ML20209G062

Insp Repts 50-327/87-08 & 50-328/87-08 on 870206-0305. Violation Noted:Failure to Properly Frisk.Deviation Noted: FSAR Commitment to Perform Preventive Maint on Condensate Demineralizer Waste Evaporizer Equipment Not Met

ML20209G062
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	04/08/1987
From:	Branch M, Harmon P, Jenison K, David Loveless, Mccoy F, Poertner W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20209G008	List: ML20209G004 ML20209G020 ML20209G033 ML20209G062
References
50-327-87-08, 50-327-87-8, 50-328-87-08, 50-328-87-8, IEB-80-07, IEB-80-13, IEB-80-14, IEB-80-17, IEB-80-7, IEC-80-06, IEC-80-08, IEC-80-19, IEC-80-6, IEC-80-8, NUDOCS 8704300463
Download: ML20209G062 (16)

See also: IR 05000327/1987008

Text

i

pa UNITED STATES

/* rtko NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[* , REolONli

g ,j 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

• ' * ATLANTA. GEORGI A 30323

\ * *

/

Report Nos.: 50-327/87-08, 50-328/87-08

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority

500A Chestnut Street

Chattanooga, TN 37401

Docket Nos.: 50-327 and 50-328 License Nos.: DPR-77 and DPR-79

Facility Name: Sequoyah Units 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: February 6 thru M h 5, 1987

Inspectors: [ 93 s - YD&te'/87

'K. M.~ 'Jeftf son, Senior Re Nt nfp~ector Signed

W

P. E.'Ha71nor3-Resident InspeGoF

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Vate/ Signed

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Ifate Signed

/ D. F. T.ovele% G5ioenT. Inspect y['

/ ( xW

W. K. PoeMner, ResIcent Inspect

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Ddte 51gned

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'M. W.' Ifranch,' Sequoyah

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Star Epc'rdinpr

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' Rate Fig ed

Approved by: - [ </h V~)

F. R. McCby, Chief, Secdtn,A D3te/51gndd

DivisioncfTVAProjects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, announced inspection involved inspection onsite by the

Resident Inspectors in the areas of: operational safety verification

(including operations performance, system lineups, radiation protection, '

safeguards and housekeeping inspections); maintenance observations; review of

previous inspection findings; followup of events; review of licensee identified

items; review of IE Information Notices; and review of inspector followup

items.

In addition this inspection included NRC activities associated with the startup

of Unit 2, which were coordinated by the NRC Sequoyah restart coordinator.

Some of these activities are described in paragraph 15 of this report.

Results: One violation (VIO) and one deviation (DEV) were identified.

VIO 327,328/87-08-03, failure to properly frisk, paragraph 5.

0704300463 070494

PDR ADOCK 05000327

G pon

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DEV 327,328/87-08-01, deviation from FSAR commitment to perform

presentive maintenance on condensate demineralizer waste evapo-

rator (CDWE) equipment, paragraph 3.

Three unresolved items (URIs) were identified:

URI 327, 328/87-08-02, control room evacuation and plant

shutdown, paragraph 14.

URI 327, 328/87-08-04, inadequate diesel generator test,

paragraph 8.

URI 327, 328/87-08-05, cable tray jumpers, paragraph 8.

.

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REPORT DETAILS

,

1. Licensee Employees Contacted

H. L. Abercrombie, Site Director

• L. M. Nobles, Acting Plant Manager

B. S. Willis, Operations and Engineering Superintendent

• B. M. Patterson, Maintenance Superintendent

R. J. Prince, Radiological Control Superintendent

M. R. Harding, Licensing Group Manager

L. E. Martin Site Quality Manager

D. W. Wilson, Project Engineer (

R. W. Olson, Modifications Branch Manager

J. M. Anthony, Operations Group Supervisor

R. V. Pierce, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor

M A. Scarzinski, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor

• H. D. Elkins, Instrument Maintenance Group Manager

J. T. Crittenden, Public Safety Service Chief

• R. W. Fortenberry, Technical Support Supervisor

• G. B. Kirk, Compliance Supervisor

D. C. Craven, Quality Assurance Staff Supervisor

• J. H. Sullivan, Plant Operations Review Staff

• J. L. Hamilton, Quality Engineering Manager

D. L. Cowart, Quality Engineering Supervisor

• H. R. Rogers, Plant Operations Review Staff

• R. H. Buchholz, Sequoyah Site Representative

E. R. Ennis, Assistant to Plant Manager

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, shift

engineers, security force members, engineers and maintenance personnel.

