IR 05000285/1989021

Insp Rept 50-285/89-21 on 890417-21.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Facility Mods & Training & Licensed Operator & Nonlicensed Staff Training

ML20247N671
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	05/23/1989
From:	Gagliardo J, Hunter D, Vickery R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20247N663	List: IR 05000285/1989021 ML20247N658
References
50-285-89-21, NUDOCS 8906050420
Download: ML20247N671 (11)

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APPENDIX

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'q U.S.-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV:

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NRC Inspection, Report: 50-285/89-21 Operating License: DPR-40

" Docket: 50-285

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Licensee: Omaha Public Power District (OPPD)-

1623 Harney Street

- Omaha, Nebraska 68102 Facility Name: Fort Calhoun Station (FCS)-

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Inspection At: FCS, Blair, Nebraska, and Corporate Offices, Omaha, Nebraska Inspection Conducted: April 17-21, 1989 Inspectors: ou & [ 13 8[

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Date 8 f . @ nter, Program Operattons Senior Reactor Section Inspector

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gR/ BLV)ckery, Reactor Inspector, Operations Date 4rogrdm Section

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' Approved f2,<> # , O

. L Gbgliardo, chTef, Operations . Program Date Section, Division of Reactor Safety Inspection Summary

! Inspection Conducted _ April 17-21, 1989 (Report 50-285/89-21) -

Areas' Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of facility modifications and training and licensed operator and nonlicensed staff trainin '

Results: Within the two areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified. One unresolved item was identified in paragraph 2.5, regarding the removal of an interlock from the fuel' handling crane (FH-12) and the failure to establish additional measures during refueling operations, which included off-load of_ the core and the transfer of 17 fuel assemblies from the core directly to Region 2 (nonpoisoned) of the spent fuel pool for permanent storage

.during the recent refueling outag '

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8906050420 890523 PDR ADDCK 05000285 G PNV

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The inspection revealed that the facility modifications reviewed appeared to be ,

acceptable; however, continued management involvement is encouraged to ensure I the full development of implementing procedures regarding facility change The licensee has complied with the requirements for annual review of.the training program and has met the necessary requirements for requalification of'

reactoroperators(R0s)andseniorreactoroperator(SR0s).:Nonlicensed operations personnel have received training for specific tasks. Training records were maintained as necessary. The licensee's evaluation of training needs and implementing them into an effective training program were satisfactor _ - _ - _ - - - - - - - - _ - - _ - - .

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DETAILS i Persons Contacted OPPD

• C. Jones, Senior Vice President

• K. J. Morris,= Division Manager, Nuclear Operations S. K. Gambhir, Division Manager, Production Engineering

• J. H. McKinnon, Acting Division Manager, Production Engineering

• W. G. Gates, Plant Manager, FCS

• J. J. Fisicaro, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Industrial Affairs

• G. R. Peterson, Assistant Plant Manager, FCS

• R. L. Jaworski, Manager, Station Engineering

• W. H. Combs, Manager, Organizational Management Development

• B. Livingston, Manager, Engineering Services

• J. M. Waszak, Manager, Administrative Services

• A. W. Richard, Manager, QA/QC

• W. W. Orr, Manager, QA/QC

• F. C. Scofield, Manager, Nuclear Planning

• F. F. Franco, Manager, Radiological Services

• J. M. Tills, Assistant Manager, FCS

• R. W. Short, Supervisor, Nuclear Projects

• K. Miller, Supervisor, Maintenance

• J. D. Kecy, Supervisor, System Engineering

• J. Bobba, Supervisor, Radiation Protection

• D. J. Mathews, Supervisor, Station Licensing

• J. J. Fluer, Supervisor, Technical Training

• R. C. Kellogg, Supervisor, Special Services

• C. A. Schanbacher, Senior Industrial Engineer

• M. A. Ferdig, Specialist, Organization and Management Development

• J.W. Chase, Licensing (Lonsultant)

• J.D.Wilcox, Licensing (Consultant)

NRC

• T. F. Westerman, Chief, Reactor Proj0ct Section 3, DRP, Region IV

• J. E. Gagliardo, Chief, Operations Program Section, DRS, Region IV

• P. H. Harrell, Senior Reactor Inspector, FCS

'*T. Reis, Resident Inspector, FCS

• D. L. Kelley, Reactor Inspector, Operations Program Section, DRS, Region IV Others members of the technical and administrative staff were also contacte * Denotes those attending the management exit on April 21, 198 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ -

