IR 05000382/1987017

Insp Rept 50-382/87-17 on 870716-0815.Violation Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Followup of Previously Identified Items,Ler Followup,Plant Startup,Monthly Maint,Monthly Surveillance,Esf Sys Walkdown & Offsite Review Committee

ML20237F873
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	08/27/1987
From:	Jaudon J, Staker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20237F856	List: IR 05000382/1987017 ML20237F855 ML20237F862
References
50-382-87-17, NUDOCS 8709020016
Download: ML20237F873 (9)

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APPENDIX B l

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-382/87-17 License: NPF-38 i

Docket: 50-382  ;

I Licensee: Louis)ana Power & Light Company (LP&L) i 142 Delaronde Street New Orleans, Louisiana 70174 Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 Inspection At: Taft, Louisians Inspection Conducted: Jul 16 rough gust 15, 1987

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1 2 I Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted July 16 through August 15, 1987 (Report 50-382/87-17) i i

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of: (1) followup of j previously identified items, (2) licensee event report followup, (3) plant status, (4) monthly maintenance, (5) monthly surveillance, (6) ESF system walkdown, (7) routine operational safety inspection, and (8) offsite review i committe ]

Results: Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified (failure to follow maintenance procedures, paragraph 9).

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees J. G. Dewease, Sealor Vice President, Nuclear Operations

• P. Barkhurst, Vice President, Nuclear Operations ;j

• S. Carns, Plant Manager, Nuclear  : !

P. N. Backes, Corporate QA Manager,

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S. A. Alleman, Assistant Plant Manager, Plant Technical Staff i

• J. R. McGaha, Assistant Plant' Manager, Operations and Maintenance t J. N. Woods, Quality Manager, Nuclear A. S. Lockhart, Nuclear Operations Support and Assessments Manager R. F. Burski, . Engineering Service Manager j

• E. Wuller, Onsite Licensing Coordinator  ;

T. H. Smith, Maintenance Superintendent, huclear j i

• Denotes personnel present at exit intereiew.

i In addition to the above personnel, the NRC inspector held discussions l with various operations, engineering, technical support, maintenance, and administrative members of the licensee's staf . Followup of Previously Identified Items (Closed) Violation 382/8701-01, " Failure to Follow Supplier QA Program Inspection Procedure." This violation required no response, and the licensee's corrective action was discussed in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/87-0 (Closed) Violation 382/8701-04, " Failure to Designate f,dccession for Plant Management Authority." The NRC~ inspector verified that the licensee has designated succession for plant management authority, in writing, by review of Plant Management Directive 1 in Licensee Letter W3A87-0053, dated March 10, 198 (Closed) Violation 382/8707-01, " Failure to Follow Snubber Installation Procedure and Surveillance Procedure." The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee's response to this violation, which is cork ned in a letter j dated May 29, 1987. The NRC inspector verified that uie changes committed to be made had been accomplished and were now in Procedures ME-3-220 and-MM-12-00 No violations of deviations were identifie l Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup The following LERs were reviewed and-close The NRC inspectors verified that reporting requirements had.been met, thet causes had been identified,.

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that corrective actions appeared appropriate, that generic applicability l had been considered, and that the LER forms were complete. ' Additionally, '

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.the NRC inspectors confirmed that no unreviewed safety questions were

. involved, and that violations ~of regulations or Technical Specification (TS) conditions had been identifie (Closed)LER 382/85-024, " Automatic: Actuation of Engineered Safety Features System." The NRC inspector verified that the training specified

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.in this LER has been complete .(Closed)LER 382/85-039, " Spurious Actuations of Control. Room Ventilation System." The NRC inspector verified that the licensee's corrective actions were performed for LER 382/87-015 as described belo :)

(Closed)LER 382/86-020, " Inadvertent Control Room Activation Due to i Instrument Anomalies." The NRC inspector verified that the licensee's 1 corrective actions were performed for LER 382/87-015 as described belo (r.losed)LER 382/87-015, " Control Room Emergency Ventilation Actuation Due l to Radiation Monitor Spike." The NRC inspector verified that nylon 1 washers and RC filters were installed, as described in this LER, and tested by review of Condition' Identification Work' Authorizations (CIWA) 030553 3 and 03301 (

No violations or deviations were identified, j Plant Status The inspection began with the plant at 100: percent power. On' July 31, .

