IR 05000344/1987007

Insp Rept 50-344/87-07 on 870301-0411.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Maint,Surveillance & Followup on Previously Identified Items

ML20210A885
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	04/21/1987
From:	Rebecca Barr, Mendonca M, Suh G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20210A843	List: IR 05000344/1987007 ML20210A837
References
50-344-87-07, 50-344-87-7, GL-84-24, GL-85-09, GL-85-9, NUDOCS 8705050184
Download: ML20210A885 (10)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report No. 50-344/87-07 Docket No. 50-344 License No. NPF-1 Licensee: Portland General Electric Company 121 S. W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name: Trojan Inspection at: Rainier, Oregon Inspection conducted: March 1 - April 11,1987 Inspectors: M ^

/n 2' d 7 R. C. Barr // Date Signed Senior Resident Inspector M%~ -

f, , Y/k / P3 G. Y. Suh / Date Signed Resident Inspector Approved By: ~

9[u8 7 M. M. Mendonca, Chief Date Signed Reactor Projects Section 1 Summary:

Inspection on March 1 - April 11, 1987 (Report 50-344/87-07)

Areas Inspected: Routine inspection of operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, follow-up on previously identified item Inspection procedures 30703, 41400, 61726, 62703, 71707, 71710, 90712, 92700, and 92701 were used as guidance during the conduct of the inspectio Results: No violations or deviations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000344 G PDR

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

• D.W. Cockfield, Vice President, Nuclear

• C.A. Olmstead, Plant General Manager

• R.C. Jarman, Manager, Nuclear Quality Assurance Department

• R.P. Schmitt, Manager, Operations and Maintenance D.R. Keuter, Manager, Technical Services J.K. Aldersebaes, Manager, Plant Modifications

• J.D. Reid, Manager, Plant Services R.E. Susee, Operations Supervisor R.L. Russell, Assistant Operations Supervisor D.W. Swan, Maintenance Supervisor .

R.A. Reinart, Instrument and Control Supervisor T.O. Meek, Radiation Protection Supervisor S.B. Nichols, Training Supervisor R.W. Ritschard, Security Supervisor The inspectors also interviewed and talked with other licensee employees during the course of the inspection. These included shift supervisors, reactor and auxiliary operators, maintenance personnel, plant technicians and engineers, and quality assurance personne * Denotes those attending the exit intervie . Operational Safety Verification During this inspection period, the inspectors observed and examined activities to verify the operational safety of the licensee's facilit The observations and examinations of those activities were conducted on a daily, weekly, or biweekly basi On a daily basis, the inspectors observed control room activities to verify the licensee's adherence to limiting conditions for operation as prescribed in the facility technical specification Logs, instrumentation, recorder traces, and other operational records were examined to obtain information on plant conditions, trends, and compliance with regulations. On occasions when a shift turnover was in progress, the turnover of information on plant status was observed to determine that all pertinent information was relayed to the oncoming shift personne During each week, the inspectors toured the accessible areas of the facility to observe the following items: General plant and equipment conditions, Maintenance requests and repair Fire hazards and fire fighting equipmen Ignition sources and flammable material control, Conduct of activities in accordance with the licensee's

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. 2 administrative controls and approved procedure Interiors of electrical and control panel Implementation of the licensee's physical security pla Radiation protection control Plant housekeeping and cleanlines Radioactive waste system Proper storage of compressed gas bottle The licensee's equipment clearance control was examined weekly by the inspectors to determine that the licensee complied with technical specification limiting conditions for operation with respect to removal of equipment from service. Active clearances were spot-checked to ensure that their issuance was consistent with plant status and maintenance evolution During each week, the inspectors conversed with operators in the control room, and with other plant personnel. The discussions centered on pertinent topics relating to general plant conditions, procedures, security, training, and other topics aligned with the work activities involve The inspectors examined the licensee's nonconformance reports (NCR) to confirm that deficiencies were identified and tracked by the syste Identified nonconformances were being tracked and followed to the completion of corrective actio Logs of jumpers, bypasses, caution, and test tags were examined by the inspectors. Implementation of radiation protection controls was verified by observing portions of area surveys being performed, when possible, and by examining radiation work permits currently in effect to see that prescribed clothing and instrumentation were available and use Radiation protection instruments were also examined to verify operability and calibration statu The inspectors verified the operability of selected engineered safety feature This was done by direct visual verification of the correct position of valves, availability of power, cooling water supply, system Integrity and general condition of equipment, as applicable. ESF systems verified operable during this inspection period included the Residual Heat Removal System and the Emergency Boration portion of the Chemical and Volume Control Syste No violations or deviations were identifie . Maintenance The inspectors observed selected portions of modifications to the diesel generator room for addition of a sound proof boot This addition was to comply with a commitment to the NRC. The modification was in accordance with Maintenance Request (MR) No. 87-0345. The maintenance personnel were knowledgeable of the MR requirements including fire protection. The ,

