IR 05000285/1989017
| ML20244C300 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 06/01/1989 |
| From: | Westerman T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20244C287 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-285-89-17, NUDOCS 8906140204 | |
| Download: ML20244C300 (24) | |
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APPENDIX U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV j NRC Inspection Report: 50-285/89-17 Licensee: OPR-40 Docket: 50-285 Licensee: Omaha Public Power District (OPPD)
1623 Harney Street Om&ha, Nebraska 68102 Facility Name: Fort Calhoun Station (FCS)
t Inspection At: FCS, Blair, Nebraska !
Inspection Conducted: April 1-30, 1989 Inspectors: P. H. Harrell, Senior Resident Inspector T. Reis, Resident Inspector l T. O. McKernon, Reactor Inspector Approved: 2- fr 6 - /'#/
T. F. Westerman, Cnief, Project Section B Date Division of Reactor Projects 1 Inspection Summary i
Inspection Conducted April 1-30, 1989 (Report 50-285/89-17)
i Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including review of j previously identified items; operational safety verification; plant tours monthly maintenance observations; monthly surveillance observations; security observations; radiological protection observations; and in-office review of i g periodic, special, and nonroutine event report i
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Results: Curing this inspection period, the NRC inspectors reviewed the areas
~iH cussed belo The discussion provides an overall evaluation of each are The NRC inspectors reviewed the actions taken by the licensee in response to j previously identified item Based on reviews of'the actions taken by the !
l licensee, it appeared that the licensee had appropriately implemented both the I
short- and long-term actions. to prevent recurrence of the identified problems ;
and concern l l
l During observations of activities and evolutions performed by the operations l staff, the NRC inspectors noted no problems with the performance of the staf SQhg3 PDR ADOCK O PW l l I< _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - - - _ . _ _ - . _ - _ -
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It appeared-that the licensee's operations staff performed their duties in a professional manner to ensure safe plant operation.
L The NRC inspectors performed numerous tours of th'e plant during this inspection period. In prior inspection periods, numerous concerns were identified during plant tours; however, no significant concerns were identified during this inspection period. -It appeared that the licensee has increased the quantity and quality of their tours to identify potential nonconforming items.
L . Maintenance and surveillance activities were observed by the NRC inspectors during this inspection period. During observation of.these activities, the NRC
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inspectors noted that the activities were performed in a. professional manner.
l For those specific activities where anomalies were noted during testing, prompt action was taken by the licensee to ensure that the problem was correcte During observations of the activities and tasks performed by security and health physics personnel, the NRC inspectors noted that these personnel performed their duties in a professional mariner. No observations or conccrns were identified with i,hese activities during this inspection perio l
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DETAIL S Persons Contacted G. Peterson, Manager, Fort Calhoun Station
- L. Kusek, Acting Plant Manager, Fort Calhoun Station J. Adams, Reactor Engineer J. Bobba, Supervisor, Radiation Protectica C. Brunnert, Supervisor, Operations Quality Assurance
- J. Fisicaro, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Industry Affairs R. Garfoot, System Engineer, Toxic Gas Monitors J. Gasper, Manager, Training J. MacKinnon, Acting Division Manager, Production Engineering Division
- R. Jaworski, Manager, Station Engineering J. Kecy, Supervisor, System Engineering
- F. Kenney, Supervisor, Access Authorization Programs
- J. Lechner, Senior Design Engineer D. Lieber, Supervisor Security Operations
- D. Lovett, Supervisor, Radiological Protection Operaticas
- T. Mathews Station Licensing Engineer
- D. Matthews, Supervisor. Station Licensing K. Miller, Supervisor, Maintenance
- W. Orr, Manager Quality Assurance / Quality Control
- R. Phelps, Manager, Design Engineering A. Richard, Manager, Quality Assurance and Quality Control R. Ronning, System Engineer, Emergency Diesel Generators
- C Simmons, Station Licensing Engineer F. Smith, Plant Chemist
- M. Tesar, Supervisor, Technical and General Employee Training D. Trausch, Supervisor, Operations S. Willrett, Supervisor, Administrative Services
- Denotes attendance at the monthly exit intervie The NRC inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including operators, technicians, and administrative personne . Plant Status During this inspection period, the licensee operated the plant at approximately 100 percent power. On April 18, 1989, power level was reduced to 95 percent so that a steam leak could be repaired on Feedwater Heater 5 Power was returned to 100 percent on the same da On April 28, 1989, a power reduction was commenced at a rate of 5 percent per hour to place the plant in Mode 2 (hot standby). The power reduction was initiated for the performance of a main turbine overspeed trip test, maintenance (replacement of insulators and ground wires on power poles) on the 161-kV offsite power distribution system, and performance of a l
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4 i full-flow test on the auxiliary feedwater pumps. At the end of this inspection period, the plant remained in Mode . Review of Previously Identified Items (92701 and 92702) (Closed)OpenItem 285/8823-02: Resolution of the discrepancy between the Updated Specifications Safety (TS) for the rmy Analysis water RW)Rep (ort (USAR) and the Technical pump This item involved a discrepancy between the USAR and the TS with respect to the flow provided by the RW pumps. The USAR states that two RW pumps are required to supply sufficient flow to shut down the plant; whereas, the TS required that only one RW pump be operabl To address this discrepancy, the licensee submitted 6 request for amendment of the TS to the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR). The request proposed that the operability statement for the RW pumps be changed to reflect the flow requirements needed to shut down the plant.
