IR 05000285/1998015

Insp Rept 50-285/98-15 on 980727-31.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Testing & Maint,Protected Area Barrier & Detection Aids,Vital Area Barriers & Detection Aids, Security Event Logs & Security Training & Qualifications

ML20236Y149
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	08/06/1998
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236Y146	List: IR 05000285/1998015 ML20236Y144
References
50-285-98-03-01, 50-285-98-3-1, NUDOCS 9808110214
Download: ML20236Y149 (12)

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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

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Docket No.: 50-285 License No.: DPR-40 Report No.: 50-285/98-Licensee: Omaha Public Power District Facility: Fort Calhoun Station Location: Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Ad P.O. Box 399, Hwy. 75 - North of Fort Calhoun Fort Calhoun, Nebraska Dates: July 27-31,1998 Approved By: Blaine Murray, Chief, Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Attachment: Supplementallnformation

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l 9908110214 990906 a PDR ADOCK 05000285

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-2-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Fort Calhoun Station '

NRC Inspection Report 50-285/98-15 This was an announced inspection of the licensee's physical security program. The areas inspected included: testing and maintenance; protected area barrier and detection aids; vital area barriers and detection aids; compensatory measures; security event logs; security training and qualification; and review of previous inspection finding Plant Sucoort

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Performance in the physical security area had improved and was very good. An ,

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excellent security system testing and maintenance program was conducted and properly documented. Effective protected and vital area barriers and detection systems were maintained. The barriers and detection systems provided proper delay and detection to attempted unauthorized entry. Compensatory measures were properly implemented. A very good program for reporting security events was in place. An excellent security training program had been implemented (Sections S2.1, S2.2, S2.3, S2.4, S3.1 and i SS.1).

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-3-l l Report Details l IV. Plant Suonort S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment S Testina and Maintenance Insoection Scooe (81700)

t l The inspector reviewed the testing and maintenance program to determine compliance with the requirements of the security plan.

1- Observations and Findinas The inspector determined through a review of records and interviews with security officers and supervisors that repairs to security equipment were completed in a timely manner. The timely response to repair detection aids, vital area door locks, and access l control equipment, resulted in a low number of compensatory postings.

l l The inspector determined through interviews and a review of records that proper tests l were conducted on the following: closed-circuit television cameras, communications j equipment, metal and explosive detectors, X-ray machines, perimeter microwave zones, protected and vital area barriers and portals, security dedicated power supply system, and security tamper alarms. The testing and maintenance program was excellent, Conclusions An excellent security system testing and maintenance program was conducted and documented. Timely repair of security equipment resulted in a low number of compensatory poatings.

l S2.2 Protected Area Barrier and Detection Aids Insoection Scooe (71750 and 81700)

The inspector reviewed the protected area barrier and detection aids to determine i compliance with the requirements of the physical security plan. The areas inspected L included the features of the protected area barrier and the design and capabilities of the detection aids system.

L Observations and Findinas The inspector conducted a walkdown inspection of a portion of the protected area barrier and determined that the barrier was installed and maintained as described in the physical security plan. Additionally, the inspector determined that the protected crea barrier

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-4-provided penetration resistance to both forced and surreptitious entry and was adequate to ensure delay of a potential adversar The inspector observed the licensee test the protected area perimeter microwave systam. The licensee's tests of the system were performance-based to ensure that system failures were discovered and corrected. The licensee's test of the dual-stacked microwave heads consisted of a hand-waive in front of each of the two microwave heads. This was an acceptable method of testing the operation of each microwave head.

l Section 8.1.1 of the licensee's security plan requires, in part, that weekly function tests of l

the perimeter microwave system be conducted by either walking through or up to each alarmed zone. However, this method of testing was not included in Security Procedure SETP-1A, " Security Equipment and Maintenance," Revision 17. The ir.spector determined that adequate testing was conducted and there were no violations of regulatory requirements. On July 29,1998, the licensee revised this procedure to incorporate this method of testing into their weekly function testing of the perimeter l microwave syste Conclusions Effective protected area barriers and detection systems were maintained. Acceptable function tests of the security perimeter microwave alarm system was conducted.

j However, the inspector identified that a weekly walk-through function test, required by the security plan for most of the microwave alarm zones, was not included in the appropriate security testing procedure. The security procedure was revised to include walk-through testing of this syste S2.3 Vital Area Barriers and Detection Aids

Insoection Scope (81700)

The inspector observed the licensee's vital area barriers and detection aids to determine compliance with the requirements of the physical security plan.