inspectors observed a stationed fire watch. The fire watch was cognizant '

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. 3 The inspectors also witnessed the alternating of the reactor auxiliary building chillers. An item of concern was identified and is further discussed in paragraph 5, " Items of Procedural Adherence."

No violations or deviations were identifie . Surveillance The surveillance testing of safety-related systems was witnessed by the inspectors. Observations by the inspectors included verification that proper procedures were used, test instrumentation was calibrated and that the system or component being tested was properly removed from service if required by the test procedure. Following completion of the surveillance tests, the inspectors verified that the test results met the appropriate acceptance criteria. Any necessary corrective maintenance was completed during the conduct of the tests in accordance with approved maintenance request (s). Surveillance tests witnessed during this period included:

PICT 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, and 5-4, " Steam Generator Level" Protection Sets I, II, III, and I No violations or deviations were identifie . Items of Procedural Adherence In a review of the licensee's Temporary Modifications Log, the inspectors identified a procedural discrepancy for Temporary Modification (TM) N , dated March 19, 1987, which may have resulted in or contributed to a disabled annunciator not being properly identified. TM 87-023 involved lifting leads and disabling annunciator K-19, labeled " Traveling Screen North High Delta P", in preparation for performing Periodic Instrument and control Test (PICT) 22-2, " Engineered Safety Features Actuation Response Time." The traveling water screens are nonsafety-related components. TM 87-023 stated that the annunciator window for K-19 would be turned upside down, but did not state that a temporary modification (TM) tag be attached to the K-19 windo Administrative Order (AO) 6-2, titled " Temporary Modifications," requires that all TMs, including disabled annunciators, be tagged with a TM tag, and that the TM form indicate where TM tags should be placed. The TM was performed on March 24, 1987. The inspectors observed on March 30, 1987, that the annunciator window was not hung upside down and did not have a TM tag attached. The inspectors brought this to the attention of the shift crew, who turned the K-19 annunciator window upside down and

, attached a TM tag. In discussions with the technician who performed the TM, he stated that he had in fact turned the annunciator window upside

down. Discussions with Operations personnel indicate the possibility of an operator unaware of the disabled annunciator subsequently turning the annunciator window right side up, especially since the window had no TH tag attache The inspectors discussed the concern of properly following procedures with plant management. A memo was issued to all supervisors which discussed the incident and discussed the need to identify multiple modifications in a temporary modification with TM tag In another instance of procedural adherence, the inspectors observed a portion of the performance of Periodic Operating Test (POT) 23-1, titled

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" Alternating Operating Equipment," in which the reactor auxiliary building chillers were alternated (standby train started and previously operating train stopped). The reactor auxiliary building chillers service nonsafety-related equipment located inside containment. The inspectors observed that the operator and electrician apparently did not follow the applicable approved procedure (Operating Instruction (01) 10-3 referenced in POT-23-1) for alternating the equipment and instead followed the instructions given on caution cards affixed to the chiller instrument panels. 01-10-3 is a quality-related procedure reviewed by the Plant Review Board, and thus deviations from its instructions are required to be processed in accordance with Administrative Order 4-2, titled "Use of Procedures." Conversations with plant personnel and review of a controlled copy of the Plant Operating Manual indicate that no applicable deviations to 01-10-3 have been processed to date. In addition, the inspectors noted that Data Sheet P0T-23-1-AB was apparently not on hand during the performance of the evolution, which appears to be inconsistent with Item I. D. of A0-3-6, titled " Conduct of Operations -

