ML20246F081

Insp Rept 50-285/89-30 on 890724-28.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Implementation of Corrective Actions in Response to NRC Bulletin 87-002 Concerning Fastener Testing

ML20246F081
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	08/23/1989
From:	Barnes I, Stewart R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20246F018	List: ML20246F016 ML20246F081
References
50-285-89-30, IEB-87-002, IEB-87-2, NUDOCS 8908300147
Download: ML20246F081 (7)

See also: IR 05000285/1989030

Text

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"AR REGULATORY.' COP 9IISSION;

e.- - 1 REGION IV '

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> , NRC' Inspection Report: .50-285/89-30 Operating License: .DPR-40:

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' Licensee:SOmahaPublicTPowerDistrict(OPPD) ' '

444 South 16th Street. Mall

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Omaha, Nebraska 68102-2247 . .,

'm .# Facility Name: FortjCalhoun. Station

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. Inspection At:. Fort Ca'1houn Station. Blair, Nebraska '

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,[j. y " Inspection Conducted:F July ~24-28 1989

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-Inspectori" .

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y' W . Stewa'rt, Reactor Inspector, Materials Da'te

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and Quality. Programs Section, Division of _.

Reactor Safety'

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% #p r. Barnes, Chief, Materials and Quality ; IFale *-  %

Programs Section. Division of Reactor Safety.

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Inspection Summary -

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Inspection Conducted July:24-28, 1989 (Report 50-285/8V-30)'>4

Areas Inspected: Routine f unannounced inspection of the implementation of ~,

. corrective actions.in response to!NRC Bulletin 87-02 concerning. fastener

testing and the. review of-procedures /controisiestablished to assure-

implementation'of'10 CFR Part 21 requirements.

LResults h In general 'the:11censee's documentation files reflected responsiveness

to Bulletin 87-02 and subsequent Supplements 1 and 2. Tests perfomed on

selected safety-related fasteners indicated all samples met the specific ' ~

imaterial specification requirements and therefore, no corrective action by the '

%<, licensee was deemed necessary. '

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'L'aboratory test' conducted on nonsafety, unmarked fasteners produced results- )

innoncompliancewithSAE.J429 Grade 5.-These/noncomplianceswereattributed

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y to' previous-purchasing methods which were without specific OA requirements- ,

u ,4 , and/or receipt inspection'for'nonsafety-related fasteners. The licensee has

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. removed ~all unidentifiable fasteners from warehouse stock and has-revised  :

purchase order and receiving inspection procedures to preclude recurrences.

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The licensee's evaluation concluded that no failures of fasteners have

o; curred in 15 years of plant operations, and the likelihood of a nonsafety '

fastener failure in a nonsafety system, creating a significant safety-related

operat,111ty problem, is remote. Thus, the licensee's effort to identify all

possible locations'where the unmarked fasteners may have been used is not

warranted,

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The licensee's established implementing procedures and controls to ensure the

reporting of defects and noncompliance appear to be adequate to assure  ;

implementation of 10 CFR 21 requirements. j

No violations or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

,0 PPD

• C. F. Simons Licensing Engineer

• D. J. Matthews, Supervisor, Station Licensing

• A W. Richard, Assistant Plant Manager

• J. E. Zelfel, Operations QA -

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NRC

• T. Reis, Resident Inspector

The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during the

inspection.

• Denotes those persons that attended the exit interview on July 28, 1989.

2. Followup Inspection - Bulletin 87-02 - Fastener Testing and Corrective

Actions (TI 2500/27)

The NRC issued NRC Compliance Bulletin 87-02 cn November 6, 1987. This

bulletin required licensees and construction permit holders to review

their receipt inspection requirements and controls for vendor-supplied

fasteners and independently determine, through testing, whether fasteners )

(studs, bolts, cap screws, and nuts) in stores at their facilities met

applicable mechanical and chemical specification requirements. Response 1

to Bulletin 87-02 was required within 60 days of its receipt.

On April 22, 1988, the NRC issued Bulletin 87-02, Supplement I which

requested licensees and construction permit holders to submit information

regarding the vendors which have supplied safety-related or nonsafety-related

fasteners within the last 10 years. This information was to include the

name and address of the manufacturer or supplier, and specification of the

fastener provided.

