ML20195B423
| ML20195B423 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 05/22/1986 |
| From: | Gagliardo J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | Pilant J NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8605290298 | |
| Download: ML20195B423 (2) | |
Text
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- l MAY 2 21986 In Reply Refer To:
Docket: 50-298 Nebraska Public Power District ATTN: J. M. Pilant, Manager, Technical Staff-Nuclear Power Group P. O. Box 499 Columbus, Nebraska 68601 Gentlemen:
Our letter dated April 21, 1986, transmitted an incomplete copy of the FEMA report of the October 16, 1985, joint exercise of the offsite radiological emergency exercise for the Cooper Nuclear Station. Appended is a complete copy. It is requested that representatives from Nebraska Public Power District and the appropriate state agencies coordinate to complete the necessary corrective action in a timely manner.
If you have any further questions, please contact this office.
Sincerely, "G@nal Signed by;"
J. E. Gagliardo, Chief Reactor Projects Branch cc w/o report:
Richard W. Krimm,- Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Program Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 cc w/ report:
i Guy Horn, Division Manager
- of Nuclear Operations Cooper Nuclear Station P. O. Box 98
.Brownville, Nebraska 68321 I Kansas Radiation Control Program Director
! Nebraska Radiation Control Program Director ,
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W l 7 Iges MEMORANDUM FOR: Diward L. Jordan Director Division of Dnergency Preparedness and Engineering Pesponse U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission FROM: I <r .. un Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technologica1 Hazards Program
SUBJECT:
Exercise Report of the October 16, 1985, Exercise of the Offsite Radiological Dnergency Preparedness Plans for the Cooper Nuclear Station Attached is a copy of the Exercise Peport of the October 16, 1985, joint exercise of the offsite radiological emerqency preparedness plans for the Cooper Nuclear Station at Brownville, Nebraska. The joint exercise was full participation for the State of Nebraska and the Counties of Nemaha and Otoe; ard, the State of Missouri and the Counties of Atchison and Nodaway.
The report dated December 20, 1985, was prepared by Federal Dnergency Manalement Agency (FEMA) Reqion VII.
FEMA Pegion VII identified four deficiencies in Nebraska. TWo concerned field monitoring and decontamination by the State. Two concerned Nemaha County's alert & notification ( A&N) of Indian Cave State Park and access control throughout the jurisdiction. In addition, two deficiencies were identified in Missouri. These concerned the inability to successfully demonstrate the 15,ninute A&N function by the Atchison County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and the lack of provisions in both the Missouri and Atchison County plans for A&N in the Brickyard Hill State Wildlife Area.
On November 26, 1985, the deficiency in 15 minute A&N of the public by the Atchison County EOC was corrected in a remedial exercise. All but one of the other deficiencies have been corrected by training, plan revisions, and letters of agreement. The remaining deficiency is concerned with Brickyard Hill and is scheduled for correction by June 15, 1986. This correction will include not only plan revisions and letters of agreement but a remedial exercise.
On Septanber 24, 1986, another full participation joint exercise of of fsite plans and preparedness is scheduled to be held in support of the Cooper Nuclear Station. Hiere appropriate, all of the trainiry, plan revisions and letters of agreement will be tested at this exercise.
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in the October '16,' 1985, exercise there were other inadequacies identified as requiring corrective actions. 'Ihe Staten of Nebraska and Missouri have re-ceived a copy of the exercise report and are preparinq schedules of corrective actions. When they are received and analyzed, we will send you copies.
' Although there were deficiencies observed at.the exercise, the States of Nebraska and Missouri have made substantial proqress in correcting them; the only remaining deficiency is scheduled for completion by June 15, 1986.
Based on this progress in the correction of deficiencies, there is reasonable assurance that the public health and safety can be protected in the event of an accident.at the Cooper Nuclear Station. 'lherefore, the November 30, 1983, approval under FEMA Rule 44 CFR 350 will renu!n in ef fect.
If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Rotnrt S. Wilkerson, Chief, Technological Hazanis Division at 646-2861.
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O EXERCISE EVAI11ATION OF THE IMPIJMENTATION OF STATE AND LOCAL RADIOII)GICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS EXERCISE CONDUCTED OCTOBER 16, 1985 REMEDIAL DRILL CONDUCTED NOVEMBER 26, 1985 for the COOPER NUCLEAR STATION Brownville, Nemnha County, Nebraska Nebraska Public Power District PARTICIPANTS:
State of Nebraska State of Missouri County of Nemaha County of Atchison County of Otoe County of Nodawa'y e (All affected jurisdictions participated) f' prepared by '
Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Region VII Kansas City, M0 DECEMBER 20, 1985
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- CONTENTS ABRREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
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WFRC I S E SUMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v i 1 INTRODUCTION.................................................... 1 1.1 Exercise background........................................ 1 1.2 Exercise Evaluators........................................ 1 1.3 Evaluation Critdria........................................ 2 1.h Exercise Findings Classification........................... 3 1.5 Exercise Objectives........................................ 3 1.6 Exercise Scenario......................................... 22 1.7 S ta te and Local Re sou rce s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2 Exerc i se Evalua t i on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 h
. 2.1 Joint Operations.......................................... 2h 2.1.1 Energency Operations Facility / Nebraska FCP. . . . . . . . . . 2h 2.1.2 Infor=ation Authentication Center. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 2.1. 3 Media Releas e Cente r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 2.2 Nebraska Operations....................................... 30 2.2.1 State Energency Operatiens Center (SE0C)............ 30 2.2.2 Radiological Assessment / Field Tea = Coordination..... 31 2.2.3 Field Monitoring Tea =s.............................. 32
- 2. 2. h State Radiological Laboratory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 2.2.5 Decontamination Facilities.......................... 36 2.3 County operations......................................... 38 2.3.1 Netaha County E0C................................... 38 2.3.2 Ne=aha County A=bulance.............................. 39 2.3.3 Otoe County ECC and Receptien Center................. LO 2.h Missouri State Operations.................................. L1
' 2. h.1 State E=ergency Operations Center. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L1 2 . h . 2 Fo rwa rd Co ==and Po s t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L1 2.L 3 Field Team Coordination / Dose Assessment.............. L3 2.h.h Field Monitoring..................................... LL 2.5 County Operations.......................................... h6 2.5.1 Atchison County E0C.................................. L6 2.5.2 Atchison County Deconta=ination Facility............. L8 2.5.3 Relocation Center, Maryville, Missouri............... L8 2.5.h Decontamination Facility, Maryville, Missouri........ L9 2.5.5 Atchison County Medical Support...................... h9 3 ACTIONS TO RMEDY DEFICIENCIES PREVIOUSLY CITED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 3.1 Nebraska Deficiencies............ ........................ 51 3.1.1 Field Monitoring.................................... 51 3.1.2 Nebraska City Decontamination Facility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 3.1.3 Ne=aha County Access Control........................ 52 3.1.h Alert & Notification - Indian Cave State Park....... 53 l
3.2 Missouri Deficiencies..................................... 53 3.2.1 Atchison County E0C................................. 53 3.2.2 Brickyard Hill State Wildlife Area................... Sh h SUMARY OF AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 5 SUMARY OF REC 0MENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 1'
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ACEOC Atchisen County (MO) Emergency Operations Center AEOF Alternate E=ergency Operations Facility AIiL Argonne I;ational Laboratory ARC A=prienn Red Cross BLUEBIRD Nebraska State Patrol Mobile Emergency Co==unications Center BRH Mistouri' Division of Health, Bureau of Radiological Health CD Civi-1 Defense CI;S / Co:iper Nuclear Ptation CRUSH !lebra s ka Civil Defense Portable Operations Center / Field Cd=ar.d Post DOE '
Department of Energy
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EPS Emergency Brcadcast System EPA En; crrental Protecticn Agency ECC Emergency Operations Center
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ECF Emergency Operations Facility.
EFZ Emergency Planning Zone FCP Forward Cc==and Post
. FEMA Fedt rsl Emergency ttnagement Agency IAC Infor ation Authentication Center INEL Idaho ';ational Engineering Laboratory KI Potassiu Iodide
) !GC Media Release Center
v NCEOC Nemaha County (NE) E=ergency Operations Center NPPD Nebraska Public Power District UUREG-065L Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Energency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-065h/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1)
OPPD Otaha Public Power District PAR Protective Action Reco==endation PHS Public Health Services PIO Public Information Officer RAC Regional Assistance Oct=ittee RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan SCDA Nebraska State Civil Defense Agency SEMA Missouri Department of Public Safety, State Energency Manececent Agency SCP Star.dard Operating Procedure TLD Therr.clu=inescent Dosimeter USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture
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. EXERCISE
SUMMARY
The purpose of an , exercise is to determine the ability of appropriate off-site agencies to respond to an emergency covered by State and local Radiological Emergency Response Plans. The evaluation of such an effort will, of necessity, tend to focus on the negative aspects of the exercise, on inadequacies in planning, preparedness and performance.
This focus of attention on the negative should not be taken to mean that there vere not a great =any positive acco=plishments as well. Indeed, there were, however, in the interest of brevity, only inadequacies will herein be su==arized.
. JOINT OPERATIONS Bnergency Operations Facility (EOF)/ Nebraska W P The only objective not de=onstrated fully was Number 3 for Nebraska.
There were two areas requiring corrective action. The first relates to a . clarification of the Nebraska State Plan regarding certain aspects of alert and notification. The second concerns backup co==unicaticns to the Atchison County EOC.
There were four recc==endations for operational improvement. Details are found in Lection 2.1.1.
Information Authentication Center All objectives were achieved by both States. There is one area of required corrective action relating to Nebraska coordinating with Missouri prior to release of EBS messages not acec=panied by sirens. Details are in Section 2.1.2.
Media Release Center Nebraska failed to demonstrate Objective - Number 26, as it requires a telephone hotline for rumor control. There were also three required corrective actions. Two related to the =anner in which press briefings are conducted, and the third relates to Nebraska's responsibility for rumor control. Details are in Section 2.1.3.
NEBRASKA OPERATIONS State Dnergency Operations Center (SEOC)
All objectives were de=enstrated.
Radiological Assessment and Field Team Coordination
) Only Objective Nu=ber 6 was not fully demonstrated. There was also a single reco==endation for operational improvement. Details are in Section 2.2.2.
vii Field Monitoring Teams Only two of 'five objectives were fully de=onstrated. There vere two deficiencies relating to: (a) inadequate radiation detection equipment, and (b) operational procedures of one of the field teams. Details of the deficiencies are is Section 2.2.3 Remedial Actions are in Section 3.
Details of corrective actions are contained in Section 3.1.1.
State Radiological Imboratory The single objective for this facility was not fully demonstrated.
This resulted in a required corrective action relating to the staff use of TLDs. Details are in Section 2.2.L.
Decontamination Facilities - Nebraska City, Nebraska Objective Nu=ber 29 was not fully de=onstrated. This resulted in a deficiency due to the failure to demonstrate personnel decontamination.
Details are in Section 2.2.5, with remedial action in Section 3.
Decontamination Facilities - Auburn, Nebraska Objectives de=onstrated; no proble=s observed.
Nemaha County EOC Objectives not demonstrated were 13, 17, and 35. Failure to demonstrate 13 and 17 resulted in deficiencies. One deficiency related to ti=ely alert and notification to Indian Cave State Park; the other related to the timely establishment of access control to evacuated areas.
Details of the exercise are in section 2.3.1.; details of the remedial actions are in Section 3.1.3.
Nemaha County Ambulance Unit All objectives were satisfactorily demonstrated.
Otoe County EOC and Reception Center All objectives were demonstrated with no inadequacies observed.
MISSOURI OPERATIONS State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)
Objective tht:be r h was not demonstrated due to the unavailability of adequate maps and displays. Details of reco==endations are in Section 2.k.l.
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O viii Forward Co-nd Post (FCP)
Objectives Number 13 and lh (alert and notification) vere not demonstrated due to the fact that the General E=ergency occurred before the FCP became operational. One inadequacy vas . observed. Details are in Section 2.h.2.
- Field Team Coordination / Dose Assessment Objectives Number h and 5 were not fully demonstrated. There was one area requiring corrective action. This related to the use of a single map for radiological monitoring. Details are in Section 2.h.3.
Field Monitoring Two objectives were not fully demonstrated: One related to clarity of radio ec==unications after the EOF relocated; the other related to the transport of field samples.
There was a required corrective action relating to the use of a single equipment checklist. Details are in Section 2.h.h.
Atchison County EOC Objectives not demonstrated: 1, 5, 13, la, 18, and 20. Several of these centributed to two deficiencies. The first related to the failure
) to provide timely alert and notification to the residents in general; the second relates to failure of the State and local Pla:s to provide for timely alert and notification of transients within the Brickyard Hill State Wildlife Area.
In addition, there were areas requiring corrective action related to backup cc =unication with the EOF, special needs of nobility i= paired, and shelterin6 information for transients. Details are .n Section 2 5.1.
Atchison County Decontamination Facility Objective Number 29 was only partially demonstrated. There was no personnel decontamination. Details are in Section 2.5.2..
Relocation Center, Maryvil_le, Missouri Objective Number 27 was only partially demonstrated. They will be required to use proper registration procedures at the next exercise.
Details are in Section 2.5.3.
Decontamination Facility, Maryville, Missouri Objectives were demonstrated; no inadequacies were observed.
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ix Atchison County Medical Support Due to the fact that ambulance and hospital staff lacked TLDs, Objective Number 20 was not fully demonstrated. This calls for required corrective action. Details are in Section 2.5.5
,4.,
e 1 INTRODUCTION
'l.1 EIERCISE BACKGROUND Radiological e=ergency response plans for the Cooper Nuclear Station (CNS) for. the State's .of Nebraska and Missouri and affected local jurisdications. vere conditionally approved by FD% on July 2, 198h.
The plans' of both States were evaluated in joint exercises annually since 1982. This report concerns the results of the joint exercise of October-
-16, 1985 It was classified as " full scale" for Missouri and "small scale" for Nebraska. The exercise was conducted between the hours of 0800 and 1630.