1987, at 8:11 p.m. (CDT) while isolating the C-2 waterbox for cleaning, 1 the condenser vacuum degraded,' causing -.the exhaust drain tank for Feedwater Pump Turbine (FWPT) "A"'to backup. This'resulted in a "HiHi"

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level trip in the exhaust drain tank'and a main feed pump. .The reactor power cutback system (nonsafety) initiated.a turbine runback; however, it did not cause control rod subgroup five (in manual select) to drop into the core as designed for the loss of main feed pump at above 70 percent i power. Because the cutback system had not worked, the reactor then tripped from 100 percent power on high pressurizer pressure. The Emergency FeedwaterActuationSystem(EFAS)initiatedon' low.S/Glevel.andstarted the emergency feedwater pumps. The A/B turbine. driven pump then tripped on mechanical overspeed. The,A/S pump was restarted'and again; tripped on mechanical overspeed. The. licensee investigated and determined that'the mechanical overspeed trip arm device was worn and that the setting 'of. this device was critical in' preventing. inadvertent'overspeed! trips. The A/B pump was declared operable after satisfactory performance of. surveillance testing. The plant was critical aga.in at 8:28 p.m. (CDT) on August:1.and returned to 100 percent" power on. August No violations or deviations:were identifie y

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5. Monthly Maintenance Station maintenance activities affecting safety-related systems and ;

components were observed and reviewed to ascertain that the activities I were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, j industry codes or standards, and.in ccnformance with Technical l Specification Portions of the following procedures and work authorizations were l observed by the NRC inspector:

. Procedures MM-05-004, Revision 3, " Shaft Coupling Alignment and Belt l Tension Procedure," and UNT-05-008, " Plant Lubrication Program," as .

performed on component cooling water makeup pump "B".

. Work Authorization 1000388 - Troubleshoot abnormal vibration of dry ;

cooling tower fan 18 (component cooling water system). The fan l motor was replaced, and durir.q installation, the new motor was !

alig:.ed with the fan shaft coupling using Procedure MM06004, )

Revision 3, " Shaft Coupling Alignment and Belt Tensioning." The NRC l inspector noted that this procedure had not been reviewed by the Plant Onsite Review Committee (PORC). It was not clear from the J Technical Specifications and review of Reg Guide 1.33, Revision 2, j if this procedure should have been reviewed as a repair procedure or was a description of activity that should have been within the 1 normal skill of qualified maintenance personnel. Discussion of this I issue with licensee representatives resulted in a licensee commitment to investigate a technical specification clarificatio The NRC inspector concluded that such a clarificat1on could benefit ,

safety by assuring that appropriate procedures receive PORC review l without overloading the PORC with unnecessary reviews. This is l considered to be an unresolved item pending the licensee's. review and submital of a Technical Specification clarification (382/871701). ,

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Work Authorization 1000652 - Clear flow path of moisture and perform retest on condenser vacuum pump high range noble gas radiation element. The radiation monitor sampling system was disassembled, dried, and reassembled, but moisture continued to be drawn into the I sampling line. Inefficient condenser operation because of low river level combined with high river temperature creates a condition that causes moisture from the condenser to be drawn into the monitor sampling line. An apparent modification to the samplingLsystem to prevent moisture intrusion during hot weather conditions is neede No other violations or deviations were identifie ,

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6. Monthly Surveillance

The NRC inspector'ooserved and reviewed Technical Specification required i testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with I adequate procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that {

limiting conditions for operation were met, and that any deficiencies identified were properly reviewed and resolve 'I On July 27,1987, the '90 inspector observed portions of Procedure OP-903-005, kevision 5, " Control Element Assembly Operability ]'

Check," as performed to meet the requirements of TS 4.1.3. i The NRC inspector observed portions of Procedure OP-903-007, Revision 3,

" Turbine Inlet Valve Cycling Test," which was performed on July 27, 1987, to satisfy the requirements of TS 4.3.4.2.a and 4.3.4. No violations or deviations were identifie . ESF System Walkdown The Containment Spray (CS) system was verified operable by performing a {

walkdown of the accessible and essential portion of the system on July 23, J 1987. The NRC inspector used the CS system. lineup specified on Attachment 8 of Procedure OP-9-001, Revision 4, " Operating Procedure Containment Spray," in conjunction with Drawing LOV-1564-G-lb No violations or deviations were identifie . Routine Operational Safety Inspection i

By observation during the inspection period, the' NRC inspector verified !

that the control room manning requirements were being met. In addition, I the NRC inspector observed shift turnover to verify that continuity of system status was maintained. The NRC inspector periodically questioned shift personnel relative to their awareness of the plant condition Through log review and plant tours, the NRC inspector verified compliance with selected TS and limiting conditions for operation ,

During the course of the inspection, observations relative to protected and vital area security were made including access controls, boundary integrity, search, escort, and badgin On a regular basis, radiation work permits (RWP) were reviewed and the specific work activity was monitored to assure the activities were being conducted per the RWPs. Selected radiation protection instruments were periodically checked and equipment operabilf!y and calibration frequency were verified.

