IR 05000285/1998004
| ML20216E626 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 03/12/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20216E619 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-285-98-04, 50-285-98-4, NUDOCS 9803180106 | |
| Download: ML20216E626 (14) | |
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ENCLOSURE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -
REGION IV
Docket No.:
50-285 License No.:
DPR-40 Report No.:
50-285/98-04
. Licensee:
Omaha Public Power District Facility:
Fort Calhoun Station Loca, tion:
Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4 Adm., P.O. Box 399, Hwy. 75 - North of Fort Calhoun Fort Calhoun, Nebraska Dates:
January 18 through February 28,1998 Inspectnrs:
W. Walker, Senior Resident inspector V. Gaddy, Resident inspector Approved By:
W. D. Johnson, Chief, Project Branch B ATTACHMENT:
Supplemental information 9003190106 980312 PDR ADOCK 05000285 G
PDR a
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Fort Calhoun Station l
NRC Inspection Report 50-285/98-04 D%EMi9n3 Competing priorities and poor communications resulted in system engineering personnel
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not providing timely feedback to the control room operators regarding the vperability of the postaccident sampling system. This resulted in the entire postaccident sampling sptem being declared inoperable when only the gaseous portion needed to be declared inoperable (Section 02.1).
Plant review committee activities regarding safe operation of the plant were rigorous and
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in depth. This observation was based on the inspectors' attendance at weekly plant review committee meetings for approximately 6 months (Section 07.1).
Maintenary A modification to the diesel-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was cuccessfulin reducing
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the magnitude of vibration for engine mounted components. Historically, this pump had exhibited high vibration and required frequent preventive maintenance (Section M2.1).
Following a component cooling water pump breaker trip during pump starting, the
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licensee conducted satisfactory troubleshooting and replacement of the breaker. The licensee was evaluating whether there were additional breakers susceptible to the same failure mechanism (Section M2.2).
Enaineerina The licensee had implemented a good program for testing molded-case circuit breakers
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and failure rates were being appropriately evaluated to determine whether acceleration of the test program was necessary. Based en the system engineer's evaluation, none of the failures would have adversely affected system coordination. The equipment that had been electrically supplied from breakers that had failed functional tests would not have been, and had not been, prevented from starting or operating (Section E2.1).
Plant Sucoort A weakness was identified in the thoroughness of a prejob briefing for movement of a
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radwaste container in that questions concerning actions to be taken if the waste container were dropped were not answered (Secton R1.1).
A firewatch was determined to be unsure of his duties and responsibilities. The guidance
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provided to the cable spreading room firewatches regarding notification to the control room could not be performed as originally written (Section F4.1).
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-2-The fire brigade and the control room operators demonstrated a good response to a fire
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alarm inside containment (Section F4.2).
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Reoort Details Summarv of PIsnt Status The Fort Calhoun Station began this inspection period at 100 percent power and maintained that level throughout the inspection period.
J. Operations
Conduct of Operations 01.1 General Comments (71707)
Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious; specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections below.
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment O2.1 Postaccident Samolina System l
a.
Insoection Scone (71707)
The inspectors followed up on system engineering personnel not providing timely feedback to control room operators regarding the status of the postaccident sampling system and to determine if the entire postaccident sampling system was unnecessarily -
declared inoperable.
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Observations and Findinas On January 14,1998, control room operators requested input from system engineering personnel to determine how the operability of the postaccident sampling system would be affected by performing maintenance on Gas Dilution Recirculation Pump SL-30.
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Specifically, control room operators wanted to know if Pump SL-30 was removed from service for preventive maintenance, would the entire postaccident sampling system be inoperable. System engineering personnel did not respond to the request from the
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control operators in a timely manner. As a result, the control room operators conservatively declared the entire postaccident sampling system inoperable so preventive maintenance could be performed on Pump SL-30.
During discussion with operations management, the inspectors leamed that the control roum operators did not need to declare the entire postaccident sampling system inoperable. The system was designed such that portions could be removed from service to facilitate maintenance. In this case, the control room operators could have declared the gaseous portion of the postaccident sampling system inoperable, instead of the i
entire system. However, due to a lack of feedback from system engineering personnel,
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-2-the control room operators conservatively declared the entire system inoperable.
Operations management indicatted that additional training would be provided to the operations staff on the operati-on of the postaccident sampling system in discussion with system engineering management, the inspectors leamed that one reann for the lack of feedback was participation in training during ht man performance day. Another reason for failing to provide feedback was ineffective communication between the control room operators and system engineering personnel. System engineering's failure to respond to the request for information from the control room operators resulted in the entire postaccident sampling system being declared inoperable for approximately 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. As corrective action the system engineer wcs counseled on the importance of providing timely feedback to the control room operators.
