IR 05000285/1998009

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Errata to Insp Rept 50-285/98-09.Correction Due to Errrors on Pages 5 & 13
ML20249C697
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District icon.png
Issue date: 06/25/1998
From:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20249C695 List:
References
50-285-98-09, 50-285-98-9, NUDOCS 9807010054
Download: ML20249C697 (4)


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l selector switch from off nuto to emergency standby. When this occurred the diesel generator started as designed. However, this was not anticipated by operations

 . personne Quality Assurance in Operations 07.1 Licensee Operational Exoerience Review Activities During the inspection period, the inspectors frequently attended licensee morning plant i status meetings which were used to discuss current plant conditions and planned activities for the day. The shift manager chaired these meetings and all managers were
 . present, including the plant manager. The inspectors observed that a good exchange of information regarding plant operations was provided during this meetin In March 1998, the licensee began providing industry operational experience information during the morning plant status meeting. The inspectors found that this information was thorough and gave the licensee valuable insight regarding industry events and notifications. The inspectors determined that the licensee was evaluating and prioritizing ir;dustry operating experience information for possible applicability to the Fort Calhoun Station. The inspectors concluded that the industry operational experience review activities observed were effectiv Miscellaneous Operations issues (92901)

08.1 . (Closed) Unresolved item (URI) 50-285/9805-02: cavitation of Reactor Coolant l Pump RC-3C. On April 2,1998, the inspectors observed operations personnel perform activities related to plant cooldown. Operations personnel were using Operations Procedure OP-3A, " Plant Shutdown," Revision 19, to cool down the plant. - This procedure directed operations personnel to use pressurizer steam temperature to determine actual pressurizer pressure by correlating the pressurizer steam space temperature to a pressure.using steam tables. Operations personnel were using this method to determine reactor coolant system pressure to ensure that they maintained net positive suction head for operating Reactor Coolant Pump RC-3C. Reactor coolant pressure was determined to be 225 psia using the steam table ~ During shift turnover, the oncoming shift manager questioned whether the reactor coolant system pressure was actually 225 psig, since wide-range pressure

 ' instrumentation was indicating reactor coolant system pressure was 100 psig. The oncoming operations personnel determined that reactor coolant system pressure was actually 100 psig and promptly raised the reactor coolant system pressure to 275 psi The inspectors reviewed the licensee's root cause analysis which was used to determine f

why the reactor coolant system pressure was lowered to a point below the required net positive suction head of the reactor coolant pump during plant cooldown. The licensee determined the following:

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    . Conclusions . The licensee's initial evaluation that allowed a platform to be constructed on a cable tray -{

was deficient, in that it did not consider the additional weight of individuals standing on l i' the platform._ When questioned by the inspectors, the licensee performed an additional analysis that concluded that the additional weight did not have an adverse effect on the cable tray E8 ' Miscellaneous Engineering issues (92700) E (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort (LER) 50-285/96-005. Revisions 0.1. and 2: l j inadequate initial construction of tomado venting in safety-related areas. On June 15, 1996, the licensee determined that the tornado venting panels in the auxiliary building were encumbered by various attachments which made the panels incapable of performing their design functio Subsequently, the licensee performed a safety analysis for operability and took the ! following compensatory measures:

  - Removal of all the encumbrances over the tornado vents; l

l - Revisions to Abnormal Operating Procedure-01, " Acts of Nature," to open specific l: doors in the auxiliary building and post appropriate fire watches when a tornado has been sighted or is expected. Additional analysis was completed and I determined that these compensatory actions were not necessary; and l !~ .~ Additional modifications were made to some removable block walls to prevent potential adverse interactions with safety equipment.

L During initial construction, the licensee failed to maintain adequate design control regarJing tornado venting and modifications to the auxiliary building. This resulted in l structures being built on top of the vents which would impede their venting capability.

L This nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as 'a j i noncited violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy i l (50-285/9809-02). l l- [ IV. Plant Suonort

R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls

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R1,1 . Failure to Label Baas of Radioactive Waste rction Scoce (71750) The inspectors followed up on the removal of 15 bags containing radioactive waste from J the containment to the radioactive waste buildin ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -

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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensen J. Chase, Plant Manager R. Conner, Manager, Training S Gambhir, Division Manager, Engineering and Operations Support J. Gasper, Manager, Nuclear Projects S. Gebers, Manager, Radiation Protection R. Jaworski, Manager, Design Engineering  ; R. Phelps, Manager, Station Engineering R. Ridenoure, Supervisor, Station Licensing INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP37551: Onsite Engineering IP 61726: Surveillance Observations l lP 62707: Maintenance Observations IP 71707: Plant Operations

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IP 71750: Plant Support Activities

 . lP 92901 Followup Operations IP 92700 ~ Onsite LER Review ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED Ooened 50-285/9809-01 VIO Cavitation of a Reactor Coolant Pump (Section 08.1)

Closed 50-285/9805-02 URI Cavitation of a Reactor Coolant Pump (Section 08.1) l 50-285/93-005 .LER Inadequate Initial Construction of Tornado Venting (Section E8.1) l Revisions 0,1, and 2 l

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_ - __ __-_ - _ _____ _____---__ _ _ _ ! e , . w Omaha Public Power District yg g g g E-Mail report to T. Frye (TJF) E-Mail report to D. Lange (DJL) E-Mail report to NRR Event Tracking System (IPAS) E-Mail report to Document Control Desk (DOCDESK) E-Mail report to Richard Correia (RPC) ' _l E-Mail report to Frank Talbot (FXT)- bec to DCD (IE01) bec distrib. by RIV: Regional Administrator DRS-PSB DRP Director MIS System Branch Chief (DRP/B) RIV File l

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Project Engineer (DRP/B) Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)

  ' Resident inspector i

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i DOCUMENT NAME:. R:\_FCS\FC809RP.COR To receive copy of docunir.it, Indicate in box: "C" = Copy without enclosures "E" = Copy with enclosures "N" = No copy RIV:DRP/B Q WDJohnson;df -

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6/M/98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY ________ ____________ _ }}