IR 05000285/1987025

Insp Rept 50-285/87-25 on 871001-31.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Ler Followup,Plant Tours,Operational Safety Verification,Security Observations,Safety Related Sys Walkdowns & Monthly Maint Observations

ML20236X412
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	12/02/1987
From:	Harrell P, Reis T, Westerman T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236X395	List: IR 05000285/1987025 ML20236X394 ML20236X404
References
50-285-87-25, NUDOCS 8712090176
Download: ML20236X412 (19)

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APPENDIX B_ li U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50 285/87-25 License: DPR-40 Docket: 50-285 Licensee: Omaha Public Power District (OPPD)

1623 Harney Street Omaha, Nebraska 68102 Facility Name: Fort Calhoun Station (FCS)

Inspection ~At: Fort Calhoun Station, Blair,. Nebraska Inspection Conducted: October 1-31, 1987

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l Inspector: M AiO) (1-(,-67 P. W.%rit1/denfor ReMttenCRe#ctor Date nspect

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T. Reis, Re"s1/ dent Reactor Inspector Date Approved: td - /t/2/E7 T. F. Westej' man, Chief, Projec Date' '

Sectio H , Division of Reactor Projects i

8712090176 871204 DR ADDCK 0500g2 5 l

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n Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted October'1-31, 1987 (Report 50-285/87-25)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including followup on previously. identified. items,-licensee evert report followup, operational safety-verification, plant tours, safety-related system walkdowns, monthly maintenance observations, monthly ~, surveillance observations, security observations, radiological protection observations,.in-office review of periodic and special reports, review of'an allegation related to'a rumor that fuel assemblie received just prior to~ the.1985 refueling outage could not pass receipt inspection' requirements, review of the nonlicensed training program, review of the 10 CFR Part~21 program, followup on an onsite event related to the failure of Emergency, Diesel Generator 2, and followup on an order for modification _ of license related.to Event V valve Results: Within the 15 areas inspected, one . violation (failure to take prompt corrective action for identified fire door deficiencies, paragraph 5) was identifie J f

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

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Gates, Plant Manage C. Brunnert, Supervisor, Operations Quality Assurance M. Core, Supervisor, Maintenance

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T. Dexter, Supervisor, Security-

• H. Falhaber,' Supervisor, Electrical Engineering, Generating Station-Engineering

- J. Fisicaro, Supervisor, Nuc1 car Regulatory and' Industry Affairs .

• J. Fleuhr, Supervisor, Station Training J. Foley, Supervisor,' I&C and Electrical Field Maintenance

• L. Gundrum, Plant Licensing Engineer R.'Jaworski, Section Manager, Technical' Services 1 J. Kecy,~ Acting Reactor Engineer R.tKellogg, Supervisor, Mechanical, Technical Services J. Lechner, Acting Plant Engineer D. Munderloh, Supervisor,. Nuclear Licensin'g-T. Patterson, Supervisor, Technical

• A. Richard, Manager, Quality Assurance

• G. Roach, Supervisor, Chemical'and Radiation Protection

• R.-Scofield, Supervisor, Outage Projects '

• D. Trausch, Acting Sup'ervisor, Op'eration *S. Willrett, Supervisor, Administrative Services and Security

• Denotes attendance at the monthly exit intervie The NRC inspectors also contacted other plant personnel, including operators, technicians, and administrative personne . Followup on- Previously ' Identified Items (Closed) Severity Level IV Violation.285/8634-02: Failure to properly install . fire barrier / security door This violation concerned the failure to provide adequate procedures for the installation of fire barrier / security doors, and the failure to install fire barrier / security doors in accordance with the procedures that were provide Three fire barrier and/or security doors were installed contrary to the j documented procedures,'and the procedures did not provide appropriate j quantitative' acceptance criteria as related to Underwriter's 1 Laboratory (UL) standards.- To summarize, work proceeded past unsigned {

hold points; work-completed signatures were entered in the procedures, j when certain steps had in fact not been completed; and work was verified '

as completed when a door did not meet all UL standard ..

