IR 05000285/1998025
| ML20198N982 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 12/30/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198N974 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-285-98-25, NUDOCS 9901060266 | |
| Download: ML20198N982 (14) | |
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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.:
50-285 License No.:
DPR-40 Report No.:
50-285/98-25 Licensee:
Omaha Public Power District
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Facility:
Fort Calhoun Station Location:
Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm., P.O. Box 399, Hwy. 75 - North of Fort Calhoun Fort Calhoun, Nebraska Dates:
November 30 - December 4,1998 Inspector (s):
Thomas H. Andrews, Emergency Preparedness Analyst Approved By:
Thomas W. Dexter, Acting Chief Plant Support Branch Attachment:
SupplementalInformation 9901060266 981230 PDR ADOCK 05000285 G
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-2-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Fort Calhoun Station NRC Inspection Report 50-285/98-25 This routine, announced inspection focused on the operational status of the licensee's emergency preparedness program. Emphasis was placed on changes that had occurred since the last routine emergency preparedness inspection.
Plant Sucoort The emergency preparedness program was properly implemented. All events reported
to the NRC were properly classified. The emergency plan and procedures were
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properly maintained. Emergency response facilities were maintained in a state of operational readiness. Equipment, supplies, and procedures were maintained and available for use. Senior management was aware of significant issues identified during training drills, and management expectations regarding support of the emergency preparedness program were being communicated to the staff. Audits and assessments of the emergency preparedness program provided good insight into program performance.
The licensee identified the need for improving the assessment of siren system failures.
- Steps were being taken to reduce the frequency of failures for the interactive notification
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system (Section P2).
The performance of two shift crews during walkthroughs using the training simulator
was good. Assessment of plant conditions, classification of emergencies, notifications of offsite agencies, and protection of plant personnel were properly performed in a timely manner. Two issues were identified during the walkthroughs related to protective action recommendations. One crew did not properly develop protective action recommendations. Both crews transmitted dose assessment results to offsite agencies, but the change of protective action recommendations was not made using the routine notification process. The critique of crew performance was thorough and provided good feedback for areas of improvement (Section P4)
The 1998 self assessment was very critical of program performance. It provided very
good programmatic insight and identified areas for correction and improvement (Section P7).
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-3-Report Details IV. Plant Support P1 Conduct of Emergency Preparedness Activities (93702)
The inspector reviewed event notifications reported to the NRC Operations Center since
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May 1997. All events were properly classified.
Event No. 34267 was classified as an unusual event. This event report was for the May 20,1998, transformer fault event. The licensee properly observed that the conditions for an alert were momentarily satisfied and made note of this during the notification. The inspector reviewed the licensee's critique and supporting documentation for the event and determined that the information provided to the NRC was accurate and notifications to offsite agencies were timely.
P2 Status of Emergency Preparedness Facilities, Equipment, and Resources a.
Inspection Scope (82701-02.02)
IJsing Inspection Procedure 82701, the inspector toured the following emergency response facilities and reviewed facility / equipment maintenance records.
l Control Room
Remote shutdown panel a
Operations support center
b.
Observations and Findinas The emergency response facilities were maintained in an operational state of readiness.
The technical support center and emergency operations facility were dedicated response facilities while the operations support center was an area used for routine work. Means were provided to ensure that equipment and materials needed for emergency response were secured and properly maintained. The areas designated for the operations support center were capable of quickly being reconfigured for emergency response.
Emergency kits were maintained with equipment and supplies. The quantities of supplies were adequate, and the equipment was operational. Equipment that required calibration had labels indicating that the calibration was current. Supplies with a designated chelf life were properly labeled indicating the shelf life expiration date.
Supplies with a specified shelf life were within the shelf life period. Using a list of procedures that had been recently revised and issued, the inspector determined that procedures within the facilities were properly maintained. The inspector reviewed telephone listings located in the emergency response facilities and found them to be
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-4-correct. The inspector tested selected telephone circuits by using them to contact the NRC Operations Center. All phones tested satisfactorily. The inspector determined that the emergency response facilities were properly maintained.
