ML20196D487

Forwards FEMA Re Findings for Offsite Emergency Preparedness Aspects of Plant Exercise Conducted on 880504. FEMA Identified No Deficiencies in Performances of Offsite Agencies During Exercise

ML20196D487
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	12/05/1988
From:	Greger L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Kaplan A CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO.
References
NUDOCS 8812090108
Download: ML20196D487 (2)

Text

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DE C 0 51988 Docket No. 50-440 Docket No. 50-441 The Cleveland Electric 111uminating Certpany ATTN: Mr. Alvin Kaplan Vice President Nuclear Group 10 Center Road Perry, OH 440A1 Gentlemen:

We have received the enclosed Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) letter dated November ?,1988, containing the findings for the offsite energency preparedness aspects of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant exercise conducted on May 4, 1988. FEMA identified no deficiencies in the performances of offsite agencies during the exercise. However, eight areas requiring corrective action by offsite agencies were identified by FEMA.

We fully recognize that any remedial actions to be implemented involve parties and politica* institutions which are not under your direct control. Nonetheless, we would expect the subject of offsite preparedness for the area around the Perry Nuclear Power Plant to be addressed by vou as well as others.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Comission's regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosed FEMA report will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Sincerely.

L. Rob rt Greger, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Franch o

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Enclosure:

As stated o g u.

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The Cleveland Electric Illuminating 2 Company DE C 0 51988-Distribution cc w/ enclosure:

F. R. Stead, Director, Nuclear Support Department M. D. Lyster, General Manager, Perry Plant Operations Department R. A. Newkirk, Manager, Licensing and Compliance Section S. S. Kensicki, Director, ntrry Plant Technical Department DCD/DCB (RIDS)

Licensing Fee Management Branch Resident inspector, RIII cc w/o enclosure:

Harold W. Kohn, Ohio EPA Terry J. Lodge, Esq.

James W. Harris, State of Ohio Robert M. Quillin, Ohio Department of Health State of Ohio, Public Utilities Comission W. Traver, EPB, NRR 1

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lg,i Federal Emergency Management Agency 5, 1. f; Washington, D.C. 20U2 O ,a MEMORANDUM FOR: Frank J. Congel Director, Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Re ulatory Commission FROM: REnard W. Kr Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs

SUBJECT:

Final Report of the May 4, 1988, Full Participation Exercise of the Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plans, Site-specific to the Perry Nuclear Power Plant Attached is a copy of the final report for the full participation exercise of the offsite radiological emergency response plans for the Perry Nuclear Power Station. The State of Ohio, and Ashtabula, Geauga, and Lake Counties, as well as the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company participated in the exercise. The report, dated October 20,1988, was prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region V staff.

There were no deficiencies observed during the May 4, 1988 exercise. Tne report identifies eight (8) areas requiring corrective action in the Summary Testing of Exercise Findings.

The FEMA Region V staff has reviewed the schedule of corrective actions provided by the State of Ohio in response to the exercise weaknesses identified, incorporated them into the final report, and has forwarded a copy of this report tr the State. Additional verification of corrective action implemenc.ation will be provided by FEMA Region V, as appropriate.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me on 646-2871.

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i Perry Nuclear Power Plant Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company  ;

Joint Exercise j i

Facility Location: Located in the state of Ohio, near the Village of North Perry i Exercise Date: May 4, 1988 Date of Draft Report: July 18, 1988 Date of Final Report: October 20, 1988

Participants:

State of Ohio (full); Ashtabula County i (full); Geauga County (full); Lake  !