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On April 14, 1989, NRR issued Amendment 120 to the TS. The amendment char.ged the operability requirements of the RW pumps. Based on
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issuance of the amendment, this item is considered close (Closed) Severity Level IV Violation 285/8823-03: Ion exchange resin improperly stored in Room 6 Section 3.3 of the Updated Fire Hazards Analysis (UFHA) and Section 3.3.1 of Procedure 50-G-6, " Housekeeping," state in part, s
that unused ien exchange resins should be ::tored in an area protected by an automatic detection sprinkler installation. The NRC inspector noted that during Jul.y 1988, the licensee stored eight barrels of unused ion exchange resin in Room 69 which does not have a sprinkler system installe .
The licensee admitted to the violation and cited a delay in a resin
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fill evolution and unfamiliarity of operations personnel with the requirements of the UFHA regarding resin storage as causes for the I
violation.
l As inmediate corrective action, upon notification of the condition, i the licensee removed only a portion of the resin. The licensee )
stated this action was based on a review of the UFHA for Fire j Zone 20.7. Section 5.2 of the UFHA for Fire Zone 20.7 contains a list of allowable transient combustible levels for Room 69 which includes 1000 pounds of unused resin. The engineer responding was not aware of the inconsistency which existed in the UFl.A in that Section 3.3 implied that all resin should be stored in an area protected by automatic detection sprinkler system. Further, he was ,
not aware the requirement was reiterated in Procedure 50-G-6. After l a followup conversation with the NRC inspector the following day, j
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.y which uncovered the inconsistencies, the remaining resin was, removed Id' and. properly store ,-
To prevant recurrence'of the, situation, the licensee committed-to perform tne following:
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L '(1) . Change the wording-of Procedure S0-G-6 to reflect that unused-- t resin "shall"' be stored in an area protected by a sprinkler- >
system versus "should".
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(2)- Revise the UFHA to resolve the' inconsistency between
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Sections 5.2 and (3) Revise Procedure 50-G-6 to include a mechanism fo *
. identification of special requirements' pertaining to combustibl materials storage.and use and to resolve any conflicts with the
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(4) Maintain a controlled copy of the UFHA in the control room and train all operations personnel on its content.'
The NRC inspector. reviewed the major rewrite to Procedure 50-G-6, which was issued on March 24, 1989. In addition to specifically
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addressing' the requirements for storage of unused resin,,the revision expands on housekeeping deficiencies in relation to fire protection and industrial' safety concerns. It appeared the licensee had
, provided a mechanism for identification of special requirements pertaining to combustible materials storage and-us =The NRC inspector. verified that the licensee had revised the UFHA to resolve the discrepancy between SectionsL5.2.and 3.3. 'This was *
accomplished by rewriting Section 3.3 to read that unused ion resi L is to be stored-in an' area protected by an automatic <1etection - <
suppression system:unless the presence of the resin is snalyze This revision was issued inLSeptember 1988. The NRC inspector
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verified'that a controlled copy of the UFHA is maintained in the i control roo it appeared,that the = corrective actions taken by the licensee should preclude recurrence of improper storage of unused resin if procedural adherence.is followed. Based on the above, this violation is considered close ' '(C1'osed) Open Item 285/8836-01: Installation of test tees for
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instrument air'(IA) accumulator assemblie ' This item involved a problem encounteredD' y the licensee during testing of the check valve for the IA accumulator assembly for Valve YCV-1045A. The testing identified that the check valve was leaking due to a sliver of metal lodged between the seat and dis The licensee determined that the sliver was from a compression
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fitting that was routinely disconnected and reconnected to perform the monthly surveillance tes To resolve this problem, the licensee installed a test tee with a valve upstream of the check valve. The valve is used to bleed the air pressure off the supply line upstream of.the check valve in lieu of disconnecting the compression fittin To address the generic aspects of this problem, the licensee has installed test tees and valves upstream of the check valves for all IA accumulators that are tested quarterly, except for the accumulator assembly for Valve HCV-712A. Yalve HCV-712A is installed in the ventilation system for the spent fuel pool and serves to place the high-efficiency filter in service whenever fuel is being moved in the spent fuel pool. The valve fails as is on the loss of instrument air pressur Procedure OP-11, " Reactor Core Refueling Procedure," was issued to require that Valve HCV-712A be placed in the filtering position prior i to fuel movement. Based on the established administrative controls for valve positioning, the licensee determined that the accumulator assembly is not required to be teste The NRC inspector toured the plant to verify that test tees and valves had been installed for the appropriate accumulator assemblie The NRC inspector reviewed Procedure OP-11 to verify that adequate administrative controls had been established for Valve HCV-712A. No problems were noted during the review d. (Closed) Severity Level IV Violation 285/8846-03: Failure to properly post radiation area In October 1988, the NRC inspector identified a concern where a new type of tag employed by the licensee to identi'y hot spots, or localized areas of intense radiation, could only be identified on one side. It is common practice to hang the tags and, therefore, the potential existed for an individual to be close to a hot spot and not realize it. The licensee promptly responded to this concern by revising Procedure VII-9-25, " Radiation Hot Spot Verification / Update,"
to provide instructions that all free-har.ging hot spot tags shall be identifiable from either sid On December 2 and 6,1988, the NRC inspector noted the licensee failed to install hot spot tags that could be identified from either side in that six hot spot tags in the auxiliary building could only be identified from one sid In response, the licensee admitted the violation as stated and cited failure of radiation protection supervisors to follow Procedure VII-9-25 and insufficient training on the procedure
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f revision as reasons for the violation. To prevent reoccurrence of the I violation, the licensee has taken the following corrective actionst (1) Surveyed the auxiliary building hot spot postings and corrected them, where necessar (2) Had radiation protection supervisors review Procedure VII-9-25 to ensure understanding of the requirement (3) Trained all field health physics personnel on the procedural requiremen (4) Modified the unused reserves of hot spot tags to ensure the tags are two side The NRC inspector reviewed training records to verify all health physics personnel had received instruction on the requirements of Procedure VII-9-25. Additionally, the NRC inspector toured the auxiliary building on numerous occasions and had not noted any repeat occurrences of inadequate posting of hot spot Based on the training of the health physics personnel and the continuing licensee management emphasis on strict procedura adherence, it appeared the licensee had taken appropriate corrective actions to prevent recurrence of the violatio e. (Closed) Severity Level IV Violation 285/8903-01: Lack of drawing control for temporary modifications (TMs).