, Observations and Findinas The inspector determined through observation that vital areas were appropriately locked and alarmed, that the vital area barriers were adequate to ensure delay of a potential adversary, and to ensure that unescorted access was limited to authorized personnel.

l The alarm system consisted of balanced magnetic switches at the entry points to the vital areas. The alarms annunciated in continuously manned alarm stations.

l The inspector observed the licensee tect the vital area door locking mechanisms and detection aids. All tests were pr. 9erly conducted, and all attempts to intrude into the vital

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l -5-l areas were detected. The licensse's tests of the vital area detection system were !

l performance-based to ensure that system failures were discovered and correcte l c. - Conclusions 1

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Effective vital area barriers and detection systems were maintained. The barriers and ;

detection system provided proper delay and detection to attempted unauthorized entr j S2.4 Compensatory Measures i a.- Inspection Scope (81700)

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The inspector reviewed the licensee's compensatory measures program to determine ;

compliance with the requirements of the physical security plan. The areas inspected I

included deployment of compensatory measures and the effectiveness of those measure Observations and Findinas l

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! The inspector confirmed through observations that the licensee deployed compensatory l

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measures in a manner consistent with the requirements in the physical security pla The inspector determined through interviews that the security personnel assigned to compensatory security posts were properly traine Conclus.ons

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l Compensatory measures were properly implemented and security personnel were well l trained on the program requirement Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation  !

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a. Inspection Scope (81700) l

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t The inspector reviewed safeguards event logs and security incident reports to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 73.21(b) and (c),10 CFR 26.73, and the physical security pla b. Observations and Findinas l

The inspector reviewed the security event logs from March 1 to June 30,1998. The !

records were available for review and maintained for the time required by regulation The inspector determined that the licensee conformed to the regulatory requirements regarding the reporting of security events. The logs and supporting security incident

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-6-reports were accurate, neat, and centained sufficient detail for the reviewer to determine root causo, deportability, and corrective action take Conclusions A very good program for reporting security events was in place. The security staff was correctly reporting security events. The security incident reports were accurate and nea SS Security and Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification S5.1 Security Trainina and Qualification Insoection Scooe (81700)

The inspector reviewed the licensee's security training and qualification program to determine adequacy and compliance with the requirements of the security training and qualification plan and the contingency pla Observations and Findinas The security organization conducted all required training in accordance with its approved security training and the security contingency plans. The inspector confirmed, by a review of the composite security training records, that the required training was conducted every 12 month The inspector observed security officers during the per'ormance of their duties. All security officers displayed excellent conduct and knowledge of the procedural requirement The inspector reviewed copies of medical examination records for six security officer The medical records were complete and indicated that the required annual medical examinations were thorough and conductw.f in a timely manner. The results of the medical examinations were properly documented. The inspector interviewed security officers and confirmed that the medical examinations were thoroug Conclusions An excellent security training program had beer, implemented. Security personnel were well trained on the program requirements. Medical examinations for security officers were thorough and well documented.

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l l S8 Miscellaneous Security and Safeguards issues (MC 81810,92700,92904)

S (Closed) Insoection Followuo item 285/9712-01: Summarv Description of the Measures to Protect Aaainst a Land Vehicle Bomb

l During a previous security inspection, the inspector determined that the installed vehicle barrier system satisfied regulatory requirements. However, the following features were not documented in the licensee's July 31,1995, summary description of the vehicle barrier system:

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The vital areas that are protected by the vehicle barrier system and the minimum

! standoff distance that exist for each of the vital area That a narrow gravel roadway exists between the chain link fences and the Missouri River and that this feature has been analyzed using the Barrier impact Response Model (BIRM) engineering computer progra That two exterior walls of the security building form part of the vehicle barrier system.

l During this inspection, the inspector verified that the licensee's July 30,1998, letter (No. 98-0096) to the NRC included the above informatio S8.2 (Closed) Insoection Followuo item 285/9712-02: Summary Description of Bomb Blast l

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i During a previous security inspection, the inspector determined that the licensee's July 31,1995, summary description of the measures to protect against a land vehicle

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bomb did not include documentation that the roofs, air intakes, and air exhausts of the required vital area buildings were included in the blast analysis.

During this inspection, the inspector verified that the licensee's July 30,1998, letter (No. 98-0096) to the NRC included the above informatio S8.3 (Closed) Unresolved item 285/9803-01: Licensee's investigation of Backaround investigation File

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l In November 1997, the licensee conducted an internal audit of access authorization files.

l This comprehensive corrective-actior, audit conducted by the Security Department

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included a 100 percent review of active background investigation files for individuals granted unescorted site access. The audit was performed in response to previous NRC enforcement actions and also in response to an earlier Quality Assurance Audit conducted in September 199 NRC Inspection Report 50-285/9803 dated March 27,1998, discussed the results of the licensee's November 1997 internal audit. The inspection report stated that the licensee's

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-8-internal audit had identified eleven failures in background irivestigations files regarding the implementation of the Appendix to Regulatory Guide 5.66 (NUMARC 89-01) )

Consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, the NRC inspection ]

report dispositioned ten of these failures as noncited violation 50-285/9803-02. The 1 remaining failure involved the licensee's identification that an individual's background l investigation file included a notation that the educational institution had been unable to verify his claimed education. This matter had not been previously adjudicated by the  !