County (full) and the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company.  ;

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f Federal Emergency Management Agency (

Region V ,

Natural and Technological Hazards Division 175 West Jackson Blvd, 4th Floor Chicago, Illinois 60604 i

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Region V 175 West Jackson,4th Floor Chicago,IL 60604 (312) 431 5500 October 20, 1988 MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards ATTENTION: Anna Hart, S!.-NT-TH

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&)\ h. Nk1 FRO?f: U'a 71 a ce .7. Wea ver, Chai rman Regional Assistance Cocu:tittee

SUBJECT:

Final Report Tor The May 4,1988 Full Participation Exercise With The Perry Nuclear Power Plant The federal Emergency !!anagement Agency, Region V (FEMA Region V) on July 18, 1988 provided your of fice with a draf t Report of the !!ay 4,1988 full part t elpati on exercise ith the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. In response to this draft re p o rt the State of Ohio provided FEMA Region V with a schedule of corrective actions dated August 29 and Septembe r 14, 1988. These schedules of corrective actions, along with FEHA Region V's response to the propoced corrective actions, although previously submitted, are enclosed.

Enclosed also is the Tinal Report of the May 4, 1988 full participation exercise with the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. The Final Report has been revised somewhat f rom that of the July 18, 1988 Draft Report. Therefore, any Draf t Reports held by your of fice should be destroyed. Due to these revisions to the Final Report, the schedule of corrective actions for the State of Ohio's Pfilk San.pling Team has also been revised to add the re q ui re ne n t to revise the Milk Sampling Team SOP. No revision to the schedule of corrective actions is necessary since this revision was included in the State of Ohio's schedule of corrective actione dated August 29, 1988. The TE?tA Region V final exercise report transmittal letter to the Stste of Ohio is also enclosed for your records.

Please inform FEMA Region V when the final report for the May 4, 1988 Perry Nuclear Power Plant exercise has been provided to the Nuclear Regulatory Comi s s i on.

Do not hesitate to contact Mr. Dan Benent , FTS 363-5531, if you have any questions.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

State of Ohio page 4  :

Joint Public Information Center page 6  !

Ashtabula County page 7 Geauga County page 10 Lake County page 13 EXERCISE REPORT Introduction page 19 Exercise Background page 19

2. Participating and Non-Participating State ,

Local Governments page 19 i

3. List of Evaluators page 20 '

4. Evaluation Criteria page 21

5. Exercise Objectives page 21

6. Summary of Scenario page 21

7. State and Local Resources Planned to Be page 22 Used In The Exercise

8. Exercis0 Findings In Past Exercises page 22 l

9. Exercise Objectives Still To Be Effectively Achie ved page 23  :

10. Post Exetuise Meeting page 25 Narrative

1. State of Ohio page 25  ;

2. Joint Public Information Center page 35

3. Ashtabula County page 37

4. Geagua County page 48

5. Lake County Page 59

SUMMARY

LISTINGS OF EXERCISE FINDINGS State of Ohio

1. Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety page 77

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Actions page 78

3. Areas Recommended For Improvement page 81 7 2

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.g-As:. tabula County

1. Deficiencies Af fecting Public Health and Safety page 77

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Actions page 78

3. Areas Recommended For Improvement page 83 Geauga County

1. Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety page 77

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Actions page 79

3. Areas Recommended For Improvement page 83 Lake County

1. Deficiencies Affecting Public Health and Safety page 77

2. Areas Requiring Corrective Actions page 79

3. Areas Recommended For Improvement Page 83 l ATTACHMENTS

1. Objectives

2. Scenario j

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p 'y as EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

State of Ohio The State of Ohio activated and staffed the emergency operations center (EOC) at Worthington; provided staff to the JPIC; liaisons  ;

to the County EOCs, and the utility's TOF; staffed and dispatched their communications van to Thompson, Ohio; pre-positioned three radiological monitoring teams, north of Chardon, Ohio, for field assessment and one field team for milk collection and sampling.

The EOC was staffed according to the State plan. The staff coordinated the emergency response activities by use of maps, displays, and primary and backup means of communications.