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As a result of.this violction, the licensee initiated two operations ~

incidents (01) concerning this event. -An 01 is an internal licensee document that descr.ibes the actions necessary to be completed to provide specific and generic corrective actions for.a plant event. 0Is 2621 and 2625_ required that; personnel involved be~ interviewed and counseled on the importance'of adherence to. procedures. The. door installation problems were corrected via the issuance of maintenance orders (MO) 864475 and 870028.- A' memorandum was written and circulated to all generating station engineering personnel describing.the violation and detailing the reasons for the. violation. The memo.. stressed the importance of procedural compliance, verification of . work completion prior to signing' .

work-completed steps, and ensuring that verification of completed proc'edure steps'is performed by an' appropriately qualified individua In an effort to eliminate the lack of quantitative acceptance criteria, the memo stressed that care was warranted when citing a manufacturer or i industry standard and that references to a drawing with specific criteria should be provided whenever possibl The NRC inspector reviewed the actions taken by the licensee and it appeared that the actions corrected the identified problems associated L with door installation and will reduce.the probability of recurrence of similar problem . Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of selected records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine that deportability requirements were fulfilled, immediat corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications (TS).

The LERs listed below are closed:

87-002 Initiation of the ventilation isolation actuation signal (VIAS) due to unknown causes87-011 Initiation of engineered safeguards features (ESF) due to automatic transfer of Inverter ~C 87-015 Initiation of ESF due to automatic transfer of Inverter D  ;87-024 Unplanned actuation of the VIAS c.tused by Radiation Monitor RM-062

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A discussion of the closeout of each LER is provided beloin f

l LER 87-002 was issued by the licensee to report an event related to

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the initiation of the VIAS due to a high reading on RM-052. The

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licensee reported,'at the time ~of the event, the plant was in' hot shutdown,and no activities.were in progrgss that could have caused'

the RM-062. reading'to. increase. All systems affected by a VIAS-functioned'normall The' licensee reviewed the cause for the high reading and could not determine the reason'for the. initiation'of.the VIAS. A review was .

performed by the NRC inspector, of all activities performed by the licensee, to verify that the followup actions were. adequate 1in attempting to determine the VIAS initiating event. Based on the.:

review performed by'the NRC inspector, no protiems were identifie It appeared that-this event was due to indeterminate reasons. The NRC inspector will look for a recurrence of.this event during future LER review b. lLERs87-011 and 87-015 reported events where partial actuation of

. engineered safeguards features (ESF) occurred'due to the automatic'

-transfer of an inverter from its normal, operating: mode to its-bypass transformer mode, the alternate source of power. During the-transfer, the voltage on the inverter bus dropped causing the unblocking of the pressurizer pressure low signal, safety injection actuation signal,' containment isolation actuation signal, and VIA Unblocking of the'above signals caused initiation of the signal circuits; however, since the plant was in a refueling outage,

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. operation of the equipment associated with the signals, except for the VIAS,.was not initiated because the equipment was in a pull-to-lock condition, as' allowed by the TS. During both events, all equipment' associated with the VIAS functioned normally.

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To resolve the problem with the inverters, the licensee issued-testing procedures in attempt to determine the cause of the voltage drop during transfer from the normal to the. backup power supply. - The

. procedures, approved by the plant review committen, were issued as attachments to M0s 872838 and 872768. The procedures were issued to verify that the inverters could transfer from the normal to the backup supply without a degradation of bus voltage. The results of the tests indicated that theLinverters would transfer without voltage degradation. The testing did not identify the' problem that had been previously experience The NRC inspector reviewed the test procedure and the test result Based on this review, it appeared that the procedures adequately

prescrioed a testing method and that the conclusions reached by the i licensee accurately reflected the test performe Since these events occurred, the licensee experienced additional events where inverters transferred. from the normal to the backup supply. In each of these events, no problems occurred due to the transfers. The NRC inspector will look for a recurrence of this event during future LER review l l

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ia LER 87-024 reported an inadvertent actuation of the VIAS during j

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calibration of Radiation Monitor RM-062. The VIAS.was-initiated when - 4

,r an instrument'and control (I&C) technician connected test equipment 1 to the radiation monitor'to test the high alarm set point. The test i equipment was not reset, so when the technician energized the

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l equipment, a signal was introduced which inadvertently tripped the - o VIA The VIAS system functioned.as designe l

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Action to prevent recurrence of~this. event.has been performed by!

issuance of< applicable procedure changes. Calibration Procedures CP-050, CP-051, CP-060, CP-061, and CP-062 " Electronic

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Calibration Procedure,". for each plant radiation monitor, were 3 changed to add a' precautionary.y step to require the technicians to-verify the test equipment has been reset prior to connection to the-monito The NRC inspector reviewed the procedure changes issued by the licensee. Based on the review,.it appeared that appropriate action had been taken to correct-the'cause of this event. It also appeared L

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.that the procedure changes will preclude-recurrence of this event.