• Attended exit interview.

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized with the plant manager

and members of his staff on March 6,1986. The violation and deviation

described in this report's summary paragraph were discussed. The licensee

acknowledged the inspection findings. The licensee did identify as

proprietary one document reviewed by the inspectors during this inspec-

tion. The document was a Westinghouse setpoint methodology paper and is

addressed in paragraph 4 of this report. No proprietary documentation ,

provided by the IIcensee was retained by the inspector and no proprietary

information appears in this report. During the reporting period, frequent

discussions were held with the site director, plant manager and other

managers concerning inspection findings.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)

(Closed) VIO 327, 328/86-42-06. This violation addressed the proper

installation of heat trace on safety related portions of the chemical and

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volume control system (CVCS). The inspector reviewed the corrective

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actions initiated as a result of the licensee's response, dated

October 24, 1986. The corrective actions appeared to be adequate. This

issue is closed.

. (0 pen) VIO 327, 328/86-28-01. This violation addressed the requirement to

conduct a safety evaluation for system changes in the condensate deminera-

lizer waste evaporator system (CDWE). The inspector reviewed the correc-

tive actions initiated as a result of the licensee's response, dated

July 15, 1986. This response stated that "the division of nuclear

engineering (DNE) will prepare an evaluation which addresses the require-

ments of Technical Specification (TS) 6.15, items d through g, by

December 31, 1936." The document was forwarded to the Sequoyah site

director, from DNE, on January 1,1987. The licensee stated in the

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July 15, 1986 response that the document would be approved by the Plant

Operations Review Committee (PORC) within two weeks of the plant's

j acceptance of the report. The evaluation was not PORC reviewed until

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January 23, 1987. It was subsequently approved February 6,1987. The

inspector did review the engineering evaluation, and it appeared to meet

the requirements of an unreviewed safety question determination (USQD)

!

review for normal plant conditions. The delay in processing the safety

evaluation is a deviation from a commitment to the NRC. This issue will

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be addressed in separate correspondence to the licensee.

!

(Closed) URI 327, 328/86-19-03. Section 11.2.4 of the Final Safety Evalua-

.

tion Report (FSAR) states that "All equipment installed to reduce

! radioactive effluents to the minimum practicable level is maintained in

i good operating order...In order to assure that these conditions are met,

1

administrative controls are exercised on overall operation of the system;

preventive maintenance is utilized to maintain equipment in peak

condition; and experience available from similar plants is used in

i planning for operation at Sequoyah nuclear plant." The inspector was not

t

able to identify any routine preventive maintenance performed on the CDWE

,

system and there is no objective evidence that industry experience is used

in planning for operation of the CDWE. The licensee is currently reviewing

l changes to the FSAR and as of August 1986, has implemented a process to

l establish preventive maintenance on required equipment. One of the

current FSAR changes proposed by the licensee is to eliminate the

! requirement for preventive maintenance in this section of the FSAR. This

j issue, which was previously addressed as URI 327, 328/86-19-03 is a

deviation from a commitment made in the FSAR, and will be identified as

DEV 327, 328/87-08-01.

l 4. Unresolved Items

!

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to

I determine whether they are acceptable or may involve violations or

deviations. Three unresolved items were identified during this inspection,

and are identified in paragraphs 8 and 14.

(Closed) URI 327, 328/85-18-01, Operability of containment spray pump 1A.

This item concerned the fact that the initial flow rates for containment

!

spray pump 1A were greater than 5500 gpm but dropped to 3500-4000 gpm in

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April 1981 and thereafter. The unresolved item concerned whether or not

the pump was operable. The licensee's investigation revealed that the

flow element (annubar) was bent. The licensee plans to replace the flow

element prior to unit startup. This item is closed.

