequencing of the loads onto the essential buses

when being supplied by the normal offsite power sources. The bus loading

and load sequencing would result in the initiation of the offsite power

low signal (OPLS) and cause the operating engineered safeguards

feature (ESF) equipment to be removed (" stripped") from the essential bus,

the starting of the associated emergency diesel generator (EDG), and the

sequencing of the ESF loads onto the associated essential bus for a second

time.

The licensee evaluation resulted in the necessity to load the CS pumps

onto the essential buses after the initiation of the containment spray

actuation signal (CSAS), (the combination of th? safety injection

actuation signal (SIAS) and a containment pressure high signal (CPHSI),

and the alteration of the load sequencing of certain equipment onto the

essential buses (IA3 and 1A4) to prevent a degraded bus voltage and the

initiation of a OPLS. The changes to the load sequencing included the CS

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pumps, two containment fan coolers (VA-7C and VA-7D), and the load groups

(three, five, and six) to address all design scenarios considering normal

offsite or onsite power and a single failure.

The NRC inspectors reviewed selected items including:

FC-71, " Operators Log," Revision 45, page 31 of 44, to ensure

operator actions were specified when a 4160V low voltage was

encountered. The low voltage (OPLS) setpoints for TIA3 (3845 volts)

and TIA4 (3743 volts) were given as operator action points to declare

the bus inoperable and referenced the associated Technical

Specification (2.7).

OP-10-A17-13, Revision 12. "4160 Volt Bus IA3 Low Voltage," set at

90 percent of nominal. The actual OPLS setpoint of the bus low

voltage was approximately 92 percent.. This item should have been

changed as part of the design change package and the procedural

discrepancy was brought to the attention of the licensee for action.

' OP-10-A18-17 Revision 9, "4160 Volt Bus 1A4 Low Voltage," set at

90 percent of nominal.

The modification to the CS pump initiation circuit and associated load

sequencing appears to be acceptable. The NRC inspectors have no further

questions regarding this matter at this time.

This open item is closed.

3. Followup on Licensee Event Reports (LERs).(92700)

The following LERs were reviewed to verify the specified corrective

actions had been completed and to ensure the corrective actions were

effective in preventing recurrence.

3.1 (0 pen)LER 88-032-01: Safety injection / Containment Recirculation Piping

Design Deficiency - The licensee identified a design deficiency associated

with the common recirculation header for the eight SI and CS pumps

operating simultaneously.

The NRC inspectors reviewed the change to the CS pumps initiation logic

and special tests performed by the licensee to ensure adeouate SI and CS

pump recirculation flows to prevent pump degradation. (See

paragraphs 2.11 and 2.12)

This LER will remain open pending the NRC review of the response to this

matter as reouired by NRC Bulletin 88-04, dated May 5,1988.

3.2 (Closed) LER 88-033: Electrical Distribution System Design Deficiency -

The licensee identified a problem related to the electrical loads and the

sequencing of the loads onto the essential buses when being supplied by

the normal offsite power sources.

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The NRC inspectors reviewed the licensee evaluation associated with the

changes to the electrical distribution system and selected procedure

changes to implement the changos. (See paragraph 2.12)

This design deficiency was apparently discovered during the. ongoing review

of the plant original design and as-built conditions and reported to the

NRC.

The NRC inspectors have no further questions regarding this matter at this

time.

This LER is considered closed..

4. Compliance With Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) Rule (25020)

The purpose of this inspection was to verify that the licensee has

implemented the ATWS rule, 10 CFR 50.62, and the quality assurance program

as stated in the Generic Letter (GL) 85-06, " Quality Assurance Guidance

for ATWS Equipment That is Not Safety-Related." This inspection also

included verification that the modifications made conform to the I

licensee's commitments as endorsed in the Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)

Safety Evaluation Report (SER).

This inspection consisted of a review of the following documents:

• Modification Construction Package MR-FC-87-048, " Diverse Scram

System (DSS) Testing"

Installation Procedure No. MR-FC-87-048, E-1, " Diverse Scram System

Testing," Revision 1, dated October 29, 1988

Installation Procedure No MR-FC-87-048, T-1, " Diverse Scram System

. Testing," Revision 1, dated December 27, 1988

Calibration Procedure (CP)-120A, " Pressurizer Pressure Input to the

DSO Ct.annel A," Revision 4, dated November 29, 1988

CP-1208, " Pressurizer Pressure Input to the DSS Channel B,"

Revision 4, dated November 29, 1988

• CP-120C, " Pressurizer Pressure Input to the DSS Channel C,"

Revision 4, dated November 29, 1988

• CP-120D, " Pressurizer Pressure Input to the DSS Channel 0,"

Revision 4, dated November 29, 1988

• Operating Instruction (01)-05S-1, " DSS Normal Operations,"

Revision 0, dated January 22, 1989

Operating Procedure (OP)-1, " Master Checklist for Start-Up or Trip

Recovery," Revision 36, dated January 25, 1989

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OP-10,~ " Annunciator Response Procedure," Revision 3, dated

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CP-DSS-1, " DSS Channel and Logic Checks"(New Procedure in Approval-

Cycle)"

In accordance with the SER, FCS, Unit 1, is comitted to install a DSS, a-

diverse circuitry to. initiate la turbine trip (DTT), and diverse circuitry

for. initiation of auxiliary feedwater (DAFW).

The NRC irispectors verified that the licensee' has implemented thel design

as approved by.NRR through the SER dated December 7, 1988, by document

reviews and installation walk-downs. The document review also included

review'of' procurement packages and installations drawings for ATWS

equipment. "

The documentation reviewed showed that the ATWS system hasbeen designed

according to. the'SER. .There was one open item in the SER concerning

isolation = devices that.NRR stated would need further review. NRR will

close'this issue.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. - Exit Interview

The NRC inspectors met with the licensee personnel denoted in paragraph 1

on February 3, 1989. The NRC inspectors summarized the findings of the

inspection and discussed the violation identified in paragraph 2.8.. The

licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the information provided

to, or reviewed by, the NRC inspectors.

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