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Conclusions Competing priorities and a weakness in communications resulted in system engineering i
personnel not providing timely feedback to the control room operators regarding the operability of the postaccident sampling system. This resulted in the entire postaccident sampling system being declared inoperable unnecessarily.
Qualivj Assurance in Operations 07.1 Licensee Safety Committee Activity During the inspection period, the inspectors attended several sessions of the plant review committee. This is the onsite safety review committee for the Fort Calhoun Station. The sessions attended included discussions on:
Operability and reportability evaluations;
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Upcoming outage modifications which could affect plant safety; and
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Discussions regarding operational experience from other plants and the potential
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impact on the safe operation of the Fort Calhoun Station.
The inspectors observed that the required Fort Calhoun Station management was present and actively participated in the plant review committee meeting. The inspectors determined that the reviews and discussions regarding safe operation of the plant were rigorous and in depth. The inspectors concluded that the plant review committee activities observed over the past 6 months were effectiv.
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11. Maintenance
~M1 Conduct of Wlaintenance M1.1 General Comments a.
Insoection Scooe (62707)
Component Cooling Water Pump Breaker Troubleshooting;
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Diesel Fire Pump FP-1B Sparger Installation;
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Raw Water Screen Repair;
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Fire Protection System Jockey Pump Modification; and
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Raw Water Pump Replacement.
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Observations and Findinas The inspectors found the work performed under these activities to be professional and.
thorough. All work observed was performed with the work package present and in active use. Maintenance technicians were experienced and knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. The inspectors frequently observed supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress, and quality control personnel were present when required by procedure,
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Conclusions The maintenance activities observed were conducted in a controlled and professional manner, j
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M1.2 Surveillance Teits a.
Insoection Scone (61726)
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EM-PM-EX-0'03, " Molded Case Circuit Breaker inspection and Test," Revision 8;
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OP-ST-RW-3031, "AC-10D Raw Water Pump Quarterly inservice Test,"
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Revision 19; i
SE-ST-FP-0010," Fire Protection System Diesel-Driven Fire Pump Alternate i Jil
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Flow Test," Revision 3; and OP-ST-DG-0001, " Diesel Generator 1 Check," Revision 23.
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Observations and Findinos Surveillance activities were generally completed thoroughly and professionally.
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Conclusions The surveillance activities observed by the inspectors were completed in a controlled manner and in accordance with procedures.
M2 Maintenance and Material Condition of Facilities and Equipment M2.1 Diesel-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumo Modification a.
Insoection Scooe The inspectors reviewed the licensee's activities with regard to reducing the vibration on the diesel-driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
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Observations and Findinas Between January 12 and 23,1998, the licensee parformed a modification to the diesel-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The purpose of the modification was to reduce the levei of vibration of the equipment in order to increase reliability and eliminate or reduce the frequency of certain preventive maintenance activities which were required
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due to high vibration. The modification consisted of replacing the couplings and existing stiff engine mounts for the diesel engine. The stiff mounts were replaced with rubber mounts to reduce the magnitude of vibration for engine mounted components and to reduce the transmission of vibration to other components.
Based on postmodification testing, a significant reduction in vibration transmission was obtained. The results are as follows:
The engine vibration levels were reduced by approximately 20 percent;
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Generator vibration levels were reduced by 50 percent and the preventive
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maintenance required for bearing change-out was discontinued; The pump vibration levels were reduced by approximately 20 percent; and
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The engine mounted fuel solenoid was replaced with a cable operated fuel
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solenoid which was remotely mounted. However, the new solenoid did not have sufficient spring force to close the fuel rack and shut down the engine. The original solenoid was re-installed. The licensee plans to continue replacing the engine mounted fuel solenoid approximately every 70 hours8.101852e-4 days <br />0.0194 hours <br />1.157407e-4 weeks <br />2.6635e-5 months <br /> of run time to ensure reliability for starting the engine is maintaine,
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Conclusion The modification to the diesel-driven auxiliary feedwater pump was successful in reducing the magnitude of vibration for engine mounted components and other components, which should increase the reliability of the equipment. However, an active modification still exists for remotely mounting the fuel solenoid. Basea on the inspectors'
discussions with the licensee, this will need to be completed to ensure a long-term increase in the reliability of the pump.
M2.2 Comoonent Coolina Water Pumo Breaker Troubleshootina a.
Insoection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensee's activities with regard to the trip of a component cooling water pump breaker upon a start demand.
