IR 05000285/1998010

Insp Rept 50-285/98-10 on 970524-0704.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20236S127
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	07/21/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236S123	List: IR 05000285/1998010 ML20236S122
References
50-285-98-10, NUDOCS 9807240146
Download: ML20236S127 (15)

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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket No.: 50-285 License No.: DPR-40 Report No.: 50-285/98-10 Licensee: Omaha Public Power District Facility: Fort Calhoun Station Locatio Fort Calhoun Station FC-22 Ad P.O. Box 399, Hwy. 75 - North of Fort Calhoun Fort Calhoun, Nebraska Dates: May 24 through July 4,1998 Inspectors: W. Walker, Senior Resident inspector V. Gaddy, Resident inspector Approved By: W. D. Johnson, Chief, Project Branch B ATTACHMENT: Supplemental Information

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9907240146 900721 I l- PDR ADOCK 05000285

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Fort Calhoun Station NRC Inspection Report 50-285/98-10 Ooerations

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Operations personnel demonstrated good communication, coordination, and control of activ%es -furing initiation of a Technical Specification required plant shutdow E.pocially notable were the licensee's plan to commence the required plant shutdown and contir "qcy plans for quicker power redtoctions if Diesel Generator 1 could not be declared operaiAe (Section 04.1).

Maintenance

The licensee identified six areas of pitting corrosion in the fire protection system piping since July of 1997. The inspectors verified that identified leaks were documented and either repaired or scheduled for repair (Section M2.1).

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The postaccident sampling system accident sequence was inoperable for approximately 2 weeks. The licensee continued troubleshooting efforts to identify whether an obstruction existed between the postaccident sampiing system and the waste disposal system (Section E1.1).

Plant Sucoort

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Licensee personnel were knowledgeable of the requirements of their radiation work permits. Radiological conditions had been properly posted throughout the radiological!!y controlled areas. Workers and radiation protection personnel were observed to be obeying a9 administrative and regulatory requirements (Section R1.1).

An auxiliary operator entered a high radiation area without dosimetry required by Technical Specification 5.11.1. The cause of the violation (50-285/9810-02) was a lack

. of self-checking by an auxiliary operator to ensure proper dosimetry was obtained prior to entering the radiologically controlled area. The licenses took appropriate corrective actions to address this issue; therefore, it was treated as a noncited violation, as allowed by Section Vll.B.1 of the Enforcement Policy (Section R8.1).

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The licensee was self-critical in the identification of areas for improvement and performance issues during an emergency planning training exercise.. These items included obtaining assistance from the technical support center and operations support l center personnel earlier in the event and operator confusion due to the setup of the

simtslator prior to initiation of the exercise. The exercise provided valuable training for emergency response personnel (Section PS.1).

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l-l Reoort Details Summarv of Plant Status The plant began this inspection period in an extended refueling outage. The outage was i extended due to difficulty in performing a modification to the shutdown cooling isolation valve Also, testing of the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump resulted in an overspeed condition and overpressurization of the auxiliary feedwater piping. This required a modification of the control circuit to ensure that overpressurization of the auxiliary feedwater piping could not occu On June 4,1998, the licensee closed the main generator output breaker to end Refueling

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Outage 17. The outage duration was 65 days. On June 4, a power ascension began, with 100 percent power attained on June 11,1998. The plant remained at essentially 100 percent power throughout the remainder of the inspection period.

i 1. Operations 01 Conduct of Operations 0 General Comments (71J0D l Operations were generally characterized by conservative decisions and actions.

j Operations management and supervisors were frequently observed in the control room, l providing direct oversight of operational activities. Operations personnel werre attentive j to their indications. Communications among operations personnel were generally l

complete and specific.

l- O2 Ops rational Status of Facilities and Equipment l

0 Enaineered Safety Feature System Walkdown (71707) ,

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l comr,onent cooling water system. The system was reviewed using the followino l operating instruction and drawings:

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- Operating Instruction OI-CC-1, " Component Cooling Oystem Normal Operation,"

Revision 32;

. Drawing 11405-M-10, " Component Cooling Water System," and, t

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. Drawing 11405-M-40, " Component Cooling Water System."