The basis for this violation was that the licensee did not have a process to ensure transmittal of system design changes made by TMs to the control room drawings, utilized by the plant operations staff, in a timely manner, The licensee admitted to the violation as stated and cited inadequacy of Procedure 50-0-25, " Temporary Modification Control," as the reason i for the violation. Procedure 50-0-25, Revision 26, that was in effect at the time of the violation, did not specify the actions to be taken to update the control room drawings uhen a TM was installe As itamediate corrective action, the licensee performed a review of all existing TMs and updated the control room drawings to reflect the installation of the TMs. This task was accomplished prior to leaving Mode 5 (refueling shutdown) during the January 1989 plant startu To preclude future violations, the licensee issued a revision to Procedure 50-0-25. The procedure provided specific instructions to be taken during the evaluation and verification processing of the temporary modification control form (Form FC-66) to provide updating i of the control room drawing (s) when a TM is to be installed in the j fiel _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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r The NRC inspector reviewed the revision and found that it assigned
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responsibility for control' room dradin2 revision (s) to the system i engineer. The instructions were clear and specific and, if followed, will ensure that drawings used by the operations department accurately reflect the as-built condition of the plan The NRC inspector reviewed Form FC-66. This form is'used to request, describe, evaluate, review, and facilitate installation and restoration of TMs. It was found that the form had been revised to require verification from the system engineer that the control room drawing (s) affected by the TM had been appropriately marke The NRC inspector examined the control room drawings on a sampling basis and that found the drawings currently reflect the TMs installed in the plant. The NRC inspector discussed the newly implemented drawing markup program with several operatcrs. All operators indicated the new system was helpful and not burdensom The NRC inspector was concerned that there was no evidence of training having been conducted on the various responsibilities assigned by the implementation of the revision to Procedure S0-0-25. The NRC inspector discussed this with the Supervisor, System Engineering, who indicated that he was aware of this weakness. He indicated tha*. he was committed to providing training on the revision of .
Procedure 50-0-25 as a result of weaknesses identified by the NRC Operational Safety Team Inspectiori, documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-285/88-20 Based on the implementation of the revisions to Procedure 50-0-25 and Form FC-66, and the review of marked-up control room drawin95, it appeared the licensee had taken adequate corrective action to ensure that inforination concerning field changes was appropriately transmitted to the control room drawing (s) for use by operaticas personnal. The issue of formal training on the requirements of Procedure 50-0-25 will be addressed during review of the licensee's i respcnse to Unresolved Item 285/88201-05 of NRC Inspection Report 50-285/88-201. This violation is considered closed, f. (Clo ed) Open Item 285/8903-08: A loop seal for a pressurizer code safety valve was not established during plant startu This open item was identified due tc the problems encountered by the licensee in establishing a loop seal during plant startup from the 1988 refueling outage. The loop seal was not established is the piping between a pressurizer code safety valve (RC-141) and the j pressurizer. In addition, during the plant startup, 'i61ve RC-141 .
experienced weeping problems that caused a high temperature indication on the safety valve tailpip The licensee performed an exter.viye review to detentine why a loop seal was not formed during startup. Tne licensee's review did not
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-1 firmly establish the reason that a loop seal was not fcnned. The i licensee aid determine that new insulation was installed en the loop
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seal piping during the refueling outage. The licensee reviewed the design documentation and determined that insulation should be installed on the piping and determined that the presence of the insulation should not affect tne capability of establishing a loop sea {
During plant startup, the licensee identified a problem that caused plant heatup to be halted. The problem was with the expansion bellows on the main steam line. It was determined that, should the bellows rupture, the steam impingement could cause a failure of the concrete base mat located directly beneath the main steam line. The details of the bellows problem is discussed in paragraph 14.d of NRC Inspection Report 50-285/89-03. At the time the problem was identified, the plant heatup was halted and the plant conditions held at a reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature of approximately 300'F until the bellows design modification was installed. The design modification took approximately 3 days. The licensee stated that-they felt that the most probable cause of the failure to form a loop seal was due to stopping the normal plant heatu The licensee performed an evaluation to determine if Valva RC-141 was weeping or simmering. Used in this content, weeping is a condition where the valve is leaking by the seat, and simmering is considered to be a condition where the valve is at, or near, its setpoint and is an indication that the valve is ready to lift. Based on the evaluation, the licensee stated that the valve appeared to be weepin In di cussions with the valve manufacturer, the licensee determined that uneven heating of the valve disc could occur if a loop seal is not present. The uneven heating of the disc can cause disc warpage whicn will cause small amounts of steam to be passed through tne valv The licensee revied the insulation en the loop seal piping; reestablished the loop seal, and reinstalled the insulation. Since the loop seal hds been established, no additional problems have been note i The NRC inspector reviewed the actions ta bn by the licensee. The actions appeared to adequately address the problem uf weeping of Valve RC-141. The NRC inspector will monitor the next plant startup l, to verify proper operatioh oiF the pressurizer code safety valves.