4 (0 pen) URI 327, 328/87-02-03, Use of work request (WR) to perform

modification by installing drip pans in control room ceiling. The

inspector questioned the use of a WR to perform this work on the control

building. The following items were reviewed with the licensee:

a. The inspector discussed the effect of the installed drip pans on the

operability of the ventilation system to which they were attached.

The licensee had a PORC approved USQD to indicate that the drip pans

would not affect the qualifications of the ventilation system. The

overall weight of the gutters and pans was estimated to be around 85

pounds. This weight was distributed over a large area,

b. The design was reviewed to determine the effect of the pans falling

on safety related equipment located below them. The licensee stated

that the false ceiling in the control room was a sturdy structure

that could withstand the weight of the gutters falling. Considering

'

the weight distribution and the construction of the ceiling material

the inspector considers this to be a plausible assumption.

The licensee stated that the gutters were designed so that water

would drain and not pool over the control panels. Therefore, the

water leakage, should the pans fail, would only be that roof leakage

directly over the control panels. The only problem area determined

at this time is the leakage directly over the CVCS panel. This panel

"

is required to assure that a boric acid flow path to the reactor is

available per TS in this mode.

During times of maximum leakage, the inspector estimated that

approximately five gallons of water was collected in the entire

system over a four day period. This indicates a leakage of less

than one drop per minute. This should allow considerable time for

operator action to catch the drips should the pans fail. In

addition, the licensee stated that auxiliary unit operators (AU0s)

could be dispatched to the 690 penetration room and to the boric acid

pumps and a flow path to the reactor could be established in 3-5

minutes,

c. Licensee procedures were reviewed to determine that appropriate

actions were taken in installing the drip pans. The licensee

installed the drip pans under WR 8214608 with an approved USQD from

DNE. The approach and documentation used is consistent with the way

the licensee would install temporary shielding or scaf folding as

addressed in AI-33, Temporary Shielding of Radiation.

d. The inspector expressed concern that permanent corrective action

should be implemented in a timely manner. The licensee stated that

the roofing material used on the control building roof requires that

specific temperature and moisture parameters be met before the

installation would be effective. Therefore, a warm Spring day during

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a dry spell would be required. The licensee anticipated the roofing

repair to be complete by the middle of April,

e. The history of the control building roof leakage was reviewed to

determine the appropriateness of the licensees action. Operations

personnel discussed that initial leakage had been detected in the

winter of 1985/86. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the

roof damage was caused during the implementation of the " power block"

security concept in the summer of 1985. Operations personnel stated

that the leakage was never very bad and stopped in the early spring.

In December 1986 the leakage started again and a WR was initiated to

correct the problem. Following this maintenance, engineering per-

sonnel discovered potential leakage paths. These were caulked until

such time that permanent repairs could be made. The next rain no

leakage was noted. The next storm was accompanied by very cold

weather and resulted in a large amount of leakage. This indicated a

temperature dependant crack. The drip pans were installed following

this storm.

The inspector does not consider this issue to be of safety-significance

in this mode of operation but does consider the timeliness of actions to

again be indicative of recognized problems in timely implementation of

corrective actions. The licensee has stated that permanent control

building roof repairs will be made prior to escalation into mode 4.

This item will remain open pending satisfactory completien of roof

repairs.

(0 pen) URI 327, 328,/87-02-11, Reactor coolant system (RCS) spills from

open steam generator (SG) manways. This item will remain open pending

completion of licensee investigations. At the end of the present

reporting period, two separate investigations by TVA were in progress; an

investigationbytheplantoperationsreviewstaff(PORS),andtheNuclear

Manager s Review Group (NMRG). The findings and conclusions of these

independent investigations will be reviewed as part of the resolution

process for this item.

(0 pen) URI 327, 328/86-20-09, Containment penetration general design

criteria. The inspector reviewed the following documents:

"

TVA letter Gridley/Youngblood L44 860530 807, dated May 30, 1986 -

response to NRC's request for additional information made during a

telephone conference call on May 15, 1986.