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During this inspection, the licensee addressed the remaining failure. This failure was not I previously dispositioned by the NRC due to the licensee's ongoing investigation. The f licensee stated to the inspector that neither the individual nor the licensee had been able to verify the claimed education; however, the individual continued to insist that he.had

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J completed his college degree (as previously claimed) approximately 4 years prior to working at the plant. The licensee also stated that the individual had resigned in May ,

1998 and no longer worked at the site. As a result of the resignation, the licensee stated that the individual's unescorted access had been terminated, and his background investigation file had been annotated to indicate that unescorted access would not be {

reinstated in the future until the education claim could be substantiate ]

l Additionally, during this inspection, licensee management stated to the inspector that if j the required investigation had been performed several years ago, i.e., if it had been 1 previously determined that the claimed education could not be verified, that the individual I would still likely have been granted unescorted access to the plan I License Condition 2.C of the licensee's facility operating license requires, in part, that the licensee maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the commission-approved j physical security plan, including amendments and changes made pursuant to the j authority of 10 CFR 50.54(p). {

Section 6.0 of the licensee's physical security plan stated, in part, that " Individuals

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requiring unescorted access to the protected and vital areas of Fort Calhoun Station shall be authorized such access in accordance with Regulatory Guide 5.66, June 1991, and its appendix, which satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56."

l The Appendix to Regulatory Guide 5.66 (NUMARC 89-01), Section 6.2 (Education History), requires that any claimed enrollment at an educational institution during the i previous five years be verifie )

l The licensee's failure to verify claimed enrollment at an educational institution during the  !

previous 5 years is a violation of Section 6.0 of the physical security plan. This violation was similar to a previous noncited violation identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-285/97-12; however, this violation owurred prior to this enforcement action. Further, ,

this violation was identified by the licensee as part of corrective actions for the previously )

issued noncited violation. Therefore, this nonrepetitive, licensee-identified and corrected

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violation qualifies as a noncited violation consistent with Section Vll.B.1 of the NRC

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Enforcement Policy. Consistent with Revision 1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this noncited violation is e,onsidered part of the previous Noncited Violation 50-285/9803-0 V. Manaa_ ement Meetina_s k X1, Exit Meeting Summary i

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i The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee managemn c the conclusion of the inspection on July 31,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee G. Cavanaugh, Licensing Engineer

, J. Chase, Division Manager, Nuclear Assessments l S. Gambhir, Acting Manager, Nuclear Operations Division D. Grosa, Supervisor, Access Authorization and Security Training B. Hant ner, Supervisor, Station Licensing T. Herman, Senior Lead Auditor, Quality Assurance R. Jaworski, Manager, Design Engineering B. Kindred, Supervisor, Nuclear Security Operations D. Leiber, Supervisor, Security Support Services R. Phelps, Acting Manager, Engineering Division H. Sefick, Manager, Security Services D. Spires, Manager, Quality Assurance and Qt.ality Control J. Solymassy, Manager, Fort Calhoun Station NflG V. Gaddy, Resident inspector I INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED i

! IP 71750 Plant Support Activities i IP 81700 Physical Security Program for Power Reactors IP 92904 Followup - Plant Support LIST OF ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED ltems Ooened None j ltems Closed I

I 50-285/9712-01 IFl Summary Description of the Measures to Protect Against a Land Vehicle Bomb 50-285/9712-02 IFl Summary Description of Bomb Blast Analysis 50-285/9803-01 URI Licensee's Investigation of Background investigation File I i

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l -2 LIST OF DOCUMENTATION REVIEWED Incident Report Logs from March 1 through June 30,1998 Background investigation records for four individuals denied unescorted access authorization Training records for seven security officers I Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station Security incident Reports for 23 events Preventive Maintenance Orderg_fac Weekly security diesel generator test Weekly furiction test of X-ray, explosive detectors and metal detectors Weekly function test of perimeter microwave system l

Weekly performance tests of access control and alarm only doors (zones)

l Quarterly function check of metal detectors t

Quarterly function check of explosive detectors l

Quarterly function check of X-ray machines Quarterly performan" *est of perimeter microwave system j Annual function tc .,:urity tamper alarms l Imolementina Procedures i

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l' Security Administrative Procedure SAP-10," Preparation, Approval and Distribution of Security Plans and Procedures " Revision 4 Security Administrative Procedure SAP-25," Opening / Closing of the Auxiliary Access Portal,"

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Security Administrative Procedure SAP-35, " Reporting Safeguards Events," Revision 1 Security Contingency Procedure SCP-04, " Compensatory Measures," Revision 16 Security Equipment Testing and Maintenance Procedure SETP-1 A, " Security Equipment Testing," Revision 17 l

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-3-I Security Operating Procedure SECOP-01, " Security incident Report and Shift Activity Log,"

Revision 3 Security Operating Procedure SECOP-06, " Personnel Access Control," Revision 15 Security Operating Procedure SECOP-08, " Access Portal Search Equipment,"

Revision 10 i Security Operating Procedure SECOP-14, " Security Patrols," Revision 16 Plant Computer Systems Report Card for Report Period October 1 through December 31,1997

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