Shift Records." The inspectors discussed this instance of procedural adherence with members of plant managemen Management acknowledged the Concer . Chemistry Sampling Practices in Radiation Controlled Area The inspector observed sampling of a Boric Acid Storage Tank. For this sample, the technician leaned over the radiation control boundary, took the sample, brought the sample to the clean side of the boundary, and wiped off the sample bottle. The sample bottle was then, per the technician, to be placed in the technician's lab coat; and another sample was to be similarly taken. These observations were discussed with the Region V inspector for radiation protection and with the Radiation Protection Supervisor for PGE. The concern that the sample bottle in the technician's pocket could be contaminated was recognized by all involved in the discussion. The Radiation Protection Supervisor committed to address this issue with the chemical sampling personnel and assure that such samples would be appropriately contained (plastic bags or buckets).

This issue will be followed by routine inspection activities of the Resident and Radiation Protection inspector . Followup on Previously Identified Items Generic Letter 85-09, Reactor Trip Breaker Maintenance and Surveillance Practices,(0 pen): The licensee addressed the majority of the issues in Generic Letter 85-09 in their License Change Application 117 Rev. 2, dated. The remaining items to complete are issuance of Technical Specification changes associated with undervoltage and shunt trip surveillance testing of scram breakers. The licensee had obtained approval from NRR to defer submittal of these changes until sixty days after the approval of LCA 117 to avoid previously experienced problems associated with having two or more outstanding LCAs changing the same technical specificatio Generic Letter 84-24, Certification of Compliance to 10 CFR 50.49, Environmental Qualification (EQ) of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Plants. This generic letter requested licensees to

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. 5 certify that (a) the utility had in place and had implemented an EQ Program that will satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49; (b) the plant had at least one path to safe shutdown using fully qualified equipment, or had submitted a justification for continued safe operation (JC0)

pending full qualification of any equipment not fully qualified; and (c)

all other equipment within the scope of 50.49 is either fully qualified or a JC0 had been submitte Additionally, the licensee was requested to evaluate various information bulletins and notices. The licensee responded to the generic letter on January 28, 198 In their letter, the licensee acknowledged meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49, having at least one fully qualified path to safe shutdown and having all other equipment (with the possible exception of the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves) being within the scope of 10 CFR 50.49 being fully qualified or having JC0 submitted. Additionally, the licensee had either )

reviewed or committed to reviewing the Information Notices or Bulletins outlined in the generic letter. The inspectors verified that the followup actions the licensee committed to perform in their January 28, 1985 response had been completed. NRC verification of the licensee's compliance with 10 CFR 50.49 has been directed by TI 2515/75 & 76 and is presently scheduled to be performed in May 198 ,

8. Followup on Previous Inspection Items L

Unresolved Item, 86-10-02, (Closed): Thermal Relief Valve Testing The licensee had not been testing approximately 20-25 thermal relief valves as part of the In Service Testing (IST) Program. At the close of inspection 86-10, the licensee was not able to identify the section of the ASME code that exempted thermal reliefs from testing. Subsequently, the licensee had identified the OM-10 1985 draft of the ASME code as exempting thermal reliefs from IST. The inspectors verified thermal reliefs are exempted from IS Followup Item, 85-07-01, (Closed): Completed ISI Inspections versus Code Requirements. As a result of inconsistencies between the 10-Year Plan, examination reports for outages, ISI drawing and ASME B & PV code requirements (1974 Edition and Addenda through Summer 1975), the licensee requested in a March 6, 1986 letter that Westinghouse evaluate and correct the identified discrepancie The inspectors reviewed the Westinghouse response for adequacy and discussed the response with the licensee. Only two items remain to be performed to complete the 10 year ISI requirements (24-class 3 hydrostatic tests and a weld examination of the pressurizer surge line to vessel weld). These are planned to be completed during the 1987 refueling outag Followup Item, 85-16-04,(Closed): Leak Rate Testing of The Fuel Transfer Tube Bellows. Inspection 85-16 identified that the licensee was performing Type A leak rate testing on the Fuel Transfer Tube Bellow The inspectors concluded that 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, required bellows penetrations be Type B tested. The licensee disagreed with the position, but in 1986 outage performed Type B testing of all bellow sealed penetrations while waiting for clarification on this concern by NRR. The 1986 testing of the 4 bellows assemblies at Trojan indicated acceptable leakage rates. NRR clarification concluded that Type B testing is required for the fuel transfer tube bellow The licensee has agreed to