The inspectors noted that the observable material condition of equipment and housekeeping were good. All valves were verified to be in the correct position as required by the operating instructio . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ -

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-2-04 Operator Knowledge and Performance 04.1 1Ditiation of Technical Specification Reovired Shutdown Insoection Scooe(71707)

On June 18,1998, the inspectors observed operations personnel perform the necessary functions to begin a plant shutdown required by Technical Specification Observations and Findinos At approximately 4:30 a. m., operations personnel tagged out Diesel Generator 1 for preplanned maintenance. Following shift turnover at 6 a.m., the oncoming operations crew observed that the control room air conditioning did not appear to be cooling properly. Control room temperature was 77'F with the temperature normally maintained at approximately 68'F. At 6:40 a.m. , operations personnel determined that the control (

room Air Conditioning Unit VA-46B was inoperable, due to failure to properly cool the {

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control room. Control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning equipment is considered to be safety-related equipment. Control room Air Conditioning Unit VA-46B was normally powered from Vital Bus 1 A4 with Diesel Generator 2 as a backup power supply. The Technical Specifications allowed one diesel generator to be inoperable as long as all safety-related equipment that utilizes the remaining diesel generator as a backup power supply is operable. Technical Specification interpretation 96-13-01 stated that a system could be considered operable without its normal or emergency power I source available, but not both, if all of its redundant systems, subsystems, trains, components, and devices are operable. With Diesel Generator 1 out of service, and Control Room Air Cond;tioning Unit VA-46B considered inoperablo, Control Room Air Conditioning Unit VA-46A was considered inoperable due to the unavailability of its backup power supply, Diesel Generator 1, and the inoperability of the redundant train, Control Room Air Conditioning Unit VA-468. With both control room air conditioning units inoperable, this placed the plant in Technical Specification 2.0.1, which required the plant to be in Hot Shutdown within 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> The licensee took the following actions:  !

. Immediately began the process to restore Diesel Generator 1 to operable status;

- At 6:40 a.m., notified the NRC operations office of a Technical Specification required shutdown;

• At 8 a.m., began a controlled plant shutdown and made an additiori of boric acid I to the reactor coolant system;

- At 8:15 a.m., made a second addition of boric acid to further reduce power; i

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At 8:28 a.m., declared Diesel Generator Number 1 operable following starting of the diesel to ensure o;erability; and

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Terminated the required Technical Specification shutdow The inspectors observed the above activities and considered them to be accomplished in a controlled and professional manner. Good communication was observed between the licensed senior operator and the shift manager in coordinating the required shutdown and also communicating with maintenance to restore Diesel Generator 1. Also, good communication and control of activities were observed during the performance of the surveillance required to declare the diesel generator operable and with regard to the efforts of the reactor engineer to provide guidance necessary for the power reductio Especially notable was the licensee's plan to commence the required shutdown with additional contingencies planned for quicker power reduction assuming the diesel could i not be declared operable by 8:40 Conclusions I

Operations personnel demonstrated good communication, coordinaEon and control of activities during initiation of a Technical Specification required [ ' ant shutdow Especially notable were the licensee's plan to commence the required plant shutdown and contingency plans for quicker power reductions if Diesel Generator i cub d not ba declared operabl Miscellaneous Operations issues

08.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 50-285/97-003: manual reactor trip due to a l steam line rupture. In April 1997, with the plant operating at 100 percent power, a  !

section of the high pressure turbine fourth stage extraction steam hne ruptured at a large radius elbow, resulting in the control' room operators manually tripping the reacto Several secondary systems in the turbine building were damaged, safety-related systems functioned as required, and the reactor was safely shut down. Issues related to this event were cited in a Notice of Violation issued with NRC Inspection Report 50 285/97-0 I

i The physical cause of the steam extraction line rupture was flow accelerated corrosion.

l It was datermined that over-reliance was plar,ed on one factor, that wear rates for sweeps are typically low, consequently omitting the failed site from previous inspection Consideration of other factors (e.g., industry experience / industry practice) would have resulted in selection of the taWed site for inspection The inspectors verified that the corrective actions, including replacing the affected piping, inspecting / replacing additional piping as needed, and upgrading the erosion corrosion program, were complet _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ -

