IR 05000344/1987039
| ML20237B184 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/24/1987 |
| From: | Mendonca M, Pereira D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20237B130 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-87-39, NUDOCS 8712160078 | |
| Download: ML20237B184 (7) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:_ _ _. _ _ _ _. _ . . . .. . , U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V ' l Report No: 50-344/87-39 l < Docket No.
50-344 License No. NPF-1
Licensee: Portland General Electric Company
121 S. W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name: Trojan Nuclear Plant Inspection at: Rainier, Oregon Inspection Condu e: Nov mber 2-6, 1987 Inspector: ,/ dab . ' M /p1
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D. B. Pereira, Reactor Inspector Date Si'gned Approved by: % /m% a/ eve 7 M. M. Mendonca, Chief, Date Signed l Reactor Project Section 1 Summary: Inspection During the Period of November 2-6, 1987 (Report 50-344/87-39) Areas Inspected: This routine, unannounced inspection by the Project Inspector involved the areas of Instrumentation Maintenance, and onsite followup of Licensee Event Reports.
During this inspection, inspection procedures 30703, 62704, and 92700 were used.
I Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
l i I l 2160078 973394 g ADOCK 05000344 PDR
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... .. .. .. . l j .. . . ) l i DETAILS-l 1.
Persons Contacted a.
Licensee Personnel
- C. A. Olmstead, Plant Manager
- M. J. Singh, Acting Manager, Operations and Maintenance
- M. Cooksey, Supervisor, Control and Electrical Maintenance
- E. Curtis, Acting Manager, Plant Services C. H. Brown, Manager, Quality Assurance Operations
- D. Nordstrom, Engineer, Nuclear Safety and Regulation Department
- W. L. Kershul, Engineer, Nuclear Safety and Regulation Department R. Russell, Supervisor, Operations J. Purcell, Acting Supervisor, Instrument and Control
- M. Snook, QA Specialist, Nuclear Quality Assurance Department b.
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission '
- G. Suh c.
Oregon Department of Energy H. Moomey, Oregon Resident Inspector
- Attended the Exit Meeting on November 6, 1987.
2.
Instrumentation Maintenance The purpose of this inspection was to determine whether corrective and i preventive maintenance activities relative to instrumentation components and systems were performed in accordance with licensee-approved procedures and instructions.
In addition, these procedures and instructions were reviewed to ensure they met the requirements of regulatory guides, industry codes and standards committed to by the licensee, as well as the requirements of the unit Technical Specifications (TS).
a.
Review c' Procedures The inspector reviewed the procedures for the licensee's corrective and preventive maintenance program.
This review determined the following: (1) Administrative approvals exist for removing the item from service and returning it to service, with attention to system lineup and verification prior.to its return to service.
(2) Hold points exist for inspection / audit and signoff by QA.
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(3) Provisions exist for returning the maintained item and the affected system to the original configuration following maintenance, and verifying that the configuration is correct.
) I (4) Provisions exist for operational testing of the item maintained l and the affected system following maintenance.
! (5) Provisions exist to assure that materials, parts, and components are correct and suitable, including environmental qualification.
(6) Provisions exist for assuring that limiting condition for operation requirements of the TS are identified and satisfied during the repair period including the verification of redundant system. operability when required.
! (7) Provisions exist for the control of housekeeping and for l cleaning safety-related systems / components during maintenance.
j i (8) Provisions exist for obtaining approval from operations prior , to start of work, as well as notifying operations when affected l l systems are removed from service and when systems are ready to ! be restored to normal service.
' (9) Provisions exist for the removal of jumpers, restoration'of lifted leads, reinstallation of instrument tubing, and removal of test devices.
(10) Provisions exist for acceptance criteria; including performer and verifier signoff.
(11) Provisions exist to record measurement and test equipment l identification numbers and calibration dates.
' During this review of procedures, the inspector discovered in Periodic Instrument and Control Tests (PICTs) 3-1 and 3-2 (test of alarm functions and trip setpoint settings of turbine first-stage pressure channel, steam flow channels, feedwater flow channels, and steamline pressure channels) that paragraphs 7.2.12.2 and 7.2.12.3 did not include channel headings which would serve to enhance procedure clarity.