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'.No' violations or deviatl ions were Eidentifie J Operational Safety Verification The NRC inspectorsL conducted reviews and observations of selected activities to verify. that facility operations were performed in conformance with'the' requirements established under 10 CFR, administrative i procedures, and the TS. The NRC inspectors made several control room-observations to verify the following:

l . ' Proper shift staffing l

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. Operator adherence to approved procedures and TS requirements

. Operability of reactor protective system and engineered safeguards

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. Logs, records, recorder traces, annunciators, panel indications, and switch positions complied with the appropriate requirements L

. Proper return to service of components j i

. M0s initiated for equipment in need of maintenance

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. Appropriate conduct of control room and other licensed operators

. Management personnel toured the control room on a regular basis No violations or deviations were identifie l

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i 1 Plant Tours

.q The NRC" inspectors conducted plant. tours at various' times to assessLplant j and equipment conditions. The fo_110 wing items were observed during the l

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tours:

. General plant co'ditions, n including operability of standby equipment, )

'1-were satisfactor . Equipment was being maintained in proper condition, without flui q leaks and excessive vibratio $

e . Plant housekeeping and cleanliness practices were observed, including no fire hazards'and the' control of combustible material.

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. Performance of work activities was.in accordance with approved procedure Portable gas cylinders were properly stored to prevent possible

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missile hazard . . Tag out of equipment was performed properl . Management personnel toured the operating spaces on a regular basi . The auxiliary feedwater pumps were not steam boun During a. tour of the plant on October 20, 1987, . the NRC inspector noted that-Fire Door 989-9.was unlatched. With the fire door unlatched, the TS fire barrier requirement of Door 989-9 was not me The NRC' inspector latched the fire doo During'.four of the previous six inspection periods, March 1 through October 31, 1987, the NRC inspector noted problems related to'TS fire barriers. being nonfunctional due to unlatched fire doors. On'12 .l occasions, Fire Doors 1011-1, 989-11, 1007-37, 1007-38, 989-13, 989-9, and 1 1013-6 were found to be unlatched on one or more occasions. In NRC Inspection Reports 50-285/87-10, issued for the inspection ~ period of-

' April 1987, and 50-285/87-20, issued for the inspection period of July 16 through August 30, 1987, the NRC inspector reported that discussions had been held with licensee management personnel to stress the need for additional attention in the area of maintaining. fire barriers in a functional status. Even though the discussions were held, the additional level of management attention was not provided as evidenced by continuing problems in maintaining fire barriers in a functional statu ,

Criterion.XVI of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 states, in part, that !

measures:shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality.-such as deficiencies, are promptly corrected.

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Paragraph 4.1.1 of Section 10.4 of the licensee's Quality. Assurance Plan states, in part, that. conditions adverse to quality,.such as deficiencies,-

shall be corrected as soon as practicabl Contrary to-the above, the:NRC inspector identified 12 deficiencies'

' involving seven fire doors <that did not' properly latch, thus making the.TS fire barrier nonfunctional,- and'no corrective action was taken by: license management to correct the identified deficiencies. -The. deficient fire-door . latching mechanisms involved Fire Doors'989-11, 989-13, 989-9, 1011-1, 1007-37, 1007-38, and 1013-6, and.were'previously identified in NRC Inspection Reports 50-285/87-06, 87-10,'87-15, and 87-20. .This:is'an apparent violation of the failure by licensee. management to take corrective actions:for problems identified with fire door .(50-285/8725-01)

Upon notification'by the NRC inspector, the liceasee adjusted the latch on Fire Door 989-9 and returned the door to a fully functional. status. The repair work was completed via MO 87486 . Safety-Related System Walkdowns The NRC inspector walked'down accessible portions of the following safety-related systems to verify system operability. Operability was determined by, verification of selected valve and switch positions. The systems were walked down using the drawings and_ procedures note j

. Containment spray system (Procedure 01-05-1, Revision 16, and Drawing E-23866-210-130, Revision 37)

. Main steam system (Procedure 01-MS-1, Revision 13, and 1 Drawing 10405-M-253, Revision 46) ]