However, it was difficult to determine the individual that was effectively in control of the EOC operation. Several different staff members coordinated the periodic briefings, but the individual designated as the EOC Coordinator never participated in the activity. His visible role was restricted to keeping the status board current. The noise level in the EOC operations room was not controlled during briefings. The noise level made it difficult for individuals interested in the briefings to hear.

l The 5-way telephone was used by the State of Ohio, the Counties of Ohio, the Counties of Ashtabula, Geauga, and Lake and the Perry Nuclear Power Plant to keep each other informed, i

Use of the dedicated 5 way telephone should be rastricted to l receipt / transmission of critical information. Routine data ;

should be sent via data fax. f Around the clock staffing was demonstrated by double staffing some positions and the presentation of a roster of personnel for subsequent shifts.

The Office of the Governor participated in the exercise by the presence of the Governor's representative in the EOC, who was in telephone contact with the Governor's Office. However, it is recommended that representatives of the Oovernor's Office, participating in the EOC exercises, be provided training in REP 4

,. 's exercise procedares, for a moro effective understanding of information and requests to be marte to the Governor's Office and to eliminato delays in reviewing the content of protective action recommendations.

The EOC staff demonstrated ability to project dosage to the public and implement protective actions, via plume exposure and ingestion pathway hazards. The projections were based on plant and field data reported from the EOF and the State radiological field monitoring teams. The State EOC staff gave the protective action decisions to Ashtabula, Geauga and Lake Counties for them t'o implement.

Based on data from the State Liaison in the utility EOF, the Ohio Dopartment of Health EOC staff recommended KI consumption for emergency workers. Potassium Iodide is part of the emergency worker dosimetry packet.

The staff notified and requested Federal assistance from FEMA and the Department of Energy.

The EOC statf was briefed by the Ohio Disaster Services Agency (ODSA) Chief of Staff and the Ohio Department of Public Health representative on procedures and need to implement measures for controlled recovery and reentry.

The State staff assigned to the EOF for the Perry Nuclear plant is activated at the Site Area emergency classification level using an updated call up list. The State OEF staff was operational in 45 minutes after activation. Twenty four hours staffing capability was demonstrated by double staffing. Two County representatives were also present.

The EOF is a Nuclear Regulatory Commission approved facility with a controlled air supply for the protection of the emergency staff. The co-location of the State liaison and the utility representativen provided a successful demonstration of effective interface and coordination of technical dat and emergency response personnel. The State EOC staff was able to receive technical data from the State liaison at the EOF as it became available. This enabled the State decision-makers to determine appropriate protective measures.

Major communication systems available to the State include:

1. A dedicated telephone system linking the utility EOF to the State EOC and the Ashtabula, Geauga, and Lake Counties EOC. This system cnables important information to be disseminated simultaneously.

2. The Joint Public Information Center (JPIC) also had a separate dedicated telephone line to the State EOC and the three 5

,. 's County EOCc.

3. The State mobile cormunications van provided radio communications between the State radiological field monitoring teams and the accident assessment staff in the State EOC.

4. The State of Ohio also has radio conmunications with each County in the State and with FEMA Region V.

5. The State microwave and teletype capability with FEMA Region V.

6. Facsimile (hard copy) capability was available and demonstrated between the State EOC, the three County EOCs, the JPIC and the utility EOF.

7. Cornercial telephone was also demonstrated. All cormunications systems, including back-up, were successfully demonstrate:1.

The State mobile cormunications van adequately maintained primary and back-up communications vith the three radiological field monitoring-teams, the State EOC, the three County EOCs, the utility EOF and the JPIC. The frequency used, though, had heavy traffic causing some cross talk and confusion. During this exercise some messages were given to the wrong party and on occasion, the heavy radio traffic interfered with the coordination of field monitoring team assignments. This procedural problem could be corrected by better control of radio traffic and/or use of additional radio frequencies. It is recoraended that the field team confirm their messages by repcating them to the radio operator in the communications van.