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Observations and Findinas On February 15,1998, during an equipment rotation, a licensed operator attempted to start Component Cooling Water Pump AC-3A. The pump started to rotate but, before reaching full speed, the breaker tripped. Another attempt was made to start the pump with the same res' ult. The pump was declared inoperable, a 7-day Limiting Condition for Operation was entered, and Condition Report 199800228 was initiated to document the failure.
On February 20,1998, during troubleshooting activities, the licensee determined that the reset mechanism plate mounted at the top of the direct trip actuator mechanism was shaped differently than the reset mechanisms on newer breakers. Newer style reset mechanisms were square, with a notch cut at one corner. The older reset mechanisms were completely square. The notch prevented contact of the plate with the direct trip actuator plunger during the closing cycle of the breaker. The licensee determined that the old style reset mechanism caused excessive travel of the plunger during breaker closing. Excessive movement of the plunger allowed contact with the breaker trip paddle, which resulted in intermittent tripping of the breaker during closing operations.
The licensee verified that both direct trip actuator devices had the same vendor part number.
The licensee also believed that the cap type push nut fastener on the end of the cross bar that connected the direct trip actuator reset arm to the breaker operating mechanism was binding with the breaker frame at the end of travel during the closing cycle. This condition caused excessive vibratio'1 to the direct trip actuator plunger and reset mechanism while the breaker was closing. No such binding was observed for the newer style breakers. The failed breaker was replaced with a newer style breaker, the breaker was tested, and the pump was returned to servic,
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6-The licensee was evaluating to determine why there was a difference in the reset mechanisms and also to determine if other breakers were susceptible to the same failure mechanism. The licensee was also evaluating whether prior breaker failures were caused by the same deficiencies noted above. This item will remain open pending the completion of the licensee's investigations (50-285/9804-01).
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Conclusions The licensee conducted satisfactory troubleshooting and replacement of the component s
cooling water pump breaker and continued to evaluate whether other breakers were I
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susceptible to the same failure mechanism.
Ill. Engineering E2 Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment E2.1 Mokled-Case Circuit Breaker Testing a.
Insoection Sccce (37551)
The inspectors assessed the licensee's molded-case breaker testing program.
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Observations and Findinas in December 1992, the licensee initiated a preventive maintenance test program for molded-case circuit breakers. The test program consisted of a schedule for inspecting and testing all installed critical quality element, molded-case circuit breakers on a 10-year frequency using Preventive Maintenance Procedure EM-PM-EX-0203,
- Molded-Case Circuit Breaker inspection and Test." This testing procedure was developed from guidance provided by The Electric Power Research Institute.
The ;nspectors reviewed the results of molded-case circuit breaker testing and noted the following:
There were a total of 412 critical quality element and 362 noncritical quality
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element molded-case circuit breakers installed at the Fort Calhoun Station.
The licensee identified 224 breakers which were either safety related or
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considered important to coordination and prioritized them for testing.
To date, the licensee had tested 182 breakerr, resulting in 38 failures. The
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failure totals were 15 due to visual inspectiori three due to a 300 percent overcurrent test, and 20 due to an instantanes overcurrent tes i
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-7-Based on the system engineer's evaluation, none of the failures would have
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adversely affected system coordination. The equipment that had been electrically j
supplied from breakers that had failed functional tests would not have been, and
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had not been, prevented from starting or operating.
Some steps in the preventive maintenance procedure for testing the breakers did
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not describe how a specific action was to be taken.
J Testing of the remaining breakers was scheduled to be completed by the end of
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the 1999 refueling outage, c.
Conclusions The inspectora determined that the licensee had implemented a good program for testing molded-case circuit breakers and that failure rates were being appropria'.ely evaluated to determine whether acceleration of the test program is necessary. System engineering i
personnel were monitoring the test program to ensure that the appropriate test criteria
and ongoing priontization for further breaker testing was maintained.
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IV. Plant Suonort R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controts
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R1.1 Radwaste Shioment,Brief a.
Inspection Scooe (71730)
The inspectors attended and evaluated the prejob brie'ing for a radioactive waste shipment.
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Observations and Findinas On January 28,1998, the inspectors attended a prejob briefing for the transfer of waste from the storage location in the radiation waste building to a high integrity coMainer for eventual shipment offsite. The purpose of the briefing was to discass the waste transfer that was to occur later that day and to incorporate lessons learned from an e::rlier lift of the waste liner.