The inspector reviewed corrective action documents associated with emergency response equipment. The licensee had noted an increasing frequency of problems associated with the interactive notification system. This system was used as the primary method of notifying the emergency response organization. As a result of this trend, the licensee had initiated several remedial actions including:
Automatically rebooting the computer every day at 3 p.m.
- Initiating scheduled preventive maintenance on the system hardware. Prior to
this trend, the only time maintenance was performed was when repairs were needed.
Upgrading the system hardware and operating system. This upgrade was
necessary to resolve year 2000 issues.
Frequently testing the computer to identify new problems.
- While these changes had not fully resolved the system problems, the licensee continued to investigate potential solutions.
The inspector confirmed that the licensee had an alternative method in place to notify the emergency response organization. During one of the simulator walkthroughs, the interactive notification system failed to operate properly, and the communicator demonstrated the alternative method. The inspector determined that the licensee's actions were appropriate and that the alternative method worked satisfactorily.
During the reviews of condition reports, the inspector noted one condition report that described a failure of the siren system which appeared to be a major f ailure. Condition Report 199802027 dated November 16,1998, stated that Washington County cannot sound sirens. Acccrding to the condition report, a power surge had damaged most of the equipment at the 911 center in Blair, Nebraska, on the weekend of November 14-15, 1998. On November 16 when asked to perform the siren test, Washington County informed the licensee of the power surge and stated that the sirens could not be sounded. The licensee contacted the vendor, requested repair of the system, and initiated Condition Report 199802027.
As a result of the ir achr's questions, the licensee performed a detailed investigation of the event anc iicd the following:
A failure o, u inajor portion of the siren system is a 1-hour reportable event under
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10 CFR 50.52. Because the sirens were capable of being operated from the emergency operations facility, this was determined not to be a major failure; therefore, not reported to the NR.. - _ -
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l l-5-Compensatory measures were not taken by the licensee or the county for the
presumed siren system failure. Even though the licensee took credit for the capability of sounding the sirens from the emergency operations facility, the inspector noted that no one was stationed in the facility to be able to sound the
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sirens if neeaed. The licensee later learned that an alternative method of l
sounding the sirens was available through their corporate office, but this r
l information was not provided to the control room or the county.
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The state of Nebraska would be the " decision-maker" with regard to sounding (
the sirens. The Federal Emergency Management Agency would need to assess
the ability of the county to compensate for the loss of siren activation capability.
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was informed of the inability of Washington County to sound the sirens.
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Further conversations with the vendor revealed that the siren system had
L swapped to a backup power supply as a result of the power surge. The system would have actuated if the button had been pressed. However, it appeared that Washington County personnel at the 911 center thought the siren system would not work and did not attempt to use it.
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The licensee determined that.
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Emergency preparedness personnel needed additional training with regard to the
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need to report certain failures to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72.
Procedures needed to be updated to ensure compensatory measures were
identified and activated for siren system failures.
Local agencies needed to be instructed to ensure the licensee was notified of
events affecting the siren system and to ensure that the state agencies and the Federal Emergency Management Agency were informed of these events.
Because the sirens would have sounded had the county personnel pressed the button, the inspector determined that this event was not a major failure of the siren system.
I Therefore, this event did not require reporting to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72.
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Conclusions Emergency response facilities were properly maintained in a state of operational readiness. Equipment, supplies, and procedures were properly stored, maintained, and available for use. Steps were being taken to reduce the frequency of failures for the interactive notification system. The licensee identified the need for improving the
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assessment of siren system failures.
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6-P3 Emergency Prep: edness Procedures and Documentation (82701-02.01)
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The inspector used Inspection Procedure 82701 to determine whether the emergency plan and implementing procedures were maintained. Specifically, the inspector evaluated the following areas:
Verified that the emergency plan and emergency implementing procedures were
reviewed annually and that changes were submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q) and.10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.V.
Verified annual review of emergency action levels with offsite authorities.
- Verified annual reconfirmation of offsite organization letters of agreement.
- The licensee documented task completion using emergency planning test procedures.
Adequate documentation was provided to show the tasks were completed in accordance with the emergency plan and applicable regulations. The emergency plan and procedures were properly maintained. Changes to the emergency plan and implementing procedures were provided to the NRC in a timely manner. The annual review of emergency action leveis and letters of agreement was properly performed.