The radiological field monitoring teams demonstrated the ability to monitor ambient radiation levels, to measure airborne radiciodine concentrations at the required sensitivity and to collect appropriate environmental samples. Team weaknesses were contamination control, sampling errors and proper protective clothing. These items can be rectified with further training in these areas.

The milk sampling team deployed by the Ohio Department of Health adequately demonstrated the ability to collect a sample of milk.

However, the milk sampling team SOPS need to be revised to improve exposure and contamination control techniques. Areas recommended for improvement in team equipment is detailed in the narrative.

Joint Public Information Center The security force of the Lakeland community College in Kirkland, Ohio began implementing activation (JPIC) at 1847. Assigned 6

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staff from the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI) began arriving shortly after activation procedures wee initiated.

Once the staff arrived from the State of Ohio and Ashtabula, Geauga, and Lake Counties the JPIC Manager declared the facility operational at 2010.

The utility, State and County staffs worked closely and coordir.ated their material prior to the four (4) media briefings that were conducted. Fifteen (15) to twenty (20) media representatives attended the early media briefings and channel 3 television carried a live report on the exercise from the JPIC for their 11:00 p.m. news show.

Arrangements for the media included twenty seven (27) phones, space for interviews and recordings, audio and video tapes of previous media briefings, a press kit and technical staff to answer questions. Several media groups were given tours of the working areas of the JPIC.

Rumor Control was handled by four trained customer service personnel of CEI. Throughout the exercise they handled about 40 calls, including call backs. Periodic reports, regarding types of calls, were given to the JPIC for possible use in information releases.

In summary the JPIC staff and facilities performed their assigned functions in an outstanding manner. All objectives were more than adequately demonstrated and there were no deficiencies or areas requiring corrective action.

Ashtabula County Notification procedures were initiated to activate and staff the Ashtabula County Eoc on receipt of a call from the utility at 1820. The call, received at the Sheriff's 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> dispatch center, was verified. The dispatchers using written, updated call lists, notified key staff members. Other EOC staff men.bers were called when the situation at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant became more. serious. The EOC was fully staffed at 1930, with 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> staffing demonstrated by presentatian of a roster.

The c.xecutive group coordinated the activities of the Eoc staff and made the necessary decisions to implement the recommended protective actions.

The Ashtabula County Eoc is a well appointed facility located on the lower level of the County Court House in Jef ferson. The acoustics in the Center are very good, and the equipment and visual displays are adequate to conduct efficient emergency response operations from this facility.

Ashtabula County's variety of cmergency management and law 7

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enforcement communications systems enabled them to maintain [

contact throughout the exercise with all locations including ,

, appropriate individuals, organizations, and field personnel. The t i State / County utility Emergency Response Network, known as the ,

! "five-way telephone system," and the three-wcy county system, l j both dedicated lines, supported the major volume of message  !

transmission. Back-up radio and telephone systems were '

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Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations: (PARS)

I i are not the responsibility of Ashtabula County. The State of  !

Ohio decides on Protective actions and Ashtabula County j implements them, using their own analysis of all appropriate t factors to include local restraints. Although the plume from the l

Perry Nuclear Power Plant did not affect Ashtabula County, the ,

Eoc staff kept itself informed about the problem and conducted ,

planning activities in the event Ashtabula County would be  ;

affected. i

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! During this exercise the Public Alerting and Notification System

'{ was activated (simulated) by Lake County. The activation was coordinated with Ashtabula County. The formulation of EBS i

releases was a joint activity of the executive groups of i

Ashtabula, Geauga and Lake Counties.  !

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The County organized and prepared for either shelter or l evacuation protective actions. While its portion of the EPZ was i sheltered, the county was prepareri to evacuate that area, or to l receive evacuees from other counties. The EOC staff used references, procedures and EOC displays in their planning. In [

addition to the planning to care for people, including the ,

mobility-impaired, resources were reviewed and on-call to remove I any physical impediments to evacuation routes.

