IR 05000344/1987011
| ML20215J096 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/09/1987 |
| From: | Cortland P, Mendonca M, Suh G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215J079 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-344-87-11, NUDOCS 8706240317 | |
| Download: ML20215J096 (8) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No. 50-344/87-11 i
Docket No. 50-344 License No. NPF-1 License:
Portland General Electric Company 121 S. W. Salmon Street Portland, Georgia 97204 Facility Name:
Trojan Nuclear Plant Inspection At:
Rainier, Oregon Inspection Conducted:
March 23-27, 1987 Inspectors:
NAN M-
~ [e7 M
[/ 7 Paul Cortland, Metallurgist F
Date Signed 0GCB/DOEA W
- fm h/9/0 *
Gene Y. Suh, Resideni, Inspector
<V Data Signed M [7/d'7 Approved By:
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M. M. Mendonca, Chief Date Signed Reactor ProjectsSection I, Region V Inspection Summary Inspection During the Period of March 23-27, 1987 (Report No. 50-344/87-11)
Areas Inspected:
Verification that equipment important to safety will not be damaged by flooding caused by the rupture of a non-Class I system component or pipe to the extent that engineered safety features will not perform their design functions.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
8706240317 870609 PDR ADDCK 05000344 o
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- D. Cockfield, Vice-President, Nuclear i
- A. Olmstead, General Manager, Trojan l
- P. Yundt, General Manager, Technical Functions
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- J. K. Aldersebaes, Manager, Plant Modifications
- D. Keuter, Manager, Technical Services
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- P. A. Morton, Engineering Supervisor
- J. D. Reid, Manager, Plant Services
- T. D. Walt, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Regulation Department
- M. R. Snook, Acting Manager, QA Operations Branch
- R. Russell, Assistant Operations Supervisor
- A. R. Ankrum, Engineer, Nuclear Regulation Branch B. E. Fritz, Engineer, Nuclear Plant Engineering S. G. Hillier, Engineer, Nuclear Plant Engineering M. A. Hoy, Engineer, Trojan Plant Engineering G. Alberthal, Engineer, Nuclear Safety Branch D. Robinson, Electrical Engineer, Nuclear Plant. Engineering
- M. Singh, Plant Planner / Scheduler
- R. W. Fosse, Project Engineer, Bechtel Power Corp.
H. Moomey,. Resident Inspector, Oregon Department of Energy
- Denotes attendance at exit interview conducted at Trojan Nuclear Plant on March 27, 1987.
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The inspector also interviewed other personnel during the course of the inspection, including members of the licensee's technical, operating, and administrative staff.
2.
Inspection Scope and Objectives The objective of this inspection was to verify that equipment important to safety will not be damaged by flooding caused by the rupture of a non-Class I system component or pipe to the extent that engineered safety features will not perform their design functions.
The inspection require-ments are contained in NRC Temporary Instruction 2515/88, " Inspection of Licensee's Actions Taken To Implement NRC Guidelines for Protection from Flooding of Equipment Important to Safety."
3.
Separation for Redundancy a.
Criteria An inspection was made to determine that redundant equipment impor-tant to safety was separated and protected to ensure operability in the event a non-Class I system or component failed and caused flood-ing or water impingement.
b.
Observations
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The. A and B battery rooms at elevation 65 in the control building are separated by a concrete block wall.
Each of these rooms contains a drain and the bottoms of the batteries are 24 in, above the floor.
The rooms do not contain a source of water and are in close proximity to elevation 61.
The component cooling water heat exchangers (CCW HX) at elevation 45 in the auxiliary building are separated by a 24-in. barrier.
The enclosure for each heat ex anger contains several drains.
The auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump rooms at elevation 45 in the turbine building are separated by a concrete block wall and each room drains to a different sump through 8-in. pipes.
Turbine auxiliary feedwater pump room A contains the 2-in. exciter air cooler drain line coming from elevation 69, but this can be handled by existing drains.
Equipment susceptible to flooding is more than 24 in. above the floor.
Diesel auxiliary feedwater pump room B has all electrical equipment sealed or otherwise protected from water impingement.
The bottom of one electrical panel is 10 in. above the floor.
c.
Findings No items or noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Access Doors and Alarms a.
Criteria An inspection was made to determine that the watertight barriers for protection from flooding of equipment important to safety have access doors and hatches fitted with switches that annunciate in the control room when the access is open.
The access doors should be watertight and functional.
The inspection should also determine the date of the most recent verification of the seal integrity, including a check for l
tightness.
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Observations The only watertight door found was at elevation 23 in the intake structure.
