IR 05000344/1987029

Insp Rept 50-344/87-29 on 870720-24.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Emergency Planning Program in Areas of Detection,Classification of Emergencies & Protective Action Decisionmaking

ML20238A534
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	08/11/1987
From:	Brown G, Fish R, Tenbrook W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20238A519	List: IR 05000344/1987029 ML20238A516
References
50-344-87-29, NUDOCS 8708310117
Download: ML20238A534 (8)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report No. 50-344/87-29 Docket No. 50-344 License No. NPF-1 Licensee: Portland General Electric 121 S. W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name: Trojan Nuclear Plant Inspection at: Rainier, Oregon i Inspection Conducted: July 20-24, 1987 Inspected by: NMd.<r.I., /od h///f7 '

G. A. Brown, Emer'gency Preparedness Analyst Date' Signed-d& Fadr W. K. TenBrook,dRadiation Specialist Midn Dat'e Sigiled Approved by: Ndad_ // I7 R. F. Fish, Chief Date Sigried l

Emergency Preparedness Section Summary:

! Inspection on July 20-24, 1987 (Report No. 50-344/87-29)

i Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection of the licensee's emergency planning program in the areas of detection and classification of emergencies, protective action decisionmaking, notifications and communications, changes to the emergency planning and preparedness program, and emergency response trainin The status of licensee action on previous inspection findings was l also reviewe Inspection procedures 82201, 82202, 82203, 82204, 82206 and I 92701 were use Results: No violations or deficiencies were identifie One unresolved item was identified.

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DETAILS Persons Contacted PGE Personnel l

T. Andione, Shift Supervisor S. Chiotti, Assistant Shift Supervisor

• D. Cockfield, Vice President, Nuclear

• J. Dunlop, Acting Manager, Quality Assurance N. Dyer, Manager, Radiation Protection J. Ferguson, Security Watch Supervisor K. Hanson, Shift Supervisor J. Heitzmann, Shift Supervisor

• S. Nichols, Training Supervisor j

• D. Nordstrom, Compliance Engineer

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• C. Olmstead, General Manager, Trojan J. Perrin, Shift Supervisor

• J. Reid, Manager, Plant Services M. Richards, Licensed Auxiliary Operator  :

J. Ross, Licensed Auxiliary Operator

• R. Russell, Operations Supervisor

• R. Schmitt, Manager, Operations and Maintenance R. Sherman, Emergency Planning Engineer

• Snook, Acting Branch Manager, Quality Assurance / Operations

• J. Thale, Lead Engineer, Emergency Planning

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G. Wachs, Licensed Auxiliary Operator  ;

• T. Walt, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Regulation j Contractor Personnel

• S. Harlos, Contract Engineer, ATESI, In Others

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J. DeFrance, Director, Columbia County Office of Emergency Services

• Denotes attendance at the July 24, 1987 exit intervie . Follow-up On Open Items (0 pen) Open Item 87-03-0 Revise emergency response organization lesson plans by August 1, 1987 to incorporate the results of the analysis of training requirements. This item will remain open pending completion of the lesson plan revision (0 pen) Open Item 87-03-0 Clarify the duties and responsibilities of the Emergency Coordinator in the Technical Support Center (TSC). A new TSC procedure, EP-101, is being developed. EP .01 provides the Emergency Coordinator with line items and check blanks to verify that all' assigned duties are being accomplished. This item will remain open pending implementation of EP-10 _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - - _ - - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - _

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. 2 (0 pen) Open Item 87-03-1 Review and revise applicable emergency procedures to' incorporate input from the exercise evaluation The Nuclear Safety and Regulation Department (NSRD) Commitment Tracking List (CTL) was' reviewed for procedure change items mandated by the 1986 axercise. The applicable items were compared to the new Radiological Emergency Response Plan (RERP) Procedures. All items sampled were addressed in the new procedures. This item will remain open pending implementation of the new RERP procedure No violations or deficiencies were identified during this part of the inspectio . Changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program The inspectors reviewed the changes made to the licensee's emergency planning organization and emergency response facilities to determine how such changes have affected the overall . state of emergency preparednes Several changes have occurred in the licensee's emergency planning organization and staffing. The Radiation Protection Manager has been relieved of many emergency planning duties including coordination of emergency plan and procedure revisions, oversight of drill and exercise scenario development, conduct of drills and exercises, and implementation of corrective actions resulting from problems observed in drills and exercises. These duties have been reassigned to a full-time Lead Emergency Planning Engineer. The Lead Engineer has been given charge over two additional emergency planning engineers. One engineer is responsible for implementation of emergency planning actions on-sit The second engineer implements licensee emergency planning actions off-site, and also serves as a liaison between the licensee and the various off-site authorities that would respond in an emergency. A third engineer has been provided to assist implementation of on-site emergency planning on a part-time basi The licensee also has appointed four senior managers to coordinate emergency planning implementation in each of the four emergency response facilities (ERF's). Each manager has the responsibility to participate in the development and review of procedures related to their respective facilities, assure that the facilities are in readiness, and provide the resources and personnel needed to carry out drills and exercise Also, each manager has a key emergency response position in the ERF assigned the The emergency response facilities have undergone several changes. The control room now includes a dedicated conferencing telephone (SS-3 phone)