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11. Maintenance l M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 General Comments Insoection Scope,(62707) l The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work activities: '

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Minor overhaul of Diesel-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-54;

• Replacement of Diesel Generator Number 1 glycol coolant with water;

. Rebuilding of Air Compressor CA-1B; and

. Installation of steam-driven auxiliary feedwater modificatio Observations and Findinas T he inspectors found the conduct of these activities to be thorough. All work observed was performed with the work package present and in activa use. Maintenance technicians were knowledgeable of the tasks assigned. The inspectors frequently observed management personnel and system engineers monitoring job progress and quality control personnel were present whenever required by procedur During this inspection report period, testing on steam-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-10 resulted in an overspeed condition and overpressurization of the auxiliary feedwater piping. Details of this event are discussed in NRC Special Inspection Report 50-285/98-1 Conclusion The maintenance activities observed were conducte', < a controlled manne M1.2 Surveillance Tests !nsoection Scooe (61726)

The inspectors observed all or portions of the following survei!!ance activities:

. IC-ST-DG-0067," Calibration of Emergency Diesel No. 2 Primary Starting Air Pressure," Revision 1; l

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- IC-ST-DG-0052, " Calibration of Diesel Generator No. 2 Primary Starting Air Compressor," Revision 5;

. IC-ST-VA-0033, "18 Month Char.ral Calibration of Containment Hydrogen  ;

Analyzer VA-81B," Revision 5; and )

. OP-ST-DG-0002, " Diesel Generator 2 Check," Revision 2 ,

i Observations and Findings

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Surveillance activities were completed thoroughl j Conclusion The surveillance activities observed by the inspectors were completed in a controlled l manner and in accordance with procedure j M2 Maintenance and Material Conoition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 fleview cf Material Condition Durina P_Jant Tours Insoection Scoce (62707)

i During this inspection period, the inspector performed routine plant tours and evaluated plant material conditio Observations and Findings On June 25,1998, the inspectors observed that additional deficiency tags had been placed on fire protection system piping for the identification of leakage through pin hole leaks in the piping. The inspectors discussed the condition of the fire protection system piping with the system engineer for fire protectio Since July 1997, six fire proioction system piping leaks have been identified by the licensee. Four of these leaks ha,e been identified since March 1998. The inspectors discussed with the system engineer whether there appeared to be an increase in degradation of the fire protection system piping as indicated by the number of leaks identified since March 1998. The engineer stated that the fire protection system was being moriitored and that the following action plan was in effect:

. The fire protection engineer will continue to perform Preventive Maintenance l Order 9803041, which requires a complete walkdown of the fire protection system l 4- and 5-inch piping at 6-month intervals to determine if further erosion / corrosion I of the system is occurring; I

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The preventive maintenance order will be revised to include 2.5-inch piping in the 6-month walkdowns due to recent leakage identified in 2.5-inch piping; and

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Based on the recent determination of two leaks in the plant air compressor room documented in Condition Reports 199800879 and 19980128, monthly inspections for leaks in critical areas of the plant are being conducte The inspectors discussed the schedule for repairing the identified leaks with the fire protection engineer. The fire protection system engineer stated that the six leaks cunently identified were scheduled to be repaired during the week of July 27,1998. The inspectors verified that maintenance work requests had been initiated for these work activitie {

The inspectors also reviewed Engineering Analysis EA-FC-96-009, " Critical Flaw Lengths for Rupture in Fire Protection Piping," dated February 27,1996. This analysis concluded that the observed pitting will only result in piping leakage and that no pipe ruptures are possible by a zipper effect of connecting pit Conclusions The licensee identified six areas of pitung corrosion in the fire protection system piping since July of 1997. The inspectors verified that identified leaks were documented and either repaired or scheduled for repai M8 Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)

M8.1 (Closed) Violation EA 97-280 (01014): Failure to monitor the condition of plant piping systems. This violation involved the failure of the licenses to properly rr.onitor the extraction steam line piping such that internal erosion / corrosion of the piping resulted in a rupture of the main turbine extraction steam pipin The licensee's corrective actions for this violation were reviewed in conjunction with the review and closure of LER 50-285/97-003 (Section 08.1 of this report) and found to be complete.