TVA letter Gridley/Youngblood S10 870129 800, dated January 29,

1987 exemption from 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, general design criteria

55 and 56 for RHR supply line from loop 1 and 2 hot legs and vacuum

relief lines.

"

TVA lei.ter Gridley/Youngblood S10 870116 879, dated December 24,

1986 - exemption from 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, general design criteria

55 for reactor coolant pump seal injection lines.

"

NRC letter Olshinski/ White dated April 23, 1986 - forwarding inspec-

tion report 327, 328/86-20.

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TVA letter Gridley/Youngblood S10 861224 859, dated December 24,

1986 - exemption from Appendix J leak testing for residual heat

removal and upper head injection systems and pressure relief valves.

TVA letter Gridley/Youngblood L44 870102 804, dated January 2, 1987 -

response to NRC questions concerning Sequoyah's containment isolation

system design.

• NRC minutes of August 13, 1986 meeting to discuss containment isola-

tion.

! TVA minutes of August 13, 1986 meeting to discuss containment isola-

tion.

.

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Based on the above stated review, it was determined that the commitments

made by the licensee in TVA letter Gridley/Youngblood, dated January 2,

1987 addressed the scope of URI 327, 328/86-20-09. Several of the

commltments made by the licensee are long term in nature and do not

represent issues that would prevent the startup of either unit. This

unresolved item will remain open pending final resolution by NRR and TVA.

,

"

' (Closed) URI 327, 328/86-19-03, FSAR commitment on the CDWE system. This

unresolved item was discussed in paragraph 3 of this report and resulted

in deviation 327,328/87-08-01. This item is closed.

(Closed) URI 327, 328/86-19-04, Alert and evacuate personnel in the CDWE

building. This unresolved item reviewed the regulrements to notify

operators in the CDWE building of the need to evacuate and/or a condition

of high airborne activity. There is one portable airborne monitor in the  :

CDWE building and it appeared to be operable. The licensee depends on  !

administrative means, System Operating Instruction (501) - 77.183, to

evacuate personnel from the CDWE building. This 501 requires the shift

engineer to direct the CDWE operator when to evacuate. This process does

not appear to be the most conservative policy. However, the inspector was  !

not able to identify any instances where oaerators needed to be removed

j from the CDWE building and were not. The inspector was also not able to

l identify any instances of excessive internal contamination of personnel.

1 This item is closed.

(Closed) URI 327, 328/85-46-12, Adequacy of measuring and test equipment

, used to adjust reactor protection system (RPS) setpoints. The inspector

, reviewed the following documents both of which contained proprietarj

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information:

j NRCmemoThompson(NRR)/Gibson(RII)datedOctober1985

Westinghouse setpoint methodology for RPS dated September 1986

,

The adequacy of the measuring and test equipment used to calibrate and

i adjust RPS setpoints was adequately addressed by the above two documents.

Th s item is c'osed.

.

(0 pen) URI 327, 328/86-32-07, Testing of CREV Isolation in Chlorine Mode.

This item is discussed in paragraph 7. ,

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5. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

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a. Plant Tours

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable

logs, conducted discussions with control room operators, observed

i shif t turnovers, and confirmed operability of instrumentation. The

inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems,

and verified compliance with technical specification (TS) limiting

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conditions for operation (LCO). The inspectors verified that main-

tenance work orders had been submitted as required and that followup

activities and prioritization of work was accomplished by the

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licensee. l

Tours of the diesel generator, auxiliary, control, and turbine

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buildings, and containment were conducted to observe plant equipment

conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, excessive

vibrations and plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions.

The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the following

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safety-related systems on Unit 1 and Unit 2 to verify operability and

proper valve alignment:

l Condensate Demineralizer Waste Evaporator Package

Chemical Volume and Control System (Unit 2)

l Component Cooling System (Unit 1)

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No violations or deviations were identified.

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i b. Safeguards Inspection

l In the course of the monthly activities, the inspectors included a

i review of the licensee's physical security program. The performance

i of various shif ts of the security force was observed in the conduct

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of daily activities including protected and vital area access

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controls; searching of personnel and packages; escorting of visitors;

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badge issuance and retrieval; patrols and compensatory posts.