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-4- Facility Modifications (37701)

The NRC inspector reviewed selected facility modifications and a procedure change made by the licensee pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59 and provided to the NRC in the monthly operating reports. The changes were reviewed to verify that they were completed in accordance with the requirements, including initiation, review and approval, design and design review, installation, and testing. Nc facility or procedure changes, other than amendments to the Technical Specifications, requiring prior NRC approval were noted to have been reported to the NRC by the license .1 MR-FC-79-17, Boric Acid Gravity Feed Valve HCV-258 Shaft Replacement The detailed review of the modification documentation and safety evaluation revealed that the approved modification included the replacement of the shaft on Valve HCV-258, the replacement of the spring nack assemblies and addition of torque limiter plates on the valve operators for Boric Acid Gravity Feed Valves HCV-258 and HCV-265. The licensee evaluations had determined that the shaft on Valve HCV-258 was bent due to excessive torque applications via the motor operator. The engineering reviews, the safety evaluation, and the approvals were verified to be inclusive of the total activity. The apparent discrepancy, between the information included in the modification title and description / analysis reported to the NRC and the actual content of the modification, appeared to be an isolated instance and was brought to the attention of the licensee for consideration. The NRC inspector has no further questions regarding this ite .2 MR-FC-85-136, Steam Generator Level Signal (SGLS) Block Permissive Setpoints The modification changed the SGLS block permissive setpoints and logic, improved control panel indication, and block status indication on the control beard to enhance the operations of the block / unblock functio .3- MR-FC-86-096, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Power Supplies Replacement The licensee decided to replace the original RPS power supplies with new, improved models because of the pocr reliability (increased failures),

lack of spares, and age. A total of 68 power supply units were replaced during the past refueling outage. The NRC inspector noted that program and procedure upgrades and comprehensive calibration were completed for the new RPS power supplie .4 MR-FC-87-16, Containment Sump Temperature Indication A resistance teinperature detector (RTD) was installed in the containment building sump with a temperature range of 40-350*F. Temperature indication for sump water temperature was provided on the plant computer

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-5-for operations personnel and also to the emergency response facility. The temperature channel (RTD and components) was designed for operation while submerged up to 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> under accident condition .5 OP-11, Reactor Core Refueling Procedure, Revision 27, dated December 30, 1988 The October 1988 Monthly Operating Report (LIC-88-109), dated November 15, 1988, provided a brief description of the change to OP-11 and a safety evaluation summary statement. The report noted that; a) the procedure was performed to off-load irradiated fuel from the reactor core into both the poisoned (Region 1) and non-poisoned (Region 2) spent fuel storage racks; b) the Procedure SP-BURNUP-1, "Burnup Determination for Storage of Spent Fuel," was performed on all applicable fuel assemblies prior to fuel movements; and c) the proper administrative controls were taken to prevent low burnup fuel assemblies from being stored in the non-borated (non-poisoned) storage locations. Therefore, the performance of this procedure did not constitute an unreviewed safety questio . The NRC inspector's evaluation of the change included the review of the following documents:

TechnicalSpecifications(TS)2.8,"SpentFuelPoolStorage"

USAR 9.5, " Refueling System," Revision 1, dated July 1984

License Amendment 75 and NRC Safety Evaluation, dated September 9, 1983 License Amendment 75 modification and NRC Safety Evaluation, -

" Ultrasonic Fuel Inspection in the Spent Fuel Pool," dated March 12, 1987 OP-11 " Reactor Core Refueling Procedure," Revisions 17, 20, 26, and 27

OP-11, Procedure Change (PCN No. 19613) and att'iched safety evaluation, dated March 24, 1987 SP-BURNUP-1, "Burnup Determination for Storage of Spent Fuel,"

Revision 2 Licensee safety evaluation associated with the fuel transfer during RF-11, dated October 18, 1988

