ML20195H094

Forwards Safety Insp Repts 50-440/88-06 & 50-441/88-03 on 880502-05.No Violations Noted.Areas Identified Requiring Further Review & Evaluation Discussed in Open Item Appraisal Rept Also Encl

ML20195H094
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	06/22/1988
From:	Shafer W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Kaplan A CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO.
Shared Package
ML20195H099	List: IR 05000440/1988006 ML20195H094
References
NUDOCS 8806280217
Download: ML20195H094 (4)

See also: IR 05000440/1988006

Text

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JUN 221988

Docket No. 50-440

Docket No. 50-441

The Cleveland Electric Illuminating

Company

ATTN: Mr. Alvin Kaplan

Vice President

Nuclear Group

10 Center Road

Perry, OH 44081

Gentlemen:

This refers to the special safety inspection conducted by Mr. J. Foster and

other representatives of this office on May 2-5, 1988, of activities at the

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, authorized by NRC Facility Operating

License No. NPF-45 and Construction Permit No. CPPR-149, and to the discussion

of our findings with Mr. D. Hulbert and others of your staff at the conclusion

of the inspection.

The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during

the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective

exart.ination of procedures and representative records, observations of Emergency

Response Facilities and related equipment, observation of the 1988 Emergency

Exercise, and interviews with personnel.

No violations of NRC requirer.ients were identified during the course of this

inspection. However, there were areas identified as requiring further review

and evaluation. These items are identified as Open Items in the Appendix to

this letter, and are also discussed in the enclosed appraisal report.

Your review of the observed problems in the TSC and E0F Heating, Ventilating,

and Air Conditioning (iVAC) systems should include an evaluation of the

ability of these systems to meet the commitments contained in your March 31,

1983 submittal (Sections 2.6 and 4.2) to the NRC (NRR). We will examine your

findings for these and other Open Items identified in the Appendix to this

letter during a future inspection.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Commission's regulations, a copy of

this letter, and the enclosures, will be placed in the NRC Public Document

Room.

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8806280217 880622

PDR ADOCK 05000440

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The Cleveland Electric Illuminating _2 $g g g $88

Company

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.

Sincerely,

"Original signed by W. Snell"

W. D. Shafer, Chief

Emergency Preparedness and

Radiological Protection Branch

Enclosures:

1. Appendix - Appraisal

Open Items

2. Inspection Reports

No. 50-440/88006(DRSS); and

No. 50-441/88003(DRSS)

cc w/ enclosure: '

F. R. Stead, Director, Perry

Plant Technical Department

M. D. Lyster, General Manager,

Perry Plant Operations Depar Ment

Ms. E. M. Buzzelli, Manager,

Licensing and Compliance Section

DCD/DCB (RIDS)

Licensing Fee Management Branch

Resident Inspector, RIII

Harold W. Kohn, Ohio EPA

Terry J. Lodge, Esq.

James W. Harris, State of Ohio

Robert M. Quillin, Ohio

Department of Health

State of Ohio, Public

Utilities Commission

Murray R. Edelman

W. Travers, NRR, EPB

W. Weaver, FEMA V

E. Williams, NRR, EPB

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APPENDIX

APPRAISAL OPEN ITEMS

1. Open Item 440/88006-01: Problems were observed in the TSC ventilation

system. During the appraisal, the system was placed in the emergency

mode and the following problems were noted:

• The position indication for damper DM4 (return air to suction end

of HEPA filter train) was inoperative.

• The position indication lamps for damper DM3 (outside air to the

mechanical equipment room) were inoperative.-

The current initiation logic for the TSC HVAC system does not open

the damper for outside air inlet to the HEPA/ Charcoal filter train,

but does leave open the damper for outside air to the mechanical

equipment room, (not filtered). Either one or both of the two

mechanical equipment room exhaust fans continue to run to exhaust

room air to outside. This lineup, or any imbalance in the ventilation

system, will cause air from the mechanical equipment room to be

exhausted from the TSC envelope. Outside air which makes up the air

volume exhausted in this manner is brought into the TSC envelope via

an unfiltered path. Only recirculated air in the TSC envelope passes

through the emergency filter train.

Ns overall system operability or functional testing to check items

such as proper positioning of dampers and maintenance of specified

air flows and differential pressures was performed.

2. Open Item 440/88006-02: Computer system usage was observed for the <

computer that was running the Real Time Analysis and Display (RTAD)

process. The minimum duty cycle observed was more than 80 percent.

Section B of the generic safety evaluation report defines the design ,

goal maximum duty cycle to be 30 percent. On requesting a random series

of screen formats from four CRT's concurrently, unused processor capability

ranged from 15 to 0 percent. Under heavy loading (e.g., during an

accident) computer processing capability could possibly be degraded.

Some additional free capacity should be available so I. hat the system

can respond to the additional load during a severe plant transient.

3. Open Item 440/88006-03: The E0F HVAC System was tested in the

emergency mode during the appraisal and the following problems

noted:

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The outside air damper (F-11) on one of the two roof mounted supply

fan housings (Fan "A") failed to close. The damper appeared to

remain about 30% open.

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Appendix 2

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• - The damper (F-5) which bypasses the HEPA filter train with return

air (in emergency mode) and with outside makeup air (in_the

emergency mode with outside makeup air being supplied.via

Damper F-1) failed to shut completely. The. damper. appeared

to remain about 40% open. ,

• Manual Damper 10-1 is located above a hallway ' acoustic ceiling tile.

Operation of the damper.is manual and is performed by a person

standing on a ladder. The damper position cannot be seen, and

it must be operated by feel. Proper positioning of the damper

is dependent on it being in the proper position at the beginning

of the emergency mode lineup. As a minimum, an observable

position indicator should be added to this_ damper.

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• - Manual Damper 10-3 is similar to Damper 10-1 described above.

The operating lever for 10-3 can be seen, but no position indication

is annotated on the duct or operator.

• Isolation Doors 107 and 109 (in the emergency lineup checklist) are

labelled Doors "B" and "A" respectively.

• No formal overall system operability testing procedures were in use

for the E0F HVAC System.

4. Open Item 440/88006-04: On one of the ERIS terminals in the E0F it was

noted that an occasional hardware failure causes one of the displays to

overwrite old displays, thus rendering the information unreadable.

This overwrite problem would be worse during a transient than during

the steady state power operations under which the system was evaluated.

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