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Based on the discussion provided above, this item is closed, (Closed) Unresolved Iteo 285/8909-07: Seismic qualification of the eyewash supply lin This item involved a concern that the water supply line for the eyewash stations located in the battery rooms was act seismically qualified. The lack of qualification of the line established the
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possibility that the line could fail and spray water on the station batteries. The water spray could potentially affect the operability of the batterie 'In NRC Inspection Report 50-285/89-09, it.was stated that the
. licensee would perform a seismic calculation to verify the installation of the eyewash supply!1ine. The inspection report also stated that the calcul_ation would be forwarded to NRR for revie Subsequent to the issuance of this unresolved item, a discussion was ;
held between the licensee, the NRP.' project manager, and the NRC inspector. During this discussion, it was decided that the licensee would make changes _to the appropriate _ procedure to control the water supply to the eyewash stations in lieu of performing a seismic i- calculatio The licensee revised Procedure ST-DC-1, " Station Batteries," to provide instructions to open the eyewash supply valve when battery surveillance' testing is performed and shut the valve when testing has been completed. l Procedure ST-DC-1 is the only licensee procedure that provides instructions for battery testing where the potentiEl exists for the use of the eyewash station. This approach will ensure that.the eyewash stations are available when personnel are working in the battery rooms but ensures that the water supply is secured when the battery rooms are unoccupie The NRC inspector reviewed the revision to Procedure ST-DC- Based on this review, it appeared that the licensee adequately addressed the concerns related to the water supply for the eyewash station No violations or deviations were identifie < Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The NRC inspectors conducted reviews and observations of selected activities to verify that facility operations were performed in conformance with the requirements established under 10 CFR, the licensee's administrative procedures, and the TS. The NRC inspectors made several l control room observations to verify the following: J Proper shift staffing was maintaired and conduct of control room personnel was appropriat Operator adherence to approved procedures and TS requircnents was eviden Operability of re ctor protective system, engineered safeguards equipment, and the safety parameter display system was maintaine If not, the' appropriate TS limiting condition for operation (LCO) was me _ __-____ -
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. 11 Logs, records, recorder traces, annunciators, panel ~indicat' ions, and switch positions complied with'the appropriate requirement *
Proper return to service of components was performe Maintenance orders (MO) were initiated for equipment in need of
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. . Management personnel toured the control room on a regular basi *
Control room access was properly controlle _ Control room annunciator status was reviewed to verify operator
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-awareness of plant condition Mechanical and electrical temporary modification logs were properly maintaine Engineered safeguards systems were properly aligned for the specific plant conditio During this inspect.on period, the NRC.inspectar reviewed the following items: On April 11, 1989','during the performance of operator license examinations by license examiners from the NRC Region IV office, it was noted that Procedure 01-CI-1, " Safety Injection-Nnrmal Operation," appeared to be inadequate in that the procedure could not be performed as written. The operator was simulating the performance of an evolution to drain and refill the safety injection tank (SIT).
Step 3 of Procedure 01-LI-1 stated that the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump shall be. started. Step 5 of the procedure stated that the HPSI pump started in Step 4 should be stopped. The procedure could not be performed as written since the pump was started in Step .The NRC license examiner was concerned since he was aware that the evolution of draining and refilling the SIT' had occurred twice on the previous operating shift and did not believe that a procedure change had been initiated to correct the erroneous information contained in 1 Step 5. It appeared that operations' personnel were not complyt with procedures as written, and were not initiating changes to correct the errors in procedures. The NRC license examiner's concerns were relayed to the NRC inspecto The N'RC inspector. discussed this concern with operations personnel to determine why procedures were not being corrected. During these discussions, the following co7cerns were iaentified by operations personnel:
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'(i) The licensee.is'in the process of upgrading all safety-related procedures by completely rewriting and reissuing them. The procedure upgrade program is being performed by a procedures upgrade group which is part of Project 199 The operations personnel were under the impression that they -
were not to change any procedures until the upgraded procedure '
had bean issued. They felt that they were to use the existing procedure until the new one was issued because only the procedures upgrade group could make change (2) The operators had previously attempted to prcivide procedural changes to the procedures upgrade group and the changes were rejecte In one example cited by an operator, he took the initiative to revise a seldomly used procedure to reflect the actual way the evolution was performed, had the procedure reviewed by his peers to verify accuracy, and submitted the
procedure change to the procedures upgrade group. The operator stated that the group refused to issue the procedure revision since they weren't working on that particular procedure at the time. After the operator sternly insisted that the procedure be revised, the group issued the procedure chang The NRC inspector discussed the above concerns with licensee
' managemen In response to these concerns, the plant manager issued a memorandum, on April 18, 1989, to all control room personnel. The memorandum stated that it appeared operations personnel were frustrated with the procedure upgrade process and the operators feel that interim upgrades to procedures are not encouraged while the upgrade process is proceeding. The memorandum added that procedural input to the upgrade process by operations ~ personnel is l@ly valued and that if a procedure cannot be performed as written, then the appropriate on-the-spot change must be mad Although n9 specific reasons or procedural requirements could be identifiad by the NRC inspector as to why operations personnel could not make on-the-spot changes, the corcerns discussed above are considered a probum since operations pusonnel perceive that they are not allowed te change procedures. It appears that the memorandum issued by the plant manager addressed the proble The NRC inspector perfermed a followup review to determine whether or not a change was made te Procedure 01-SI-1 on April 11, 1989. The NRC inspector noted that a procedure change had been made to correct Step 5 but could not establish the exact time when the on-the-spot change was mad The NRC inspectors will continue to review the performance of evolutions to verify that operation of plant equipment, maintenance activities, performance of surveillance tests, and other proceduralized activities are being performed in accordance with written instructions.