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. 6 submit a FSAR change requiring all bellows be Type B teste Type B testing of the bellows penetrations for the 1987 refueling outage had been planned prior to the receipt of the NRR clarificatio Followup Item 86-37-01 (Closed): As previously reported, the licensee reviewed and reanalyzed the effects of high energy line breaks (HELB)

outside of containment as a result of the identification by Westinghouse in June of 1984, that release of superheated steam could result in the event of a mainsteam line break. The original analyses, completed in 1975, had assumed the release of only saturated steam. The licensee's review identified several assumptions and conclusions of the original analyses which could not be supported by the current reanalyses using present day analyses assumptions and state-of-the-art analytical techniques. The assumptions and conclusions included the following:

safety-related equipment in the "A" switchgear room, "A" and "B" emergency diesel generator rooms, "A" and "B" auxiliary feedwater (AFW)

pump rooms, and the remote shutdown panel room would be isolated from the effects of a HELB which did not consider the potential entry of harsh environment through the ventilation openings in these rooms; the rollup doors to the diesel-driven AFW pump room and the "A" train switchgear room would withstand the maximum differential pressure expected to occur after a postulated HELB; and the pressure buildup in the turbine building would be limited to 1 psig by failure of a portion of the building's metal siding. These assumptions and conclusions in the original 1975 HELB analyses performed by the licensee's contractor were developed and reviewed within the contractor's organization. The licensee reviewed these assumptions and conclusions during plant construction and concluded they were reasonable. The licensee's current analyses considered the entry of a harsh environment into rooms containing safety-related equipment in the as-found condition (plant condition before temporary modifications described below were made) and indicated that the auxiliary feedwater system could have been subjected to an environment for which it was not qualified. The licensee's corrective action included measures to effectively seal the rooms containing safety-related equipment from a postulated HELB harsh environment, modifications of portions of the turbine building metal siding which included pressure release fasteners to allow pressure relief following a postulated HELB, and the performance of an environmental qualification review and completion of a justification for continued operation for safety-related equipment in the turbine building which concluded that equipment required for safe shutdown was either environmentally qualified, was capable of performing its safety function prior to significant exposure to a harsh environmental, or would fail in a manner not detrimental to plant safet The licensee is also preparing more detailed environmental qualification profiles for equipment located in the turbine building and will replace selected instrumentation and equipment with fully qualified Spipmen The inspector reviewed detailed construction packages and arn mpanying field change notices of Request for Design Change (ROC) 86-04 :, which implemented the modifications made as a result of the HELB reanalyses, and inspected a portion of the modifications, including the steel plates which cover the rollup doors of the "A" train switchgear room and diesel i

driven AFW pump room and the back draft dampers on the vents of the "A" AFW pump room and the remote shutdown panel roo A temporary l

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. 7 modification made by the licensee to mitigate the pressure buildup effects of a postulated HELB was the removal of portions of the siding of the east and south walls of the turbine buildin The siding has been subsequently reinstalled after being modified to incorporate pressure release fasteners. Measures to protect equipment from cold weather effects during the time the siding was removed, were previously reported in Inspection Report 86-44. The inspector reviewed the maintenance requests, maintenance pick up item forms, and operations records which implemented these measures. In addition, the inspector reviewed and inspected cold weather protective measures taken upon removal of a portion of the turbine building west wall as part of RDC 83-031 which deals with the rebuilding of the condenser during the 1987 refueling outage. A review of major work packages involving turbine building modifications either related to the reanalyses of HELB or for other modifications performed during the same time period as the HELB related f modifications, was performed to ascertain if changes were being made to the seismic design of the turbine buildin The review of RDC 86-042 related to HELB effects, RDC 83-031 related to the rebuilding of the main cendenser, and RDC 83-033 related to tube bundle replacements for various feedwater heaters indicated that all work which affected the structural capacity of the turbine building to withstand a safe shutdown earthquake were performed to allow equipment access in order to complete the work specified in the various RDC _