. Normal 4160-volt electrical distribution ~ (Procedure 01-EE-1, i Checklist A, Revision 10, and USAR Figure 8.1-1, Revision 32) l

During the walkdowns, the NRC inspector noted minor discrepancies of an 1 editorial. nature between the drawings, procedures, and plant as-built I conditions for the selected areas checked. No discrepancies were noted during the walkdown of the containment spray syste The NRC inspector noted two minor physical deficiencies with plant ,

equipment during the containment spray system walkdown and brought them to l the attention of the licensee. M0s were initiated and repairs were 1 completed for the identified deficiencies. The deficiencies were an abnormality with a valve position indicator and a valve exhibiting  ;

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excessive packing leakage. The deficiencies would not have affected the

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operation or safe operability of the syste l Minor editorial discrepancies were noted in Procedures 01-MS-1 and  ;

01-EE-1, Checklist A during the walkdown of these systems. None of the

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conditions noted affected the operability or. safe operation of the systems. Licensee personnel' stated that'the noted; minor discrepancies

'would be correcte No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observations The NRC inspectors reviewed and/or observed selected station maintenance-activities .on safety-related . systems and components to verify the maintenance was conducted in accordance'with approved procedures,-

regulatory requirements, and the TS. The following items were considered during the reviews'and/or observations:

. The TS limiting conditions for operation were met while systems or components were' removed from servic . Approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work, i

. Activities were accomplished using approved M0s'and were inspected, as applicabl . Functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to servic . Quality control- records 'were maintaine . Activities were-accomplished.by qualified personne . Parts and materials used .were properly certifie . Radiological and fire prevention controls were implemente The NRC inspectors reviewed and/or observed the following maintenance !

activities:

. Repair of a charging pump power supply breaker (M0 874749)

. Repair of a leaking flange on the component cooling water system (M0 873956)

. Replacement of the motor on RM-057 (M0 873891)

. Repair of an oil recirculation pump on an emergency diesel generator (M0 873869)

. Repair of fire doors (M0 864475 and 870028)

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. Testing of Inverters C and D (M0 872768 and 872838)

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. Repair of Fire Door 989-9 (M0 874860)

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. Correction of. labeling in auxiliary feedwater cabinet (M0 874709)

No' violations or deviations were identifie . ' Monthly Surveillance Observations The NRC' inspectors observed selected portions of the performance of and/or reviewed completed documentation for the TS required surveillance testing on safety-related systems and components. The NRC inspectors verifieci i the following items during the testing:

. Testing was'. performed by qualified personnel using approved procedure . Test instrumentation was calibrate . The TS limiting conditions for operation were me . Removal'and restoration of the affected system and/or component were accomplishe . Test results conformed with TS and procedure requirement . Test results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the tes . Deficiencies identified' during the testing were properly reviewed and

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resolved by appropriate management personne i The NRC inspectors observed and/or reviewed the documentation for the i following surveillance test activities. The procedures used for the test activities are noted in parenthesi . Automatic initiation of- the auxiliary feedwater system (ST-FW-3)

. Inservice inspection of a raw water pump (ST-ISI-RW-3)

. Monthly inspection of a station battery (ST-DC-1)

. Auxiliary feedwater pump steam supply valve inservice inspection (ST-ISI-MS-1)

. Monthly inspection of the diesel fire pump battery (ST-FP-2)

During'the observation of the performance of ST-FW-3, the NRC inspector j noted that test circuit jacks were incorrectly labeled in the test cabinet The.I&C technician performing the test was aware the jacks were improperly labeled and was able to perform the test correctly. The L _ _ _ -_a

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labeling deficiencies were corrected via M0 874709. .The revised labeling was reinspected by the NRC inspector and found to be satisfactor No violations or deviations were identifie . Security Observations The' NRC inspectors verified the physical security plan was being implemented by selected observation of the following items:

. The security organization was properly manne .j

. Personnel within the protected area (PA) displayed their identification badges.=

. Vehicles were properly authorized, searched, and escorted or controlled within the P . Persons and packages were properly cleared and checked before entry int'o the PA was permitte . The effectiveness of the security' program was maintained when security equipment failure or impairment required. compensatory measures to be employe . The PA barrier was maintained and the isolation zone kept free of transient materia . The vi.tal area barriers were maintained and not compromised by breaches or weaknesse '

. Illumination in the PA was adequate to observe the appropriate areas at nigh . Security monitors.at the secondary and central alarm stations were functioning properly for assessment of possible intrusion .