1.2 EXERCISE EVAIAJA'IT)RS Seventeen Federal Agency personnel and seven FDM Contractors evaluated the off-site emergency response functions:
OBSERVER AGENCY ASSIGNIENT
. Wolf Biedenfeld PHS NE & M0 Medic Bob Bissell FD% Ne=aha Co. (NE) EOC James Bogard DOE M0 Rad Tea =/Atchison Co. Decon Bill Brinck EPA FT Coord./ Dose Assess =ent (MO)
I'.arlee Carroll FD% EOF /FCP (NE)
Nate Chip =an INEL NE Rad Tess #2 John Cole =an ' FDM Regional Office Coordination Caroline Herzenberg ANL Nebraska City.& Auburn Decon Tom Hogan FDM M0 FCP/Atchison Co. EOC Rochelle Honkus INEL NE FT Coord./ Dose Assessment Chuck Huyett FDM Regional Office Coordination Eric Jenkins FDfA NE State EOC Rich Leonard FDM Overview Jamie Majors FDM Regional Office Coordination Gary McClure FDM M0 State EOC Dorothy Nevitt USDA M0 FCP Eileen O' Hare ARC Nodaway Co. Decon Facility /
Mar:etille Relocation Center Jim Opelka ANL- NE Rad Lab Gary Sanborn NRC IAC Chris.'Saricks ANL Nemaha Co. (NE) EOC Lyle Slagle' INEL NE Rad Team #1 Tim Seidel- FDM MRC Dick Sumpter FD% Overview Dianne Wilson FDM Nebraska City Relocation Center /
Otoe Co. EOC
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1.3 EVAWATION CRITERIA The evaluation criteria for tr$1s exercise were:
- 1. ITUREG-065h/ FEE-REP-1, Rev.1 ( All applicable requirements).
- 2. The 35 Objectives used by FDIA vill serve as a composite of exercise demonstratable elements contained in I."JR EG-065 h , A copy of these objectives is centained in Section 1.h of this evaluation. These objectives will be referenced by number throughout the report.
3 tiebraska Padiological Emergency Response Plan for !iuclear Power Plant Incidents (RERP), April 15, 1983, (with all current changes and acendments thereto).
- h. Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Nuclear Power Plant Incidents, Necaha County, fiebraska, April, 1983.
- 5. Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Otce County, Nebraska, April, 1983.
- 6. Missouri Uuelear Accident Plan, Cooper Nuclear Station.
- 7. Atchison County, Missouri Radiological Fr.ergency Respense Plan.
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1.4 EXERCISE FINDINGS CLASSIFICATION 1; FEMA classifies exercise inadequacies as deficiencies or areas requiring corrective action.
Deficiencies are demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can ' be taken to protect the health and safety of the public living in the event of a radiological emergency.
Areas requiring corrective actions are demonstrated and observed inadequacies of State . and local government performance, and although their correction is required, they are not considered by themselves, to adversely i= pact public health and safety.
. In addition, FEMA identifies areas recommended for improvement, which are ' problem areas observed during an exercise that are not considered to adversely impact public health and safety. While not required, correction of these would enhance an organization's level of preparedness.
1.5 ' EXERCISE ORTECTIVES On August h, 1985, the State of Nebraska Civil Defense Agency submitted final off-site objectives for the exeriese.
On August 5, 1985, the off-site objectives from the Missouri State Emergency Management Agency were received.
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Objectives - Nebraska State Support Capabilities (Verbatim, as submitted)
- 1. Activation of staff with subsequent deployment and operation of the State Field Command Post to include local and long-range com=unications. If plant scenario permits, test relocation of State Field Command Post. Participation of Nebraska State Patrol BLUE 3IRD vill be si=ulated.
- 2. Notification and follow-up contacts with State, Federal, and private agencies having responsibilities described in the Nebraska Plan.
. 3. Operational status and functioning of State EOC as well as coordination with agencies and field elements. Includes State EOC interstate coordination. With one exception of the Health Department, Agency representation at the State EOC vill be simulated. State EOC will implement appropriate protective actions
- as approved by the Governor and/or the Governor's Authorized Representative.
- 4. State field radiological monitoring activities, off-site dose assessment, and coordination of protective action reco=mendations with Governor's Authorized Representative and State EOC.
Coordination vill also be effected with the utility and ' Missouri.
This will include timely mobilization, deployment and operation
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of State field radiological monitoring teams, as well as canage=ent of team _ activities, appropriate briefings and infor=ation flow.
Field monitoring team equipment and coccunications capabilities vill also be demonstrated. State aerial radiolegical monitoring missions to roughly track and define the parameters of the airborne plume, as veJ1 as transport samples to the State Lab vill be simulated.
- 5. Decision-cak*ng provisions for the use and distribution of radioprotective drugs for emergency workers.
- 6. The collection and transport or samples to the State Laboratory in Lincoln =ay be simulated. Timely processing of samples and other techniques at the State Laboratory will be de=onstrated.
- 7. State EOC coordination of simulated Federal technical and non-technical support under the Federal Radiological Energency Preparedness Plan (FRERP), including ~.essage flow and si=ulated support by such agencies as NBC, DOE and FD:A.
- 8. State CD support of the jointly operated Information Authentication Center (IAC) and Media Relase Center (!GC ) . Demcastrate IAC coordinated dissemination of information simulated through the EBS. Operations at the MRC will include news cedia briefings, as well as the appropriate use of zone designators/ local ter=s in briefing media and the State of Nebraska use of visual displays for briefing and cperations. The transmission of selected emergency infor.atica by ceans of portable data terminals vill also be demonstrtated. Rumor control functions at the IAC and GC vill te tested.
- 9. Support for and supervision of two decenta ination statiens; one at Auburn for emergency workers and the other at Nebraska City for evacuees.
- 10. State and local communications including primary and supporting capabilities.
- 11. Decision-making and coordination for reentry and recovery.
- 12. State's capability to provide and distribute sufficient desi=etry to include self-reading and per=anent record devices (TLDs) for the initial distribution to emergency workers operating in radiation areas. Most TLDs used during the exercise vill be simulated.
Actual TLDs vill be available for inspection at the State ECC.
Objectives - Nebraska Local Support Capabilities
- 1. Initial notification receipt and alerting of key people.
- 2. Communications and coordination with all involved agencies.
- 3. Activation and staffing of local Emergency Operating Centers (EOC) and appropriate use of Emergency Classifications.
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- h. Coordinatpd access control and security decision-making by selected lav enforcement agencies.
- 5. Increased. readiness =casures for potential operations at tiebraska City /Otoe County relocation center. This facility will be operated on a training 6 asis, but will be subject to observation.
- 6. Decontamination station operations at Auburn to support emergency workers will be demonstrated.
- 7. Deconstrate capability to activate public alerting system and provide an informational message to the public within 15 minutes.
Actual activation of alerting system and EBS will be simulated.
However, preparation and handling of public notification messages vill be demonstrated. (The pualic alert and notification procedures vill be accccolished during the FEMA-h3 test, to be conducted on October 17, 1985.)
- 8. Coordination vitr ':/t/BC where appropriate concerning local public information activias. De=onstrate capability to define ha::ard area by referencing local land arks.
9 Provision of fire and rescue support as required by plant.
Transport and reception of simulated radiation casualty to the fieraha County Hospital by a local Rescue Squad.
- 10. Decision making and coordination planning for recovery and reentry.
- 11. The Ilebraska City /Otoe County reception registration and decontamination activities in support of ?ie:aha County evacuees vill be operated on a training basis, but vill be subject to observation.
- 12. Deconstrate effective system for distribution and record keeping of dosimetr/- - to include per=anent record devices (TLDs').
- 13. Denenstrate timely co==unication and coordination with cec = unity racilities for mobility impaired, disabled, etc. that may require special actions; such as, early notification or other support functions as identified.
lL. Decision-making vill be demonstrated to simulate and control allocation of local resources, and determine need for State support, as necessary.
15 Decision-making vill be demonstrated to simulate allocation of appropriate support for the evacuation of the public with special needs, if required.
Since Missouri submitted its objectives in a for=at utilizing the 35 FD'A Objectives, they are reproduced in full.
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- l MISSOURI STATE OBJECTIVES 1985 - COOPER 1
- _IEOC_ _ _ _ IFCP _ _ _ _ _ _IDose
_ _ _ _ _ _ !!AC _ _ _ _ _Assm _ _ - - - _IFMC _ _ _ _ _!MRC _ _ _ _ _ _ _ lNedica_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _l !_
!____I ! ! ! I i !
! 1 ! : 1 I :
Demonstrate ability to : I I : :
- 8. 1 I
- YES :YES mobilize staff and 1YES YES tYES YES : N/A : i cetivate f acilities f I i ! ! ! ! ! ;
promptly. l____ _____ _____ l __________!____i______!_______!
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- : I !
- 8. Demonstrate ability to i ! : :
- YES : N/A fully staff facilities !YES YES !YES :YES YES :
cnd maintian staffing i I i ! ! ! ! !
crcund the clock. l____I_____!_____l ! ! l _______
l t 1 : I ! ! ! !
Demonstrate ability to I l : : : ! : :
O.
ocke decisions and to IYES ! YES :N/A I YES YES YES : N/A :
coordinate emergency : I I I i : I
! : I : ! : :
cctivities.
1 I I i l I i I O. D;monstrate adequacy i I : : i i :
of facilities and ! YES I YES :YES I N/A :YES :YES : N/A :
dicplays to support ! I i : : I I !
cmcrgency operations. l____l_____I_____!__________l ____l______!_______!
! ! I i ! I i I
- 9. D nonstrate ability to i I 1 i ! I communicate with all ! YES i YES tYES I YES YES YES : YES :
cppropriate locations, ! ! ! : I : : :
organizations, and ! ! ! ! ! : :
fiold personnel. !____I_____l _____
l __________!____l ______!_______l 8 I I I : 1 I !
Demonstrate ability to ! ! ! ! ! : ! !
6.
'mobilire and deploy tN/A : N/A !N/A : YES :YES :N/A : N/A :
fiold monitoring teams I ! ! I : : : :
in a timely fashion. !____!_____!_____l __________
l ____
l ______!_______
! ! ! ! ! ! ! I
! : I !
- 7. D:monstrate appropri- ! I t :
oto equipment and l N/A ! N/A iN/A I YES :N/A IN/A : N/A :
procedures f or deter- I ! ! ! : :
l eining ambient radi- 1 I ! ! ! ! :
l I ction levels, l____!_____ : .
____ ______ l _______ l 1 I I I ! l : I
,0. Deronstrate appropri- 1 I I I ! I i l
oto equipment and i N/A I N/A !N/A I YES :N/A IN/A : N/A :
procedures f or measur- 1 I I i 1 1 !
- : I m nt of airborne ! ! I !
! ! ! I rcdiciodine concentra- 1 I I !
I I : i : :
tions as low as ! I 10-' uCi/CC I I I ! ! l ! I presence of noble ! I ! : : i :
gcses. i____!_____!_____I__________I____I______I_______I u
6 TEBE TFEE- TiAE- TB5sE Essa TERE IREE-- TREBIEEE:
- I :_-_-_I : : : _______
- : I :
- 9. Demonstrate appropri- : :
cte equipmer.t and :
procedures for .:ollec- I N/A : N/A IN/A : YES N/A IN/A : N/A :
i : : : I : !
tion, transport and I, cnalysis of samples l : : : : : :
of soil, vegetation, cnow, water and milk. l____ _____ _____!__________!____
- i : : : : : :
- 10. Demonstrate ability to project dosage : N/A : YES :N/A : YES : YES :N/A : N/A :
- l ;
to the public via ! :
plume exposure, based : :
- I : : :
cn plant and field : 1 dOta, and to determine : : : : : : :
appropriate protective : : : : : : i measures, based on ! : : :
- : : : l l :
PAG's, available :
chelter, evacuation ! : : : l :
time estimates, and : l l : :
other appropriate : : : : : :
- : g
! I :
fcctors. --- ,_____ , ,
! . l 11.D monstrate ability : : : : : : :
to project dosage : : : : : : :
to the public via N/A I YES IN/A : YES lN/A IN/A : N/A :
ingestion pathway : : : : : : :
cxposure, based on :
field data, and to ! ! : : : : :
d termine appropriate : : :
protective measures
- : : : : : I bcsed on PAG's and cn other relevant fcctors (NUREG-0654, i : : : : : : :
I.10, J.11). !____ _____ _____l__________ ____!______l_______l
! l : : : : : :
- 12. Demonstrate abilty to I i : : : : :
icplement protective : I :
cction for ingestion N/A : YES N/A : YES lN/A lN/A IN/A :
pathway hazards !
I : : : :
(NUREG-0654, J.9, I : I J.11). : ____
l _____!_____ __________ ____ ______ : ,______ :
I : I : : : 1 i
- 13. Demonstrate abiliy to : I : : : : :
clert the public with- !N/A : YES lN/A : N/A lN/A lN/A IN/A :
in the 10-mile EPZ, ! : : : : : :
I : ! ! ; !
disseminate an initial :
instructional message 1 : : : : : : I within 15 minutes l____l_____:_____i__________!____ ______ _______
)
iEUd~IE5P~~iiEb~~Ibb5E~hE5b~iEbE~lbRE-- ibi5iEAti l____I_____!_____!__________!____!______!_______t 1 I I i ! I I !
- 10. Demonstrate ability'to I ! ! ! I I I I formulate and distri- lN/A I YES N/A : N/A IN/A :N/A IN/A bute apprpriate in-~ t I i ! I i I l ctructions to the i ! ! ! ! I i :
public in a timely I I ! ! ! : I I fcshion. I I l_____l__________!____I______I_______:
! I l ! I I i !
- 15. Demonstrate the organi-! ! I I I I I :
zotional ability and :N/A i N/A lN/A i N/A IN/A IN/A :N/A :
rcsources necessary to i I I i 1 : i m nage an orderly I : ! ! ! ! :
Cvacuation of all or i ! I I I ! ;
pcrt of the plume EPZ l I ! ! I i i (NUREG-0654, J.9, ! ! ! ! ! ! ! :
J.10.g). !____!_____!_____I__________t____l l I : ! ! ! ! ! I
- 16. D:monstrate the organi-l I ! ! I i zctional ability and iN/A I NO IN/A I N/A IN/A IN/A IN/A :
rcsources necessary to I ! ! 1 ! ! I :
d3al with impediments ! I i : : ! I to evacuation, as I ! ! ! ! ! ! l inclement weather or i i ! : I ! ! I traffic obstructions. ! : i : ! I I l (NUREG-0654, J.10.k). I i i 1 : l l 1 i ! I I ! ! !
- 17. D;monstate the organi- 1 I I ! I i :
rctional ability and !N/A I NO IN/A ! N/A IN/A !N/A !N/A I rcsources necessary to ! ! ! I ! ! !
ccntrol access to an l I I : I ! :
Cvacuated area (NUREG- ! ! : I : I !