between the control room, Technical Support Center (TSC), and Operations Support Center (OSC). Also, an override paging microphone has been added to assure that important plant messages from the control room are promptly relayed to plant personne In addition, a new shift supervisor emergency station has been established to provide a convenient space for the shift supervisor and other control room personnel to carry out ,

emergency response duties while monitoring plant operation !

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.- 3 The'0SC has undergone several changes as a result of weaknesses observe in the 1986 RERP exercise. New radiological controls have been established at the. radiological access point and the the 45' elevator lobby. Several'two-way radios have been purchased expressly for communications between the OSC and teams in the field. The OSC plant status. board and emergency team status board also have been improve The inspectors noted that the Technical. Support Center (TSC) engineering personnel are now stationed near important reference materials and diagrams, and an extra engineer has been provided for continuous communications over the CR-0SC-TSC (SS-3) conference phone in the TS The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) has undergone several changes related to radiological habitability and dose assessmen All dose assessment functions previously performed in the TSC have now been moved to.the EOF. New status boards indicating present meteorological conditions and wall maps indicating dose assessment data have been.adde A continuous air monitor has been installed in the EOF emergency ventilation system. .'This monitoring rystem is capable of alarming on setpoints established for gross alpha, beta or gamma radiation from filtered particulate and filtered radiciodin The safety parameter

' display system has been programmed to capture critical plant parameters on a single display screen corresponding to parameters on plant status boards in the TSC and OS The changes noted in the emergency planning staff and the emergency response facilities are considered improvement No violations or deficiencies were identified during this part of the inspectio . Emergency Detection and Classification The inspectors examined the licensee's procedures for classifying emergencies and the licensee's efforts to provide emergency action levels to off-site authorities for annual revie This program area was inspected to determine if the licensee used and understood a standard emergency classification scheme and emergency action levels (EAls), and to determine if the classifications and EALs met NRC requirement The licensee's emergency classification procedure EP-1 contained emergency classifications consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E. Also, the emergency action levels specified for each classification were consistent with the initiating events described in Appendix 1 to NUREG-065 The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and the Director of the Columbia County Office of Emergency Services regarding the annual review ,

of the licensee's emergency action levels. Based on these discussions, l the inspectors determined that the licensee had consulted with local officials in the annual review of EALs, as require No violations or deficiencies were identified in this part of the inspectio ___-________O

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~ Prot'ective Act' ion Decisionmaking

'The inspectors reviewed the. licensee's emergency procedures as part of a determination that the licensee.has a continuous capability to assess an analyze emergency conditions, and to make recommendations to protect the public and onsite worker The procedures appeared to contain impediments which could lead to incorrect or untimely protective action recommendations by control room personne These impediments' include the

.use of Maximium Permissible Concentration (MPC) units for radioiodine action levels in procedure EP-1, and the difficult location of guidance for' authorization of emergency exposures expected to exceed 10 CFR 20 dose limit It is noted that the licensee has made improvements in

'these areas in the' revised emergency procedure packag No violations or deficiencies were identified in this part of the inspectio . Notifications and Communications The inspectors reviewed th< ' licensee's notification procedures, maintenance of the prompt notification system, and voice / data communications systems as part of a determination that the licensee is ,

maintaining a capability for notifying and communicating among licensee i personnel, offsite authorities, and the public within the EPZ during anL emergenc The licensee's notification procedures were reviewed and found to be I consistent with the licenste's classification and EAL scheme. The procedures properly specified when to notify and activate the emergency response organization. The content of emergency messages to offsite authorities was consistent with NUREG-0654 guidanc The prompt notification system (siren system), as installed, was  !

consistent with the description in the emergency plan. The inspectors l reviewed records of tests of the prompt notification system and verified that silent, growl and full-cycle tests were conducted at the required frequency. Maintenance documentation verified that prompt corrective action was taken for all problems identified during test The licensee's equipment for communications among the emergency response organization and with offsite authorities was consistent with that described in the emergency plan. Communications drills were conducted at a frequency which met or exceeded requirements, and prompt corrective action was taken for problems identified during communications test The inspectors conducted a radio check between the licensee's field team-vehicle and the EOF radio operator's console. One inspector and a radiation protection technician successfully communicated with the E0F from a designated offsite radiological sampling locatio No violations or deficiencies were identified in this part of the inspectio _ - - - -.