Based on the inspection described above, Followup Item 86-37-01 is closed. The licensee's environmental qualification review and revised HELB cnalyses will be reviewed by NRR upon completion of the licensee's environmental qualification profile studie This review will be tracked in the followup of LER 86-1 . Fire Watch Patrols In a routine review of licensee response to recent instances of nonfunctional penetration fire barriers, the inspector identified a case where the requested hourly fire watch patrol was not performed for several hours for a safety-related area. The action required by the applicable Technical Specifications Limiting Condition for Operation (T.S. 3.7.9 Penetration Fire Barriers) was met, however, as the licensee had posted during the same time period a security officer on one side of the nonfunctional fire barrier on a continuous 24-hour basis. Although the security officer's specific orders were related to security functions and did not include fire watch duties, the security officer's general duties include the reporting of fire Thus, a continuous fire watch was in plac The nonfunctional penetration fire barrier was the east wall of the Turbine Building switchgear room, as reported in Nonconformance Report 87-025 on February 20, 1987. The licensee verified the operability of the fire detectors in the switchgear room and established an hourly fire patrol for the Turbine Building switchgear room. A review of the licensee's Roving Fire Watch Log indicated, however, that on February 25, 1987, the Turbine Building switchgear room was not listed on the fire watch log, and thus the performance of an hourly fire patrol for the room was not documented. A review of the computer records for entry and exit

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, 8 through the card-key controlled doors of the room indicated that for 14 of the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of February 25, 1987, a fire patrol officer entered and exited the roo Discussions with security personnel who perform the fire patrols suggest that the fire watch log may not always be carried by the officer performing the fire patrol This may be the reason the room was patrolled even though the room was not listed on the fire watch log and the security officers failed to notice the omission of the room in the listing of the lo Although this appears to be an isolated case of missed fire watch patrols, the need for increased controls was discussed with licensee management. The ifcensee has subsequently made addenda to the fire patrol post orders requiring that security personnel carry the fire watch log while conducting the fire patrols and that an independent verification by a second security officer be made of the listing of areas to be patrolled for each da . Part 21 Follow-up The licensee reviewed each of the following Part 21 reports for eplicability. As part of the applicability review, the licensee sea ched equipment files to ascertain if the component (s) of concern was used at the facility for safety-related functions. When the licensee determined the Part 21 report to be applicable, corrective actions were taken or planned to be taken. The inspector reviewed the licensee's determination of applicability and corrective or planned corrective actions for effectivenes P (Closed): Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Limitorque motor operated valve (MOVs) motors lead insulation embrittlement. The licensee repaired or contracted the repair of the motor leads. The leads were repaired to D0R guidelines. PGE plans to upgrade the motor leads during the 1987 refueling outage to the criteria set forth in NUREG-0588 (Category 1).

86-18-P (Closed): Limitorque MOV limit switch cracked rotors. White molded limit switch rotors in the SMB series Limitorque Motor Operators were observed to contain cracks near the actuation shaft groove pin The licensee has verified that no white molded limit switch rotors are used at Trojan. NRC field verifications will be performed in the upcoming Equipment Qualification inspectio P (Closed): Degradation of Electrolytic Capacitors in Foxboro H Line instrument The licensee ascertained that no Foxboro H Line instruments are used in safety-related applications. Additionally, the licensee believes the Trojan calibration program is capable of identifying instrumentation drift caused by failing component P (Closed): Defective Weimar Electronics Underpower Relays. The licensee concluded that no Weimar Electronic products are used at the Trojan facilit P (Closed): Atwood & Morrill Company, Inc. Thrust Bearings Deficiency. While modifying the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV), the licensee noted chat the stationary sleeve on three of four thrust

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.- 9 bearings extended beyond to rotating face. The bearing's stationary sleeve was machined, installed in the MSIVs and the values tested to verify proper operatio P (Closed): Buchanan 724 terminal strips for use in Limitorque MOVs. The licensee reviewed purchase records and determined no 724 terminal strips had been procured. Additionally, the ifcensee is scheduled to remove all terminal strips during the 1987 refueling outag P (Closed): Static "0" Ring (SOR) series 1, 8 and 9 pressure switches setpoint drif The licensee examined procurement records and verified that they do not use these models of SOR pressure switches in safety-related application . Exit Interview

, The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 1 on April 16, 1987, and summarized the scope and findings of the

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