O$54, J.10.J). ! : !_____: __________!____t :
i ! I i ! ! : :
- 10. D;monstrate the organi-! I i ! ! I I i rctional ability and IN/A 1 N/A I N/A i N/A lN/A :N/A IN/A i rcsources neccessary ! I I ! ! ! !
to effect an orderly I l ! ! I ! !
cvacuation of mobility-l i I ! l ! ! :
impaired individuals ! I i i i ! ! I within the plume EPZ ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
(NUREG-0654, J.10.d). I I : !__________!____I______I_______
n
-1
-9 l
~
IE06 iF5P~~iiEU~~ibb5E~E55b~iFbC ib5E~~~ib5Dich~I
_ !____!_____I_____I__________I____3______!_______
1 I i i ! ! I i
- 19. Demonstrate the organi-l ! I l I l ! I actional ability and iN/A I N/A IN/A I N/A IN/A IN/A I N/A I rcsources necessary to I i ! ! I I I !
cffect en orderly i i I I l ! ! :
cvacuation of schools I ! ! ! ! I I !
within the plume EPZ l ! I I ! ! I :
fNUREG-0654, J.9, ! ! ! I I I ! !
J.10.g). l____!_____I_____I__________I____!______I_______l I I : ! ! I i i 20 Demonstrate the abilityl ! I ! I I I !
to continously monitor i N/A i YES !YES I YES LYES I N/A : N/A :
cnd control emegency i I I I I I :
worker exposure. !____I_____I_____I__________!____I______I_______
! ! l ! I ! !
- 21. Demonstrate the abilityl i I ! ! I I I to make the decision, 1N/A I YES IN/A 1 YES IN/A IN/A : N/A !
bcsed on predetermined I ! ! I I I : !
criteria, whether to i I I i ! I l :
icsue KI to emergency I I I i i ! ! !
wzekers and/or the ! I I i i ! i !
g:neral population. f.___l_____I_____!__________l____I______l _______
l I I ! I I I ! !
- 22. Demonstrate the abilityi ! ! ! ! ! !
to supply and adminster i N/A i YES IN/A I N/A IN/A IN/A I N/A !
KI, once the deci sion ! I I I ! ! !
h s been made to do so.l____!_____l_____!__________!____!______!_______!
! I I ! ! I
- 23. Demonstrate the ability! I i ! ! ! ! I to effect an orderly I N/A I N/A IN/A ! N/A !N/A I N/A : N/A i cvacuation of onsite ! ! I I I I !
p rsonnel (NUREG-0654, I i ! ! ! l ! !
J.2). I I ! ! ! ! ! !
! ! ! I ! ! ! !
- 24. D:monstrate ability to 1 I ! ! I I I I brief the media in a i N/A ! to IN/A I N/A !N/A !YES I N/A I clear, accurate and i I I I l i ! I timely manner. !____!_____I_____I__________I____!______!_______!
)
TEEE TEcE- TiEE- 755si EsiA TEAE TARE-- TA;3ic;i: '
- ____t : : : : : :
1 i ! I i : i :
- 25. Demonstrate ability- to : : I i : I ,I :
provide advance co- I I I I I I I N/A I YES YES N/A N/A :YES N/A crdination of inform- ! ! l !
ction released. !____l_____I_____!__________l ____I I :
J ! ! ! ! :
- 23. Demonstrate ability to i : : : : : I :
cctablish and operate : I I ! I I I rumor control in a co- .
,N/A I
?O I
N/A , N/A ,N/A
. :N/A ,N/A ,
crinated fashion. I ! : I I I :
1 I i i : : :
- 27. Demonstrate adequacy I : : : : I : !
cf procedures f or reg- I : : : : :
N/A N/A sctration and radio- !
. N/A .N/A
- .N/A I:N/A
- N/A :
l ogi cal monitoring I : : : : : g ;
of evacuees (NUREG- ! : : : : : : ;
0054, J.12). !____I_____!_____l __________ ____ l ______l_______i
- : : ! ! ! ! I
- 20. Demonstrate adequacy : : : : :
of facility for mass !N/A : N/A :N/A I N/A !N/A I N/A : N/A i ccre of evacuees ! ! : : ! : i (NUREG-0654, J.10.h) : ____!_____!_____! I i : :
- ! I i i ! ! !
29, Demonstrate adequate ! ! : : : ! !
cquipment and pro- lN/A I N/A :N/A i YES !N/A IN/A ! N/A :
ccdures for decon- I : : ! ! ! I tcmination of emer- l l l : : l l g ncy workers, equip- i : ! ! : :
m:nt and vehicles ! I i : I ! l (NUREG-0654, K.5.a,b) i i : I ! : ! !
. l . I t .
- 30. D monstrate adequacy I i ! : i : i :
of ambulance f acilities! N/A : N/A !N/A : N/A lN/A IN/A !YES :
cnd procedures for i ! ! ! ! ! :
hcndling contaminated I 1 I I i : :
i ndi vi dual s. I I I i i !______!_______!
! 1 I : I : i
- 31. D monstrate adequacy I i ! i : i !
of hospital facilities IN/A i N/A N/A : N/A IN/A :N/A :YES :
cnd procedures for I i : i ! ! ! I hcndling contaminated I ! ! ! ! ! ! !
individuals. I____!_____! ! ! ! !_______!
lEOC lFCP IIAC : DOSE ASSM lFMC lMRC l MEDICA 1:
- ! i I :
1 I I I : I :
'3i. Demonstrate ability to I : 1 i : : i :
identify need for, ~ !YES I YES IN/A i N/A N/A IN/A :N/A :
request, and obtain ! : I t : I i :
Federal assistance. : I t_____t__________l ____!______l _______
4 I ! ! ! I :
- 33. Demonstrate ability to I ! l : : : : :
rclocate to and operatel N/A I to N/A : N/A IN/A IN/A !N/A :
the alternate EDF/EDC ! ! I t ! : :
(NUREG-0654, H.2, H.3).! ! ! : i : I :
- i : : : I I
- 34. Demonstrate ability to I : : ! I i :
estimate total pop- lN/A ! N/A IN/A i to IN/A !N/A :N/A :
ulaion exposure 1 : : : : I !
-,~!__---__:
(NUREG-0654, M.4) : I : : ---------- ---- __-- : I
. . ! I ! . .
- 35. Demonstrate ability to ! ! ! ! : i :
d3termine and imple- !N/A ! YES :N/A i N/A IN/A IN/A :N/A :
ment appropriate : I : : : I l l measures for controlled! ! i ! ! ! !
rccovery and reentry. l____I_____!_____i__________!____! !_______!
)
i
LOCAL OBJECTIVEB 1985
. CDDPER IdiCEi5bE~~l~ 6DEUIS~~~~i
- I__________I____________I I I i
- 1. Demonstrate ability to i I I mobilize staff and acti- I YES I N/A I vote facilities promptly l__________I____________I I I i
- 2. Demonstrate ability to i I I fully staff facilities I YES I N/A I and maintain staffing l__________I____________I around the clock. I i i l I I
- 3. Demonstrate ability to 1 I I make decisions and to I YES I N/A I coordinate emergency i I I activities. l__________I____________t I I I
- 4. Demonstrate adequacy of I I I facilities and displays I YES I N/A I to support emergency i I I op erati ons. l__________I____________l 1 l 1
- 5. Demonstrate ability to i I I communicate with all I YES I N/A I appropriate locations, I I I organizations, and field i I I personnel. l__________I____________l l i 1
- 6. Demonstrate ability to I i i mobilize and deploy fieldl N/A I N/A I monitoring teams in a l i I timely f ashion. l__________I____________I I I i
- 7. Demonstrate appropriate i I I equipment and procedures i N/A I N/A l for determining ambient i i i radiation levels. l__________I____________t i I I O. Demonstrate appropriate ! I I equipment and procedures i N/A I N/A I for measurement of air- 1 1 1 borne radiciodine con- 1 I I J centrations as low as i I I l 10-* uCi/CC in i I I the presense of noble l__________I____________l gases.
l
. _13_
1ATCHIBON I NODAWAY I l_________I____________f I I I l
- 9. Demonstrate appFoprate i I I equipment and procedues ! I I
)
for collection, trans- I I I N/A N/A I part and analysis of I I samples of soil, vege- 1 I I tation, snow, water and i I I milk. l__________I____________f I I i
- 10. Demonstrate ability to i I I project dosage to the i I I N/A i N/A I public via plume exposurel based on plant and field i I I data, and to determine I i I appropriate protectivt I i i measures, based on PAU's,I I I available shelter, evacu-l i I ation time estimates, I i 1 and all other appropri- 1 I I ate factors. l__________I____________I I I I .
- 11. Demonstrate ability to I i i project dosage to the I
^ l I^ l public via ingestion i I I pathway exposure, based 1 I I on field data, and to I i !
determine appropriate i I I protective measures, I I I based on PAG's and other I i i relevant factors. I i !
(NUREG-0654, I.10, J.11).I__________l____________l i I i
- 12. Demonstrate ability to I I I implement protective i ' '
N/A i N/A actions for ingestion I I pathway hazards. (NUREG- 1 I i 0654, J.9, J.11). l__________I____________I I I i
- 13. Demonstrate ability to i I I alert the public within 1 I I "I^ l the 10-m11e EPZ, and i I disseminate and initial i I I instructional message i I I within 15 minutes. l__________I____________f
)
.-,,--n - - - . - - - - - . - . . , ,---w-,---a-- - - , , . , - - - . - , , ,-. .- ,. - , , - - - , , , --m--.. , ---n. , -- n,--
l
. 1 IEiCUiE6U~~l'U66UEEY~~~~l l__________l____________II
- 10. Demonstrate ability to 1 I I I f ormulate and distribute t YES I N/A I appropriate instructions l i to the public in a timelyl i fashion.
l__________I____________li i I I I
- 15. Demonstrate the organi- 1 I
rational ability and I ygg i N/A i resources necessary to I I I
manage an orderly evacu- l 1
! I ation of all or part of I i I I plume EPZ (NUREG-0654, J.9, J.10.g). l__________I____________f I I i I I
- 16. Demonstrate the organi- 1 i I rational ability and I g3 N/A resources necessary to I i i '
r I I deal with impediments to i I I !
evacuation, as incle- 1 J
I ment weather or traffic I I I I obstructions (NUREG-0654,1 J.10.k). l__________I____________f I I i I I
- 17. Demonstrate the organi- 1 i I I rational ability and YES N/A )
resources necessary to i I I
! I I control access to an I
evacuated area. (NUREG- 1 I 0654, J.10.j) l__________I____________t
! I i I !
- 10. Demonstrate the organi- 1 I
zational ability and re- I YES I
N/A sources necessary to i I I l I I effect an orderly evacu- 1 ation of mobility-impair-l i I i I ed individuals within thel I I plume EPZ (NUREG-0654, I J.10.d). l__________I____________I i
t
1 l
I~5TC5i86U~ l'UU6IEE9~~~~ l ;
l__________I____________I I I
- 19. Demonstrate the organi- 1 mational ability and re- I g i t I i NM I sources necessary to offeet an orderly evacu- 1 I I ation of schools within I i I I
the plume EPZ (NUREG- 1 I 0654, J.9, J.10.g). I I ___I I I I
- 20. Demonstrate the ability i I I to continously monitor 1 YES I N/A I and control emergency I ! I worker exposure. I__________l____________l I I I
- 21. Demonstrate the ability i I I to make the decision, I I 1 N/A N/A I I I based on predetermined I I crieteria whether to 1 issue KI to emergency i I I i I I workers and/or the general population. l__________I____________f I I I
- 22. Demonstrate the ability i I I to administer KI, once I YES I N/A I I
the decison has been madel i to do so. l__________l____________I I I I
- 23. Demonstrate the abili ty i I I I
to effect an orderly i N/A I N/A I
evacuation of onsite per-l !
sonnell (NUREG-0654, J . 2 ) l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ l ., _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ l I ! !
- 24. Demonstrate ability to i I I brief the media in a i tK) l N/A I clear, accurate and i I I timely manner. l__________I____________l I I I
- 25. Demonstrate the ability i I I to provide advance co- I YES I N/A I l
ordination of informa- 1 I I tion releases. l__________I____________I l
[
\
l
l'ETCUiS U~l~U6DEU'~~~~l .
I___ ____l____________I !
I I I ,
- 23. Demonstrate abili_ty to i i I establish and operate i NO I N/A !
rumor control in a co- 1 I I ordinated f ashion. l__________I____________I I I I
- 27. Demonstrate adequacy *of 1 I I procedures f or regis- I N/A I YES I traion and radiological l I I monitoring of evacuese. I I I (NUREG-0654, J.12). l__ ____I____________l l l t
- 28. Demonstrate adequacy of I I I facility mass care of i N/A I N/A I evacuees (NUREG-0654, I I I J.10.h). l__________I____________l 1 1 I
- 27. Demonstrate adequate I i I equipment and procedures i N/A I N/A l' for decontamination of I I I emergency workers, equip-l , I I ment and vehicles. I I I (NUREG-0654, K.5. a,b). l__________I____________I I I I
- 30. Demonstrate adequacy i I I of ambulance facilities i N/A I N/A I and procedures for hand- 1 I I ling contaminated indi- 1 I I viduals. !__________I____________I I I i
- 31. Demonstrate adequacy i I I of hospital facilities i N/A I N/A I and procedures for hand- 1 I I ling contaminated indi- 1 I I viduals. l__________l____________I I I I l
- 32. Demonstrate ability to i I l identify need for, 8 N/A I N/A !
request, and obtain i I I Federal assistance. l__________!____________I i
- _ty_
\
I ATCHIBON I NDDAWAY l l__________l____________I 1 I I
- 33. Demonstrate ability to i I I relocate to and operate i NO I N/A I the alternate EOF /EDC 1 I I (NUREG-0654, H.2, H.U l ______i____________l i I I
- 30. Demonstrate ability to i I I estimate total popula- I N/A I N/A I tion exposure (NUREG- 1 I i 0654, M.4). l__________I____________I I I I
- 35. Demonstrate ability to I i i determine and implement i I I appropriate measures for i YES I N/A I controlled recovery and 1 I I reentry. l__________I____________l 1
. __ . _ - . . _ _ _ ~ - _ - _
FEMA OBJECTIVES ,
CORRE5FORDUC C&JECTIVE ,
PART(5) 0F FORM NU11C-4634
- 1. Demonstrate ability to mobilise Roc Sec. 1 E.1 I.2 staf f and activate facilities W Sec. I promptly. MIA Sec. I RELOC Sec. I M c. I
- 2. Demonstrate ability to fully EOC Sec. I A.2.a.
staf f facilities and maintain W Sec. I A. 4 staf fing around the clock. MIDIA Sec. I RILOC Sec. I
- 3. Demonstrate ability to make ECC Sec. II A.1.d, decisions and to coordinate A.2.s eme rgency activities.