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-7-Ill. Engineering E1 Conduct of Engineering E1.1 Troubleshooting of Postaccident Samotina System A ccident Seauence Insoection Scone (37551)

The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding a body-to-bonnet leak on the reactor coolant drain tank pump outlet valve during troubleshooting on the postaccident sampling system accident sequenc Observations and Findinos On June 19,1998, a chemistry technician performed a scheduled preventive maintenance order to obtain an accident mode, diluted, grab sample from the postaccident sampling system. The result of the sample analysis was 162 parts per million of boron as compared to approximately 1100 parts per million boron from the latest reactor coolant system sample. System engineering personnel then directed chemistry to seperform the sequence and the result of the second sample was 20 parts per million boron. The accident sequence of the postaccident system was then declared inoperable and troubleshooting activities began to determine why such low boron levels were being obtained. During the troubleshooting activities, the postaccident sampling system accident sequence was performed several times in an attempt to identify the  ;

proble On June 25, during troubleshooting an auxiliary building operator identified a body-to-bonnet leak on reactor coolant drain tank discharge Valva HCV-500A. This was one of the valves in the postaccident sampling system sequence. The licensee then formed an event investigation team to evalcate whether the waste disposal system i piping was overpressurized. The reactor coolant drain tank discharge valve was repaired and design engineering personnel performed an analysis which determined that the pressure the waste disposal piping was exposed to was within design limit precsure j The analysis was reviewed by the inspectors on July 1,199 The event investigation team concluded that either the postaccident sampling system return valve to reactor coolant drain tank Inlet Valve HCV-6743 did not open as required )

or the line going to the reactor coolant drain tank from the postaccident sampling system )

was obstructed. The investigation team also recommended that the liquid accident mode soquences of the postaccident sampling sysem not be performed until pressure protection was installed between the portaccident sampling system and the waste disposal syste At the end of this inspection period, the licensee was continuing efforts to det9rmine whether the postaccident sampling system piping to the reactor coolant drain tank was l

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obstructed. In additicn, an action plan was being developed for installation of pressure protection between the postaccident sampling system and the waste disposal system and future testing to ensure operability of the postaccident sampling system accident sequence. This will be an inspection followup item (50-285/9810-01). Conclusions The postaccident sampling system accident sequence was inoperable for approximately 2 weeks. The licensee continued troubleshooting efforts to identify whether an obstruction existed between the pastaccident sampling system and the waste disposal syste IV. Plant Support R1 Rad!ologica! Protection and Chemistry Controls R1.1 Ipurs of Radiologically Controlled Areas Insoection Scoce (71750)

The inspectors performed routine tours of the radiologically controlled area and observed radiation work practices of plant personnel. The inspectors also performed confirmatory surveys of radiation levels throughout the radiologically controlled are Observations and Findinos During the inspection period, the inspectors observed licensee personnel performing their duties inside the radiologically controlled area. Workers and radiaticn protection j personnel were observed to be obeying all administrative and regulatory requirement l The inspectors performed confirmatory surveys and verified that radiation protection personnel had properly posted radiation areas throughout the radiologically controlled area. Bagged materials were also properly secured and labeled. The inspectors also ;

verified that pii doors required to be locked for the purposes of protecting personnel from I radiation exposure were locked. The inspectors verified that licerisee personnel were I l

aware of the requirements of their radiation work permit I Conclusions i

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l The inspectors concluded that licensee personnel were knowledgeable of the requirements of their radiation work permits. Radiological conditions had been properly posted throughout tha radiologically controlled areas. Workers and radiation protection personnel were observed to be obeying all administrative and regulatory requirements.