Participants in the briefing provided suggestions for reducing radiation exposure, and job
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responsibilities for the waste transfer were defined. The briefing was good with one
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exception. A participant asked what should be done if the waste 1:ner were to drop during transfer. The supervisor present did not directly answer this cuestion and the question was not answered during the briefing. The inspector discussed this with the
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radiation protection manager.- The radiation protection manager stated that this did not l
meet his expectations and stated that a contingency plan for a dropped waste liner would be developed prior to transferring the waste.
The licensee determined that another briefing needed to be conducted. This briefing was excellent. All members involved in the radwaste movement were present, and probing questions were asked concerning contingency plans if the radwaste movement
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did not go according to plan. The licensee had performed an actual movement of an empty container to determine how much time would be required to perform the radwaste i
movement and the estimated dose rates along the waste transfer path. The briefing was completed with an additional emphasis by the radiation protection manager to his staff to i
work safely and ensure that everyone involved was clear on the work to be performed.
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Conciusions i
i The inspectors identified a weakness in the thoroughness of a prejob briefing for movement of a radwaste container, The licensee conducted a second briefing which appropriately addressed potential contingencies that could occur during the radwaste j
movement.
F4 Fire Protection Staff Knowledge and Performance F4.1 Adeauacy of Firewakh
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InspeClion Scooe (71750)
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The inspectors questioned a firewatch on his duties.
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Qb1EYations and Findinas On January 25,1998, the licensee initiated a continuous firewatch in the cable Lpread room in response to issues surrounding a smart fire. Specifically, it was identified that a smart fire could cause hot short circuits that could cause Shutdown Cooling isolation Valves HCV-347 and -348 to spuriously open. If the valve opened it could result in an intersystem loss of coolant accident. In response, the licensee established a continuous firewatch as a compensatory measure fcr the smart fire scenario until power was removed from the shutdown cooling isolation valves.
On January 27, during a tour of the cable spread room, the inspectors questioned a firewatch on what his duties were if a fire occurred in the cable spread room. The firewatch was not sure what all of his duties and responsibilities were. The inspectors informed the shift supervisor and the individual was replaced. In response, the licencee
retrained all firewatches, provided them with written explanatioris that described why they were standing watch, and provided them with a written list of their duties. Listed duties of
the firewatch included using the telephone to call the control room, at the provided
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-9-extension number, if any evidence of a fire was noted. On February 5, the licensee
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realized that there was not a telephone in the cable spread room. Following this discovery, guidance was provided to the firewatches to contact the control room using l
the Gaitronics.
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Conclusions The inspectors identified that a firewatch was not sure of his duties and responsibilities.
In response to the inspectors' observation, the licensee retrained all firewatch personnel.
The guidance provided to the cable spreading room firewatches regarding notification of the control room could not be performed as originally written.
F4.2 Resoonse to Containrrent Fire Detection Alarm a.
Insoection Scoce (71750)
On February 9,1998, at approximately 2:45 p.m., the control room operators received a fire alarm indicating a potential fire inside containment. The inspectors responded to the control room and observed the licensee's response to the fire alarm.
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Qbsprvations and Findinos Fire Detection Zone 11, which consists of 13 detectors around the outside of the basement level of Containment Elevation 994 feet, came into alarm.
The control room crew held a briefing to discuss their plan of action and fire brigade members were directed to make a containment entry to determine whether a fire existed inside containment. The control room operators had no indications of elevated temperatures or any other abnormal activity inside containment.
The inspectors noted that the control room operators had the appropriate procedures available and in use. The inspectors discussed the response time with the fire brigade
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members. Two members of the fire brigade and a health physics technician entered containment dressed in full fire protection gear. The time from the initial alarm until entry into containment was approximately 35 minutes. All necessary equipment was available and functional.
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Conclusions The inspectors considered the fire alarm response by the fire brigade and the control room operators to be goo.
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o V. Manaoement Meetings I
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
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The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management on March 2,1998. The licensee acknowledged the findings as presented.
The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection period should be considered proprietary. No proprietary infonnation was identified.
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ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee J. Chase, Plant Manager R. Clemens, Manager, Maintenance D. Dryden, Station Licensing S. Gambhir, Division Marager, Engineering and Operations Support W. Gates, Vice President, Nuclear R. Jaworski, Manager, Design Engineering, Nuclear R. Phelps, Manager, Station Engineering R. Ridenoure, Supervisor, Operations R. Short, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations INSPECTION PROCEDURES USER IP37551:
Onsite Engineering IP 61726:
Surveillance Observations IP 62707:
Maintenance Observations IP 71707:
Plant Operations IP 71750:
Plant Support Activities ITEMS OPENED. CLOSED. AND DISCUSSED Ooened 50-285/9804-01 IFl Component cooling water pump breaker troubleshooting (Section M2.2)
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