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13 Throughout this inspection period, the licensee experienced problems maintaining the boron concentration in SIT SI-6C. There are two check valves installed in series between the SIT and the RCS. The check valves had been leaking, causing coolant from the RCS to leak into Tank SI-6C. This small leakage (estimated by the licensee to be 0.1 gallons per minute) caused the dilution of the boric acid solution in SIT SI-6C, since the boric acid concentration in the RCS is lower than the concentration in the tank. The RCS boron concentration was approximately 1100 parts per million (ppm);
whereas, the concentration in the tank is maintained above 1800 pp Due to tha check valve leakage, the concentration in the tank dropped to as low as approximately 1820 pp To increase the boron concentration in SIT SI-6C, the licensee has been draining the tank and then refilling the tank with boric acid solution from the safety-injection and refueling water tank (SIRWT)
using a HPSI pump. The boric acid concentration in the SIRWT is normally maintained around 1900 pp Due to dilution of the boron concentration in SIT SI-6C, the licensee had to drain and refill the tank on four occasions during this inspection period. Each time SIT SI-6C was drained, the licensee entered a 1-hour TS LCO. To avoid repeated entry into the LCO, the licensee developed and implemented an alternate means of adding boric-acid to the tank. As provided by the instructions in Procedure SP-SITFILL-1, " Injection of Concentrated Boric Acid Into Safety Injection Tar.k SI-6C " attached to MO 892537, the licensee added boric acid solution directly to SIT SI-6C via the tank sampling line. A portable pump and barrel of boric acid solution was transported into containment and the solution was pumped into the tank. A sample was taken and the resulting solution was approximately 3300 ppm. The licensee sparged SIT SI-6C with nitrogen, resampled, and determined that the concentration was approximately 2040 ppm. The evolution was performed without any problem Prior to performing the filling of SIT SI-6C, the licensee generated a 10 CFR Part 50.59 evaluation to address this evolution. The evaluation concluded that the evolution did not involve an unreviewed safety questio The NRC inspector reviewed Procedure SP-SITFILL-1 and the 50.59 evaluation to verify compliance with the appropriate regulations. No problems were noted during the review The licensee has experienced problems with maintaining the toxic gas monitors (TGM) in an operational condition due to recurring anomalies
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with the monitors. An-instrumentation and control (I&C) technician was attempting to repair the TGMs and alertly noted that the booster pumps (a pump installed for each monitor that takes a suction from the roof sample point and discharges to the suction of the monitor pump)hadnotpreviouslybeentestedtoverifythepumpflowrat The licensee issued Procedures CP-6286A-M, " Hydrogen Fluoride Monitor A;," CP-6286B-M, " Hydrogen Fluoride Monitor B;," CP-6288A-M,
" Chlorine Monitor A." and CP-6288B-M, " Chlorine Monitor B;" to provide instructions for testing the booster pumps. The test results indicated that the flow rate was approximately 4.5 liters per minute; whereas, the acceptance criteria required a minimum flow rate of 6.5 liters per minut Based on the low flow of the booster pumps, the TGMs were declared inoperable. At the time of discovery of the problem, the control room ventilation system was in the 100 percent recirculation mod TS 2.22 requires that any time both channels of the TGMs are inoperable, the control room will be in full recirculation. The ventilation was in recirculation because the TGMs were out of servic The licensee replaced the booster pumps with like-for-like replacements and reperformed the flow rate test. The pumps successfully passed the tes Due to the reduced flow rate, it could not be determined whether or not the TGMs could meet the design basis acceptance criteria for response time. The lower flow rate causes the response time to increase. The licensee is currently performing an evaluation to determine if the response time is within the specified limit. This item remains unresolved pending the completion of the evaluation by
~the licensee. (285/8917-01)
No violations or deviations were identifie . Plant Tours (71707)
The NRC inspectors conducted plant tours at various times to assess plant and equipment conditions. The following items were observed during the tours:
- General plant conditions, including operability of standby equipment, were satisfactor *
Equipment was being maintained in proper condition, without fluid leaks and excessive vibratio * Valves and/or switches for safety-related systems were in the proper positio _ - - _ - - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . - _ - _ . _ .
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Plant housekeeping and cleanliness practic 4 were observed, including no fire hazards and the control of combustible materia ,
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Performance of. work activities was in accordance with approved
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Portable gas cylinders were properly stored to prevent possible missile hazard *
Tag-out of equipment was performed properl *
Management personnel toured the operating spaces on a regular basi During a tour of the plant on April 21,, 1989, the NRC inspector noted considerable vibration on the 1-inch piping from each main steam line below the high pressure turbine to Valves MOV-CV-2, MOV-CV-4. SPDV-3, and SPDV-4. The concern was brought to the attention of the secondary systems lead engineer. On April 24, 1989, a memorandum was generated from system engineering to design engineering requesting analysis of the conditio The NRC inspector noted-that the steam lines in question are not safety grade but their failure could cause a challenge to safety systems. The concern is considered an open item pending review of input from design engineerin (285/8917-02)
No violations or deviations were identifie ' Monthly Maintenance Observations (62703)
The NRC inspectors observed selected station maintenance activities on-safety-related systems and components to verify that the maintenance was conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory requirements, and the TS. The following items were considered during observations;
The TS LCOs were met while systems or components were removed from service.