In addition, the

! protected and vitalinspectors observed

areas' barrier protected

integrity. Thearea lighting,

inspectors ver i-

i fled an interface between the security organization and operations or

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maintenance. Spectfically, the resident inspectors: i

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interviewed individuals with security concerns

inspected security during outages

reviewed a licensee security event report

No violations or deviations were identified. I

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c. Radiation Protection

The inspectors observed health physics (HP) practices and verified

implementation of radiation protection control. On a regular basis,

radiation work permits (RWPs) were reviewed and specific work activi-

ties were monitored to ensure the activities were being conducted in

accordance with applicable RWPs. Selected radiation protection

instruments were verified operable and calibration frequencies were

reviewed.

During an auxiliary buildinc tour, the inspectors identified two

craftsmen performing activit'es under work plan 12344 and RWP 252.

The work being performed involved boring into cement with a large

electrical drill . The workers did not have breathing protection and

there was no air monitor near their activities. An HP supervisor was

asked to evaluate these activities. This will be reviewed during

the routine inspection program.

During an auxiliary building tour the inspectors observed approx-

imately six workers exit the radiologically controlled area (RCA)

without properly frisking. tasks in the

auxiliary building while wearing heavy work gloves.The workers were perf

their gloves at the frisking station, frisked their hands and then

replaced their gloves. The gloves were not frisked prior to leaving

the area. TS 6.11 requires that procedures for personnel radiation

protectian be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 20

and shall be approved, maintained and adhered to for all operations

involving personnel radiation exposure. Radiological Controls (RC)

-1, Radiological Control Program, implements this requirement. RC-1

states that employees are responsible for properly monitoring them-

selves prior to leaving RCAs. This is a violation 327,328/87-08-03.

6. Engineered Safety features Walkdown (71710)

The inspector verified operability of the residual heat removal system on

Units 1 and 2 by completing a walkdown of the systems.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Monthly Surveillance Observations (61726)

The inspectors observed / reviewed the below listed TS required surveillance

testing and verified that testing was performed in accordance with

adequate procedures; that test instrumentation was calibrated; that LCOs

were met; that test results met acceptance criteria requirements and were

reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; that

deficiencies were identified, as appropriate, and that any deficiencies

identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by

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management personnel; and that system restoration was adequate. For

complete tests, the inspector verified that testing frequencies were met

and tests were performed by qualified individuals.

SI-304 Boric Acid Transfer Pump, with temporary change 87-141.

The procedural change provides for pump data acquisition

using special test instruinentation to comply with ASME

section XI requirements for instrument accuracy. The local

pump suction and discharge gages do not meet the accuracy

and range standards of section XI. The change also pro-

vided for a lineup deviation that changed the flow path

from the boron injection tank (BIT), which is drained and

not in service, to a recirculation path to and from the

boric acid tank (BAT). The recirculation path provides

back pressure conditions similar to the normal BAT to pump

to BIT flow path conditions. The inspector will determine

if the special test, when completed, meets the requirements

of ASME section XI for system resistance.51-196 CalibrationofUpperHeadInjectionSystemInstrumentation.

The licensee was using newly purchased test instrumentation

to calibrate level switch LS-87-22, which isolates the

upper head accumulator by closing valve 2-87-22. The new

test equipment was

Static 0-Ring (50R)type purchased

switches.specifically to calibrate the

SMI-0-43-1 Special Maintenance Instruction Chlorine Detector Func-

tional Test. The inspector reviewed the following tests

and documents in order to determine if the functional test

of the chlorine detectors met the commitments made by the

licensee in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

Work Recuest B227205

Standarc Practice (SQ) M - 2, Maintenance Management

SQA-66,PlantHousekeeping

51-240, Functional Test of Control Room Air Intake

Chlorine Detection System

As a result of the review it was determined that SMI-0-43-1

performed the functional test by placing sodium hyoochlo-

rite near the detector. An activation time of approx-

imatel

tion. y 4 seconds

The test didwas

not achieved

appear to by boththe

satisfy trains of ventila-

FSAR require-

ment to test the ventilation intake to 'Le detector and

therefore may not have satisfied the comm'tments as stated

in the FSAR. This issue will be followed under URI 327,

328/86-32-07 which will remain open.51-204.2 Functional Test of the Radiation Monitoring System. During

a review of this surveillance it was determined that

certain calculations were not independently verified. The

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licensee identified this issue two days before the

inspector during a surveillance instruction review of

SI-83.2. The licensee had implemented adequate corrective

action through its surveillance instruction review program.