However, by inference and experience, the Instrumentation and Control (I&C) personnel knew which channel they were testing.
By direct observation, the inspector noted that the I&C personnel could proceed with PICT 3-l's and 3-2's succeeding paragraphs without confusion.
In addition, in the " Returning the System to Operation" section, paragraph 7.3.7.5 in PICT 3-2, requires returning the steam dump interlock switch to ON.
This steam dump interlock switch was never repositioned during the performance of the procedure nor the initial preparation.
Based on the inspector's comments, the licensee began reviewing the PICTs.to determine the corrective actions needed to revise them.
These items are designated open item 87-39-0 ; .. . .
i l . Although these procedural discrepancies have no significant safety concern, similar identified problems with procedural compliance'and issuing procedure deviations aggressively have been discussed with the 1icensee in previous NRC inspection reports including Inspection . Report 87-40.
It appears that the message from licensee management to stop and obtain a deviation prior to proceeding has not yet been fully received or understood.
Although Administrative Order 4-2, entitled, "Use of Procedures," describes the use and control of written plant procedures, and also clearly provides the administrative methods of issuing deviations, it appears based on recent NRC findings that licensee personnel have not implemented the procedure change process to its full potential.
As a whole, the instrumentation maintenance procedures appeared to acceptably maintain safety-related systems and components at the quality level required to perform their intended safety functions.
b.
Work in Progress The inspector observed work in progress associated with PICTs 3-1 and 3-2 as well as Barton pressure transmitter calibrations.
The observation of the PICTs and Barton pressure transmitter calibrations determined the following:
(1) Operational personnel were notified and a clearance issued to ' perform the PICTs or transmitter calibrations.
(2) Maintenance work orders were issued and approved by the shift supervisor.
(3) The latest approved procedures and instructions were used.
(4) Properly specified parts and materials were identified for the activity, and qualified test equipment and tools were used.
(5) Qualified inspection personnel were signing off at designated . procedural steps and proper restoration of barriers and covers was accomplished.
QC personnel witnessed the torquing of the Barton pressure transmitter's covers and signed the maintenance , work request.
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(6) Proper identification of jumpers and lifted leads was maintained.
) (7) Required system preparations were accomplished and verified prior to functional testing.
(8) Satisfactory functional testing was performed prior to returning the system to operations.
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Review of Records I The inspector reviewed records associated with completed maintenance activities to determine the following: i l
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(1) Required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work.
(2) The acceptance criteria were met, and approved.
(3) Referenced procedures were approved and appeared adequate for the maintenance activity.
(4) Functional testing, adjustments, and calibrations, as necessary, were completed prior to returning the equipment to operations.
(5) The corrective and preventive maintenance records were assembled, stored, and retrievable as part of the maintenance history.
During the review of completed instrument maintenance activities, the inspector noted that the majority of the procedures recorded the test equipment used in the procedure with their serial numbcrs.
The inspector found one or two records out of about 50 or 60 with incomplete test equipment serial number designation in the test equipment section of the data sheet.
This test equipment was ramp generators used in the various PICTs and was a previous finding in Inspection Report 85-36.
The inspector felt that the data sheets as
i a whole were acceptably completed, but stated that added emphasis should be given to the I&C personnel to ensure that all test equipment used is recorded.
Based upon the program review, observation of work in progress, and a review of completed instrumentation records, the inspector determined i that the licensee has an acceptable instrumentation maintenance program.
I Based on the inspector's observations, the instrumentation maintenance program meets the requirements of regulatory guides, industry codes and i standards committed to by the licensee.
' No violations or deviations were identified in this area of inspection.
3.
Barton Transmitter Investigation ! On October 30, 1987, the licensee discovered that twelve Barton pressure transmitters were indicating unusual low pressure readings.on steam line/ steam generator pressures (approximately 830 psig vice 880 psig).