P4 Staff Knowledge ano Performance in Emergency Preparedness a.
Inspection Scoce (82701-02.04)
The inspector conducted walkthroughs with two operatir.g crews using a dynamic simulation on the plant-specific control room simulator. The inspector assessed the ability of the control room teams to classify events accurately, perform the required notifications in a timely manner, perform offsite dose assessments, and make adequate protective action recommendations.
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_C3servations and Findinas The performance of two shift crews was evaluated using scenarios developed by the licensee. The performance of both crews was good. Event recognition, classification, and offsite notifications of event classifications were performed properly and in a timely manner.
Internal communications and supervisory oversight were good. Briefings were frequent and served to maintain focus on priorities, as well as, a review of current conditions.
Both crews demonstrated good teamwork to ensure that critical information was given to the shift supervisor for use in decision making. Crews showed good awareness in identifying potential paths for event escalation. Three-part communications were used throughout the scenarios. Three-part communications included the following parts:
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-7-Statement or request made by the first person to the second person.
- Repeat of the statement or request by the second person to the first person.
- Confirmation by the first person that the repeated information was correct.
- The protected area evacuation and site evacuation occurred in accordance with licensee's procedures. Announcements were made to the plant and in buildings where the plant page cannot be heard. The inspector determined that the licensee's process to protect plant personnel was very good.
Two issues were identified during the simulator walkthroughs associated with protective action recommendations.
The protective action recommendations developed by the first crew after the
declaration of the general emergency were incorrect. The error occurred on the first protective action recommendation based upon dose assessment results.
The crew recommended evacuating all sectors out to 2 miles, plus Sectors A and B out to 5 miles. The dose assessment results did not justify evacuating Sectors A and B beyond 2 miles. This was followed by a recommendation to evacuate children and pregnant women in Sectors R, A, and B. While this was correctly based upon dose assessment results, it represented a downgrade in protective action recommendations.
Neither crew properly communicated the change of protective action
recommendations to offsite agencies. Instead of using a notification form, the dose assessment results were transmitted by facsimile to offsite agencies. A., a result, there was no assurance the information would be given to people making protective action decisions in a timely manner.
The licensee conducted remedial training for the person performing dose assessment for the first crew and discussed the issue with the remainder of the crew. The inspector agreed with the licensee's assessment that this was a human performance issue and not necessarily representative of the program performance. The licensee determined that incomplete procedural guidance was a contributing factor for the failure to properly communicate the change of protective actions to offsite agencies. Remedial actions were taken to ensure that the upgrade of protective action recommendations were communicated using the notification forms. The inspector determined that the corrective actions identified by the licensee were sufficient to address these issues.
Both crews conducted critiques of their performancc. The critiques included input from the emergency planning evaluators as well as from the crew. The critiques contained a mix of areas for improvement and recognition of good performance.
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Conclusions The performance of two shift crews during walkthroughs using the training simulator l
was good. Assessment of plant conditions, classification of emergencies, notifications of offsite agencies, and protection of plant personnel were properly performed in a timely manner. Two issues were identified related to protective action i
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-8-recommendations. One crew did not properly develop protective action recommendations. Both crews transmitted dose assessment results to offsite agencies,
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P5 Staff Training and Qualification in Emergency Preparedness a.
Insoection Scoce (82701-02.04)
Using Inspection Procedure 82701, the inspector reviewed: (1) training records for key emergency response personnel and (2) records and documents associated with emergency drills / exercises.
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Observations and Findinas l
The licensee increased the number of training drills conducted, therefore, increasing the i
amount of data to evaluate drill performance. The inspector noted that no strengths, good practices, weaknesses, or deficiencies were observed as part of training drills.
However, some of the comments indicated problems that would be considered as exercise weaknesses by the NRC if they occurred during an evaluated exercise.
Examples included:
_The technical support center was never declared fu;!y operational anc the site l
director was delayed assuming command and control.
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Dose assessment was performed incorrectly.
Conditions for a general emergency were not recognized by the dose
assessment personnel in the emergency operations facility.
The conditions for a general emergency were recognized but not declared until
40 minutes later.
Plant personnel were evacuated directly into the plume.