This issue is considered to be a licensee identified item

and will be considered as a component of the surveillance

instruction program review.

TS 5.5.1 Meteorological Tower. TS 5.5.1 states that, "The meteoro-

logical tower shall be located as shown on Figure 5.1-1."

The tower is not indicated in figure 5.1-1. This was

brought to the attention of the 11censee. The licensee

stated that this discrepancy had already been noted and was

in the process of being corrected. A TS change request

will be submitted by the licensee to the NRC prior to

restart of unit 2 to correct this discrepancy.

8. Monthly Maintenance Observations (62703)

Station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components

were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance

with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes and standards,

and in conformance with TS.

The following items were considered during this review: LCOs were met

while components or systems were removed from service; redundant

components were operable approvals were obtained prior to initiating the

work; activities were ac;complished using approved procedures and were

inspected as applicable; procedures used were adequate to control the

activity; troubleshooting activities were controlled and the repair record

accurately reflected what actually took place; functional testing and/or

calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to

service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accom-

plished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly

certified; radiological controls were implemented; QC hold points were

established where required and were observed; fire prevention controls

were implemented; outside contractor force activities were controlled in

accordance with the approved quality assurance (QA) program; and house-

keeping was actively pursued.

The inspectors witnessed the disassembly of 2-FCV-3-103, the Unit 2 main

feed control valve to steam generator 4. The valve was being disassembled

to inspect its internals for indications of erosion-corrosion as part of

the licensee's response to the feed line break at Surry, Maintenance

personnel used maintenance instruction (MI)-11.12, Disassembly and Repair

of Main Feedwater Regulating Valves 1,2-fCV-3-35,48,90, and 103. Minor

indications were found at the valve internals and at the pipe elbow

directly below the valve. Repairs will be effected to this elbow. The

other three elbows will be inspected and repaired in a similar fashion.

The inspectors witnessed performance of special maintenance instruction

DPS0 SMI-1-DG, which verifies the functional operability of the emergency

diesel generators (EDGs). Specifically, the inspector observed the

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i successful testing of the generator phase differential fault relay

circuit. Af ter activating the fault relay, the technician is required to

, attempt to start the EDG locally to ensure the relay locks out the start

circuit. The procedure does not require a similar start attempt from the

remote start panel (main control room). The inspector questioned whether

a all circuits were adequately tested. This item will be followed as URI

l 327, 328/87-08-04.

1

Work plan 12365 was reviewed to evaluate whether field change request

(FCR) 5142 was implemented in accordance with modifications and additions

! instruction (M and AI) - 7. FCR 5142 addressed a cable tray jumper that

.

did not incorporate the use of a conduit. This will be followed as URI

. 327, 328/87-08-05.

!

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The inspectors identified some portions of spent fuel pool piping that was

deformed. The apparent cause of the deformation was incorrectly applied

!

expansion tabs. The issue was discussed with the acting plant manager, who

,

in turn requested the Sequoyah project engineer to evaluate the issue. In

j a memo Nobles / Wilson dated February 2, 1987, the licensee determined that

i the deformation was the result of welding that was performed on these

relatively thin walled pipes. The licensee further determined that there

were no safety considerations because the integrity of the pipe had not

i been compromised. The inspector had no further questions.

No violations or deviations were identified.

) 9. Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (92700)

! The following LERs were reviewed and closed. The inspector verified that:

reporting requirements had been met; causes had been identified; correc-

tive actions appeared appropriate; generic applicability had been

considered; the LER forms were complete; the licensee had reviewed the

! event; no unreviewed safety questions were involved; and no violations of

I regulations or TS conditions had been identified.

