IR 05000344/1987032

Insp Rept 50-344/87-32 on 871013-16.No Deficiencies or Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Exercise & Associated Critique & Followup on Open Items Identified During 1986 Exercise

ML20237C528
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	12/02/1987
From:	Brown G, Fish R, Good G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20237C519	List: IR 05000344/1987032 ML20237C517
References
50-344-87-32, NUDOCS 8712210361
Download: ML20237C528 (7)

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l U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report N /87-32 Docket N License N NPF-1 Licensee: Portland General Electric Company 121 S.W. Salmon Street Portland, Oregon 97204 Facility Name: Trojan Inspection at: Ranier, Oregon Inspection Conducted: October 13-16, 1987 Inspectors: ,kh h / O G. A. Brown, E6ergency Prepard- Dat'e 6igned ness Analyst, Team Leader 9tMt . 9(ord ) n brs/nv G.l M. Godd; Emergency Prepared- Date Signed ness Analyst Team Members: T. H. Essig, Senior Radiation Specialist, NRR, NRC R. Barr, Senior Resident Inspector, Trojan, NRC G. A. Stoetzel, Pacific Northwest Labora- l tories I W. Hansen, COMEX Corporation Approved by: .hh a R. F. Fish, Chief

/ k[7 Datb Signed Emergency Preparedness Section Summary:

Inspection on October 13-16, 1987 (Report No. 50-344/87-32)

Areas Inspected: Announced inspection of the emergency preparedness exercise i and associated critique and follow-up on open items identified during the 1986  !

exercis Inspection procedures 82301 and 92701 were covere j Results: No deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identifie O 4 h k kDO k

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DETAILS 1. Attendee's At Exit Interview D. Cockfield, Vice President, Nuclear C. Olmstead, General Manager, Trojan C. Yundt, General Manager, Technical Functions D. Bennett, PGE Maintenance Supervisor C. Brown, QA Operations Branch Manager F. Casella, Contract Engineer, HMM Associates N. Dyer, Branch Manager, Radiological Safety S. Harlos, Contract Engineer, ATESI, In P. Martin, Branch Manager, Trojan Plant Engineering

- T. Meek, Supervisor, Radiation Protection R. Merlino, Contract Engineer, HMM Associates H. Mooney, Oregon Department of Energy

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, B. Newman, PGE General Physics S. Nichols, Trojan Training Supervisor D. Nordstrom, Compliance Engineer J. Reid, Manager, Plant Services S. Sautter, Nuclear Information Officer R. Schmitt, Manager, Trojan Operations and Maintenance R. Sherman, Nuclear Engineer M. Singh, Outage Manager G. Stein, Manager, Performance Monitoring / Events Analysis Group J. Thale, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Safety and Regulation T. Walt, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Regulation 2. Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Open Item 50-344/87-29-0 Improve the ability of Control Room (CR) staff to make timely and proper classifications and protective j action recommendations (PARS) based on procedural emergency action ~

levels. During this emergency preparedness exercise, the CR staff j performed classifications and made PARS in an efficient and timely l manne This item is close ;

(Closed) Open Item 50-344/87-41-0 During the 1986 exercise the CR crew 3 did not meet their objective to demonstrate the ability to classify l events and complete initial notifications in a timely manner. During this exercise both actions were performed in an efficient and timely manner. This item is close (Closed) Open Item 50-344/87-41-02. The Engineering Group in the Technical Support Center (TSC) did not provide adequate support to the CR during the 1986 exercise. During this exercise the Engineering Group aggressively provided support to the CR and produced several innovative methods for mitigating casualties. This item is close (Closed) Open Item 50-344/87-41-03. The TSC did not perform timely dose assessments during the 1986 exercise. As a corrective action the licensee has reorganized the dose assessment functions so that they are

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i performed initi$11y at'the CR-then later at.the Emergency Operations

,_g Facility (EOF). This change eliminates dose assessment functions in the

'L TSC itself. Under the~ reorganization, the E0F dose assessment section

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_ will be immediately staffed by plant personnel at an Alert or higher declaration and will perform calculations under._the direction of the Duty

- Plant General Manager / Emergency Coordinator in the TSC until the EOF is l

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officially activated by the regular staf This plan worked well during i the 1987 exercis All dose calculations were per. formed accurately and' l