Ashtabula County's management of controlling access to a specific l

geographical area was demonstrated by activation of an access  ;

control point (A.C.P.) north of Austinburg at the intersection of highways I-90 and State route 45. Two Ohio Highway Patrol cars {

officers were stationed at the access control point. The i officers were knowledgeable of their duties, communications, {

dosimetry, KI, and the specific aspects of emergency worker j exposure control.  ;

9 The ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker f exposure was fully demonstrated at the Ashtabula County EOC and at the State Highway Patrol access control point near Austinburg.

l Personnel dispatched from the EOC to the JPIC and EOF were  ;

thoroughly briefed on dosimetry kits and XI before departure. .

The Highway Patrol Officers were knowledgeable of the dosimetry t items, KI, exposure limits and appropriate record-keeping I procedures.

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School evacuation procedures were demonstrated during the morning of May 4, 1988. In addition to the demo"strated activities, interviews were conducted with the District Superintendent, the Acting Transportation Supervisor, the Principal of the Cork Elementary School and two school bus drivers.

No media briefings were conducted at the County EOC. State, County and utility plans indicate media representatives should go to the JPIC at the Lakeland Community College to receive their information. Releases, made from the JPIC were cootdinated with the EOC staff. Hard copy of releases were transmitted to the EOC.

The toll free rumor control telephone number can be answered at three locations in the EOC. The position in the Dispatch Center is continuously monitored and the other two in the EOC operations room is monitored once the EOC is staffed. This number and other emergency information is distributed within the EPZ as part of the annual Emergency Information Brochure.

Activation and staffing of the Ashtabula County congregate care center was performed promptly by 35 persons from five agencies.

The congregate care staff displayed dedication and training in their assigned responsibilities. The facility is adequate to support extended operations in emergency situations.

Evacuco registration at the congregate care center was efficiently demonstrated by the Red Cross. Radiological monitoring and decontamination procedures were successfully demonstrated by fire department personnel. Their ability knowledge and attention to detail resulted in an excellent demonstration. The f acility it. large and well suited for mass care. Communications, s e curit'/, and billeting procedures were also successfully demonstrated.

The ambulance service was requested at 2224 to go to the emergency decontamination center where an emergency worker was injured. The ambulance service was not notified until 2300 because the lead controller in the EOC told the Fire / EMS Coordinator that actual activation of resources would be simulated. Once this mistake was realized the ambulance was dispatched on a timely basis. It is recommended that exercise controllers be cautioned in future exercises to be sure their instructions are complete and understood by the exercise participants. The ambulance team was able to handle the injured, contaminated patient properly and transport him to the hospital, one ambulance crew nember, though, was not familiar with the proper procedures and use of the CDV 700 radiation monitoring instrument. Otherwise, the ambulance team performed admirably.

The team was able to properly handle the contaminated, injured patient and transport him to the hospital.

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Dosimetry kits with direct reading and perma.nent record dosimeters and KI were distributed to all emergency workers.

1 Adequate equipment and personnel from the Austinturg Fire Department were available for monitoring emergency worker personn,,1 and vehicles. Reserves are available from the Trumble and Saybrook Fire Departments. A monitoring instrument was not working properly and one instrument did not have a proper calibration sticker indicating the date the instrument was last calibrated. The monitoring demonstration by the AustJnburg Fire Department, although adequate, indicated refresher training is

, needed ori the proper use of the CDV 700 radiation monitoring instrument in monitoring personnel and vehicles, a

The Brown Memorial Hospital omergency medical staff performed

, very well in handlir.g and treating an injured and contaminated

individual. The hospital was well prepared with attending J

medical staff, health physics support, and appropriate medical

and radiological equipment. The medical staff and the support services carried out tneir duties in a most professional manner.

d The Executive Group discussed the activities that would continue l while county residents remained in shelter and Lake County l evacueos were housed in care centers. They also discussed what j actions would be required when the evacuees were released from i shelter. Eoc staff reviewed their procedures and were prepared to inplement recovery and reentry activities.