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Approvals were obtained prior to iisitiating the wor *
Activities were accomplished using approved MOs and ware inspected, as applicabl *
Functional testing and/or calibrations were performed price to returning components or systems to servic *
Quality control records were maintaine *
Activities were accomplished by qualified personne * Parts and materials used were croperty certified.
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Radiological and fire prevention controls were implemente The NRC inspectors observed the following maintenance activities:
Repair of an oil leak on the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump '
(M0892354)
Troubleshooting the reason Emergency Diesel Generator for the (EDG) fuel 1 not oil transfer pumping pump)on (M0 892L87
Troubleshooting digital outputs for sequential permissives used in I the rod drive system resulting from conflicts between software and !
hardware contact states (M0 892457)
Repair of a clogged raw water strainer (MO 891921)
Erection of scaffolding in the station battery rooms (M0 892421)
A discussion of each item is provided below: On April 12, 1989, the NRC iaspector observed licensee personnel repair an oil leak on the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (FW-10)inaccordancewithM0892354. It was initially reported that the leak rate was approximately 0.5 pints every 20 minutes and the oil was leaking through en oil sightglas The licensee investigated and noted that the sightglass for monitoring the oil flow to the governor for Pump FW-10 was cracked and was leaking. The personnel performing the maintenance estimated the actual leak rate to be approximately 20 drops per minute. f.fter discussions with the pump manufacturer, the licensee discovered that the oil adjustment knob was incorrectly set. The licensee found the knob to be fully open. The knob should have been set i'or a flow rate of five drops per minute. The licensee adjusted the knob and the oil leak stopped, Based on the observations of the NRC inspector, it appeared that the licensee personnel performed this maintenance activity in a professional manner. The maintenance personnel also checked the remainder of the oil system for leaks and found none. The NRC inspector also noted that the system engineer was present during the performance of the maintenance to provide guidance to the maintenance personnsl. After the maintenance was completed, Puap FW-10 was run to verify satisfactory operatio During the performance of t'n e surveillance test on EDG 1, the lkensee noted that it did not appear that a fuel oil transfer pump (FT-2) was operating properly. The licensee issued MD 892187 to investigate the caus Maintenance personnel performed troubleshooting activities on Pump FT-2 to determine why the pump would not properly establish
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fl ow. The craftsmen disassembled the strainer on the pump suction to verify that the strainer was not clogged. The strainer was nct clogged; however, the craftsmen poted that it appeared that a threaded pipe elbow connected to the strainer was loose. The loose fitting could have been a potential cause of the prcblem since air ney have leaked into the syste After tightening the piping elbow and reinsta' ling the stra'ner, the licensee tested Pump FT-2 and verified that the pump operated properly by performance of the surveillance tes During review of this problem, the NRC inspector noted that the licensee has agreed, in a letter dated March 24, 1989, to include the fuel transfer pumps for both EDGs in the inservice testing (IST)
program. In the letter, the licensee stated that procedural implementation of the IST requirements would be completed by November 198 The licensee reviewed the portion of Procedure ST-ESF-6 that is used to verify operability of the EDG fuel oil transfer pumps. The licensee noted that the guidance for determination of operability could be. enhanced. The licensee stated that Procedure ST-EST-6 would be revised to provide improved guidanc The NRC inspector reviewed Procedure ST-ESF-6 and noted that it appeared that the procedure was adequate as written, but concurs that additional information would improve the procedure, c. On April 17, 1989, the NRC inspectcr observed licensed operators performing a power reduction in order to take Feedwater Heater SB of f line to repair a steam leak. During the reduction from 100-percent ;
to 95-percent power, with power et 98 percent, Control Element Assembly (CEA) Groups 2 and 3 inserted simultaneously with Group 4 control rods while in the manual sequertial mode of operation. All three groups were inserted to 124 inches from 126 inche Operations noted the improper sequencing immediately and stopped control rod manipulations. Operations then switched to manual individual mode and withdrew Group 2 and 3 rods to 126 inche Group 4 rods were later inserted to 122 inches for maintenance of axial shape index using the manual individual mod The reactor engineer and I&C personnel were promptly summoned to investigate the problem. I&C personnel found that digital outputs for the sequential permissives used in the control rod drive circuits
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contained conflicts between the software status displayed and the actual state of hardware contacts. The contacts were in a closed
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state when the software indicated that they were open. The cause of l the discrepancy between the computer output signal and the hardware status was not known. As immediate action I&C personnel cler. red the permissive contacts which had allowed Groups 2 and 3 to travel with
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Group 4. Operations performed an operability check an.i found that
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Groups 2 and 3 no longer traveled with Group 4. The above was y accomplished within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> following the occurrenc Tae lead electrical engineer initiated an emergency software service request to have the programming department install a patch'in the coftware to enable the computer to capture the differences in digital output states between the. software and hardware. Additionally, 60 892457 was issued for any herdware repair that may be necessary, as well ar to provide postmaintenance testing instruction On April 18, 1989, tha computer system department inserted a monitoring program in the rod supervisory sensing system to monitor any mismatches between digital output and actual hardware status and l
to display alarms. The work was performed under Emrgency Software Service Request 89-ERF-007 and the program was tested by Verification and Validation Test Plan YNV-R555-02.00B. The NRC inspector m viewed l these completed documents and found no problem On April 21, 1989, shift technical advisors perfcrmed Procedure ST-CEA-1, " Monthly Test of Power Dependent Insertion Limits, Deviation, and Sequence Monitoring System."- This was the
. formal postmaintenance test for return to service of the manual sequential mode of operation. The NRC inspector reviewed the-completed test document and noted no problem The NRC inspector was in the control room for the majority of the occurrence and noted the following positive attributes on the part of the plant staff:
(1) Immediate operator recognition and recovery from a potential significant proble (2) Rapid response from I&C, engineering, computer systems, and plant management to support operation (3) Efficient determination of an operability concer I (4) Quick identification of the cause of the problem by skilled technician Overall, the staff's professional actions resulted in a skiiled, safe, and indepth recovery from a significant problem. The NRC inspector noted one weakness that existed throughout the even Immediately after identification of the problem, operations demonstrated operability of the CEAs by exercising them in the manual individual mode. However, from the time of the event on April 17, 1989, until the completion of the postmaintenance test on April 21, 1989, there existed a question of operability of the manual sequential mode of CEA operation. Therefore, the CEA mode selector switch should have been caution tagged to identify the problem. This 1