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. 5 7. Training The inspectors audited the licensee's documentation of emergency response training and determined that training has been provided to the appropriate personnel in the emergency response organization. The type, amount and frequency of training was consistent with licensee's requirement No violations or deficiencies were identified in this part of the inspectio . Walk-Through Observations The inspectors conducted four walk-through drills with four control room -

shift crews consisting of at least a shift supervisor and an auxiliary operator. The walk-throughs were conducted to determine the. licensee's onshift capability to assess emergency conditions, properly classify an emergency, make proper protective action recommendations, and make notifications to onsite personnel and offsite authoritie The walk-throughs also provided an opportunity to evaluate the adequacy of the licensee's emergency procedures and the effectiveness of emergency response trainin Each shift crew was presented with a scenario involving plant conditions and radiological data excerpted from the emergency action levels contained in emergency procedure EP-1, " Emergency Classification and Initial Protective Action Recommendation". Each shift crew was instructed to take all normal actions that would be performed in an actual situation, short of actual operation of plant systems or communications system The scenario began with a high reactor coolant system pressure alarm followed by indications of inadequate core cooling and failed fue Next, increasing whole body dose rates and increasing radiciodine concentrations at the exclusion area boundary were given as an indication of an unmonitored release of radioactive material. A situation involving workers trapped in a high dose rate area was also included. The final portion of the scenario involved a large loss-of-coolant accident, with concomitant increases in containment building pressure and containment radiation level In response to the scenario, all shift crews demonstrated the ability to make timely and proper notifications to plant personnel and offsite authorities. Also, each shift crew demonstrated the ability to make timely and proper protective action recommendations for the public upon classification of a Site Area Emergency or General Emergency. However, some problems were observed in the areas of classifications, onsite protective actions, and emergency radiation dose extension One shift crew failed to classify a Site Area Emergency based on a site boundary I-131 concentration exceeding 1.0 E-6 pCi/cc per EP-1, Module One shift crew required prompting to declare a Site Area Emergenc l

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. ; 6 Three shift crews failed to initiate onsite protective actions based on a site boundary whole body dose rate exceeding 2 mR/hr, or I-131 concentrations exceeding 0.4 times the Maximum Permissible Concentration (MPC) per EP-1, Figure 1-15. In addition, all shift crews failed to initiate administration of potassium iodide or the donning of respiratory protection as protective measures for plant personnel based on I-131 concentrations exceeding 100 MPC at the site boundary per EP-1, Figure 1-1 In response to a situation in which two workers were trapped under debris in a 500 R/hr area, no shift crews demonstrated familiarity with the

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recommended whole body dose limitation of 75 rem to save a life. The shift crews also found it difficult to locate guidance in the emergency procedures for emergency authorizations to exceed 10 CFR 20 dose limit One shift crew did not recognize 60 psig containment building pressure and 3000 R/hr containment building area radiation level as conditions symptomatic of a General Emergency per EP-1, Module Also, the shift crew did not reevaluate the offsite protective action recommendations in response to the containment building condition Following the walk-throughs, the inspectors met with licensee representatives to discuss the problems observed. The licensee stated that it was not their policy to train control room personnel to recognize radiological field measurements in their emergency response dutie Rather, these measurements would be interpreted by the dose assessment group in the E0F. The licensee also stated that shift crews are trained to make protective action recommendations based on plant conditions onl However, the licensee conceded that there were areas of joint concern regarding the utility of the present emergency procedures. The licensee stated that the new RERP procedures being developed would also address the problems observed during the walk-throughs and be implemented by August 31, 198 The difficulties encountered by the onshift emergency response organization demonstrate a need for the licensee to improve their ability to make timely and proper classifications and protective action recommendations based on procedural EALs and to locate significant procedural guidance. Since new procedures are in the process of being implemented, this will be considered an Unresolved Item (87-29-01).

9. Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection to discuss the inspection findings and specific concerns i regarding the shift crew walk-throughs. Licensee personnel attending the

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exit interview have been identified in Paragraph 1 abov During the meeting, the licensee reiterated its commitment to tne implementation of a new emergency procedure package with accompanying training for all members of the emergency response organization by August 31, 1987. The licensee's commitment to a new RERP procedure package will continue to be tracked as Open Item 87-03-11. The licensee was informed that Region V

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.. 7 would evaluate the effectiveness of the licensee's corrective actions after the implementation of the new procedure package to determine the disposition of Unresolved Item 87-29-0 i

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