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Geauca county i The Geauga County ECC was activated and the staff mobilized 1 prorptly beginning with the Alert notification. Exercisu I participants activating planned field activities were on station j to carry out their demonstratien of capability.

i The County EOC became fully staffed and exhibited the capability 1

to operate 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day by presenting a roster of personnel.

l The roster also reflected additional pe rsonne.1. who were being trained during the exercise.

The executive staff and the operations staff demonstrated the ability to make and coordinate emergency activities through their field operations pe rsor.nel . These activities were carried out with etficiency and accuracy. The Geauga EOC accommodates the l emergency rcsponse staff very well with a comfortable spacious q environment.

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) Throughout the emergency response the various communications j systees were utilized to communicate with other f acilities and j field personnel to effectively conduct the emergency response.

Within the resources available, the County demonstrated the 10

ability to project dosage to the public based on field data provided them by the utility and the State. Appropriate protective actions were issued by Geauga County.

Geauga County coordinated with Ashtabula and Lake counties the alerting of the public in the effected EPZ and the dissemination of an instructional message within the fifteen minute time requirement of NUREG 0654. In addition, Geauga County coordinated with Ashtabula and Lake County to formulate and distribute instructions to the public.

Emergency worker exposure control and the ability to continuously monitor this exposure was demonstrated satisfactorily at the access and traffic control point. In addition, the emergency werkers demonstrated satisfactory knowledge for the taking and the use of Potassium Iodide.

Discussed among the staff in the Eoc was the use of potassium iodide by emergency workers and others as may by designated, one specific instance was the potential need to declare farmers emergency workers so they could return temporarily to their farms to care for animals and crops.

The appropriate organizations located in the County EOC demonstrated the resources to deal with impediments to evacuation by placing on standby the equipment to clear the roadway of obstructions. Through the efforts of the State Patrol and the County sheriff the resources and procedures were demonstrated to

control access to a limited portion of the evacuated area. ,

The organizational ability and resources were demonstrated to

, manage an orderly evacuation of the affected portion of the Geauga County ten (10) mile emergency planning zone (EPZ). t Procedurally demonstrated were the resources needed to effectively evacuate the mobility-impaired individuals within the affected portion of Geauga County. This was done through lists  !

indicating where the individuals reside and the nature of their t impairment. The ability to control access to an evacuated area, to include necessary resources and operational control, was

demonstrated.  ;

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! The County Superintendent of Schools demonstrated procedurally, l the resources and coordination to effect an orderly evacuation of l the schools within the plume EPZ. A demonstration was conducted the morning of May 4, 1988 at the Ledgemont Elementary School.

The coordination of advanced information, particularly activities leading up to the declaration of General Emergency, was handled via the "3 way" telephone. The Public Information Officer utilized the telephone system to coordinate the release of information prior to its release at the JPIC.

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The Middlofield Firo Department handled all decontamination activities at the Geauga County Congregate Care Center located at l Cardinal High School in Middictield, Ohio. The need to monitor f vehicles and persons was demonstrated, as well as their [

subsequent decentamination. All procedures were handled well.  !

i All emergency workers responding to the Geauga County Congregate care Center wore radiation monitoring packets clipped to their clothing. The items included verst one CDV 730 dosimeter, one l CDV 742 dosimeter, one TLD, one bottle of KI, KI warning  :

information, and a radiation worker exposure log. Personnel knew I the proper usage of dosimetry (i.e. how often to read their  !

dosimeters) and KI (i.e. when to take), as well as j decontamination procedures. ,

A large Congregate Care staff included approximately 3" volunteer  ;

Fire Department personnel, the Red Cross, the Clergy, Amateur ,

Radio, and Nursing. Activation was completed in a timely manner. j All personnel were aware of their duties and demonstrated them -

effectively.  !