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was not done. However, subsequent operations shif ts were notified of the condition via formal operations correspondence and the shift turnover lo ' On April 19, 1989, the NRC inspector witnessed portions of maintenance being performed on raw water pump discharg a Strainer AC-128. The strainer was taken out of service' because excessive backpressure indicated clogging. The work was authorized by MO 891921. The NRC inspector verified that AC-12B was properly tagged out prior to being released to the maintenance departmen The NRC inspector also.noted the licensee had entered a TS 24-hour shutdown LC0 for repair of the straine The NRC inspector witnessed maintenance personnel remove a damaged air-operated backwash valve and replace it with a manual ball valve to attempt to backwash the strainer down to an acceptable backpressure. However, this approach was not used because operations persormel were concerned that the backwash line could not be isolated after flushing in order to reir. stall the original air-operated, bladder-type valve. Therefore, tne air-operated valve was expeditiously repaired, reinstalled, and the strainer was successfully backwashed approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> prior to the expiration of the 24-hour LC On April 27, 1989, the NRC inspector noted that painting had begun in the station battery rooms as part of the continuing facilities upgrade progra It was noted that a substantial wooden-frame protective covering had been erected in each of the two battery rooms .l to prevent contact with the battery teminals while paint was being applied to the interior surfaces of the room During revicw of MO 892421, the NRC inspector determined that the licensee had properly designed the protective cover and generated a 10 CFR Part 50.59 evaluation prior to constructing the cover. The erection of scaffolding in areas where safety-related equipment is
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located, without the performance of a safety analysis, had been a recurring problem at the FC To address the recurring problem, the licensee proceduralized the erection of all scaffolding. It appeared that the licensee had reestablished control over the erection of scaffolding.
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No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly o Surveillance .0 observations (61726)
The NRC inspectors observed selected portions of the performance of the TS-required s. surveillance testing on safety-related systems and component The NRC inspectors verified the following items during the testing:
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Testing was performed by qualified personnel using approved procedure Test instrumentation was calibrated.
l The TS LCOs were me Removal and restoration of the affected system and/or component were accomplishe Test results conformed with TS and procedure requirements.
l Test results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the tes Deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne i
! Test was performed on schedule and complied with the TS required frequenc The NRC inspectors observed the following surveillance test activitie The procedures used for the test activities are noted in parenthesis:
Monthly test of EDG 1 (ST-ESF-6)
Monthly test of Channel B of the safety-injection actuation signal (ST-ESF-2)
Monthly test of the containment spray logic (ST-ESF-4)
Monthly test of the recirculation actuation logic (ST-ESF-13)
Full-flow test of the auxiliary feedwater water pumps (SP-FW-11)
A discussion of each surveillance observed 'is provided below: On April 5, 1989, the NRC inspector observed-the monthly testing of EDG 1. The NRC inspector noted that the testing was performed in accordance with the procedure, as written, and was performed in a professional manne During the testing, an anomaly was identified with respect to the operation of the fuel oil transfer pump The licensee issued MO 892187 to investigate the pump anomaly. A discussion of the actions taken by the licensee is provided in paragraph 6.b of this inspection repor On April 17, 1989, the NRC inspector witnessed the performance of
.su veillance testing of EDG 2. The test was performed by licensed operators with an approved, up-to-date procedure. The primary
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purposes of this test were to verify that the diesel generator started, cane up to speed and voltage output, properly loaded electrically, and maintained continuous power output within specifications. During performance of the test, operations noted some trouble in maintaining continuous power output at the specified maximum of 2402 kW for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. On the output of both emergency response facility computers and the analog control room instrumentation, the power output was noted te swing widely. All operators involved had noted some variance of this paraneter in the past but never of such magnitude. The system engineer, electrical maintenance supervisor, and lead I&C technician were summoned to investigate. The I&C technician determined that the computer output accurately reflected the power output. After approximately i hour, the power fluctuations dampened out and the test was successfully completed. M0 892447 was written to troubleshoot the cause of the malfunction, adjust or repair, as required, and reperform Procedure ST-ESF-6 to verify proper contro In discussions with the Supervisor, Electrical Maintenance, the NRC inspector learned that no anomalies could be found with the generator. The supervisor believed the fluctuation in generator output to be attributed to fluctuations on the grid. MO 892447 was voide In further discussions with the diesel generator system engineer, it was found that engineering was concerned with proper operation of the governor. They have arranged for a factory representative to inspect the governor during a future test. Engineering initiated M0 892680 which requires consulting with Woodward, the governor manufacture This M0 is still outstanding at this time. The NRC inspector will perform routine followup on the completion of M0 89068 On April 6,1989, the NRC inspector observed the surveillance testing of the Channel B safety-injection actuation signal, containment snray logic, and recirculation actuation logic. During observation of these testing activities, the NRC inspector noted that the testing l
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was performed in accordance with the instructions provided by the procedure and in a professional manne j During testing of the safety-injection actuation signal logic per Procedure ST-ESF-2, a relay failed to trip when the test was initially performed. The same procedural step was reperformed and the relay tripped. Personnel performing the testing issued M0 892219 to document the test anomaly and initiate a review of why the reley did not initially operate. The licensee lubricated the relay and reperformed the complete test. The testing was reperformed without problem c. On April 29, 1989, the NRC inspectors cbserved the performance of the full-flow test for the auxiliary feedwater pumps. The test was performed in accordance with the instructions provided in Procedure SP-FW-11. " Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operational Test."