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1.D.B.-l.B.1, " Fort Calhoun Station Fuel Status," dated December 19, 1988, Revision 20 2. The NRC inspector reviewed License Amendment 75 and the associated NRC safety evaluation, dated September 9,1983, which addressed the utilization of high density spent fuel storage racks which consisted ,

of two types of racks - Region 1 (poisoned) fuel storage racks, which I

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rovided:a critically safe physical-configuration and Region 2

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nonpoisoned) fuel storage-racks, which provided a1 critically safe configuration for fuel assemblies that met certain burnup. criteri ; NOTE: The. spent fuel: storage rack regions are located physically J

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' adjacent in the' spent fuel pool - Region 2, rack rows 01

,X -through 27 and Region 1,' rack rows 28 through>3 , ,

The NRC safety evaluation concluded t:at the proposed storage racks were acceptable provided the appropriate. controls had been include These controls included: '1) The transfer 4cf a fuel assembly from the, *

reactor core to Region 1 (poisoned);of the; racks 2) an' analysis of the burnup for the fuel assembly completed to W

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of the fuel assembly to Region 2 (nonpoisoned) permit orand-for storage, deny. movement .

-3) the transfer.of the fuel assembly from Region 1.(poisoned)'to  ?,

Region 2(nonpoisoned)forpermanentstorage.:The'controlsalso- >

tincludedithe installation of an interlock on the~ fuel handlin machine (FH-12) during refueling operations to. prevent freshlys discharged fuel'from.being laced in Region 2 of: the spent fuel pool

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storage racks (non-poisoned . These requirements are specified in

. : Technical: Specification (TS 2.8, " Spent Fuel Pool Storage," and the

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TS basis, which address the initial fuel enrichment /burnup and

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. interlock respectively. .The installed interlock (electronic stop) on

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FH-12: during refueling:is also addressed in USAR 9.5, "Refuelings r ' System," Section 9.5.2, " System Description."

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" The NRC inspector also reviewed the subsequent modification to

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? Licensee Amendment 75-and the' associated'NRC Safety Evaluation, dated 4 ,

March 12, 1987. The modification to Amendment 75 addressed the

' movement of selected fuel assemblies from;the reactor core to the-

, ultrasonic test: equipment located ~in the cask loading area of the spentfuelpool(Region 2).

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NOTE:' The licensee submitted.to the staff included the determination-

- that the ultrasonic test equipment was a critically safe =

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The modification also addressed the movement of permanently dischhrged n . fuel assemblies to Region'2 storage from the test rig, provided the burnup verification had been performed. The_ removal of the interlock on FH-12 was rec;uired in order to allow the movement of a fuel assembly from the reactor core directly into the test equipment for the' purposes of_ inspection ~of the fuel assembly during refueling operation The NRC safety evaluation concluded that the OPPD request to allow the refueling machine interlock to be bypassed for the temporary transfer of discharged fuel assemblies to test equipment in the cask '

loadingareaofthespentfuelpool(Region 2)forinspectionduring, l

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-7-refueling outages:is acceptable. Also, fuel assemblies being p(ermanently nonpoisoned)discharged may provided that theremain in burnup required the Region verification 2 spenthas fuel racks been performe The review of the most recent revisions (26'and 27) of OP-11 revealed that specific procedure steps addressing limitations and precautions associated with FH-12 interlocks and movement of fuel assemblies from the' reactor core to the only Region 1 or the test rig had been previously delete >

-2. The document review and discussions.with licensee personnel by the NRC' inspector' revealed that a permanent changethad been processed on March 24, 1987, regarding OP-11, Revision.19, which deleted two steps in the procedure and allowed the removal of a previously installed interlockonthefuelbuildingcrane(FH-12) The: interlock prevented the-inadvertent entry of the fuel building crane and a fuel

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assembly,into. Region 2 of the spent fuel pool during refueling operations.- The.two deleted steps in OP-11 were Section I Initial Conditions, Step T. "FH-12 is interlocked and blocked to prevent inadvertent entry into Region.2'of the spent f6el pool" and Section III, Precautions, Step G. " Fuel moved from the' core to the spent fuel pool may only be placed in Region 1 of the spent' fuel pool."