No violations or deviations were identifie . Radiological Protection Observations The NRC inspectors verified that selected activities of the licensee's radiological protection program were implemented in conformance with the facility policies and procedures and in compliance with regulatory requirements. The activities listed below were observed and/or reviewed:

. Health physics (HP) supervisory personnel conducted plant tours to ,

check on activities in progres . Radiation work permits contained the appropriate information to ensure work was performed in a safe and controlled manner.

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. Personnel in radiation controlled areas (RCA).were. wearing the-required personnel-monitoring equipment and protective clothin ..

. . = Radiation and/or contaminated areas were properly posted and

' controlled based on the activity levels within the are . Personnel properly frisked prior to exiting an.RC . Personnel were aware of and actively participated in the as low as reasonable achievable (ALARA) progra The licensee did not meet its 1987 exposure goal of 345 man rem. Current exposure on self-reading dosimeters is 442 man rem and data available through the end of August 1987 accounted for 370 man rem on thermoluminescent dosimeters. .The'ALARA exposure goal was derived.from a 5 year commitment to the Institute'of. Nuclear Power Operations (INP0) and-data available from previous outages. The exposure goal was set prior to ,

completion of.the refueling outage maintenance schedule and appeared not- '

to have been formulated with the appropriate < input to make it an achievable goa The licensee was making efforts to improve ALARA goal setting-in the future. The former ALARA coordinator had been transferred to outage scheduling. His experience in man-rem estimates and redcction methods should assist in establishing more realistic ALARA' goals in'the futur No violations or deviations were identified, j 11. In-office Review of Periodic and Special Reports In-office review of periodic and special reports was performed by the.NRC resident inspectors and/or the Fort Calhoun project inspector to. verify the fol. lowing, as appropriate:

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. Reports included the information required by appropriate NRC requirement ,

. Test results and supporting information were consistent with design predictions and specification . Determination that planned corrective actions were adequate for resolution of identified problem . Determination as to whether any information contained in the report should be classified as an abnormal occurrenc The NRC. inspectors reviewed the following:

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September monthly operating report, dated October 13, 1987 fl .

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. Additional information on the Fort Calhoun internals vibration monitoring system, dated October 13, 1987 No violations or deviations were identifie . Review of an Allegation (Reference 4-86-A-127)'

'The NRC' inspect'or reviewed an allegat' ion related to a rumor that the fuel assemblies received just prior to the 1985 refueling' outage could not pass the established quality control inspections. A prior review was performed into the structural integrity of the fuel and was documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-285/87-2 The-purpose of this portion of the allegation followup was to' review the

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fuel _ receipt inspection records generated when the fuel was received on site. The NRC inspector performed the following:

. Review of' Procedure SP-NFR-1, "New Fuel Receipt," to verify that receipt inspection requirements were clearly establishe ~

. Verification that the individual performing the inspection was qualified per the licensee's established progra . -The receipt inspection records were completed in accordance with the established requirements in Procedure SP-NFR- . Any anomolies noted during receipt inspection activities were properly dispositioned by the appropriate personne The review performed by the NRC inspector revealed that the receipt inspection records had_been satisfactorily' completed by qualified personnel. ' Inspection of each fuel bundle, included a verification by a qualified licensee individual and by a representative of the fuel supplier, Exxon Nuclear Company (ENC), that the bundle met established

. requi rements. During inspection of the fuel assemblies, licensee personnel noted that 4'of the 44 bundles received had minor problems (e.g., bent tab and white residue on a fuel pin). In each case, the documentation indicated that a qualified licensee individual and the ENC representative had reviewed the identified problems and had determined that the fuel bundles were acceptabl Based on the documentation reviewed by the NRC inspector, it appeared that j the fuel . bundles were properly receipt inspected and all identified l

anomolies were properly dispositione No violations-or deviations were identifie . Nonlicensed Training Program The NRC inspector reviewed the nonlicensed staff training program to verify the program was being implemented in accordance with the

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. requirements of Section 5 of the ,5, Chapter 12'of the Updated Safety

' Analysis Report and ANSI 3.1-197 ne review' included examination of training records-and discussions with licensee personnel; 'The review also

. included verification that selected personnel met the experience requirements for the' position held as defined by. ANSI 3.1. In the selected cases reviewed,. personnel qualifications exceeded the appropriate requirement The licensee recently revised the nonlicensed training programs as part of

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an effort to achieve INP0 accreditation for the overall program. .The K revised training programs employ INP0 concepts of performance-based training and the-licensee was pursuing an INP0 review for accreditation'.'