4 Demons trate adequacy of f acilities EOC Sec. III C.3.a.
ar.d dispisys to support emergency EOF Sec. II H.2, ope ra tions . MED IA Se c. II H.3
- 5. Damons trate ability to con =unicate EOC Sec. IV F with all appropriate lo ca tions , W Sec. III organizations, and field personnel. Mf.DIA Sec. III RELOC Sec. III g Sec. I, 11 g Sec. IV
- 6. Demonstrate ability to mobilize 3 Sec. I E.2, 1.8 l and deploy field unicoring teams in a timely fashion. i
- 7. Demons trate appropriate equ.ipment and procedures for determining 3 Sec. II. III 1.8, 1.11 l ambient radiation levels.
- 8. DemonacTate appropriate equipment g Sec. II, III 1.9 and procedures for measurement of RADL.AB Se c. I,11 airborna radigiodine concentracions as low as 10~ uC1/CC in the presence of nobig gases.
- 9. Demons trate appropriate equipment 3 Sec. II, III 1.8 and procedures for collection, RADL.AB Sec. I, 11 transport and analysis of samplas of soil, vegetation, snow, water, and milk.
L
. CORRESP0HDLIC OBJECIIVE PARI (8) 0F FORM N 434
- 10. Demonstrate shility to project toc Sec. Y 1.10, J.10.m dosage to the. public via plums W Sec. Il exposure, bened es plant, and field data, and ter determina appropriate protective measures, based on FAG's, availabla shelter, evacuation tima estiastes, and i all other appropriate factors.
- 11. Demonstrate ability to project toc Sec. Y 1.10. J.11 dosage to the public via ingestion EOF Sec. VI patturay exposure, based on fiald data, and to determine appropriate protective measures , based on FAGS and other relevant factors.
- 12. Demonstrate ability to implenant EOC Se c . VII.C J.9, J.11 protective actions for ingestion
. pathway hazards.
- 13. Demonstrate ability to alert the EOC Sec. VI E.6 public within the 1D-alla ZP2. and FA,Sec. III disseminate an initial instructional message , within 13 minutes.
14 Demonstrate ability to formulate EOC Sec. VI E.3 and distribute appropriate ins tructions to the public, in a timely f ashion.
- 15. Demonstrate the organizational EOC Se c . VII .A J.9, J.10.'s abilit7 and resources necessary H Sec. I to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plums EPZ.
- 16. Demons trate the organizational EOC Se c . V11.A J.10.k ability and resources necessary & Sec. I
- to deal with impediments to evacuation, as inclement weather or traf fic obetructions.
- 17. Demons trate the organlaational EOC Sec. VII.A J.10.j ability and resources necessary E Sec. I to control access to an evacuated area.
)
j
CORRISPONDING -
OBJECTIVE PART(S) 0F FORM NUREC 0654
- 18. Demonstrate tim organisational toc Sec. VII.B J.10.d ability and reseuress necessary H Sec. 11.5
, to of fact an orderly evacuation of mobility-ispaired individuals with1o the plume EFZ.
- 19. Demona trate the organisational EOC Sec. V11.5 J.9 J.10.g ability and resources necessary {Sec.11.A to etfact an orderly evacuation of schools within the plume EFZ.
- 20. Demonstrate ability to continuously EOC Sec. Vill moottor and control emergency K.3.a. b FA,Sec. IV worker exposure. g Sec. V
- 21. Demonstrate the abilty to make the EOC Sec. V J.10.f decision, based on predetermined EOF Sec. VI criteria. whether to issue K1 to eme rgency workers and/or the general population.
- 22. Demons trate the ability to supply EOC Sec. VIII J.10.e and administer KI. once the decision M Sec. IV has be e n su de t o do so. 3 Sec. V
- 23. Demonstrate ability to etfeet an EOC Sec. VII.B J.2 orde rly evacuation of onsite pe r s onn e l .
2 t. . Demons trate ability to brief the EOC Se c . I X C.3.a media in a clear, accurate and MEDIA Sec. IV C.4.a t i me l y a.a nne r. EOF Sec. IV
- 25. Demons trate ability to provide EOC Sec. IX C.4.b advance coordination of inf ormation ME D IA Se c . IV released.
- 26. Demons trate ability to es tablish EO F Se c . .H T" G.4.c and operate rumor control in a MEDIA Sec. VI coordinated f ashion.
- 27. Demons trate adequacy of procedures RELOC Sec. 11 J.12 for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees
- 28. Demonstrate adequacy of f acilities RILOC Sec.111 J.10.h for mass care of evacuees.
.- . - . __. _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ , . . . _ _ _ l
COR21SPONDIE OBJECfIVE FAII(S) 0F FORM NUEEG-0654
- 19. Domsastrate a squate equipesar DECON all E.5.a. b and proemdures' for decentamination of eastgency workara, equipesnt and vehicles. .
- 30. Demonstrate adequacy of ambulance MEDIC Sec. Ill L.4 facilities and procedures for handling contaminated 1pdividuals.
- 31. Demonstrate adequacy of hospital MEDIC Sec. II L.1 facilities and proendures for handling contaminated individus1s.
- 32. Demonstrate ability to identify need (to be developed) C.1.a. b for, request, and obtain Federal assistance.
- 33. Demons trate ability to relocate to (to be de velope d ) H.2, H3 and operate the alternate EOF /EOC.
- 34. Demons trate ability to satinate EOC Se c . Y M.4 total population exposure. EU7 Se c . T 1
- 35. Demons trate ability to decersine EOC Se c. I M.!
and implement appropriate esasures for controlled recovery and reentry.
i
)
e .
1.6 FXFRCIGE SCPNAHIO This exercice -scenario vac initiated by a plant worker injur/ vith contamination. This triggers the Unusual Event.
The Alert vac declared when a dropped radiation filter cartridge spread contamination vithin the, plant.
Pur.p damage and centrol rod incertion problems lead to a Site Area E.ergency. The condition escalates to a General E=ergency when a containment spray valve fails, as well as failure of two of the three fission product barriers.
Power failure due to an electrical storm also forces relocatien to an alternate EOF.
Before Recovery in achieved, a radicactive release occurs and lasts approxicately two hours.
Planned + Actual Timo -
Evont T8 e 0735 Unusual Event 0738 CECO Alert 0812 1030 Cite Area Energency 1030 1115 General Emergar.cy 1105 1200 ECF Pcuer Lens 1150 1300 Felocate to Alt rnate EOF 1227 1300 Radicactiv, Feleaso 1303 1 !. L '; Feleaco Te rni r.a
- ed 1500 1630 Exercice T.rninated 1605 1.7 STATE AND IlX'AI, RFIl0URCFIl
'atn of :ebracka
- 1. Civil Defense Acency
- 2. rept. af Health, Divinica of Pat Health an! ' ate Padiclcgical Laboratory
'0 cal Foccurces
- 1. !iemaha County (a) Civil Defenne (b) Sheriff (c) County Bearl (d) RADEF Cfficer (e) County Health Director
( f) County 'a'elfare Direet or (c) PIO I,
. . _ . - - ~. . . . . .
. - _ = -
,g .
(
,f 1 2. Otoe County (a) Civil Defense >
(b) Sheriff (c) County Co==ission (d) PIO L ,
1 (e) Socitl Services' 3 City of_kaburn (a) Mayorf (b) Fire Depart =ent/ Rescue Squad-
- h. Nebrask.a City (a) Mayor
'(b) Police Chier
. (c) Fire Chief Volunteer Agencies
- 1. American Red Cross - Ne aha and Otoe County Chapters Numerous other volunteers not affiliated with for=al organizations, but recruited by the Civil Defense Directors were active participants. Their contributions are acknowledged and appreciated.
State of Missouri
- 1. Department of Public Safety, State Emergency Manage =ent Agency
- 2. Divicicn'of Health, Bureau of Radiological Health
- 3. Depart =ent of Public Safety, Missouri State High.vay Patrol L. Department of Public Safery, Headquarters Missedri National Guard
-5. Northwest Missouri State University. ,
Local' Resources -
'l. Atchison County (a) County-Coc=issioners (b) County Highway Depart =ent (c) Sheriff's Depart =ent
'(d) Atchison County Ambulance (e) Fairfar: Coc= unity Hospital .
2.
Nodaway County (a), Sheriff's Depart =ent Volunteer Ag ne'ies '
American Red' Cross - Atchison and Nodaway County Chapters Numerous other volunteers not affiliated vii.h for=al orga.tizations ,
but- recruited by the local ' Civil Defense Director were active
) participants. Their contributions are ac)rr.ovledged and appraciated.
The extensive use of . teenage volunteers at the Atchison County EOC was especially noteworthy.
.i
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2 EXHtCISE EVAIDATION 2.1 JOINT OPERATIONS 2.1.1 Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)/ Nebraska FCP This facility is located at the plant and was staffed by personnel representing the utility, Nebraska and Missouri. It was pri=arily a I!ebraska operation, due to the fact that it was also their FCP. Missouri participation was =ini=al, due to the fact that their FCP was located at the Atchison County EOC in Rock Port.
Even though the Field Tea = Coordination function for both States was physically located in the EOF, each vill be evaluated under its respective State Operations section.
Objectives to be de=onstrated by Nebraska: 1, 2, 3, b, 5, 20, 21, 22, 23, 33, and 35 Objectives to be de=enstrated by Missouri: 1, 2, 3, h, 5, 10, 11, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 33.
Full staffing of the FCP for Nebraska was acce=plished according to plan by 0932. First and second shift rosters were presented to account for 2h hour capability. A representative frc= Atchison County, Missouri arrived shortly after 0900, with other staff arriving frc= Jefferson City about 1125 But the utility did not provide any briefing and the Missouri team vent from person to person gathering infor ation. Objectives 1 and 2 ve.re fully de=enstrated.
Coordinated decision-=aking and e=ergency activities were de=onstrated.
This included the coordination of protective action reco==endations between Nebraska and Missouri, rectifying an inadequacy frc= 198L.
However, the evaluator noted the possibility for ti=e inaccuracy and confusion in =essage handling. On some occassions a single =essage form recorded more than one cessage, but showed only one " start" and no "end" time, i= plying that the =essages were done si=ultaneously. It is reco== ended that Nebraska change procedures . and/or for=s to record each =essage on its own for=, or provide " start" and "end" times for each of the cultiple =essages on a single. form.
Objective ' Nu=ber 3 was only partially de=onstrated, due to the lack of briefing for Missouri staff.
Status boards and displays vere adequate, satisfying an inadequacy from 198k. However, space was tight. 'a' hen Missouri people arrived at about 1130, there was virtually no space available. Nebraska Operation and Rad Health had expanded to fill virtually all usable space. Though Objective Number h was fully de=onstrated, it is reco== ended that: 1) So=e arrange =ent be =ade to reserve adequate space for Missouri; and 2) Nebraska and Missouri radio operations should utilize headsets to reduce noise levels.
9
Primary and secondary cc==unications links were all eventually demonstrated, satilifying Objective Number 5. It is noted that the Missouri radio should be in place before the arrival of the BRH representative to ensure backup co==unication frc= the EOF to the Atchison County EOC.
According to the febraska State Plan, and local portions site specific to Cooper Nuclear Station, there are =ultiple alternative means for acco=plishing the administrative and physical functions of alert and notification. However, no preferred or primary method could be deter =ined.
During this exercise the procedure used was notification by the licensee to the Nebraska FCP and the Atchison County, Missouri PIO. The FCP notified the local Nebraska EOCs. '4 hen the utility was unable to contact the Missouri SEOC the utility instructed the Missouri representative at the EOF to notify the Atchison County EOC.
If this is to be the primary or preferred means of alerting the various Missouri and Nebraska off-site authorities, it should be clearly set forth in the Plans, with secondary and tertiary methods so identified. These Plan clarifications vill be shown as " required corrective actien" for Nebraska. Missouri has since corrected their Atchison County Plan to correspond with both the State and the utility notification sequences.
For both States the type and number of dosi=eter vere adequate, as was the use of TLDs, thus, demonstrating Objective Number 20, and eliminating a Nebraska inadequacy fro = the 198L exercise. However, the evalur. tor reco== ends the develop =ent of a dose record to be issued with the self-reading desi=eters to assist staff in correctly recording their readings at the appropriate intervals. Recc== ended dose limits and reading intervals should be provided as a reminder.
At approximately 1155 therc was a si=ulated power failure in the EOF.
Energency lights came on, but the decision was cade to relocate to the alternate EOF in the ar=ory at Auburn as a precaution.
Evacuation of the EOF began around 1200. Staff arrived at the alternate EOF at 1227. No preparations had been =ade, but tables, phones, status boards are perranently stored on site and by 1235 Nebraska operations were set up and they received the first plant update at 12h0. During the relocation process the SEOC assumed co==and of the Nebraksa operations with CRUSH handling much of the co==unications.
This activity provided a full demonstration of Objectives 23 and 33, for both States.
A sufficient supply of KI was available, and appropriate personnel from both States engaged in a lengthy discussion of the advisability of administering the drug and also the methodology.
I
It was finally decided that the situation did not warrant administratien cf KI. However, ~it was adequately demonstrated that distribution could und would have been,=ade, if circumstances warranted it.
Objectives 21 and 22 vere adequately demonstrated, for both States.
Nebraska Operations staff returned to the EOF and participated in discussion cf relevant recovery and reentry issues, demonstrating Objective 35 Su ary: Objective not fully demonstrated by Nebraska: Number 3.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action
- 1. Tne Nebraska Plan for the Cooper Nuclear Station does not stipulate the primary means of carrying out alert and notification at each energency action level. 'a'hile it provides several alternatives, it does not prioritize among them. The Plan =ust be amended to accomplish this.
- 2. Backup co==unication between the EOF and Atchisen County EOC =ust exist prior to the arrival of SEMA staff at both locations.
Recommendations _
- l. Nebraska should consider changing procedures and/or forms to record each cessage on its own separate for=; or provide " start" and " erd" times for each cultiple message on a single form.