' timely. 'This item is close (Closed) Open I_ tem 50-344/87-41-0 The Operational Support Center (OSC)

staff did not satisfactorily demonstrate many of its objectives during the 1986 exercise. During the 1987 exercise the OSC met all objectives except for the' objective which dealt with dispatching a SCBA compressor team to refill bottle Use of self contained breathing apparatus (SCBAs) was limited during the exercise due to the scenario. During the exercise-the OSC demonstrated the ability to maintain habitability by timely establishing control points and properly using protective clothing and respirator The OSC satisfactorily demonstrated coordination of task requests from the CR and TSC. Team briefings, de-briefings and tracking were effectiv Status boards were generally well maintaine All personnel in_the OSC demonstrated a positive and aggressive attitude toward their mission. .This item is close (Closed) Open-Item 50-344/87-41-05. The E0F was not activated in a timely manner during the 1986 exercise. During the 1987 exercise the EOF was observed to be fully functioning within 35 minutes of the Alert declaratio This item is close . Emergency Preparedness Exercise Planning The licensee's Radiological Safety Branch (RSB) of the Nuclear Safety and Regulation Division has_the overall responsibility for developing, conducting and evaluating the emergency.' preparedness exercis A member i of the RSB was assigned to act as a lead controller with the responsibility to develop the scenario package and-conduct the exercis The scenario package was developed with the contracted assistance of HMM Associates. Persons involved in the scenario development were not participants in the exercis The scenario package was controlled so that players were not allowed access prior to_the exercise. Prior access was given only to authorized-agencies such as as the NRC and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), who reviewed the exercise objectives and scenario, and others with a need to know the information. The exercise was intended to meet the requirements of Section IV.F.3 of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50.

l Exercise Scenario The exercise scenario started with an event classified as a Notification of Unusual Event (NOVE) and escalated to the General Emergency classificatio The initial classification resulted from laboratory analyses indicating fuel damage in excess of specified limit A pressure excursion of the Waste Gas Surge Tank and subsequent release of

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radioactivity in excess of technical specification limits prompted the Alert declaration. The Site Area Emergency was declared for a loss of coolant accident exceeding the capacity of the charging system The General Emergency was declared due to the loss of two fission product barriers and an imminent failure of the containmen '5. Federal Evaluators Six NRC inspectors evaluated the licensee's response. Inspectors were located in the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center, and the Emergency Operations Facilit Approximately 40 FEMA, Region X, evaluators observed those portions of the exercise that involved State and local agencies, including the interface occurring at_the EOF. The results of FEMA's evaluation will be described in a separate report issued by FEM . Control Room The NRC observer evaluated the Control Room crew's ability to detect and classify emergency events, formulate protective actions, perform required notifications, analyze plant conditions and take corrective action The Control Room crew's responses were satisfactory but the following observations, which are intended to be suggestions for improving the program, were noted:

There was delay between the time of emergency classification declarations and the time they were announced over the PA syste For example, the following sequence was noted:

Declaration Elapsed Time for PA Announcement Alert 13 minutes Site Area Emer minutes General Emergency 8 minutes Those logs maintained by the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) and the SS-3 Telephone Communicator were complete and neatly maintained, however, those maintained by the Shift Supervisor and Control Room Operators were incomplete and often illegibl From the level of detail contained in the Shift Supervisor and Control Room Operator logs, reconstruction of the event would have been difficul The NRC Resident Inspector was not notified of the Unusual Even . Technical Support Center The NRC observer evaluated the Technical Support Center staff's ability to activate in a timely manner, assess and classify accidents, make dose assessments, decide on appropriate protective action recommendations, make proper and timely notifications, support the Control Room, and maintain radiological monitorin _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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l The Technical Support Center actions were satisfactory but the following l observation, which is intended to be a suggestion for improving the ]

program, was noted:

The TSC appeared to lack a method for tracking actions after it has i directed that a task be performed. For instance, the Duty Plant l General Manager directed the Control Room to determine the loss of

.l coolant accident leak rate and had to repeat the order some three 1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> later when he learned that it had not been performe . Operational Support Center The NRC observers evaluated the Operational Support Center staff's ability to timely activate and staff the facility to support the Control Room and TSC with appropriate skills and craftsme l The OSC staff's actions were satisfactory, however, the following )

observations which are intended to be suggestions for improving the program, were noted:

Briefings conducted by the CSC Director regarding overall plant status were incomplete. For instance, the OSC personnel were unaware of the actual start time of the release and they only had a ,

general idea as to the location of the plume. It appeared that the OSC Director had not been kept abreast of the overall plant conditions by other emergency response managers, so he couldn't i always give an appropriate briefing on overall plant statu '

Some r* the work forms were incorrec For example: The task for Team 4 was incorrectly stated on the for Section 4 of the work form for Team 8 was not completed after the team returne Some health physics (HP) technicians need to improve their participatio For instance: The HP technician who accompanied Team 11 was not adequately prepared to take an air sample. He had no paper to record sample information and he had to remove the tape around the glove of his protective clothing to read the time on his watc The HP technician who accompanied Team 2 over-simulated his actions by simulating both the taking of an air sample and smear . Emergency Operations Facility The NRC observers evaluated the Emergency Operations Facility staff's ability to timely activate the facility with appropriate skills and disciplines, provide offsite dose assessment capabilities, make appropriate and timely notifications, implement protective actions

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onsite, make' protective action recommendations'offsite, interface with offsite officials, and. issue information to the media.

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Performance of the EOF staff was satisfactory but the following observations, which are identified as Open Items, were noted. Open Items

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are observations of sufficient importance to. warrant NRC examination during a future inspectio There appeared to be a conflict between the licensee's emergency plan and related implementing procedures regarding specific groups that comprise special populations. .The' emergency plan definition of special population includes schools, day care centers and retirement centers as part of the special population grou However, the newly-revised-licensee procedure (No. EP-002) addresses only certain members of the security forces of nearby industries who are part of the special population group. .This conflict resulted in confusion between the licensee and offsite agencies as to the correct protective' action response for special population group The licensee's resolution of this conflict will be evaluated during a future. inspection and will be tracked as Open Item No. 87-32-0 The procedure for monitoring exposures of offsite field. teams was inadequate. .One State field monitoring team would have received almost 5 rem whole body exposure during the exercise because of a lack of' proper monitoring procedures. The current procedure requires.the E0F Dose Assessment. radio operator to poll the teams every. half hour and record the results of their pocket dosimeter readings on the " Field Team Data"' form, however, because the procedure did not provide for review of these forms by cognizant management personnel, they were filed away without further actio The licensee's resolution of this omission will be evaluated during a future inspection and will'be tracked as Open Item No. 87-32-02, 1 Critiques Immediately following the exercise, critiques were held in each of the emer'gency response facilities (ERFs). A formal critique involving site and management personnel was conducted on October 15, 198 The purpose of.the formal critique was to summarize the earlier critique session observations and present them to upper management for consideration and dispositio The-Vice President of Nuclear Operations, the Plant Manager and other executives attended this critiqu The following represent the ,

types of comments made at this meeting: l Technical staffs should review status boards more frequentl More Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) drawings are needed in the 1 TSC, only one set is availabl l i

The phone number list shows the wrong number for the EOF on the

"81-Bridge". ,l l

Questions to be passed through the SS-3 Telephone Communicator to other ERFs should be in writing rather than ora . - - - - - .

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The OSC had too many teams duplicating effort Controller prompting was noted in the OSC on two occasion One OSC inplant team did not receive a good egress rout . Changes to the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures The licensee made major modifications to the procedures in August 198 The following comments resulted from a review of the revised procedures that were examined in connection with preparing for this inspectio Paragraph 2.3.4.6 of EP-100 delegates the responsibility for NRC notification to the Shift Technical Advisor (STA). This conflicts with Figure 003-2 of EP-003, " initial Notification for Trojan Emergencies," that indicates that this NRC notification is to be made by the shift superviso EP-003, " Initial Notification for Trojan Emergencies," has no provision for a report from the Security Supervisor verifying that all notifications have been completed. In contrast, the STA is required to submit a report verifying the completion of notification The procedures do not provide adequate guidance for downgrading an emergency classificatio . Exit Interview An exit interview was held on October 16, 1987 with licensee representatives. Attendees of this interview are denoted in paragraph 1 of this repor The licensee was advised that there appeared to be an overall improvement in all areas from the previous exercise. The licensee was informed that no violations, deviations or weaknesses were identified during this inspection, but there were two open items. The items described in Paragraph Nos. 6, 7, 8 and 9 were discussed during this exit intervie !

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