On June.10, 1988, the NRC issued Bulletin 87-02, Supplement 2, which

superseded the requirements of Bulletin 87-02, Sapplement 1. Supplement -2

required addressees to provide within 90 days of receipt of Supplement 1:

"1. A list of the suppliers and manufacturers from which safety-related

ferrous fasteners 1/4 inch in diameter or greater may have been

purchased, within the past 10 years, including addresses. For those ,

fasteners purchased from fastener suppliers and/or original equipment

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manufacturers, any available information that identifies the

manufacturer or subtier supplier of the fasteners also should be

provided. Approved Vendor L1st or Qualified Supplier Lists are the

intended sources for this information. Addressees are not required

<to search purchase order files, contact subcontractors to obtain the. 9

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information, or submit data on fasteners supplied as part of the

original component.

, 2 . For nonsafety-related fasteners the same information as required in

the first two sentences of Item 1, above, except that a) the time of

interes*; is for fasteners procured in the last 5 years, and b) the

search of available records in this case should. include purchase

orders unless the licensee utilizes approved vendor lists or

qualified supplier lists in procuring nonsafety-related fasteners.

This information collection is understood to be on a best-effort

basis. Further, addressees are not required to contact

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subcontractors to obtain the information or to submit data on

fasteners supplied as part of an original component."

The objectives of this area of the inspection were to verify that the

licensee has complied with the testing of fasteners, as required by

Bulletin 87-02 (including the Supplements 1 and 2), and that corrective

action has been taken by the licensee for .any significantly out of

specification material found during testing of safety-related festeners.

Finding - Document Review

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As requested by Bulletin 87-02, the lict;nsee, with the particip? tion of

the senior NRC resident inspector, selected from warehouse stores, a

sample of 10 3afety-related fasteners (random sizes of bolts, studs,

and/or cap screws) and 10 nonsafety-related fasteners (random sizes of

bolts, studs,ard/orcapscrews). Corresponding nuts (one- 4 r-one) were

also selected.

The 40 threaded fasteners were submitted to Taussig Metallurgical

Laboratory, Skokie, Illinois, for the various tests to determine .'

conformance with their applicable material specifications. The ten

externally threaded safety-related fasteners were marked FC-C1 through

FC-CIO, and were subjected to tension testing. The associated nuts were

identified as Samples FC-CIN through FC-CION. All nonsafety-related i

externally threaded fasteners and nuts required hardness testing. All

40 samples were subjected to chemical analyses.

Material specifications applicable to the test samples included the

following ASME/ ASTM requirements:

Safety-Related

ASTM A193 B7/A194 2H

ASTM A193 B8/A194 2H

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ASTM A325 Tpl/A194 2H

ASTM A307 GRA/A675 GR60

ASTM A307/A194 2H

Nonsafety

ASME SAE J429 GR5/SAE J995 GR5

ASTM A325 Tpl/A325-74

3/4" Nut, ASME A194-B8

A review of the initial test results, documented in Taussig Report 78153,

dated December 30, 1987, revealed that one safety-related put

(Sample FC-C6N, A194 2:1) failed to meet the .40 percent minimum carbon

requirement of specification A194 2H. In addition, six nons ?ty-related

bolts (Samples FC-1, 2, 6, 7, 8, and 9) and one nut (Sample FL-4N) failed

to meet ASTM /ASME specifications. The six nonsafety-related bolts failed

to meet the SAE J429 Grade 5 specification range of 25-34 Rockwell "C,"

and the carbon content of .28 .55 percent. The one nonsafety-related nut

was identified as in noncompliance with the A194-B8 specification for

hardness (60-105 Rockwell "B").

In view of the failure of the safety-related nut (Sample FC-C6N) to meet

- the carbon content of ASTM A194 specifications, the remaining nuts in

stores from the same lot were tagged as nonconforming and an additional

18 nuts (from the same lot of 48 total) were sent to the Taussig Laboratory

for metallurgical tests for proof load, hardness, and chemical aralysis.

The resulting Taussig Test Report 78575, dated January 15, 1988, indicated

that all 18 nuts met the ASTM A194 2H specifications. In addition, the

licensee discovered that when the original 40 samples were returned from

the Taussig Laboratory, safety-related nut, Sample FC-C6N, was found in

the untested condition. Also, an extra nut originally shipped with

Sample FC-C7N was found to'have been tested twice. Sample FC-C6N was

resubmitted to the test laboratory, tested, and found to meet the

requirements for ASTM A194 2H fasteners. This information was contained

in a revised response to Bulletin 87-02, dated March 23, 1988. The

resulting retests indicate that no failures were attributed to samples j

selected from the safety-related fasteners in storage, therefore, no

further corrective action on the bulletin was anticipated or planned

relative to safety-related fasteners.