- Additionally, the report indicated problems with obtaining adequate support from other groups. These included:
Operations was not able to support a full operating crew for the drill.
- Operations only assigned one operator to fill the roles of auxiliary building
operator, turbine building operator, and auxiliary building / turbine building controller.
No controller followed an operational support center team dispatched to perform
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repairs.
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The medical portion of the drill was canceled because the controller did not
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attend the controller training and could not be reached for a briefing prior to the drill.
l These observations could have led one to conclude that management was not being
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fully informed of problems with the emergency preparedness program or that the emergency preparedness program was not well supported by other groups. To assess the validity of this possible conclusion, the inspector interviewed three division managers, the plant inanager, and the vice-president, nuclear. Each individual was asked to give their perception on the performance of the emergency preparedness l
program and the level of support for emergency preparedness they expected from their l
staff. Bat,6d upon these interviews, the inspector determined that management was
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aware of significant issues identified during training drills and that management i
expectations regarding support of the emergency preparedness program were being communicated to the staff.
- Dunng the tour of the control room, the inspector observed that the shift technical advisor had a beard that could have adversely affected the use of a self-contained breathing apparatus. Upon further questioning, the inspector was informed that the shift technical advisor was not required to maintain respiratory protection qualifications. The licensee reviewed the qualifications for all of the shift technical advisors and found that three of six individuals assigned to shifts were not currently qualified to wear respiratory protection. The licensee's procedures that described qualifications did not list respiratory protection as a qualification requirement for the shift technical advisor.
The licensee's response to a toxic gas emergency would have required personnel in the control room to don self-contained breathing apparatuses to permit continued operation of the plant. In situations where the shift technical advisor was not qualified to wear self-contained breathing apparatus, the individual would have had to evacuate along with other plant personnel. This could have resulted in a violation of Technical Specifications that require a shift technical advisor to be on-shift for operating and hot shutdown modes.
The failure to require respiratory protection qualifications for shift technical advisors was identified to the licensee as an area of vulnerability. The licensee immediately replaced the on-duty shift technical advisor with an individual who was qualified as a shift technical advisor and who had current respiratory protection qualifications. A plan was initiated to ensure that shift technical advisors that did not have current respiratory protection qualifications obtained the physical exam, training, and fit testing, as necessary, prior to assuming the shift as a shift technical advisor. The training
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requirements for the shift technical advisor were revised to include respiratory protection training.
The inspector did not identify any incidents where minimum shift staffing was not met due to the shift technical advisor h. ing to evacuate as a result of not being qualified to wear respiratory protection. The licensee's actions were implemented in an expeditious manner to address the existing condition and to prevent recurrence. The inspector n,c
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l-l-10-determined that the safety significance of this issue, as identified, was minor, therefore was not cited as a violation of NRC requirements.
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Conclusions
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Senior management was aware of significant issues identified during training drills and management expectations regarding support of the emergency preparedness program j
were being communicated to the staff. Training requirements for shift technical advisors l
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were modified to include respiratory protection qualification.
P7 Quality Assurance in Emergency Preparedness Activities a.
. Inspection Scope (82701-02.05)
Using inspection Procedure 82701, the inspector examined the latest audits and internal l
assessments of the emergency preparedness program.
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Observations and Findinas l
The inspector reviewed the 1997 and 1998 quality assurance audits and assessments of the emergency preparedness program. The scope of the audits was consistent with the scope specified in the emergency plan. The audits were conducted within 12 month intervals as stated in the licensee's emergency plan. The findings provided good insight into the performance of the program.
The audit team loader served as the technical expert. This individual had previously worked in the emergency planning department and was very knowledgeable of emergency preparedness procedures and regulations. In addition, the audit team l
leader maintained good awareness of industry events and issues related to emergency
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preparedness. As a result, the inspector determined that the audit team leader was well qualified to serve as the technical expert for the audit team, t
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Assessment of the offsite interface included interviews of offsite officials. The portion of the audits describing the assessment of the offsite interface was transmitted to each of the counties and the states of Nebraska and towa. This satisfied the offsite interface assessment requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t).
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The inspector reviewed a self assessment performed by the emergency planning staff.
t The inspector determined that the self assessment was comprehensive, identified many areas for management focus, and provided good insight into programmatic issues.
