ML20055G326

Responds to to AR Blough Concerning NRC Findings of Reasonable Assurance Re Emergency Preparedness at Plant. Reasonable Assurance Exists Now & Existed When NRC Permitted Initiation of Power Ascension Program Above 5% Power

ML20055G326
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	07/13/1990
From:	Martin T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	Fleming J AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
Shared Package
ML20055G327	List: ML20055G326 ML20055G334
References
NUDOCS 9007230051
Download: ML20055G326 (5)

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l R L 1 3 1999 Ms. Jane A. Fleming

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Duxbury, Massachusetts 02332 g

Dear Ms. Fleming:

I am responding to your letter to Mr. A. Randy Blough dated May 6,1990. In your letter you do not agree with Mr. Johnson's answer regarding the NRC's finding of reasonable assurance regarding emergency preparedness at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station-and _believe his answer was unresponsive to your February 25,1990 allegations, l which you also enclosed. In response, I shall outline the methodology the NRC -l' employs 'to determine' reasonable assurance, and then answer the specific questions in your February 25, 1990 letter.

- The NRC's final rules on emergency preparedness became effective in 1980. Plants  !

which were 'then currently licensed (Pilgrim was licensed in 1972) were required to i meet all new requirements regarding emergency preparedness by April 1,1981, except i for the installation of public notification systems, which had to be completed by q February 1,t1982. Since then, for all licensed operating power reactors, the NRL nas 1 required that the'overall state of emergency preparedness provide reasonable assurance '

that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological q emergency.  !

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Regarding 10 CFR 50.47(a), during 1981 through 1982, the NRC based its reasonable j

L..  : assurance _ findings for reactors on (1) submittal of licensee and State and local j Egovernment emergency plans upgraded to meet the requirements of the final rule, (2) i NRC reviews of onsite emergency plans, (3) a comprehensive emergency preparedness appraisal conducted during 1981 through 1982 by the NRC at each operating reactor site to verify implementation of licensee plans, and (4) evaluations of joint emergency exercises involving each licensee and State and local governmental organizations. The onsite portion of the exercise was observed by the NRC while the offsite portion was l

observed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The results of the  ;

offsite exercises were documented by FEMA in reports to the NRC. The review and analysis of these reports provided the basis by which the NRC determined that there p was an adequate level of emergency preparedness at operating nuclear power plants, including the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station.

On August 6,1987, FEMA withdrew its finding that Commonwealth and local emergency plans for Pilgrim were adequate. This withdrawal was based on specific emergency preparedness issues as identified in FEMA's Self Initiated Review. At the

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Jane A. ' Fleming 2' time, the plant was voluntarily shut down for concerns not related to emergency .

preparedness. - The NRC staff judged the deficiencies identified by FEMA to be significant enough that the NRC stated that the plant would not be allowed to restart until improvements were made in the plans and some limited demonstrations of those

improvements were observed.

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-In NRC licensing proceedings, FEMA findings constitute rebuttable presumptions on

' questions of adequacy and implementation capability. However, for operating reactors, Lthe Commission explicitly provided procedures to be followed in cases in which NRC finds that the state of emergency preparedness "does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency". If the NRC makes such a finding and such deficiencies are not corrected i in 4 months, the NRC will determine whether the reactor shall be shut down until the deficiencies are corrected or whether other enforcement action is appropriate (10 CFR 50.54(s)). Again, the NRC is to base its finding on a review of FEMA's findings as to whether State and local plans are adequate and capable of being implemented. In view of FEMA's schedule for review of the revised Commonwealth and local plans for adequacy, which was dependent upon submittals by the Commonwealth, the staff was obligated to address whether to invoke 10 CFR 50.54(s) in connection with

- consideration of whether to permit restart when the existing Confirmatory Action Letter was satisfied. That is, whether the circumstances required that the NRC determine that the state of emergency preparedness "does not provide [the requisite] reasonable

. assurance". While 10 CFR 50.54(s)(3) required the staff to consider the FEMA finding of deficiencies reflected in the 1987 FEMA Self Initiated Review and Interim Finding report, it did not require the staff to ignore developments and improvements and other

'information significantly bearing on emergency preparedness in the area requiring improvement which had occurred in the time period after FEMA issued its 1987 report.

Thus the NRC, as it would do for any operating reactor, initiated a review of the -

FEMA findings as well as other pertinent information with the objective of ensuring that the licensee took appropriate steps to assist the Commonwealth and local governments in addressing the deficiencies in offsite preparedness identified by FEMA.

The NRC staff did not, subsequent to FEMA's Self Initiated Review, make a finding "...

that the state of emergency preparedness does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency ..." associated with the Pilgrim facility.