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The NRC inspector kept himself informed on a daily basis of overall status of piant and of any significant safety matter related to plant operation Discussions were held with plant management and various members of the operations staff on a regular basi Selected portions of operating logs and data sheets were reviewed daily.

l The NRC inspector conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits of the control room. Observations included: witnessing work activities in progress; verifying the status of operating and standby safety systems and equipment; confirming valve positions, instrument and recorder readings, annunciator alarms; and housekeepin During a routine plant tour, the NRC inspector observed that one end of the "A" essential services chiller was labelled as the "A/B" chille Although the chiller was identified correctly as the "A" chiller in several other locations, including the local control panel, this erroneous labelling created the possibility of personnel working the wrong train of an ESF system. This condition was identified to the shift supervisor, and this isolated labelling problem was promptly cort ecte While performing routine plant walkdowns, the NRC inspector observed that locking devices were not installed on two of the threaded fasteners connecting Rigid Supports SIRR-3006 and SIRR-3008 to High Pressure Safety Injection System Flow Control Valves SI-227A and SI-225A. Licensee Procedure MM-12-001, Revision 2, " Pipe Hanger Support Installation, Fabrication, and Removal," requires installation of locking devices on all threaded fasteners used for pipe support installation. The NRC inspector also observed that Rigid Support SIRR-760, connected to low pressure safety injection system piping upstream of the flow control valve, was bent. These discrepancies were identified to the shift supervisor, and locknuts were promptly installed on Supports SIRR-3006 and SIRR-3008. The licensee also initiated an evaluation of the condition of Support SIRR-760, and the support was replaced. During followup of the

"A/B" Emergency Feedwater (EFW) pump event (see paragraph 5 of this report), the NRC inspector observed a threaded fastener on Hanger MSSH-3084, which supports EFW pump "A/B" Stop Valve ML-416, that did not have a locknut or other locking devices installed. Also, several locknuts installed on this support were not in contact with the nuts as required by licensee Procedure MM-12-001, Revision 1, " Pipe Hanger Support Installation, Fabrication, and Removal." This condition was identified to the Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent and corrected. Failure to install locknuts on pipe supports during a station modification was previously identified in NRC violation 382/8631-01. The failure to follow maintenance procedures is an apparent violation (382/0717-02).

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During the routine containment penetration isolation walkdowns, the NRC inspector found that the two bolts that connect the Instrument Air Containment Penetration Isolation Valve IA-909 to Support IARR-3001 were not installed. This condition was identified to the shift supervisor, and 4 bolts were promptly installe l On July 16, 1987, while investigating a channel check failure on wide range containment pressure instrument channel "D", the licensee found the pressure instrument to be isolated. The licensee restored channel "D" to service and verified that the three remaining channels were not in an isolated condition. After investigation, the licensee concluded that the instrument had been left isolated after a calibration performed during the last refueling outage in December 1986. Leaving the containment pressure detector isolated while changing operational from shutdown to operating is an apparent violation of Technical Specification 3.3.1. Because the !

violation was identified by the licensee, appears to fit the definition of Severity Level IV, is being documented in .accordance with 10 CFR l Part 50.73, had been corrected, and is not a repeat violation, it is not cited herein at this time. It will be considered an open item, however, so that licensee actions to prevent recurrence can be inspected for effectiveness (382/871703). In response to this event, the licensee is evaluating the current policy on procedure sign-offs in contaminated areas. Also, since containment pressure does not change in magnitude enough to allow channel checks or functional checks to indicate an isolated instrument, Procedure OP-10-001, " General Plant Operations," is being revised to include a check of containment pressure instruments with containment purge operating and secured prior to startup af ter outage Followup on licensee corrective actions is considered to be an open item (382/8717-03).  !,

No other violations or deviations were identifie l Cffside Review Committee -

i After reviewing the minutes from previous Safety Review Committee (SRC) ]

meetings, the NRC inspector attended a regularly schedultd meeting on j August 13, 1987. The meeting consisted of reports from the SRC 1 subcommittees, a plant status updata, a QA activities report, a report i from the SRC chairman on various issues, a proposed technical specification change review, and briefings from licensee staff members on various topic . Exit Interview ,

l The inspection sccpe and findings were summari;.ed on August 20, 1987, with j those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the NRC inspector's findings. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material providg rjeviewed by the NRC inspector during this inspection, a Y g', d,  ;

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