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I R8 Miscellaneous Radiological Protection and Chemistry issues R8.1 (Closed) LER 50-285/97-005: improper entry into a high radiation area. On May 30, 1997, an auxiliary building operator signed in on Radiation Work Permit 97-002, which details requirements for routine aaxi!!ary building operations. The auxiliary building operator then obtained an aLNGR, which is a integrating alarming dosimeter required for entry into the radiologically controlled area. The auxiliary operator then relieved the ,

offgoing auxiliary operator and proceeded to perform routine auxiliary building operation Approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> into the shift the auxiliary building operator was relieved so that a offsite requalification physical could be obtained. The auxiliary building operator signed out of Radiation Work Permit 97-002 and returned the ALNOR to its charging rac Upon returning to the plant site following the physical, the auxiliary operator received a I turnover and resumed auxiliary building operator duties. At approximately 1 p.m. the auxiliary operator entered the radiologically controlled area, not realizing he had failed to re-sign Radiation Work Permit 97-002 and obtain an ALNOR. During performance of auxiliary building duties, the auxiliary building operator entered the charging pump valve room to assist in the performance of waste holdup tank level instrument flushes. The charging pump valve room was designated as a high radiation area. After approximately

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10 minutes in the charging pump vdve room, the auxiliary building operator attempted to check his dose on the ALNOR and rsalized that he had failed to sign in on a radiation work permit and was without an ALNOR. The auxiliary building operator immediately i I

exited the high radiation area and informed the shift radiation technician and the shift manager of the situation. The auxiliary building operators estimated dose for the entry was 5 millire The licensee performed the following corrective actions:

. A memorandum was issued by the operations manager to all operations personnel on radiation controlled area entry requirements and expectations for frequently checking dosimetry; )

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. Tiw event was discussed with plant staff during human performaN,e day 1 l

June 11,1997, and

. The individual involved was counts led regarding the importance of self-checking l to ensure radiation requirements are me !

The inspectors concluded that the licennee's corrective actions had been appropriat Failure to comply with Technical Specification 5.11.1 requirement for entry into a high radiation area is a violation. This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation 's be .g treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (50-285/9810-02).

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-10-P5 Staff Training and Qualification in Emergency Preparedness (EP) i l

PS.1 EP Trainina Drill Inspection Scoce (71750)

The inspectors observed operations crew performance in the simulator during a training drill exercise. In addition, the inspectors attended the critique of the training drill and discussed personnel performance with the operations supervisor, Observations and Findinas On June 25,1998, the licensee performed an EP training exercise. The primary focus of the training exercise was in the following three areas:  ;

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. Communications, both two-way and three-way, focused on operations personnel; l

. Dispatching of operations support center personnel in a timely manner to perform j work; and l

. Demonstration of the ability to conduct facility briefings in a timely manne The licensee identified good performance in the areas of operations personnel communications, operations support center personnel response time, and operations l personnel briefings. The licensee identified an area for improvement in that the contro! l room should have requested more involvement from the technical support center and operations support center personnel earlier in the e ent. Nso, setup of the simulator prior to the initiation of the exercise was somewhat .,onfusing to the operations personnel. The emergency planning personnel agreed that this needed improvemen Conclusions The licensee was self-critical in the identification of areas for improvement and performance issues during an emergency planning training exercise. These items included obtaining assistance frorG the technical support center and operations support center per=onnel earlier in the event and operator confusion due to the setup of the simulater prior to initiation of the exercise. The exercise provided valuable training for emergency response personne .

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-11-V. Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to the members of licensee management at the exit meeting on July 6,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings as presente The ine ectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identifie l l

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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee D. Buell, System Engineer J. Chase, Plant Manager R. Clemens, Manager, Maintenance C. Fritts, System Engineer S. Gambhir, Division Manager, Engineering and Operations Support S. Gebers, Manager, Radiation Protection R. Phelps, Manager, Station Engineering C. Sterba, System Engineer INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations IP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations IP 71750 Plant Support Activities IP 92700: On Site LER Review ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSF,D Opened 50-285/9810-01 IFl Troubleshooting of Postaccident Sampling System Accident Sequence (Section E1.1)

Closed 50-285/97-003 LER Manual Reactor Trip Due to a Steam Line Rupture (Section 08.1)

50-285/97-005 LER Improper Entry into a High Rajiation Area (Section R8.1)

EA 97-280 (01014) VIO Failure to Monitor the Condition of Plant Piping Systems (Section M8.1)

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-2-Ooened and GQMid 50-285/9810-02 NCV Improper Entry into a High Radiation Area (Section R8.1)

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