- 2. Scre arrangement should be made to reserve adequate space for Missouri.
'. Nebraska should develop a dose record to be issued with self-reading dositeters to assist in getting staff to record readings at proper intervals.
2.1.2 Information Authentication Center (IAC)
Objectives to be ' demonstrated by Nebraska: 1, 2, L, 5, 13, IL, 20, and 25 Objectives to be demonstrated by Missouri: 1, 2, L, 5, 20, and 25 This facility, located at the EOF, is staffed by representatives of the utility and both States.
Activation and staffing of this facility proceeded according to the Plan with two PI0's arriving from Lincoln at 1020. Utilization of a verified roster provided for 2k hour staffing, as Objectives Number 1 and 2 were fully demonstrated. It was discovered that prior to departure from Lincoln, a precautionary EBS announcements was made, without benefit of siren sounding.
There were also other precautionary EBS announcements made prior to the j
i
General E=ergency. In an area vere there are 2 States, 2 EBS stations, 2- points of contact, and 2 points of siren activation, this could lead to a great deal of confusion and the need for an early activation of all ru=or control syste=s.
The facility is rather s=all for the nu=ber of people and amount of equip =ent it would house in a real e=ergency. However, this situation did not deter the staff from carrying out their tasks. Pri=ary and back-up co==unications to all required sites was demonstrated fully accounting for Objectives Ilumber h and 5 At the General E=ergency, alerting the public through sounding the sirens is the responsibility of local govern =ents. In Nebraska the IAC is responsible for coordinating and releasing to the EBS subsequent messages regarding plant coordination and reco== ended protective actions. In Missouri, EBS is notified by the FCP or the County.
To the extent called for, these portions of Objectives 13 and IL vere de=onstrated.
However, it should be noted that the Nebraksa State and local Plans are very ambiguous in describing the steps required and the specific parties responsible.
In the Nebraska State Plan, page 52, paragraph b. , and pages B-5 and B-6 permit the activation of public alert ' and notification through several channels. They fail to prescribe a pri=ary or preferred =ethodology; neither do they identify which =eans are to be used under which conditions. While this cultiple option approach per=its a great deal of flexiblity, it also pro =otes uncertainty.
Clarification of precise alert and notification terminology and
=ethodology vill be required. (Detailed under EOF Section.)
Throughout the exercise the staff monitored and recorded exposure values, fully demonstrating Objective Nu=ber 20.
There was constant coordination between both States, local and the licensee PI0s once the IAC was staffed, fully demonstrating Cbjective Nu=ber 25 Su m ry: All objectives planned for this facility were demonstrated.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action
- 3. When Nebraska releases EBS messages prior to the sounding of sirens, they =ust notify Missouri of their intention to do so.
2.1.3 Media Release Center (MRC)
This facility is located in the Douglas County EOC in 0=aha, Nebraska, and is staffed by representatives of the utility and both States.
Objectives to be de=onstrated for both States were: 1, 2, h, 5, 25, and 26 (for Nebraska).
O The Nebraska _and Missouri contingents of the staff of this facility accomplished activation and staffing in a timely canner and by roster de=onstrated 2h hour staffing, acco plishing 03dectives Number 1 and 2.
Facilities and equipment were adequate, as were all co==unication equip =ent, demonstrating Objectives Number k and 5.
During the exercise, four briefings for media were held at 1150, 1305, lk25, and 1515. NPPD, Missouri, and Nebraska all made presentations and fielded questions. NPPD failed to provide any usable visual aids for the media, causing briefings to be confusing and of poor quailty. A plant scheratic of sufficient size and quality to allow reproduction by video or still photograpy should be available.
The same applies to displays of the geographical area, which should include easily recognizable land arks. An enlargement of the cap in the brochure would be very helpful.
During press briefings the participants each individually addressed the media and then retired to the side. This put each presenter in the position of being open to a full range cf media questions, some of which may have been outside their area of expertise. The briefings became very long and ecnfusing.
A consistent, coordinated briefing protocol should be established prior to briefing. It should include someone to act as moderator and introduce the others. After short individual presentations they could field media questions as a panel. Also, arrangements should be made to provide sn-mries of prior briefings to reporters via video, audio tapes or hard copy. This is particularily i=portant to reporters arriving between briefings.
Nebraska and Missouri minically accc plished Cbjective Number 2L.
Bere was a failure to establish a Nebraska rumor control line at the
!GC , due to confusion about whether NPPD or the NSCDA had the primary responsibility. Each claimed it was the other's responsibility. NSCDA staff telieved that the procedure was the same as that for Fort Calhoun, where the utility is responsible for the function. If this line was established at a location other than the IGC, the number was never publicized through the ?GC.
In any case, the portion of Objective Number 26, which calls for a telephone hotline was not demonstrated.
Su-m ry: Objective not demonstrated: Number 26 for Nebraska (N/A for Missouri).
Areas Requiring Corrective Action L. The form and content of press briefings should be improved as detailed in the body of the report. (IRTREG-065h , 6. 3.a. , 6. L .a. )
i l
L
_29
- 5. IiPFD should provide plant sche atics and not rely on gestures and vague verbal descriptions given by the PIO. (NURIE-065k, 6.3.a.,
6.h.a.)
- 6. The ilebraska Plan should be clarified to delineate lead responsibility' for the rumor control hotlines, and an agreement reached between tiPPD and fiSCDA. (!iUREG-065L , G. L .c. )
)
2.2 NEBRASKA OPPRATIONS 2.2.1 State Phergency Operations Center (SEOC) '
1 The following ' objectives were to be demonstrated at this . facility:
1, 3, L, 5, 10, 17, 25, 32, and 35.
At OTLO the SEOC was notified of an Unusual Event at 0738 at the Cooper
!!uclear Station. At 0812 the State Patrol notified the SEOC that the condition had escalated to the Alert level.
At this time, activation and staffing was begun, with all calls being completed a t. 08L8, fully de=onstrating Objective flu =ber 1. Since they did not intend to demonstrate Objective flu =ber 2, other Agency staff attendance was simulated.
.At 1028 the SEOC vas notified that a Site Area E=ergency had been declared. Placing cattle on stored feed was announced at 10L8. They also coordinated with the U.S. Coast Guard and the FAA for the purpose of controlling access to the Missouri River and affected air space, de=enstrating Objective fiumber 17.
At 1105 the General Emergency was declared. The SEOC i==ediately coordinated with the Governor's representative to release appropriate protective action recc==endations.
Due to a si=ulated loss of electrical power at the EOF /FCP, the staff vas forced to relocate to an alternate facility. This evacuation began at 1205, at which time the EOC assu=ed control of the FCP functions. This operation proceeded very smoothly and continued until the alternate EOF /FCP wasjestablished at the Armory at Auburn, !!ebraska at 12LO.
Cecision aking, co==unications, coordination, and facilities at the SEOC vere all adequate, as well as advance coordination of infor=ation fully demenstrating Objective !; umber 3, L, 5, and 25.
As mentioned above, appropriate protective action recc==endation vere issued at the- preper time, de=onstrating that portion of Objective I; umber 10 for which the SEOC-is responsible.
Objective tiumber 32, regarding identifying the need of and request
'for Federal technical assistance was shown by the State as an objective for de=onstration. However, the scenario did not realistically require additional resources, and the co==unication was only informational in nature.
Discussion of' recovery and reentry issues as prepared on preprinted for=s covered required points demonstrating Objective ?iu=ber 35.
Su==ary' : All objectives set forth for this exercise were fully demonstrated.
I
2.2.2 Radiological Assessment and Field Team Coordination Objectives to le de=onstrated: 1, 2, 3, h, 5, 6, 20, 21, 22, and 35 The call initiating activation of the radiological group was received at 0757. All required staff =e=bers were in place at the EOF by 0957, fully de=onstrating Objective Nu=ber 1. Objective Number 2 was demonstrated insofar as the facility was fully staffed. They did not intend to de=onstrate %
hour capability at this exercise.
The Radiological Health Coordinator worked very effectively with the Governor's representative to carry out all required decision =aking, fully de=onstrating Objective Number 3.
The facility did not afford adequate space or furniture for the functions that needed to be perfor=ed within the EOF. Noise was also a proble=, but was controlled. It is reco== ended that headsets be used to reduce noise levels. However, teams worked around these difficulties to enrry out their tasks.
As =entioned above, due to a simulated power failure it was necessary to relocate to an alternate facility in the middle of the exeresie. Before, during and after this event, co==unication syste=s functioned without any problems, fully demonstrating Objective Nu=ber 5 l , Field team deployment frc= the EOF vas delayed due to problems with l the equip =ent belonging to OPPD. (This problem vill be examined in more detail under Section 2.2.3, " Field Monitoring". ) This delay of nearly 30 minutes kept them from demonstrating Objective Nu=ber 6.
The Dose Assessment team was well trained. Calculations were =ade via pri=ary and back-up co=puters. Projections were verified with the utility and the State of Missouri and showed high correlation. PAR's were made in a timely =anner and coordinated with both the utility and Missouri.
The plu=e was defined via field data; iodine calculations were checked.
However, it is reco== ended that data sheets should be improved to allow verification of field data. Currently, they use two separate for=s which do not permit all relevant data to be arrayed in a ' single format. This
=akes verification difficult.
The staff was equipped with dositetry adequate to =onitor and control exposure, demonstrating Objective Number 20.
However, it is reco== ended that record keeping forms for self reading dosimeters be developed and readings taken on a = ore regular basis.
The decision regarding use of KI was =ade according to the State Plan.
Though it was not administered, its availability and the capability to administer were shown, thus demonstrating Objectives Number 21 and 22.
) At the appropriate ti=e a table top discussion was held to cover the issues related to recovery and reentry. Field sa=ples of vegetation and water vere taken and screened using the ND-6700 multi channel analyser.
,l'
- - i:
};
It should be noted that Ilebraska was provided a separate Radiological scenario to test this aspect of their preparedness. This was necessitated by the fact that the plume vent into Missouri. The method worked quite well and was handled vithout confusion.
Su==ary: ' Objective Number 6 was not fully de=onstrated at this exercise.
Recommendation
- 5 Record keeping forms should be developed for self reading dosi=eters, including an indication of frequency of readings.
2.2.3 Field Monitoring Teams NOTE: Two conitoring teams are called for in the plan. In prior years 3
one team was co= prised of two employees fro = the State Bureau of Radiological Health, and the second team was ce= prised of two employees of the 0=aha
. Public Power District (OPPD) sent fro = the Fort Calhoun I?uclear Station.
l In evaluating their performance they were referred to as the " State" tea:
and the " Utility" team.
For this exercise the teams were mixed, each being co. prised of one i
State and one utility person.
Objectives to be de=onstrated were: 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 20, and 22.
- Field Team Number 1 The liebraska State Civil Defense Agency (SCDA) cade the call to mobilize field tea = personnel at 0755. The OPPD tea
- = ember arrived at the EOF at 09h5 and the !iebraska 3RH member arrived at 0957.
i While =obili:ation was acco=plished in a timely =anner, deployment.
from the EOF vas delayed by about 30 minutes. This delay was due in large
'- 'part to .the fact that team number 2 did not have a verking GM probe. After unsuccessfully attempting to repair it, the field team coordinator ordered team number 1 to give their probe to tea: 2. No back-up survey instruments l
1 vere provided in the kits or at the deploy =ent points.
i
- Even with this delay (deployment occurred at 1032), the team was not on meteorological conditions, exposure control procedures, or briefed clarification of work roles between-utility and State personnel.
-The " Deploy =ent" portion of Objective Number 6 was not fully de=onstrated.
l
-The vehicle for the team was excellent and provided pri=ary and back-up co==unication, satisfying a deficiency frc= 196L.
4 Due to the fact that they loaned their GM probe to tea: 2, they did not have a sodium iodide scintillation counter.
.The air sa=pler did not show a date for calibration of flow rate, continuing an. inadequacy noted in 198h . Also, there were no silver zeolite cartridges in the kit.
- - - -.m, - - - , ,- ,ne-_---,.-w -m -w -
-,p,- .w,,, --e,-- ,-----e,%-- ,---e.-,.--,--, .--e< ~r--, - - . - -
) Since both tea: =e=bers were totally unfamiliar with the caps used, the terrain,- or the predetermined =onitoring points, there were unacceptable delays in finding monitoring locations requested by the EOF. About an hour was spent within the plu=e while trying to deter =ine where they were before any sa=pling was done., Also, there was no consistency in surveying for ambient radiation. When survey was perfor=ed, they used the high range (ionization chamber) instrument instead of the low range instru=ent, and thus, they were unable to obtain an accurate reading. This was noted as a deficiency in the 198L exercise.
No monitoring was done outside the vehicle. No ground level and 3' (above ground) readings were taken. When asked by the EOF to locate the "1 ' R/hr level" of the plume and take an air sa=ple, the tea = vas not sure how to proceed.
Also, they were not adequately versed in use of the for=ula provided for calculating radiciodine concentration. After the sa=ple was counted, 4 three attempts were made before correct values were derived. Although they were aware of the necessity to proceed out of the plume to count the air sa=ple, they did not =onitor to assure that radiation levels outside the plu=e were background before counting the second air sa=ple.
They did demonstrate proper techniques for collecting soil, vegetation and water sa=ples, but did not package or transport the=.
Objectives Number 7 and 6 were not de=cnstrated; Objective Nu=ber 9 was partially de=cnstrated.
Team members failed to read their dositeters on any scheduled or predeterMned basis. The BRH ce=ber had =id and high range pocket dositeters (20R and 1COR) and the OPPD me=ber had 2 low range instruments (200 =R and 500 =R). Neither of the= vere aware of any =aximu= dose allowed without further authorization, or any " turn around" levels. Both = embers had permanent record dositeters, as required (Simulated TLD).
~When the team = embers did re= ember to take readings in the vicinity of the plu=e, they used the high range instruments instead of the reco== ended low range. The controller calculated that they accu =ulated an esti=ated dose of 1500 =R before they first examined their. desi=eters. It is 1 questionable whether this vould have been detectable on the high range instruments, and would have far exceeded the scales of the low range dosimeters. For these reasons, the reco==endation made under field team coordination for =aintenance of field tea = dose records applies here as well.