Regarding 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), the staff is aware of no serious flaws. During the October 12-13, 1989 exercise, communications worked properly. The sirens were not planned to be operated during the exercise, and their operation was not part of the exercise objectives. An annual test was conducted in 1989 and this test revealed the sirens worked properly. The staff is not aware of any problems with the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS). During the exercise, problems were identified by FEMA N kh $"

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Jane A. Fleming- 3 I 8 1990 a

regarding the~ coordination of siren sounding times and for the transmission of hard copy EBS messages to the local towns. Correction of these areas was demonstrated in a remedial exercise on May 25,1990.

Regarding 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), the issuance of a public information brochure is an annual requirement. An interim brochure had been distributed late in 1987. The 1989 public information brochure was distributed in August and September,1989. FEMA had reviewed the 1989 brochure and found it acceptable prior to distribution.

Regarding 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), the staff considers that adequate emergency facilities and equipment are in place. You are correct that the Wellesley Reception Center for-Duxbury is not complete, but as of this date it is essentially complete, and the NRC has determined that the Wellesley Reception Center could fulfill its function in an actual emergency. You are also correct in your statement that there are no specificallyl designated host schools for Duxbury. However, Massachusetts has addressed this concern by developing an Executive Order, ready to be signed if necessary, which designates the Massachusetts Criminal Justice Training Academy in Needham as the Duxbury . host school. The Executive Order also gives the Commonwealth the authority to designate other schools to accommodate any overflow. Duxbury officials are also negotiatin'g with Needham officials to have the Needham schools designated as host schools. The NRC and FEMA use 20% of the population in the emergency planning zone as a planning basis for assessing the monitoring capability of reception centers.

. The staff considers the Reception Center and Host Schools adequate to fulfill their

roles. In summary, the NRC was aware of these issues, and considered the current status of these issues as well as the progress towards resolving these issues, prior to making a decision to allow Pilgrim to operate at greater than 5% power.

Regarding 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), the staff considers that adequate methods and systems

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for monitoring offsite releases are in place. These methods for both on-site and off-  !

' site monitoring include portable and fixed moaitoring equipment and are capable of measuring releases regardless of origin (i.e., .firect torus vent).  !

Regarding 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), the stafi considers that an adequate range of protective actions is in place. The lo;al towns around Pilgrim have developed 3 procedures for a range of protective ections including evacuation and sheltering. The NRC regulations do not require that there be a range of protective actions that includes both evacuation and sheltering options, for all accidents at all times at all locations within the EPZ With regard to your statement as to the Spengler and Keller wind study, the staff has previously considered coastal wind conditions. Although we are not aware of any concerns with our analysis of coastal winds, we would evaluate the validity of any information not previously provided to the staff, including the Spengler and Keller study, if that is provided to the staff. Regarding your statement that 217 l

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JUL 2 3 ;gg Jane A. Fleming . 4-buses are available and 457 buses are needed, FEMA has reviewed in detail the.

transportation requirements and availability and has determined that they are adequate -

Rega'rding 10 CFR 50.47(b)(12), the staff considers that adequate medical services are in place based upon the capability of the area hospitals, as well as their patient care abili. ties. Additionally, BECo has letters of agreement with these hospitals and provides

. training and drill support.

.Regarding'10 CFR 50.47(b)(13), the staff considers that recovery and reentry procedures are adequate, Further, FEMA did not identify any major problems with recovery and reentry in its 1987 report or during the October 12-13, 1989 exercise.

Regarding 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), you are correct in your statement that not all emergency response personnel had been trained prior to the NRC permitting Pilgrim to operate above 5% power However, many key response staff had received training and this included many school supervisors, as well as teachers. This training was considered sufficient to allow the power ascension program to continue.

Finally, in a July 9,1990 telephone conservation with members of my staff, you

-indicated 'that the staff is aware of a letter from the Chairman, Board of Selectmen of Duxbmy to the NRC Commissioners that disputes the information reported in our Status.of Emergency Preparedness Report to the Commission. Neither I, nor my staff, are aware of this information.

-In summary, the staff considers that reasonable assurance exists now, and existed at the time the NRC permitted the initiation of the power ascension program above 5%

power. I know that your views differ from those of the NRC. However, the NRC positions have been established after considerable study of the issues, and I and my staff are confident that the health and safety of the public in the vicinity of Pilgrim are adequately protected.

Sincerely, gaginal S16uod BY t Thomas T. Martin Regional Administrator cc:

R. Strome, Director, FEMA Region I m.m e p r wn 3 pawn UgNCN, )Yud2,0 Ubi 2

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