The review by the NRC inspector of the 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation performed by the licensee (form FC-154, dated March 24,1987)and attached to the procedure change (PCN No. 19613). revealed that the NRC safety' evaluation regarding the March 12, 1987, modification to-Licensee Amendment 75, dated March 12, 1987, was referenced as the basis for the removal of the interlock on the fuel building crane (FH-12) and the procedure changes. The NRC safety evaluation

~for the modification to Amendment 75, described the handling of fuel assemblies to be removed for inspection from the core directly to the ultrasonic test equipment in Region'2 of the spent fuel pool and then moved into the Region 2 storage racks for permanent storage, provided the burnup verification (SP-BURNUP-1) had been performed. The removal of the interlock on FH-12 at other times during refueling operations and transfer of fuel assemblies from the reactor core directly into Region 2 of the spent fuel pool was not addresse .5.4- Documentation reviews and (RF-11),

personneltheinterviews revealed the recent refueling outage fuel building cranethat during)

(FH-12 interlock was not active. This allowed the crane to travel to the Region 2 (non-poisoned) storage area of the spent fuel pool during

the refueling operations. During RF-11, the reactor core was off-loaded and 17 fuel assemblies were moved directly from the reactor core to Region 2 (nonpoisoned) of the spent fuel. The remaining)

(poisoned offuel the assemblies spent fuel pool.were moved fromreviews Documentation the core and to Region 1 l

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, . personnel' interviews revealed the the burnup . verification (SP-BURNUP-1)

hadLbeen performed. and. independently verified in October 1988 prior

. to fuel assembly movement. < Personnel interviews revealed that the

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ifuel movements performed during RF-11'were_ discussed with NRC prio to the outage.: A sample by the,NRC' inspector-of selected fuel

, g, assembly movement records.and the FCS fuel' status! records (T.B.D.-l.B.1),

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dated December 19, 1988,Lidentified no instances where fuel assemblies:

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'were moved to'a location 11n the wrong storage position (Region) in o the ' spent fuel pool. ' Document review and discussions with licensee

.s  : personne1~ did not identify additional. procedural requirements or

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documentation of independent' verification of fuel ~ assembly numbers or

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. location in the spent fuel pool at the time of, movement of a fuel assembly into the Region 2 storage area of.the. spent; fuel pool to provide additional: assurance of proper. fuel assembly storage locatio >

Further, interviews revealed that an independent verification of fuel'

. assemblyfstorage location in, the spent fuel pool had not been performed

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by the' licensee subsequent to RF-11'. The concerns'regarding.the

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verification'of the fuel assembly; locations were presented to the

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licensee.for- consideration and evaluatio ,

The NRC inspector concluded that the licensee could have misinterpreted

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the intent of the March 12 1987, modification to License Amendment 7 ' The. issue is whether or not fuel can be moved directl.y from the core to Region 2~rather'than being moved to Reg 1on 1 6nd then later moved to Region 2. Since the licensing intent is not clear, this is

> considered to be.an unresolved item pending clarification by NR (285/8921-01)

No violations' or deviations were identified in the review of this program

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< area.; J Licensed Operator Training (41701)

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The NRC inspector reviewed the licensed operator training program in selected areas to verify that the program met with the licensee's NRC

, approved program. Areas of the program inspected included:

• Verification and review of an annual training program evaluation;

• ' Verification of operators maintaining their required minimum reactivity manipulations over the past two years;

Review of documentation'and storage of required training records;

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" Review of the licensee's progress to revise and conduct training on

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emergency and abnormal operating procedures;

• Review of the licensee's progress to complete installation and startup of simulator; and

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Review of the licensee's progress to develop and implement a plan to assign more licensed operators as instructor The NRC inspector reviewed Station Audit and Review Committee (SARC) Audit Report 7-88, " Performance, Training, and Qualification of Facility Staff,"

and the training response to the previous Audit 6-87. The 1988 audit evaluated the effectiveness of the training program in six areas. The audit identified several recommendations in five of the six areas. Also identified was one deficiency and four quality items. The audit provided a satisfactory evaluation of the effectiveness of the training program as required. The training department responded to the 1987 audit recommendations in May 1988. The responses addressed more than twenty items related to licensed operator and licensed operator requalification

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training programs. The NRC inspector reviewed the above responses and discussed the progress of several of the items with the licensee. The licensee appeared to be making satisfactory progress in evaluating and restructuring the requalification training progra The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's methods of tracking and verifying that licensed operators maintained their required minimum reactivity manipulations. During this review, several records were accessed from the licensee's OPTIM system, which included:

The 1988 licensed operator requalification training for two SR0s and one R0; Special topics training for Special Topic 88-6; and

A listing of incomplete requalification training for three SR0s and one R The NRC inspector verified the accuracy of the above OPTIM data through several cross reference checks of the system and comparison to more than 70 attendance records from the permanent records files of the license The system also provided the NRC inspector with a review of the training on selected licensee event reports (LERs) and other industry events by the licensee. While reviewing some of the licensee's permanent records, it was noted that the licensee maintained a copy of notices sent to operators for makeup of missed training. Through the use of the OPTIM system data and review of the permanent records, the NRC inspector was able to verify that the licensee had established a reliable system for maintaining an accurate and up-to-date status of licensed trainin The licensee was in the process of revising and conducting training on emergency operating procedures (E0Ps) and abnormal operating procedures (A0Ps) as a part of their safety enhancement program (SEP)

concerns. All the E0Ps had been revised and developed. The bases had been developed and verification completed for three E0Ps. The NRC inspector reviewed four E0Ps and one of the completed bases. The E0Ps had incorporated the dual column format and the guidance of Revision 3 of the

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-10-combustion engineering owners group (CEOG) emergency procedure guideline The reviewed records of deviation and bases along with the associated validation documentation was complete. A training schedule for E0Ps had

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been issued. Ten A0Ps were in the draft stage of development. Three of the. draft AOPs were reviewed by the NRC inspector. The A0Ps were being drafted in the dual column fnrmat and contained several changes and updates. The revision of E0Ps and A0Ps appeared to be proceeding in a timely manner with quality.. improvements. The NRC inspector-discussed with the licensee the current status and needs required to support design, fabrication, and startup of the planned simulator at the licensee's training facility. In review of the schedule with the licensee there were no identified delays on the licensee's part and the licensee was optimistic that the vendor was taking corrective action to make up their

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slight delay in schedule. The licensee's support and involvement in the simulator project were eviden The licensee has developed and was attempting to implement a plan to assign more licensed. operators as instructors. Additional nonlicensed operator personnel had been hired and an effort was being made to hire additional personnel. The licensee has scheduled two complete sessions of nonlicensed operator training for the year. A methodology has been developed to determine the assignment of other personnel to the training departmen It appeared that the licensee has been making progress in correcting past problems and making new improvements in the licensed operator training progra No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program are . Nonlicensed Staff Training (41400)

The NRC inspector reviewed the nonlicensed operator training program in the following areas:

Observation training for management and supervisory personnel

Training facilities and aides

Maintenance qualifications for performance of tasks

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The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's lesson plan used for observation training for management and supervisory personnel. The lesson plan met all of its required objectives and should provide the licensee an excellent tool for improvement. Although the licensee was able to document attendance for over a hundred personnel, there was not a formal guideline established as to who was required to have the training. This concern was addressed to the licensee in NRC Inspection Report 50-?85/89-2 i

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-11-A tour was made of the electrical-and mechanical training facilities. The licensee had several good training aids, which included cut-a-ways of motor operated valves (MOVs) and switchgear. The classrooms and training areas were well kept and provided with a large selection of tools and instruments for trainin The training facility maintained a record of qualifications completed for maintenance related tasks. A periodically updated copy of.the personnel / task qualification chart was maintained at the training facility and in the maintenance group work areas. Discussions with instructors and students found that the licensee was providing ample training time with quality training material. A review of the training schedule supported the licensee's dedication to provide continued training and qualification for nonlicensed operator Based on the review performed, it appeared that the licensee had implemented comprehensive and effective training progress for nonlicensed staff personne No violations or deviations were identified in the review of this program are . Exit Interview The NRC inspectors summarized the inspection scope and findings with.the individuals identified in paragraph 1. The specific item of concern

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regarding the removal of the interlock from the spent fuel pool crane (FH-12) in 1987 and the transfer of fuel assemblies from the core directly to Region 2 (nonpoisoned) of the spent fuel pool was presented to the licensee representatives and the licensee indicated that the matter would be evaluated. No information reviewed by the NRC inspectors was identified by the' licensee as proprietar ,