The licensee performed monthly surveillance on these instruments and found all twelve instruments, Barton Model 763A pressure transmitters, exhibiting a 30 to 50 pound "zero adjust drift," and that the " span setting" on several instruments drifted slightly.
The licensee recalibrates all the instruments and was verifying the instruments against a Heise gauge installed in the 'A' steam line on a shiftly basis.
The steam pressures provide signal input to steam line delta P for safety injection and delta P for AFW pump speed control.
The inspector arrived onsite November 2,1987, to review the instrumentation maintenance program and decided to follow this proalem as well.
The inspector reviewed the calibration of the steam pressure J mm
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transmitters, one of which the I&C personr.el were performing daily at that time. One of the Barton transmitters was recalibrates on November 2, 1987 and found to be acceptable.
The Barton factory representatives arrived onsite November 4,1987, and proceeded to check the four spare Barton transmitters still in the I&C shop for drift. The Barton representatives concluded that the problem had to do with the calibration procedure in that the licensee personnel did not cycle the transmitter 3 times prior to calibrating the pressure transmitters. The licensee felt that the instruments had excessive drift and that it was not the calibration procedure or personnel error. The licensee has not yet incorporated the vendor's recommendation.
On November 4, 1987, the licensee performed calibrations on Barton transmitters PT-516 and PT-535 early in the day, and both transmitters I had out of specification readings.
These specification readings were attributed to incorrect connections to a Fluke meter during the calibration process. The licensee reperformed the calibrations using the correct ground connections with the same Fluke meter (T-6375) and determined that instrument PT-535 had one out of specification low
reading caused by the incorrect Fluke ground connection earlier in the ' i day.
Instrument PT-516 had several out of specification low readings.
The licensee subsequently recalibrates these transmitters.
On November 6, 1987, the inspector determined from discussions with the licensee that the Barton transmitter calibrations were in specification l and did not appear to be drifting. The licensee was continuing to calibrate the transmitters at a reduced frequency..This issue was also being followed closely by the resident inspectors, and will be tracked as open item 87-39-02.
4.
Onsite Followup of Licensee Event Reports a.
Licensee Event Report (LER) 87-12-LO (Closed) Control Room Boundary C_ompromised Due to Removed Duct Panel LER 87-12-L0 describes the events on May 13, 1987, during the 10-year Inservice Inspection hydrostatic test of Train B of the Service Water System, where a duct panel on the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CB-1) Train "B" was removed to allow an inspection.
Following completion of this inspection of the cooling coils for leakage, the duct panel was not reinstalled. This resulted in an unintended degradation of the control room ventilation boundary.
The cause of this event was personnel error. The engineer performing the inspection was not aware that the control room boundary was being maintained in Mode 6 during core alterations as required by administrative procedures. A contributing cause was that the control room had the appearance that the ventilation boundary was not being maintained because the main control room door was propped open. The door a s open to support maintenance activities and control rocm operators and maintenance workers were aware of the need to immediately close the door in the event of an incident requiring emergency control room ventilation. Since it
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_ . . . . appeared that the boundary was not being maintained instructions on placards which are located on CB-1 duct access ports cautioning against opening the duct and requiring Shift Supervisor notification were not followed, nor were administrative procedures followed.
The immediate corrective actions were to stop fuel movement, replace the duct panel which restored the control room boundary, and to counsel the engineer involved on the need to maintain the control room boundary in Mode 6 ' In addition, Administrative Order 3-21, " Control Room Emergency Ventilation Boundary" was reviewed and it was confirmed that sufficient guidance is provided on the need to maintain the control room boundary in Mode 6 during fuel movement.
The long term corrective action was to develop enhanced work controls on ventilation systems, floor drains, and seismic restraints.
Work on such systems could have a similar impact on both trains and the Plant Review Board decided to track it via Commitment Tracking Log record 20724.
All licensee corrective actions, except for long term corrective action have been completed.
Based on the licensee's corrective , actions and future action, the inspector considers LER 87-12-L0 closed.
5.
Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 1 on November 6, 1987, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
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