Door 205 was never fitted with switches because it serves only to protect an inner door, which is controlled by a card reader.
This door is not subject to flooding from a non-Class I system or component.
c.
Findings No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
5.
Sealed Water Passages a.
Criteria An inspection was made to determine that penetrations through walls of room containing equipment important to safety were sealed against water leakage from a failure of non-Class I water systems.
The
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inspection should determine that openings between floors do not create a potential for flooding.
For example, there may be unsealed pipe sections in the horizontal structure, b.
Observations All passages between walls were observed to be sealed unless other-wise necessary.
In that event, the gaps around the pipes were sufficient for seismic movement.
Pipes were used to drain water and all observed floor penetrations were sealed.
Drain pipes passing through rooms were visible and no open sections were observed.
For example, the cable spreading room drain at elevation 77 in the control building passed through the electrical equipment rooms at elevation 61.
Drain pipes going directly to sumps were not accessible, c.
Findings No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
6.
Floor Drains and Curbs a.
Criteria An inspection was made to determine that floor drains were not obstructed, that screen covers were in place, and that curbs were continuous.
The inspection should ensure that the area served by the floor drains are free from objects that may migrate during water flow to the drain and obstruct the drain (such as polyester bags or sheets, paper, etc.).
Where applicable, the inspection should determine that floor drain check valves open and close correctly without sticking, b.
Observations The drains for auxiliary feedwater pump room A at elevation 45 in the turbine building were opened and examined.
The drains for pump room A use a check valve called a JOSAM Backwater Valve - Ball Float Type, which consists of a hollow plastic ball with an overhead seat to prevent backflow.
One valve was removed, and examination did not reveal any pits or grooves in the ball or the seat.
A flexible metal snake was inserted into this drain for 25 feet, which was past the first bend, and no obstructions were found.
The drains for the emergency diesel generator rooms use a bronze flapper valve called a JOSAM Backwater Valve - Swing Check Offset Type in the 8-in. drain line.
The examination did not reveal any pits or scratches in the flapper or seat.
Integrity of the drain was verified by flowing water through the drain and into the sump.
The initial flow from the emergency diesel generator room B appeared to be oily.
The curbs observed were continuous.
One concrete block wall at elevation 45 in the turbine building was checked with an eddy current
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device.
It verified the presence of internal metal reinforcing material along the top and vertically on 2-foot centers.
The cable spreading room at elevation 77 in the control building contains-a deluge system and multiple drains.
The deluge system was l
used in 1985 and the drains were satisfactory.
c.
Findings
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No items of.nonconformance or deviations were identified.
7.
Water Level Trips and Alarms a.
Criteria An inspection was made to determine that level alarms and pump trips in rooms containing non-Class I system components and pipes whose rupture could result in flood damage to equipment important to safety alarm in the control room and limit flooding.
The inspection should determine the date of the most recent verification of the functioning and calibration of the level alarms.
Redundance of switches is required; critical trip circuits should be redundant.
b.
Observations Trojan Nuclear Plant does not have any equipment applicable to this i
inspection.
As an alternate, the electric circuits for the auxiliary i
building sump water levels were examined.
Train A uses the west sump that contains a single indicator capable of reporting five water levels.
Redundance is accomplished by having the electric circuit indicate that the water is above a certain level while keeping the
'aans energized for all of the lawer water levels.
At elevation 77 in the auxiliary building, the K-24 board of the C151 Rad Waste Panel showed that the creen lamp LS4202 was lit indicating a sump level between 20 in. and 4J in.
The area under the K-21 section of the emergency core cool'ng system (ECCS) panel in the control room contained the same information.
Both boards have a green lamp for 20 in., amber lights for 41 in. and 65 in., and red lights for 89 in, and 113 in.
In addition, the visual annunciator at C1 on board K20 on panel C19 in the control room lights and indicates
" Aux Bldg Sump Hi Lyl/Hi-Hi Lvl" for either the 89 in. or 113 in.
levels.
At the same time, the visual annunciators on board K-24 of Panel C151 in the auxiliary building light and indicate " Aux Bldg Sump West Level Hi" and " Aux Bldg Sump West Level Hi-Hi" as appropri-ate.
Train B uses the east sump and has similar electric circuits.
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Findings No items of nonconformance or deviations were identified.
8.
Equipment Location and Protection a.
Criteria i
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An inspection was made to determine that Class I equipment is located or protected so that rupture of a non-Class I system that is a portion of a pumped system or is connected to a cooling tower con-taining water will not result in failure of the equipment from flooding.
For example, water impingement shielding may be used for electric motors.
b.
Observations The inspectors did not observe a location in which a non-Class I pipe could fail and affect a Class I system.