They did have a supply of KI and were aware of procedures for its use.
l They failed to de=onstrate Objective Number 20, but did de=onstrate Objectives Nu=ber 21 and 22.
i Co==unication throughout was excellent, fully demonstrating Objective
{ ). Nu=ber 5 1
i
-,, ,- ,, , . . - , . . - - .- -- ~-.- -- - - - - - .
t
-3h-i Field Team Number 2 i
As. stated above for team 1, =obilization was timely, deployment was ,
not. Objective Number 6 was not fully demonstrated.
Continuing an inadequacy fro = last year, no check source was available.
All equipment had stickers indicating calibration within the last year.
However, . the digital icn chamber gave erroneously high background readings, rendering the= inaccurate in the dose rate mode. It did appear to operate correctly in the integrated dose = ode.
The sodiu=. iodide scintillation counter (SAM II) gave background readings (counts per unit of time) which varied significantly, depending on whether the engine was used as power source or the battery. While tlis piece of equipment is adequate (when operating prcperly), the plan needs tc be revised te reflect its use, since an IIDG is currently called for.
Objectives 7 and 8 vere not adequately demonstrated.
They did, however, de=onstrate proper techniques in deter =ining radiation levels and in taking air, soil, and vegetation sa=ples, de=onstrating Objective Iu=ber 9 Con =unications with the EOF vere =aintained throughout the exercise.
McVever, slight break-up was experienced after relocation to the AEOF. ~
Ctfective Number 5 vas fully de=enstrated.
TLDs and pocket dosimeters were used, demonstrating Objective Nu=ber 20.
KI was available, and its administration fully understood. Objectives
.21 and 22 vere de=enstrated.
Su==ary (both tea =s): Objectives. unde =cnstrated for this exercise:
6, 7, 8, 9, and 20.
Deficiencies That Would Iead to Negative Findingl
- 1. There was not sufficient operational radiation detection equipment available .to place two fully equipped monitoring tea =s in the field or a Letter of Agreement (LOA) between the State and both utilities to provide for same. (NUREG-065h, A. 3, I. 7, 8, 9, 10.)
- 2. Field tea = operation was deficient to the extent that:
- a. One team was unable to locate predeter=ined monitoring points.
i 1 See Supplemental Report, Section 3, detailing correction of these deficiencies, i
a
4
- b. Remaining within the plume for over an hour, they failed to survey for ambient radiation on any consistent basis.
f.
- c. When ' surveying was done, they erroneously used high range '
instruments.
- d. No monitoring was done outside the vehicle.
- e. Calculation of radiciodine concentration required three atte= pts to obtain correct values.
- f. Background readings were not verified before counting air sa=ples.
- g. The team exhibited an overall lack of training.
Areas Requiring Corrective Action _
- 7. Team was unaware of maximum dose allowed, or turn around levels.
Recommend that individual dose rate record cards be developed showing above data.
)
Q 2.2.14 State Radiological Laboratory The caly obje.ctive stated for de=onstration was Nu=ber 9. And only that portion referring to the de=enstration of appropriate equipment and procedures for sample analysis vould be applicable.
. The evaluator noted that staffing was adequate for a single shift.
Although, it was - not a planned objective, there was no back-up to the radiological chemist. In addition, it was the evaluator's judge =ent that the procedures for use of the ND 6700 were sufficiently . co= plicated that
!- a regular lab chemist could probably not be expected to step in for the radiological che=ist if the situation required it.
' As part of the exercise the staff adequately de=onstrated procedures for analysis of soil samples which had been laced with Cesiu= 137.
Field samples were logged in using a methodology which worked s=oothly, was thorough and well understood by the staff. Additionally, they had developed analytical protocols for each operation at the RAD LAB, and had a written agree =ent with the Depart =ent of Radiological Health for pick-up and disposal. of radioactive materials. These additions satisfy inadequacies noted at the Fort Calhoun Exercise of July 2L, 1965.
4 The evaluator noted that not all of the staff who handled the radioactive samples. had TLDs, and none of the staff had pocket dosimeters. Insofar as this ' would appear to be an. integral part of " appropriate procedures for analysis of samples", Objective Nu=ber 9 is Judged not to have been fully demonstrated.
t Areas Requiring Corrective Actions
- 8. All staff handling radioactive samples should wear TLDs. This should be de=enstrated the next ti=e the RAD LAB is exercised.
2.2.5 Decontamination Facilities i
NEBRASKA CITY, NEBRASKA A decontaminatien facility for evacuees was exercised at the National Guard Ar=ory at Nebraska City. Since this was the' first ti=e for this facility, it was considered to be a semi-training exercise.
2 Objective 29, as applied to this site, calls for a de=onstration of equipment and procedures used in deconta=ination of personnel. The plan calls for local radiological conitoring and deconta=ination capabilities
, to function under the direction of State staff.
During the exercise, vehicular and personnel monitoring was demonstrated.
Vehicles needing decontaminatien vere segregated for later re= oval to a local car wash.
i i -
- ~ %-
. , - , _ . , - , , -,-e.,.-._,,n..,,,,_-. _ e , , . . , _ , v. v,e n-----,y--,-,-_.,-,-.g -,--+m-. +---m~-~ -_,, --n-----r--
4
, The tiebraska -City Decontamination facility failed to demonstrate the capability to perform personnel decontamination. Specifically, there were I no shower facilities available. Persons staffing the facility reported that a portable shower would be used in a real emergency. However, they had not looked into thy particulars of how and where it would be obtained and installed. Also, the segregation of clean and contaminated areas would be by masking tape on the floor. Due to the restricted space, the likelihood of recontaminating persons who had been decontaminated was high.
Su-enry: Objective fiumber 29 was not fully de=enstrated.
Deficency That Would Imad To A Negative Findingl 3 The fiebraska City Decontamination Facility failed to demonstrate the capability to perform personnel decontamination.
AUBURN, NEBRASKA A facility for decentamination of energency workers was set up at the fire station in Auburn.
A well trained staff demonstrated the equipment and procedures for monitoring people and vehicles.
Facilities for personnel decontamination were limited in that they had caly one shower. Vehicular decontamination was fully explained with excellent facilities. The procedures for handling radioactive vaste were vell. thought out and suitable.
Surnn ry: Objective fiumber 29 was de= castrated.
') 1 See supplemental report, Section 3, detailing correction of these deficiencies.
- 0.
s
'2.3 COUNTY OPERATIONS 2.3.1 ~Neumha County EDC Objectives to ' be de=onstrated: 1, 2, 3, h, 5, 13, lb, 15, 17, 18,
-20,'25, 35 ,
The Sheriff received notification of Alert status at 0828 and
, =obilization and activation occurred pro =ptly thereafter, staffing being f co=pleted at 0920.
Use. of a verified roster and double staffing at some positions de=onstrated 2k hour capability.
Objectives Number 1 and 2 were fully de=onstrated.
Decision-=aking, coordination, and all necessary co==unication was demonstrated, fully satisfying Objectives Number 3, h, and 5, and satisfying '
inadequacies in these areas which were noted at the 19Eh exercise.
When notification of the General E=ergency was received at 1106, the Sheriff was notified and sounding of sirens was simulated at 1111. The IAC vas called at 1113 with the EBS =essage. However, there was a . failure to notify the authorities at Indian Cave State Park that a. General E=ergency
.had been declared. The last record of co==unication with the park was at 09L5. Neither the State Plan. nor the Nemaha County Plan is very explicit about this responsibility and the manner in which it is to be carried out.
Since the park relies on route alerting, which was deter =ined in the
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198h exercise to take h5 minutes, it would be advisable for them to begin-notification 'for evacuation at the Site Area E=ergency to accomplish A&M 4
vithin the allowed L5 =inutes.
The evaluator' observed that the PIC vas not fully familiar with EBS
, =essage procedures. He appeared unsure of who is to prepare and who is to authorize EBS messages. When the reco==endation to evacuate to two miles was received, the PIO tried to call the IAC to authorize the =essage. Since the IAC- vas being relocated to another site, he could not take contact.
He then called the IGC. The situation would indicate the need for clarification regarding who can authorize =essages, and additional training for the PIO.
Objective Number 13 was not fully demonstrated; lh was.
l At 1210,the Sheriff received notice to evacuate to two =iles. Evacuation of all residents was confir ed at 1315. However, no one authorized road I
blocks to provide access control until 13h3. Then it only resulted because the EOF called at 13hD to request the location of the road blocks. Once ,
activated, resources and organizational ability were well de=cnstrated.
Objective Nu=ber 17 was partially de=enstrated.
. 1 i
Sufficient resources were available to deal with any impediments to evacuation, fully d'emonstrating Objectives Number 15 and 16.
The Sheriff also dealt with =obility i= paired during the exercise, accounting for a de=enstration of Objective Number 18.
Appropriate dosimetry equipment and procedures were shown, fully demonstrating Objective Number 20.
As =etioned above, the PIO was unsure of EBS procedures, however, he did coordinate with the IAC in a de=onstration of Objective Nu=ber 25 At 1538, a message from the IAC advised of status deescalation to Site Area Emergency. It also reminded far=ers that reentry was still on hold until State Health Officials could check the area. The =essage further advised: "No action required by you." This effectively terminated Recovery and Reentry activities without permitting demonstration of Objective Nu=ber 35.
Su==ary: Objectives not fully demonstrated: 13, 17, and 35 Deficiencies That Would Lead To A Negative Findingl L. Failure to notify Indian Cave State Park in sufficient time to permit alert and notification of transients in the 5 to 10 =ile area within L5 minutes.
5 Failure to establish access control road blocks to evacuated area in a timely canner.
Area Requiring Corrective Action 9 The State should provide the needed training regarding proper PIO procedures.
2.3.2 Nemaha County Ambulance Unit Objectives to be demonstrated were: 5, 20, and 30.
The ambulance responded to a plant request to transport a contaminated, injured patient to the hospital. The vehicle was equipped with all
- appropriate co==unication equipment satisfying an inadequacy from the 198L exercise.
However, =essages are relayed through the radio at the Law Enforce =ent Center. The operation failed to relay the message totally and accurately.
He failed to say that the patient was contaminated.
1 See supplemental report, Section 3, detailing response to these
) deficiencies.
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- It L is reco== ended that the radio relay staff be instructed in the necessity for verbati= transmission in medical emergencies.
The crev was equipped with high and low range dosimeters, chargers and record cards. The health physicist from the plant also accompanied the _ to the hospital ,vith the - patient, and assisted with contamination
-containment enroute. He also ' provided the crev vith TLDs upon arrival at the plant.
All procedures ' were properly followed in receiving and transporting the patient, fully demonstrating Objectives Number 5, 20, and 30.
2.3.3 Otoe County EOC and Reception Center- t NOTE: The =ain =ission of the County EOC' is to activate and support the Reception Centers at Nebraska City.
$ To accomplish this, the EOC vould need to de=enstrate Objectives Number
-1, 2, 3, h, and 5.
l=
After receiving a call from the Nebraska Highway Patrol at 0815, the
. .EOC was - activated and staffed by 1000. Though they did not demonstrate-2h hour capability, the presence of a large number of elected and appointed officials was gratifying.
The u persen in charge exhibited gcod coordinative and decision-=aking. ,
skills.
r For the limited purposes of this ECC, the facilities and co==unication equipment were adequate.
All objectives were demonstrated.
f Objectives to be demonstrated at the Reception Center vere: 1, 2, 3, 5, 27, and 28.
t I
When evacuation was called for, activation of the Nebraska City '
i Belocation Center was requested. The activation and staffing began ittediately, as .they prepared for registration, congregate care, and L decontamination.
-While registration and decontamination were handled at the National Guard Ar=ory, the majority of the care facilities were scattered around
, ' town at 15 sites providing accomodations-for 2,L67 people. The armory itself
_could acco=odate about 350 people.
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Throughout the, exercise the staff de=onstrated coordination and carried out their duties according to plan. Direction and control vere - evident;
_ facilities and co==unication were adequate. All objectives were demonstrated
! and no inadequacies were observed.
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.,- -h1-t 2.4 MISSOURI STATitOPERATIONS At the " Unusual Event" staff are dispatched from the SEOC to the Atchison County EOC to establish a Forward Co==and Post (FCP). When this has' been accomplished, most decig, ion-=aking vill occur at the FCP. Until this time, the SEOC is the control center, and vill co==unicate with the team while enroute.
2.k.1 State Energency Operations Center (SEOC)
Objectives to be de=onstrated: 1, 2, 3, h, 5, and 32.
Activation of the SEOC began at 0815 with receipt of the call announcing the " Alert" status. . Only members of the State E=ergency t'anagement Agency were called upon to staff the office for this exercise. These positions were double staffed and engaged in a shift change.
To this extent Objectives Ilumber 1, 2, and 3 vere demonstrated.
While the . building facilities and co==unications are adequate, it was noted that they do not have a large scale =ap of the Cooper area showing the EPZ, the sector designations or population by area. If evacuation or other protective actions are called for prior to the establishment of the FCP, these visual aids would be required for informed decision-=aking by the SEOC staff. These same inadequacies remain from the last two Cooper exercises.
.Therefore, Objective ilumber L was net fully demonstrated; Objective fiumber 5 was.
At 1122 the FCP announced they were operational and co==and was transfered to the FCP.
Through the rest of the exercise the SECC was kept posted on all developments.
At 1514, after conferring with the FCP, the SEOC contacted FEMA to coordinate a request for Federal Assistance, deconstrating Objective ilumber 32.
Su==ary: Objective not de=onstrated; flu =ber h.
Recommendation -
- 6. Use of large scale =ap for Cooper area showing EPZ and population figures. This is not required, due to the reduced role of the SEOC resulting from delegation of control to the FCP.
2.h.2 Forward Cnmunand Post (FCP)
The Missouri State FCP was located at the Atchison County EOC.
Objectives to be demonstrated were: 1, 2, 3, h, 5, 12, 13, lb, 20, 21, 22, 25, 32, and 35.
-h2-The SDIA staff simulated travel fra: Jeffersen City and arrived at the FCP at 1120.' They were briefed by the Atchisen County CD Director regarding acticns taken to date.
Objectives Nutter 1, 2, and 3 were de=enstrated.
Facilities were sc=ewhat improved over last year since the Field Tea Coordination had been ,=oved to the EOF. Cc==unication capabilities to all appropriate units were de=onstrated. Objectives Nu=ber k and 5 vere acco=plished.
Since the General E=ergency was declared prior to the activation of the FCP, Objective Nu=ber 13 became the responsibility of the Atchison County EOC. Due to a failure to issue proper subsequent messages to transients, Cbjective lk was not derenstrated.
The Bureau of Radiological Health (BRH) delivered 30 TLDs to the FCP/EOC.