The review was scheduled for the first quarter of'198 The NRC ir.spector reviewed the following training. program master plans (TPMP) to verify that the appropriate requirements had been implemente .j Plan Designation Title STA-TPMP Shift Technical Advisor-Training Program Master Pla A0N-TPMP Auxiliary Operator Nuclear-Training Program Master Plan RP-TPM Radiation Protection Technician-Training Program Master Plan EON-TPMP Equipment Operator Nuclear-Training Program Master Plan I&C-TPMP Instrumentation and Controls-Training Program Master Plan Based on the review performed, it appeared that the licensee had j implemented comprehensive and effective training programs for nonlicensed '

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No violations or deviations were identifie ]

1 Review of the 10 CFR Part 21 Program This review was continued from a review that was initiated during the previous inspection period. The previous review was documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-285/87-2 The NRC inspector reviewed a selected sample of the available documentation for evaluations performed by the licensee for self-identified conditions, deviations, or circumstances. Based on this review, it appeared that the licensee was performing an adequate revie l j

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'The.NRC inspector.also reviewed evaluations performed by the-licensee for

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deviations, conditions, or circumstances identified by users,-vendors, or suppliers. The evaluations were performed to determine the applicability of the identified problem to the safe operation of the facility. The

evaluations 1 reviewed by the~NRC inspector are. listed below:

User,L Vendor, or Supplier Subject .,

Valcor Valves- Failure of valve springs Validyne Component failures in transducers-Georgia Power' Failure of springs i Valcor valves Promatec Defective fire barrier seals Northeast Utilities Cracks in charging pump blocks Foxboro N-Ell and N-E13 transmitter deficiencies Airco Defective weld electrodesL Seimens-Allis Defective. reactor coolant Engineering pump antirotation device Atwood and Morrill Defective stationary sleeves on main steam isolation valves Niagara Mohawk Improper electrical. manhole duct seal design Automatic Valve Degradation of aluminum valves using Houghto 620 lubricant Automatic Sprinkler Model C valves and Mercury ;

Company check devices failed to open '

Isomedix Measurement tolerance concerns on dose and dose rates for qualification tests Arizona Nuclear Fire in emergency diesel Power Project engine injector Basler Electric Cracking of 0-rings on Fairbanks-Morse diesel engines Cooper-Bessemer Internal failure of an emergency i diesel engine

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Vermont Yankee Defective spring packs in Limitorque valves 50R Gas bubbles in pressure switches Bechtel Pipe support tolerance and-

. installation procedures Public Service of Deficiencies with air-start Colorado motors on anLemergency diesel engine j The NRC inspector noted that the following Part 21 reports provided by users, vendors, and suppliers were still under review by the licensee:

User, Vendor, or Supplier Subject TEC Defective Model 914-1 valve flow monitors Virginia Electric Defective Inland Steel Company. products i

l Foxboro Defective E-line and H-line

instruments

! General Electric' HFA armature binding Gibbs and Hill Qualification of the containment recirculation line l Niagara Mohawk Improper seating of Agastat GP-

[ Series relays

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Toledo Edison Inadequate instructions for maintaining torque balance i

switches Indiana Electric Defective parts supplied for an auxiliary feedwater pump Sacramento Municipal Warping of Limitorque limit Utilities District switch rotors i Foxboro Defective SPEC 200 current-to-voltage cards

Morrison-Knudsen Failures in 125-volt relays l

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The NRC inspector reviewed approximately 30 purchase orders.to verify that

the licensee had included the requirements of Part 21, as appropriate. No'

examples were noted where Part 21 wasn't appropriately include During an inspection performed in January 1987 the NRC inspector noted two areas where the licensee needed to provide additional attention. The two areas are discussed below:

. .The licensee was not providing training in the area of Part 21 for licensee personnel. The licensee established a training program for appropriate personnel, including training during general employee training and retraining classes