In addition, electrical equipment is located several inches above the floor and drains are usually present.
Some examples follow:
Room Elev.
Blda Height Drains at Floor Level (in.)
Battery
Control
Yes plus access to Elev. 61 Elec Aux Area
Control
No, but open access to Elev. 61
"B" ESF Switchgear 61 Control 4+
No, 4 in. above, but can drain under door to lower level Cable Spreading
Control High Yes AFW Pump A
Turbine High Yes AFW Pump B
Turbine
Yes
"A" ESF Switchgear 69 Turbine
No, but access to Elev. 45 CCW HX
Aux 24+
Yes Shielding from water impingement was found around electric motors at elevation 45 in the auxiliary building.
Some examples are service water booster pump area coolers P-304A and P-304B, containment cooling water pump fan coolers V-256A and B-25GC, and containment cooling water pump P-210C.
The licensee uses five sealing methods for cables to enter a cabinet:
watertight, conduit, full putty encapsulation, partial putty, and none.
However, no circumstances were observed in which failure of a non-Class I system would affect a Class I component.
In addition, the cables are routed in the cabinets with a gravity loop that keeps water away from electrical terminals.
Separate panels with drains are used in the cabinet, and electrical terminals are 3/4 in, above the bottom of a panel.
Components observed to be subject to water impingement from fire suppression line sprinklers or deluge systems were either sealed or shielded.
Components subject to water impingement from broken drain lines supplied by a deluge system are protected because the deluge lines are normally dry.
c, Findings No items of nonconformance or deviations were found.
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a.
Criteria
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An inspection was made to determine that the simultaneous loss of l
offsite power with the rupture of a non-Class I system component or
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pipe will not affect the operation of the annunciators, alarms, switches, trips, etc.
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b.
Observations The applicable drawings for the sump water level indicator circuits are E1708, " Auxiliary Building Sump Level"; E1556, " Schematic Diagram Radwaste"; and El, " Plant Single Line Diagram." The drawings show that distribution panel YO3, which is located at elevation 65 in the control building, supplies the sump alarms and can be powered by either emergency diesel generator A or B.
c.
Findings No items of nonconformance or deviations were identified.
10.
Administrative Control a.
Criteria An inspection was made of the methods or programs used to maintain protection from flooding of equipment.
b.
Observations Administrative Order A0-10-1 Rev. 13, dated March 22, 1985, " Plant Safety and Housekeeping," requires a daily cleanup by each employee, monthly inspections for housekeeping, and specific supervisor respon-sibility for areas in the plant.
Administrative Order A0-3-25 Rev. 2, dated May 4,1986, " Ready for Startup," requires an inspec-tion for adequate housekeeping and cleanliness.
The Design Input Record is a required checklist of items that must be considered when making a design modification and item 6 states in part, "Environmen-tal conditions anticipated during storage, construction, and opera-tion such as internal flooding."
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Findings No items of nonconformance or deviations were identified.
11.
Trojan Nuclear Plant Maintenance i
Immediately before this inspection, the licensee performed Maintenance Request 87-1375 concerning flood protection of safety-related equipment.
This involved verifying that penetrations were sealed, flood barriers were
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properly installed, valves between sumps were closed, backflow valves were in usable condition, and debris was removed.
As a result of this inspec-tion, the licensee is evaluating several nonconformance reports and event reports.
The most significant item is NCR 87-046 concerning equipment drains in the AFW pump rooms that provide a flood path from backflow of
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the acid waste drain syste !
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12.
Turbine Building Louvers The turbine building is equipped with louver openings along the west wall to discharge water in the event of an internal flood caused by a break in the circulating water pipes or condenser water boxes.
As reported in LER 87-06, a recent licensee evaluation postulated insufficient capacity to accommodate the maximum flowrate from the design-basis circulating water system rupture without flooding the safety-related equipment rooms.
The capacity is the combination of the free space volume at and below eleva-tion 45 of the turbine building, the water dikes around rooms containing safety-related equipment at elevation 45, and the flood-relieving louvers.
The licensee's corrective actions will be reviewed.
13.
Documents Reviewed a.
Drawings El Plant Single Line Item E1556 Schematic Diagram Radwaste D1708 Auxiliary Building Sump Level b.
Administrative Orders A0-3-25 Ready for Startup A0-10-1 Plant Safety and Housekeeping 14.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with the licensee representat'jves as noted in paragraph 1 on March 27, 1987 and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities.
The inspectors noted that the excellent prepara-tion and cooperation on the part of the licensee made this a successful review.
No items of nonconformance or deviations were found.