Their use rectified an inadequacy frc= the past. All other dosimeters were distributed and prcperly used. BRH distributed KI to all workers who =ight te exposed to a thyroid dose in excess of 25 rec. They were all aware of the procedures for its use.
Objectives Nu=ber 20, 21, and 22 vere de=cnstrated.
Throughout the exercise, the Atchisen County FIO liaisen who had been dispatched to the EOF continued to verify and cocrdinate infor=ation. To this extent Cbjective Nutter 25 was de=cnstrated.
At 1620 the FCP asked that the SECC request Federal Assistance in the for= of additional support for field monitoring activities, de=cnstrating Cbjective Nu-ter 32.
A special de=enstration occurred after the exercise was actually terminated.
A tes= vas dispatched to the field to take sa ples and survey in the ingestion pathway. The results were then analyzed and reviewed to generate appropriate protective action recc==endations. Cbjective 12 was fully de=cnstrated.
FCP and County ECC staff joined in discussion of recovery and reentry issues. They covered securing evacuated areas, reentry for essential services and safety precautions. Objective Nu=ber 35 was demonstrated.
S e-ary: Objectives Nu=ber 13 and 1h were not de=enstrated.
Area Requiring Corrective Action
- 10. The FCP staff did not issue subsequent proper =essages to alert transients regarding appropriate protective actions.
-h3-
> 2.4.3 Field Team Coordination / Dose Assessment Objectives to be demonstrated: 1, 2, 3, h, 5, lo, 11, 20, 21, 22,
.and 35 The tea = frc= the' Bureau of Radiological Health was prepositioned at Rock Fort and arrived at the EOF at 1120. Staffing was co=pleted at 1125 Double staffing was used to de=onstrate 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> capability.
Objectives Nu=ber 1 and 2 were fully deconstrated.
Dose assesscent and radio logs were kept and coordination of teams with~the utility was very well done. Coordination with Nebraska or protective actions was also excellent. I Upon . arrival, they received no briefing by the utility to bring them up to .date en the situation. Instead, they vandered frc= person to person trying to gather infor=ation as best they could.
Objective Nu=ber 3 was partially de=enstrated.
'a'ne n the Missouri team arrived at the EOF at 1120 there was virtually no space to accomodate them. Not enough chairs or desks were available and the noise level was rather high though controlled. (It should be noted-that these condition i= proved when they relocated to the alternate EOF about 1230.)
The rad =enitoring caps for.the States and the utility were all different and quite confusing in coordinating field tea = =ovements.
For these reasons, there was not an adequate demonstration of Objective-Nu=her L.
All cc==unication equip =ent worked well before and during the relocation of the-EOF. .However, after relocation of.the EOF, cakeshift antenna placement caused ce==unication dead spots for Missouri. Objective Nu=ber 5 was fully de=enstrated.
Dose projection utilized both plant and field data. Calculations by hand' were demonstrated pro =ptly, and the team was directed effectively in defining the plu=e. l A two day time ju=p in the scenario allowed vegetation samples to be taken and dosage in the ingestion pathway to be projected. As centioned above, coordination with Nebraska was good.
Objectives Nu=ber 10 and 11 vere fully deconstrated.
Staff were all equipped with high and low range dosimeters and TLDs, as.vell as appropriate record cards. KI was available and all were aware of the proper procedures concerning its use.
_hh-Objectives Number 20, 21, and 22 were fully demonstrated.
The ERH staff' followed through with sampling =easurement, use of analytical results,'and prepared action limits to determine the levels for reentry. The SDiA ' representative discussed i=plementation, press releases, public notification and timing.
Objective Number 35 was de=enstrated.
Sunnary: Objectives not fully demonstrated: 3, L and 5 Areas Requiring Corrective Action
- 11. Coordination of field teams was co= plicated by the use of three different maps. A single map indicating predesignated radiological monitoring points should be adopted and provided for use by both States and the licensee. However, the one currently in use by the licensee is not reco== ended.
2.h.h Field Monitoring Objectives to be demonstrated: 5, 6, T, 8, 9, 20, and 22.
Field team was pre positiened at Rock Port and simulated travel frc=
Jefferson City, arriving at the State FCP about 1125 After a situation briefing they deployed into the field under the direction of the field tea =
coordinator located at the EOF. Objective 6 was demonstrated.
'4hile the team had sufficient radiation =cnitoring equipment to perform their assigned duties, the precise type of equipment did not agree totally with the inventory list in the plan.
As mentioned in previous exercises, the vehicle (with over 100,000 miles) would not suffice in rough terrain and/or bad weather and could place their staff in danger.
SD:A assures that in case of necessity the 'iational Guard will provide a vehicle.
Objective Number 7 was demonstrated.
The team and driver demonstrated an excellent ability to locate proper check points and demonstrated full familiarity with equip =ent and procedures necessary for measurement of airborne radioiodine. They also collected soil, vegetation and water samples.
However, there was no de=onstration of the transport of these sa=ples, or subsequent analysis at a rad lab.
Objective Number 8 was fully demonstrated; Objective Nu=ber 9 was partially de=onstrated.
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'w' hen the EOF . relocated to Auburn, the radio co==unication was not always audible. It was subsequently deter =ined that the antenna arrangement at the alternate EOF was inadequate.
To this extent, Objective Number 5 was not fully demonstrated.
The team possessed sufficient equip =ent and de=onstrated the proper procedures to =onitor and control exposure. However, the evaluator noted that a =id-range dosimeter should be included in their equip =ent. This vould give greater assurance that the 3 re= dose limit not be exceeded.
The availability and policies governing the use of KI were de=onstrated, thus accounting for Objectives Number 20 and 22.
Su==ary: Objectives not fully de=onstrated: 5 and 9.
Area Requiring Corrective Action
- 12. There were two different equip =ent checklists with the equipment, as well as third version in the plan. More equip =ent is carried than listed. Lack of single comprehensive checklist can result in failure to include all neces sary equip =ent before dispatch.
('.~u?EG-06 5 '. , H.11. ) .
Reco=mendation
- 7. Soil and vegetation samples vculd te better protected if double-bagged. Also, water samples collected by syringe, rather than i==ersion of containers vould be less likely to have surface contamination. Standard Operating Procedures for all sampling equip =ent (not just air sa pler and radiciedine sample analyzer) should be compiled in a reference =anual.
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-h6-P.5 COUNTY OPERATIONS 251 Atchison County EOC objectives to 'be ce=onstrated: ' 1, 2, 3, h, 5, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, i19, 20, 22 -25, and 35.-
The call initiating activation was received from SEMA in Jefferson City at 0829. Mobilization of staff began i==ediately and appeared to be completed by 0900. However, it was difficult to determine what constituted full staffing, as this infor=ation is not clearly listed in the County Plan.
This has not been corrected in the new Plan sub=ission.
One person whose absence was easily detectable was the County Health Officer. It was his responsibility to issue personal dosimetry to persons in the EOC. While a Deputy Sheriff did a good job of filling in, he was assisted by a prepositioned SEMA staff person (who. technically would not yet have arrived fro: Jefferson City).
The ' SEMA person's activity prior to his actual arrival time made it difficult to - render a fair assessment of several activities to be perfor ed by County staff. In future exercises State staff should not appear at the County ECC until their simulated arrival time.
Nevertheless the County staff adequately demonstrated Cbjective Nu=ber
'2; 0bjective Nu=ber 1 was partially demonstrated.
' Accurate and complete message logs were maintained throughcut. The
" Operation Secure" radio linking Atchison County EOC, State ECC and the MRC =ade a high level of coordination possible. However, there was no backup ce==unication to the EOF until the FCP was established.
f Objectives Nu=ber 3 and h were fully de=enstrated; Objective Number 5 was not.
At 110h ' the General E=ergency was declartd. The licensee attempted, according to the State Plan, to notify SEMA at the State EOC. The line
-was busy, and after two failed atte= pts, the utility liaison gave notification instead to the Atchison County PIO Liaison at the EOF. The County PIO, in turn, called the County EOC at 1112 ' and notified them. Sirens were activated (simulated) at 1125 and the EBS station was called at 1127.
This notification sequence was not in accordance with the Plan. Proper routing -vould be from the utility *,o the SEOC to the County. This vould have added ti=e to the process, resulting in more than 15 minutes for alert
'and notification.
! It was also noted that a later EBS message recc==ending sheltering did~not include instructions for transients without shelter, (e.g., ca=pers, hunters, etc.).
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! Ileither the State nor County Plan address the issue of alert and notification of transients in the Brickyard Hill State Wildlife area. Alert and notification of persons in this area =ust be carried out in accordance with the require =ents of fiUREG-065h and REP-10 (for=erly FEMA-h3).
Objectives Nu=ber 13 and 1h were not demonstrated.
At proper times traffic control was ordered, and evidence was given of sufficient resources to handle evacuation, if required.
Objectives Number 15 and 17 vere demonstrated.
However, the organizational ability to evacuate =obility impaired persons was not de=enstrated. The failure was due to the absence of sufficient written infor=ation to give reasonable assurance that all mobility impaired could be accounted for.
There was no written list of those needing assistance.
Objective Number 18 was not de=onstrated.
The resources to effect school evacuation were successfully de=onstrated, acco=plishing Objective Nu.ber 19.
As mentioned above, the State representative assisted in the distribution of dosimeters before he actually would have arrived.
)
His involvement plus the absence of the County Health Officer who is charged with distribution of dositetry =ade it impossible to assess the County staff capability to achieve that portion of Cbjective Number 20.
Also, TLDs were delivered by BRH and did not arrive until about 1130.
TLDs need to be stored and available at the County ECC.
Objective Nu=ber 20 was not fully demonstrated.
The ability to supply and administer KI was de=onstrated, acce=plishing Objective Nu=ber 22.
The PIO for the County provided one formal press briefing, and the Civil Defense Director gave several status briefings throughout the exercise.
Objective Number 25 was de=enstrated.
As the status at the plant deescalated, the County staff discussed recovery and reentry.
They arranged to secure evacuated areas, provided for reentry for essential services, described safety precautions and ce==unicated their conclusions to all response organizations.
) Objective Nu=ber 35 was de=enstrated.
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-h8-Deficiences That Would Imad To A Negative Finding
- 6. Atchison County EOC failed to provide both an alert and an instructional ~ =essage to those citizens within the EPZ vithin 15 minutes, as prescribed. (NUREG-065h, Appendix 3.B.).
- 7. Neither ' the State nor Atchison County Plan provide for alert and notification of the transients within the Brickyard Hill State
'Jildlife area. Plans must be revised to reflect the applicable provisions of NURED-065h and REP-10 (formerly FEMA-h3).
Areas Requiring Corrective Action
- 13. Backup co==unication with the EOF prior to arrival of SEMA staff is required.
Ih. People requiring transportation assistance must be listed by name and address, with special needs of nobility i= paired being clearl'y indicated. This list must be updated at least annually.
(NUREG-065h, J.10.d. ) .
- 15. EBS =essage should contain sheltering infor=ation for transients.
Recommendation
- 8. The PIO should not let media briefings take priority over the responsibility of issuing for.al EBS notification in a titely =anner.
2.5.2 Atchison County Decontamination Facility Objectives to be de=onstrated: 29 A facility for. the decontamination of energency workers and vehicles was established at the Tri-County Landfill.
During the exercise they de-:enstrated proper procedures and adequate l facilities for surveying and decontaminating vehicles.
$ There was no demonstration of decontamination of personnel or equipment.
j Objective Number 29 was only partially de=onstrated.
i 2.5.3 Relocation Center, W ille, Missouri Objectives to be de=onstrated: 1, 2, and 27.
Upon notification, the facility at Northwest Missouri State University
' was mobilized and staffed in a ti=ely fashion de=enstrating Objectives Nu=ber
, 1 and 2.
I '4hile evacuees were monitored for radiological centamination, there was no demonstration of proper registration of evacuees through issuance of decontamination forms. This was an inadequacy from the prior exercise and is still unresolved.
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-h9-3 Su==ary: Obje.ctive undemonstrated: 27.
Area Requiring Corrective Action
- 16. Proper use of registration forms to separate contaminated and decontaminated evacuees vill be required at the next exercise.
2.5.4 Decontamination Facility, Maryville, Missouri If monitoriong at the Maryville Relocation Center indicated the need to decontaminate evacuees, they were directed to the decontamination site which was staffed by personnel from St. Francis Hospital, Maryville. Surface decontamination 'would be handled here; internal decontamination vould be done at the hospital.
While there was no actual demonstration of decontamination of personnel.
Procedures were described and facilities were displayed and explained.
Objective Number 29 was de=enstrated.
2.5 5 Atchison County Medical Support - (
Objectives to be de=onstrated: 5, 20, 30, and 31.
Medical support capabilities included both the amublance service and the Fairfax Co== unity Hospital.
Proper ce==unication capability were exhibited by both the ambulance dispatch, the a=bulance itself, and the hospital.
Objective Nu=ber 5 was de=onstrated.
The ambulance crew su==oned to the vehicle accident correctly used survey =eters and took proper precautions to prevent conta=ination of the
. ambulance.
However, Deputy Sheriffs at the scene who did not have desi=etry, respirators, or protective clothing, assisted in leading the contaminated patient.
The ambulance proceeded to deliver the patient to the Fairfax Co== unity
' Hosiptal where the e=ergency roc = vas prepared to handle the contaminated individual. All proper 3 procedures were' observed for decontamination and vaste disposal.
The use of a radioactive source nde the procedures quite realistic, and provided an opportunity to deal with cross-contamination.
Objectives 30 and 31 vere de=enstrated.
However, the evaluator noted that both the a=bulance and hospital staff
) lacked TLDs. Ambulance staff also see=ed to lack an awareness of the fact that the use of KI could be initiated at their own discretion when the limits are projected to be reached, and need not wait for a specific authorization.
For these reasons, Objective Number 20 was not fully demonstrated by the a=bulance crev._
Areas Requiring Corrective Action
- 17. TLDs should be available for both the ambulance crew and the hospital staff when handling a conta=inated patient.
- 16. A=bulance crews need to be better trained in the use of KI.
Recommendation 9 Since the hospital does not have a health physicist on staff, the utility should provide one when the hosptial expects to receive a centaminated patient. The utility should also reimburse the hospital at least for its use of supplies, equipment and const=2bles used during an exercise.