In reviewing the test data with regard to the nonsafety-related fasteners,

it appears from the test data taken that only the SAE J429 steel was found

to be in noncompliant.e with the SAE J429 Grade 5 specification. In addition,

itletter

wasLIC-88-023,

apparent from theJanuary

dated fastener

19,testing) data

1988 for sheet

each (Attachment

sample, that the I to 0 PPD

failures occurred only from sen.ple lots of screws or nuts that were absent

of any identifiable markings (spr.cification and/or manufacturer). In

discussing this observation wifa the cognizant licensee representative, j

the inspector was informed tnt the licensee's evaluation concluded, as

evidenced by the hardness and chemical analysis, that the unmarked screws

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or nuts ni m SAE Grade 2 rather than SAE Grade 5 as indicated by the l

licensee records ~. It was further pointed out by the licensee representative l

that prior purchase orders for nonsafety-related fasteners did not contain.

specific material specifications nor impose.QA requirements on suppliers.

All unmarked screws or nuts have been subsequently removed from the .

warehouse.. stores. This was partially verified by sampling stock locations i

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during a warehouse walkdown by the inspector, accompanied by the licensee

representative. Other corrective actions implemented include revisions to

the warehouse receiving stock locations cards to assure only clearly

identified SAE Grade-5 screws or nuts ar-e accepted at the warehouse,

and purchase orders contain more specific material specifications.

Licensee's Conclusion 1

As stated in an internal memorandum, " Engineering Evaluation on CQE and

Non-CQE fasteners," dated May 2, 1988, and response letter to NRC, dated

March 23, 1988, the final results and engineering evaluations indicate

that all safety-related fasteners were within specifications and thus,

need not be subjected to further evaluation. 'The above evaluation

memorandum further -tates that piping systems which could contain

questionable fastehers would have been qualified through 15 years of

service without failure. It is not apparent that failures have occurred

as a result of fasteners being in noncompliance. Thus, the licensee

concluded that any further evaluation of nonsafety-related fasteners was

unwarranted. During subsequent discussions with the cognizant licensee

representative, the inspector was informed that to evaluate further and

to verify each bolting application in nonsafety components would be exceedingly

burdensome, costly, and would not appear to be justifiable. In addition,

the licensee believes that information provided in response to Bulletin 87-02

provides reasonable assurance that fasteners used at the Fort Calhoun

Station meet the requisite specifications and that operability of

safety-related components is not affected.

The licensee has performed an analysis of the requisite fastener testing 1

and established an apparent cause. Corrective actions have been taken.

These licensee actions appear appropriate and no further inspection of

this matter is planned at this time.

3. 10 CFR Part 21 Review

The objective'of this area of the inspection was to determine whether

organizations and individuals subject to 10 CFR Part 21 regulations have

established and are implementing procedures and controls to ensure the

reporting of defects and noncompliance.

During the inspection, the inspector reviewed the following procedures:

Quality Assurance Plan, Section 10.5, "10 CFR 21 Reporting of

Defects and Noncompliance," Revision 3, dated August 1, 1988.

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QDP-19 " Quality Assurance and Quality Control Department Procedure,"

Revision 5, dated August 1, 1988.

QP-19. " Product Engineering Division (PED) Quality Procedure,"

Interim Revision, dated July 1, 1938.

N0D-QP-12. " Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance to the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission," Revision 3, dated April 19, 1988.

QP-26, " PED Quality Procedure," Revision 0, dated June 9, 1989.

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QP-6, " PED Quality Procedure," Revision 0, dated June 6, 1989.

gel-2, " General Engineering Instruction " Revision 1, dated July 19,

1988.

In addition to the'above review, the inspector selected three items

identified for review / evaluation applicable to potential 10 CFR 21

deportability requirements from a' listing of current items in the

review / evaluation process. Items selected were as follows:

Item No. 89-0001, Check Valve, dated January 16, 1989.

Item No.89-003, Solenoid Valve, dated June 22, 1989.

• Item No.89-006, Control Valve, dated June 26, 1989.

It was observed by the inspector that two of the items had been

previously reported to the Commission by the specific vendor, wherein

the third item (Item No.89-006) is relative 1o vendor supplied

conponents which require the licensee to revit:w the applicability to

their facility.

It appears that the items identified were consistent with the

licensee's estchlished procedures and that the information end data

appear to be factual and complete. In addition, the findings

indicated that substantial safety issues do not exist.

No violations or devictions were identified.

4. Exit Interview

The inspector met with Mr. A. W. Richard, Assistant Manager, Fort Calhoun

Station,, and other members of the itcensee's staff on July 28, 1989. At

this meeting, the inspector summarized the inspection findings. The

licensee did not identify any proprietary information to the inspector.

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