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Conclusions Audits of the emergency preparedness program were good. The audits were conducted on a 12-month frequency as required by 10 CFR 50.54(t). Assessment of offsite
interfaces was performed and transmitted to the offsite agencies in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(t). The 1998 self assessment was very critical of program performance,
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V. Manaaement Meetinas X1
. Exit Meeting Summary
The inspector presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the
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conclusion of the inspection on December 4,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings l
presented. No proprietary information was identified.
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ATTACHMENT 1 PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
' Licensee
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J. Chase, Division Manager, Quality Assurance
D. Dryden,' Licensing
, G. Gates, Vice President - Nuclear i
W. Hansher, Supervisor, Station Licensing T. Herman, Senior Quality Assurance Lead Auditor E. Matzke, Licensing :
R. Meng, Senior Emergency Planning Analyst R. Phelps, Division Manager, Nuclear Engineering (Acting) -
J. Sefick, Manager, Emergency Planning and Security.
C. Simons, Emergency Planning Supervisor
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J. Solymossy, Plant Manager M. Tesar, Division Manager, Nuclear Support NRC
- W. Walker, Senior Resident inspector
!NSPECTION PROCEDURES USED 82701 Operational Status of the Emergency Preparedness Program 92704 Followup - Plant Support 93702 Prompt Onsite Response to Events at Operating Power Reactors
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Documents Reviewed
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Letters 97-QA/QC-066, "QA Audit Report #4, Emergency Response Plan and implementing Procedures," May 5,1997 98-QA/OC-005," Quality Assurance Emergent Surveillance Report Number R-97-1, Emergency Preparedness Activities," January 14,1998 98-OA/OC-047, "QA Audit Report #4, Emergency Response Plan and implementing Procedures," April 7,1998 l
98-OA/OC-090, " Emergent Quality Assurance Surveillance Report Number R-98-1, Dose Assessment Activities," July 22,1998 98-OA/QC-112 " Quality Assurance Emergent Surveillance Report Number R-98-2, Independent Review of EPIP-OSC-1," September 17,1998 EP-97-286, " Report for the September 18,1997 Training Drill," September 25,1997 EP-98-084, " Drill Report for March 5,1998, Training Drill," April 3,1998 EP-98-142, " Drill Summary Report for the Training Drill Conducted June 11,1998," June 17, 1998 EP-98-153, " Drill Report Summary for Unannounced Emergency Planning Drill Conducted June 18,1998," June 19,1998 EP-98-163, " Drill Report Summary for the Training Drill Conducted June 25,1998," July 1,1998 EP-98-181, " Lessons Learned from the July 9,1998 Training Dril!," July 21,1998 EP-98-207, " Drill Report Summary for the Training Drill Conducted August 6,1998," August 11, 1998 EP-98-221, " Drill Report Summary for the Training Drill Conducted July 9,1998," August 28, 1998 EP-98-249, " Drill Report Summary for the Training Drill Conducted September 17,1998,"
September 29,1998 l
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-14-Procedures EPIP-EOF-6," Dose Assessment," Revision 27
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EPIP-EOF-7, " Protective Action Guidelines," Revision 12 EPIP-OSC-1, " Emergency Classification," Revision 29 EPIP-OSC-2, " Command and Control Position Actions / Notifications," Revision 34 EPIP-OSC-15, " Communicator Actions," Revision 18
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EPT-1, " Alert Notification System Silent Test," Revision 7 EPT-14, " Environmental Monitoring Drill," Revision 6 j
EPT-16," Review and Update RERP/EPIPs/OSC-1 EALs." Revision 5 EPT-17, " Audit of RERP," Revision 4 EPT-22," Letters of Agreement (Verification of RERP Appendix A)," Revision 22 EPT-34," Perform Augmentation or Notification Drills," Revision 16 EPT-42, " Verification of Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Qualification Status,"
Revision 9 Other Documents Condition Report 199801188, May 20,1998, Loss of Power Event Condition Report 199802027, November 16,1998, Washington County Cannot Sound Sirens Condition Report 199802083, December 1,1998, Reportab!!ity of Siren System Failure Condition Report 199802106, December 2,1998, STA Respirator Qualifications