! LERs Unit 1

l 327/85-045 Diesel Generator Start. A review of this event determined that

i this was an example of inadequate control of safety related maintenance

, which resulted in damage to breaker connection pins.

1

LERs Unit 2

i' 328/86-004 Incore Computer Program. The licensee's corrective actions to

require independent verification for data used to determine incore flux

mapping and other soft ware computer data entries appears to be adequate.

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_ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ ___._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _

. -_ -. .-. .

. .

11

10. Event Followup (93702, 62703)

During the inspection period, the licensee made two separate immediate

notification phone calls:

On February 27, 1987, the licensee notified NRC through the emergency

notification system (ENS) of an inadvertent emergency diesel genera-

tor (EDG) start. The event was caused by personnel error involving

i

an instrument technician conducting a test of a breaker trip relay.

The technician attached test leads to the wrong relay, and tripped

the shutdown board instead of the intended ERCW pump feeder breaker.

The EDGs started, load sheading on the affected bus occurred, and

the EDG tied onto the deenergized bus. All blackout loads sequenced

on correctly. After verifying off-site power availability, the

operators reset the blackout relays, paralleled to off-site, and

restored normal power to the bus. All ESF functions worked as

required. This event will be further reviewed as part of the LER

followup inspection program once the LER is issued.

On February 27, 1987, the licensee made a ENS notification of a late

. report under the guidelines of 10CFR 50.72.b.2.iii. Continuing

1

investigation of the RCS spill event of January 28, 1987, revealed

that both trains of RHR had been out of service as a result of air

binding of the RHR pumps. This condition was evidenced by pump

'

cavitation (pump amperage oscillation), flow variation, and miniflow

recirc valve opening on the running pump. A conservative assumption

is that both pumps were or would have become inoperable until proper

RCS level was restored.

a No deviations or violations were identified.

11. IE Information Notices (92701)

The following IE Circulars (IECs) were reviewed and closed. The inspector

verified that: corrective actions appeared appropriate; ceneric applica-

bility had been considered; the licensee had reviewed the event and that

'

appropriate plant personnel were knowledgeable; no unreviewed safety

questions were involved; and that violations of regulations or TS condi-

,

.

tions did not appear to occur.

(Closed) IEC-80-06 Implant Therapy Sources. This IEC was transmit-

i ted to medical licensees only and is not generic to

Sequoyah.

(Closed) IEC-80-08 BWR RPS Response Time. This IEC was written

'

discussing a difference between General Electric TS and the

i design basis. This was not applicable to Sequoyah.

(Closed) IEC-80-19 Noncompliance with License Requirements for

Medical Licensees. This IEC was not applicable to

Sequoyah.

4

$

i

,_.-e ._. . . _ . , _ . , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . . . . . . _ , , , , . - , . . . _ . . - . . , _ , _ . . . _ _ _ _ , . - . _ _ . . , - _ ,

. .

12

12. IE Bulletins (92703)

IE Bulletins are documents issued by the NRC which require certain

specific actions of the addressee. The ins'pector has reviewed the actions

taken by the licensee as a response to the below listed IE Bulletins

(IEBs). The inspector verified that: corrective actions appeared

appropriate; generic applicability had been considered; the licensee had

reviewed the event and that appropriate plant personnel were knowledge-

able; no unreviewed safety questions were involved; and that violations of

regulations or TS conditions did not appear to occur.

(Closed) IEB-80-07 BWR Jet Pump ' Assembly Failure. This IEB was

written to discuss problems with crack indications in Jet

Pumps and is not applicable to Sequoyah.

(Closed) IEB-80-13 Cracking in Core Spray Spargers. This IEB

discussed problems generic to BWR equipment only. It is

not applicable to Sequoyah.

(Closed) IEB-80-14 Degradation of BWR Scram Discharge Volume

Capacity. This form of scram system is used in BWR's only

and is not applicable to Sequoyah.

(Closed) IEB-80-17 Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a

Scram at a BWR. This IEB discusses an event which occurred

at Browns Ferry where the control rods failed to insert

because of a hydraulic lock in the scram discharge volume.