. The licensee had not established an internal tracking system for ensuring Part 21 reports were being reviewed. The licensee implemented a' tracking system to establish documentation that Part 21-reports have been received and that an appropriate review had been complete Based on the review performed by the NRC inspector, it appeared that the licensee had established a program for effectively reviewing Part 21 reports and taking action,'when necessar No violations or deviations were identifie . Followup on an Onsite Event During this inspection period, the NRC inspectors continued to followup on an onsite event that occurred on September 23, 1987. The event was the failure of Emergency Diesel Generator 2 to perform its intended safety function during surveillance testing. The diese'l failure was caused by water entering the instrument air system on July.6, 198 The details of the followup are provided in NRC Inspection Report 50-285/87-2 . Review of Licensee Actions Related to an Order for Modification of License On April 20, 1981, an order for modification of license was issued by the NR The Order was related to the requirement for establishment of a TS amendment for testing of valves of an Event V configuration. Valves of an Event V configuration are those valves located in high pressure / low

. pressure system boundaries which provide the potential for an intersystem loss-of-coolant acciden The NRC inspector performed the reviews listed below to verify that the licensee had properly implemented the requirements of the Order. These reviews are in addition to previous reviews performed and documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-285/86-0 i

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ALTS was implemented in:accordanc'e with the' requirements'of the

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' Orde .. Test. procedures were established lto implement: the requirements of the' <

LT , . 'The. test procedures provided an acceptable l test ' method.'

. ' Test. data for past testing l activities 1 indicated results within the established TS: acceptance criteria.-

The.NRC inspector reviewed.the TS manual:and'noted that the licensee had:

submitted and received approval from the NRC, of a TS amendment to. include the requirements stated in the 0rder. TS 2.1.1(12) appropriately 1 implemented the'~ requirements of the Order by specifying the valves"tha '

requir.'ing testing an'd the: acceptance criteria for. valve. leakage rates.

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The licenseeLissued Procedures ST-CV-1, " Leak Test of HPSI System .

- Secondary Check Valves": for high pressure safety injection.(HPSI)~ Check

. Valves SI-195, SI-198,.SI-201, and SI-204, and'ST-CV-2, " Leak' Test of LPSI-

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. System Secondary Check Valves,"ifor low pressure' safety injection (LPSI)

Check Valves SI-194,- SI-197,! SI-200, and 51-203 .to implement, the)  !

requirements.of TS 2.1'.1(12). The NRC inspector reviewed Procedures:ST-CV-1,and.ST-CV-2,.and' determined that they. contained the-

.following elements: i

. :The' procedures specified that each check valve be tested; individually-in lieu of.being. tested in pair . .The. testing frequency specified was the'same as required by theIT . .As-found leakage'was' recorde . Leakage rate adjustments were made to correct the data obtained during testing: pressures.to a differential pressure of 2100 psid which is experienced lduring plant' operations, ds

. Evaluations of the' data were reviewed to. verify compliance with established TS acceptance' criteria.

W The NRC inspector reviewed selected tests completed in accordance with the requirements,of Procedures ST-CV-1 and ST-CV-2. The review indicated that the . leakage. rate through each.of

the check valves was a maximum of . gallons per minute (gpm). This value is within the acceptable limits'for leakage..as.specified.in the T '

The plant .,as an installed.' leakage system that continually monitors the backflow through combined injection flow Check Valves SI-216,.SI-220,

.

SI-208, and-SI-212. The combined injection flow through the check valves  !

-includes HPSI, LPSI, and flow from the safety injection tanks. This leakage' monitoring system contains a flow meter and necessary valves to l

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determine the amount.and source of leakage from any of the four check valves. The licensee logs the_value of.the leakage'on the control room-

' logs and monitors'the_ system for any abnormal _ condition The NRC inspector reviewed'a selected sample of the control room logs and noted that the reading for the total combined flow from the'four check valves has been consistently less than 0.5 gp This is within:the acceptable limits as specified by_the T Based'on the' reviews performed by the NRC inspector,las discussed above,

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it ~ appeared that the licensee had properly implemented a leakage testing program that complied with the Order.' A review'of the test results

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obtained by the licensee indicated that the Event'V valves continued to perform their intended safety function by meeting the acceptance criteria specified in the T No violations or' deviations were identifie . Exit Interview The NRC inspectors met with Mr. W. G. Gates (Plant Manager) and other j members of the licensee staff at the end of this inspectio At this '

meeting, the NRC inspectors summarized the scope of.the inspection and the finding !

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