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) '3 ACTIONS TO RDEDY DEFICIENCIES PRETIOUSLY CITED
.\
A preli=inary review of the exercise findings revealed deficiencies attributable to both Nebraska and Missouri. Details of these deficiencies vere sent to . bo$h States, FEMA Headquarters, -and the Regional Assistance '
Co==ittee on October 31, 1985. _
The nature of :the Nebraska deficienciest was such that they were correctable by training, plan revisions, and letters of agree =ent.
One,of tha Missouri deficiencies required demonstrated capability through a re=edial drill. It was successfully conducted on November 26, 1985
[ ,
Details regarding the re=edial actions of both States are contained in this supplement to the Evaluation Report.
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3.1 NEBRASKA DEFICIENCIES 3.1.1 Field Monitoring
- The following deficiencies were assessed against the Field Monitoring activity:
- 1. Tnere was not sufficient operational radiation detection equip =ent available to place two fully equipped monitoring tea =s in the field, nor was there a Letter of Agreement (LOA) between the State e.nd both utilities to provide the means for such. (NUREG-0651., A.3, I. 7-10.)
- 2. Field team operation was deficient to the extent that:
A .. One team was unable to locate predeter=ined =cnitoring points.
- b. Re=aining within the plu=e for over an hour, they failed to survey for a=bient radiation on any consistent basis,
- c. 'a'h e n surveying was done, they erroneously used high range instruments.
- d. No cenitoring vu done outside the vehicle.
- e. Calculation M adiciodine concentration required three atte= pts and an : 4 g
- ile length of ti=e to obtain correct values.
- f. Backgrc an r- s. ings were not verified before counting air su:ples. +
- g. The team exhibited an everall lack of training.
The State was notified of these deficiencies October 31, 1985 On Nove=ber 29, 1985, the FEMA ' Regional Office received a letter detailing the'following accompliehed and intended re=edial actions.
On Nove=ber 8, 1985, there was a joint - =eeting involving the State Division of Radiological Health, the State Civil Defense Agency,!0=aha Public Power District and Nebraska Public Power District. The purpose was to reviev k the details of the deficiencies cited above, and discuss a LCA covering the critical points.
All parties agreed on the necessity, for such letters and indicated that t Q .following stipulations would be acceptable. -
' - ~
Each utility would provide to the State as support for the other's facility, sufficient trained personnel and equipment to permit the State to field two fully equipped radiological monitoring teams (and back-up to permit 2h-hour operation).
These utility employees, available for an emergency, vill also participate in training, drills and exercises to the extent deemed necessary by the State Director of Radiological Health.
Ilecessary radiological monitoring equipment, vehicles and ec==unications equipment sufficient to ec= ply with NUREG-065L vill also be provided by the utilities.
While all parties agree to this in principle, the necessary legal procedures are still in process. Signed documents vill be available by February 1L, 1986.
When these documents have been received and approved by FDIA, Region VII, this deficiency vill be closed. Pending a de=enstration by both teams at the next exercise.
3.1.2 Nebraska City Decontamination Facilit,f The IIebraska City Decontacination facility failed to de=cnstrate the capability to perfor= personnel decontacination. Specifically, there were no shover facilities available. Persons staffing the facility reported that a portable shover would te used in a real emergency. However, they did not specifically know what this vould mean or where it would be obtained.
Also, the segregation of clean and contacinated areas was by =asking tape en the floor. Due to the restricted space, the likelihood of recent1=inating persons who had been deconta-inated was high. (NUREG-005k, K.5.b.)
As a remedy, the facility, a National Guard Armory, was inspected by the State Director of Radiological Health, the Otce County Civil Defense Director, and a member of the SCDA staff on Ilovember 12, 1985.
After inspecting the facilities, a report was prepared describing the proposed structure modifications. The report has been reviewed by the appropriate Region VII RAC ce=ter and is judged to adequately address the issue of facility lay-out.
Additionally, arrangements have been made to provide necessary shovering facilities en a temporary basis.
When the State and local plans are properly amended to reflect the changes proposed in the report, this deficiency will be closed, pending a demonstration at the next exercise.
3.1.3 Nemaha County Access Control Evacuation of certain portions of Ne=aha County were called for during the exercise. At 1315 the County Director reported that evacuation had
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', been completed. At 13hD the EOF called to ask about the location of the access control roadblocks. It became apparent that roadblocks had not been established. They were oredered to be set up at 13h3. Failure to establish access control in a ti=ely manner was a deficiency.
On Nove=ber 29, 1185, the State submitted changes to the Ne aha County Plan clarifying responsibilities related to access control. A training session for County Directors with REP responsibilities has been scheduled for January, 1986. Access control vill be a point of e=phasis.
This deficiency will be closed, pending a demonstration at the next
. exercise.
3.1.4 Alert and Notification - Indian Cave State Park Indian Cave State Park was not notified by the Ne=aha County EOC in sufficient time to conduct route alerting, thus providing alert and notification to park users within h5 minutes from the time off-site authorities are notified, as required by NUREG-065h.
On Nove=ber 18, 1985, a meeting was held with Nebraska Game and Parks officials, the Superintendent of Indian Caves State Park, the Director of Radiological Health and the Assistant Director of State Civil Defense.
The resultant decision was that all State owned parks, recreational and wildlife areas within 10 miles of a nuclear power plant would begin evacuation procedures no later than the announcement of a Site Area E=ergency.
Also, State and local Plans have been amended to specify both the persons responsible and the times for notification to assure that parks and recreation areas can comply.
This deficiency will be closed pending a demonstration of the capability of the County to notify Indian Caves State Park, and the Park to alert and notify transients in the park within the alotted time at the next exercise.
3.2 MISSOURI DEFICIENCIES 3.2.1 Atchison County EOC The first is the failure of the Atchison County EOC to provide both an alert and an instructional message to those citizens of Atchison County within the 10 mile EPZ vithin 15 minutes as prescribed by NUREG-065h, Appendix 3.B.
The 15 minutes begins when the plant notifies the off-site authority of the emergency.
At 110h the General E=ergency was declared. The licensee atte.pted, according to the State Plan, to notify SEMA at the State EOC. The line was busy, and after two failed atte. pts, the utility liaison gave notification instead to the Atchison County PIO Liaison at the ECF. The County PIO,
). in turn, called the County EOC at 1112 and notified the=. Sirens were activated (simulated) at 1125 and the EBS station was called at 1127.
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-SL- l This notification sequence was not in accordance with the Plan. Proper routing would be from the utility to the SEOC to the County. This vould have added time to- the process, resulting in more than 15 minutes for alert and notification.
To remedy this deficiency a remedial drill was held on Novetter 26, 1985. FEMA staff were present as evaluators. At 15L1 a General E=ergency was declared at the Cooper Nuclear Station. The licensee i==ediately contacted the Missouri State EOC in Jefferson City. The message was completed by 15LL. At 15L6 the State EOC called back to verify. They then notified the Atchison County EOC of the General Emergency. By this time it was 15L9 At 1550 the Atchison County EOC contacted the EBS station and dictated the notification message, with instructions that it be repeated every 10 minutes.
Sirens were also sounded at this time (1550). These actions successfully de=cnstrated the ability of Atchison County to accocplish alert and notification within 15 minutes. This deficiency is closed.
3.2.2 Brickyard Hill State Wildlife Area l As a result of the pre and post exercise review it was discovered that neither the Missouri Radiological Energency Response Plan nor the Atchison County Plan nake any provision for the alert and notification within k5 minutes of transients at the Brickyard Hill State Wildlife Area.
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The State was infor.ed of this deficiency on October 31, 1985 and were l told that remedial actions will include a revision of State and local plans j to provide for the alert and notification (within L5 ninutes) to the transient l population of the Brickyard Hill State Wildlife Area. Tnese revisions shall fully comply with all applicable provisions of MUREG-065L, FEMA-REP-1, Rev.
1, and FEMA-L3 (now REP-10).
Cn November L, 1955, the State of Misecuri sub=itted changes to the State Plan.
IJpon review, the response was judged inadequate. On November lL, 1985, the folleving was sent to the State Emergency Management Agency:
"Regarding deficiency number 2, you prepose a change to the Missouri Plan. It states that the Department of Conservation 'will provide prcept notification (alert and notification) of the public. in the conservation j areas within the ten cile EPZ at the Alert Classification. This notification vill be acec=plished within L5 minutes of notification of a Site Area E=egency l Declaration'.
There are five problems with this change.
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- 1. Ycu cannot know the time interval between the Alert and the Site l I
Area Emergency, and therefore cannot say with absolute certainty that the notification vill be accenplished within L5 minutes of a Site Area Emergency.
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- 2. Since no syecific conservation area is centioned, it cust be assu=ed that this . change applies to all conservation areas. Those within 5 miles or a plant (callaway) only have 15 minutes for alert and notification. Response for each contingency must be addressed individually. ,
- 3. There is no description of how prompt alert and notification vill be performed. As stated in =y memo of October 31, 1985, 'These revisions shall fully comply with all applicable provisions of NUREG-065h, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, and FEMA-h3 (Reissued in November, 1985 as FEMA-REP-10 ) . ' Compliance with these docu=ents would require that any cobile siren system be subjected to the same tests and requirements as fixed sirens.
- h. At a minimu=, the signs that are proposed cust be at all points of ingress / egress as well as at all parking areas. They must also include reference to the EBS Station, including location on the dial, plus evacuation routes to lead them away from the nuclear power plant. Reference, FEMA REP 11 'A Guide to Preparing E=ergency Public Information Materials'.
5 You must indicate how you vill deal with ru= ors which may be generated from an early evacuation not followed by an i==ediate EBS tessage."
4 On the date of this report no response from the State had been received.
The deficiency still exists.
As advised on November lk, 1985, the State of Missouri vill have until February ll, 1986, to accomplish the remedial actions cited above.
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14 SU)S4ARY-0F AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS JOINT OPERATIONS Faergency Operations Facility (EOF)/ Nebraska FCP
- 1. The Nebraska Plan for the Cooper Nuclear Station does not stipulate the pri=ary means of carrying out alert and notification at each emergency action level. While it provides several alternatives, it does not prioritize among the=. The Plan =ust be amended to accomplish this.
- 2. Backup co==unication between the EOF and Atchison County EOC cust exist prior to the arrival of SEv.A staff at both locations.
Information Authentication Center (IAC)
- 3. When Nebraska releases EBS messages prior to the sounding of sirens, they =ust notify Missouri of their intention to do so.
Media Release Center (MRC)
L. The form and content of press briefings should be i= proved as detailed in the body of the report. (ITJREG-065L, 6. 3.a. , 6. h.a. )
5 NFFD should provide plant schematics and not rely on gestures and vague verbal descriptions given by the PIO. (NUREG-065L, 6.3.a., 6.h.a.)
- 6. The Nebraska Plan should be clarified to delineate lead responsibility for the rumor control hotlines, and an agreement reached between NPPD and NSCDA. (IPJREG-065L, G.L.c. )
NEBRASKA OPERATIONS Field Monitoring Teams 1
Field Team Number 2
- 7. Team was unaware of =axicum dose allowed, or turn around levels.
Reco==end that individual dose rate record cards be developed showing above data.
State Radiological Imboratory
- 8. All staff handling radioactive samples should wear TLDs. This should be demonstrated the next time the RAD LAB is exercised.
COUNTY OPERATIONS Nemaha County EDC 9 The State should provide the needed training regarding proper PIO procedures.
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MISSOURI STATE OPERATIONS Forward Cnennand Post (FCP)
- 10. The FCP staff did not issue subsequent proper messages to alert transients regarding appropriate protective actions.
Field Team Coordination / Dose Assessment
- 11. Coordination of- field teams was complicated by the use of three different caps. A single map indicating predesignated radiological monitoring points should be adopted and provided for use by both States and the licensee. However, the one currently in use by the licensee is not recommended.
Field Monitoring
- 12. There were two different equipment checklists with the equipment, as well as a third version in the plan. More equipment is carried than listed. Lack of a single co. prehensive checklist can result in failure to include all necessary equipment before dispatch.
(MJREG-065h, H.11. )
COUNTY OPERATIONS Atchison County EOC
- 13. Backup co==unication with the EOF prior to arrival of SEMA staff is required.
lb. People requiring transportation assistance cust be listed by name and address, with special needs of cobility 1. paired being clearly indicated. This list must be updated at least annually.
(NUREG-065h, J.10.d. )
15 EBS tessages on sheltering should contain sheltering infor ation for transients.
Relocation Center, Maryvil.le, Missouri
- 16. Proper use of registration forms to separate contaminated and decontaminated evacuees will be required at the next exercise.
Atchison County Medical Support
- 17. TLDs should be available for both the ambulance crew and the hospital staff when handling a contaminated patient.
- 18. Ambulance crews need to be better trained in the use of KI.
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CJ 5 SU) MARY OF RECOMENDATIONS JOINT OPERATIONS Dnergency Operations Facility (EOF)/ Nebraska FCP
- 1. Itebraska should consider changing procedures and/or for=s to record each ressage on its own separate form; or provide " start" and "end" ti=es for each multiple =essage on a single for=.
- 2. Sene arrangement should be made to reserve adequate space for Missouri SEMA staff.
- 3. fiebraska and Missouri radio operations should utilize headsets to reduce noise levels.
L. !!ebraska should develop a dose record to be issued with self-reading dosimeters to assist in getting staff to record readings at proper intervals.
NEBRASKA OPERATIONS Radiological Assessment and Field Team Coordination 5 Record keeping for:s should be developed for self-reading desi=eters, including an indication of frequency of readings.
MISSOURI STATE OPERATIONS State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC)
- o. Use of large scale =ap - for Cooper area showing EPZ and population figures. '"hi s is not required, due to the reduced role of the SECC resulting frc= delegation of control to the FCP.
' Field Monitoring
- 7. S o i '. and vegetation sa=ples would be better protected if i double-bagged. Also, water sa..ples collected by syrigne, rather than i==ersion of containers vould be less likely to have surface contamination. Standard Operating Procedures for all sa=pling equip =ent (not just air sa:pler and radiciodine sample analyzer) should be ec= piled in a reference =anual.
COUNTY OPERATIONS Atchison County EOC
- 8. The PIO should not let =edia briefings take priority over the responsibility of issuing for=al EBS notification in a timely =anner, d
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- i-Atchison County Medical Support 9 Since the' hospital does not have a health physicist on staff, the utility should provide one when the hospital expects to receive a contaminated patient. The utility should also rei= burse the hospital at levt for its use of supplies, equipment and consu-ables used during an exercise.
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