The rods at Sequoyah fall iato the core on a trip and do

not require the functioning of a hydraulic system. This

item is not applicable to Sequoyah.

13. Inspector Followup Items

Inspector followup items (IFIs) are matters of concern to the inspector

which are documented and tracked in inspection reports to allow further

review and evaluation by the inspector. The following IFIs have been

reviewed and evaluated by the inspector. The inspector has either

resolved the concern identified, determined that the licensee has

performed adequately in the area, and/or determined that actions taken by

the licensee have resolved the concern.

l (Closed) IFI 327, 328/85-46-08, Temporary Alterations

l

l

(Closed) IFI 327, 328/86-20-01, Temporary Alteration Program

Improvements

l The above two IFIs address the use and control of temporary alterations

l on safety-related systems. The licensee committed to the Institute of

Nuclear Power Operations (INP0) to clear all temporary alterations that

l were in place on January 1,1984, before unit 1 startup following

l cycle 4 completion. After the NRC identified the above IFIs the licensee

did an engineering study on the then existing 64 safety related temporary

alterations. The licensee determined that four outstanding temporary

alterations required review and/or correction prior to the startup of

l

Unit 2. The licensee's corrective actions in this areas will be monitored

!

_

. .

13

during the NRC maintenance team review of Nuclear Manager's Review Group

(NMRG) item H-1 which was found to be open in inspection report 327,

328/87-15. These followup items are administratively closed.

(Closed) IFI 327, 328/86-15-02, Waste Evaporator Leak.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective actions to correct a

defective seam in the CDWE building wall. Engineering change notices

L6558 and L6417 were reviewed. The inspector had no further questions.

This item is closed.

14. Control Room Evacuation (71707)

The inspector reviewed A0I-27, Control Room Inaccessibility. The pro-

cedure describes the actions to be taken should the control room become

uninhabitable. The procedure requires the dispatching of more personnel

than are required as a minimum on-shift in TS 6.2.2.a. Appendix A of

10 CFR 50 requires in GDC 19 that equipment at appropriate locations out-

side the control room be provided with a design capability for prompt hot

shutdown of the reactor, including necessary instrumentation and controls

to maintain the unit in a safe condition during hot shutdown. This

criteria is addressed in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.68.2, Initial Startup

Test Program to Demonstrate Remote Shutdown Capability for Water-Cooled

Nuclear Power Plants. This RG states that startup testing should demon-

strate that the number of personnel available to conduct the shutdown

operation is sufficient to perform the many actions required by the

procedure in a timely, coordinated manner.

The documentation available on the startup test as described in item

SU-1.2A of Table 14.1-3 in the FSAR will be reviewed. The following

issues will be resolved:

-

Whether there is sufficient personnel and guidance to perform a safe

and orderly shutdown from outside the control room with a minimum

shift crew per the TS.

-

Whether procedures are adequate to address the limiting case of

minimum shift manning.

-

Whether the initial startup test was performed utilizing the

personnel indicated in the procedure or the TS minimum, and whether

the procedure was adequate.

This will be identified as URI 327,328/87-08-02.

15. Startup Activities

During this inspection period the inspector continued the review of

Sequoyah readiness for restart. This review concentrated on evaluation of

, .

14

the numerous list of items that TVA considers non-restart for Sequoyah

Unit 2. The lists being reviewed include the following:

Work requests

Deficiency reports

Problem identification reports

Significant condition reports

Condition adverse to quality reports

Corrective action reports

Employee concerns deficiency reports

In addition to the above lists the inspector will review the " satellite"

programs such as design baseline and employee concerns, to ensure imple-

mentation of the restart criteria described in Standard Practice SQA-191,

" Evaluation of Operational Readiness Prior to Plant Restart".

16. TVA management changes:

E. R. Ennis - appointed Assistant to the Plant Manager

D. C. Craven - temporarily appointed to assist the surveillance instruc-

tion review manager

R. W. Fortenberry - temporarily appointed to assist the surveillance

instruction review manager

.

I