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During observation'of the, testing, the NRC inspectors noted no problem with the performance of the' test. .The test was well
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. coordinated by the system engineer and professionally performed by
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L' s ;This test.was performed to. address a concern identified by an NRC
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l- '*; -., inspector on'theLMaintenance Team Inspection (MTI). The data from-l t the tests were forwarded to the MTI team leader for. review. Th results:of the data review will be documented in NRC Inspectio ; - < Report 50-285/89-0 "
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No violations or deviations were identifie . Security Observations (71707)
The NRC inspe'ctors verified that the physical security plan was being-
- implemented by selected observation of the following items
The. security organization was properly manne '
l Personnel within the protected area (PA) displayed.their identification badge Vehicles were properly authorized, searched,.and escorted or controlled within the P *
Persons and packages were properly cleared and checked before entry into_the PA was' permitte *
The effectiveness of the security program was maintained when security equipment' failure or impairment required compensatory '
measures to be employe
The PA barrier was maintained and the isolation zone kept free of transient materia *
The vital area barriers were maintained and not compromised by breaches or weaknesse Illumination in the PA was adequate to observe the appropriate areas; at nigh <
Security monitors at the secondary and central alarm stations were functioning properly for assessment of possible intrusion No violations or deviations were identifie I Radiological Protection Observations (71707) I The NRC inspectors verified that selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection program were implemented in conformance with the i
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' facility policies and procedures and in compliance with regulatory
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, requirements The activities listed below were observed and/or reviewed:
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HP' technicians were using calibrated instrumentation,
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, : Radiation work permits contained the appropriate information to 4 ensure that work was performed in a safe and controlled manner.-
Personnel in radiation controlled areas (RCA) were wearing th required personnel monitoring equipment and protective clothing and werel properly frisked prior to exiting an RC '*-
Radiation and/or contaminated areas were properly posted and controlled based on the activity levels within the are '
No violations or deviations were identifie ~ 10 'In-Office Review of Periodic. Special, and Nonroutine Event Reports (90712 and 90713)
H In'-office review of periodic, special,.and non:outine event reports wa ~
performed by the NRC . inspectors to. verify the following, as appropriate:
. Correspondence included the;information required by appropriate NR requirements,
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Test results and supporting information were consistent with design predictions and specification *- Planned corrective actions were adequate for resolution of identified
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Whether or not any information_ contained in the correspondence report should be classified as an abnormal occurrence or additional reactive inspection..is warrante *
Correspondence did not contain incorrect, inadequate, or incomplete informatio The NRC inspectors reviewed the following correspondence:
Closeout of Concerns in Safety Enhancement Program, dated April 5, 1989=
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Revision 3 to the Safety Enhancement Program, dated April 5,1989
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Special Report on Inoperability of Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation Used for Postaccident Monitoring, dated April 5, 1989 k
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Reouest for Alternate Schedule for Submittal of'NRC Bulletin 88-10 Written Response, dated April 3,1989 l
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1988 Refueling Outage Type B and C Local Leak Rate Test Summary, b, 1 April 3, 1989 Completion Schedule for Surveillance Testing of Alternate Shutdown Panel, dated April 7,1989 Failure to Perform Surveillance Test ST-FP-2 Within Required Interval.-
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(LER 89-008), dated April 6, 1989 Response to NRC Generic Letter 88-17, dated April 11, 1989 Emergency Safeguards Actuation Due to Personnel Error (LER 88-038-01), dated April 19, 1989 Monthly Operations Report for March 1989, Undated
Status of Implementation of TMI Action Plan Items, dated April 18, 1989 OPPD Response to the Station Blackout Rule as it Applies to the Fort Calhoun Station, dated April 17, 1989
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Fort Calhoun Station Radiation Protection Enhancement Program, Bimonthly Status Report, dated April 17, 1989 March Monthly Operating Report, dated April 14, 1989 161-kV Power Supply Reliability Review, dated April 21, 1989
Independent Nuclear Appraisal, dated Apri! 21, 1989
Inadequate Analysis for Feedwater Regulating Valves (LER 89-007),
dated April 24, 1989 No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview
.The NRC inspector met with Mr. L. T. Kusek (Acting Plant Manager) and other members of the licensee staff on May 9, 1989. The meeting attendees are listed in paragraph 1 of this inspection report. At this meeting, the NRC inspectors summarized the scope of the inspection and the finding ,
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