Registration and Monitoring of evacuees was handled effectively. L Evacucc were monitored upon arrival at the facility and initial  !

personal information was obtained. If they were found to be free i of contamination, they were sent directly to Registration. If i' contaminated, they were sent to the Decontamination shower room, and registered once determined to be free of contamination. Red Cross handled the registration.

The Red Cross handled mass care, and the Geauga County Amateur Radio Club demonstrated the communication link to the County EOC.

The Police Department provided security. The Fire Department ,

demonstrated radiological monitoring, and Trask Ambulance handled r the transport of an injured, contaminated patient to Geauga  !

Hospital. [

The decontamination facility at Hambden is well equipped and  !

entirely suitable for handling decontamination of persons, i' equipment and vehicles. Prompt activation and full staffing was demonstrated. Communications equipment at the center was excellent and proficiency in its use was demonstrated. The }

ability to decontaminate people, equipment, and vehicles was  ;

demonstrated with a minimum simulation. A high degree of L knowledge and proficiency with regard to radiological exposure was demonstrated. The staff was well organ:, red and was efficiently directed and controlled. A high degree of training and cross training was evident. This is especially commendable in that the enti; e staff are volunteers. The decontamination of an individual and a vehicle was well done. (

t The handling of a Medical Response involving radioactive contamination was demonstrated during this exarcise. Per the 12 j f

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o s scenario, an crorgency worker was injured when he was inadvertently hit by a car that he was decontaminating. The car struck him below the left knee, causing him to fall to the ground, and become contaminated. His right side became contaminated to 0.9 mR/h. He also suffered a possible fractured left leg.

The Middictield Fire Department provided initial patient care, until the Trask Ambulance Company arrived. Trask Ambulance personnel divided into teams on-the-scene handling (contaminated) and ambulance (non-contaminated). A Control Line was observed. Radiation Safety procedures were handled well. The

patient was placed in leg and neck braces and wrapped to contain contamination. He was then handed across the control line. The back of the ambulance was paper-lined to contain contamination.

The crew wore dosimetry and protective clothing. Radiation instrumentation was plastic wrapped. On-the-scene personnel were monitored for contamination at the completion of their duties.

The patient was transported to the Geauga Hospital. The ambulance travelled within speed limits, in normal traf fic, and -

without lights or sirens. This was in accordance to pre-exercise guidance.

The awaiting Hospital staff was fully prepared. All personnel 1 wore full protective clothing and respiratory protection. The ambulance pulled into an enclosed bay area. The radiological l room, just beyond the door, was secluded from the main Emergency ,

Room facilities. The walkway and radiological examining room '

were plastic lined, and signs and barriers were in place. A t control line was established at the examining room door.  :

Nuclear medicine personnel were the Health Physicists. The Emergency Room had an alternate ambulance entrance that was i removed from the contaminated area. The ambulance and anbulance  :

personnel were monitored before leaving the scene. The patient 4 was decontaminated prior to sending to x-ray. At this time, the hospital exercise was terminated. All operations followed >

radiation safety procedures.

At the conclusicn of the exercise the Eoc staff jointly f participated in a discussion as tc the needs and problems of l returning the community to normal. The diccussion continued well  :

beyond what was anticipated. The exchange was good.

Lake County The EOC was activated following receipt of the Alert notification over the 5-way dedicated telephone system. This system is monitored 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day. Staff call up procedures were i demonstrated with the Eoc functionally activated within one hour.  ;

It is recommended that all personnel associated with the exercise l begin and end communications with a statement that this is an L 13

• . l exercise. Around the clock staf fing capability was demonstrated by some double staffing and the presentation of a roster.

The EOC was set up prior to a exercise with each work station having supplies and a copy of the plan and the specific .

procedures for the person assigned to the work station. There was ample space for the conduct of emergency operations with '

breakout rooms for the Executive Group and the Accident Assessment Group. All of the necessary maps and displays were available in the EQC. It is recommended that these maps and displays be more fully utilized by the EOC staff particularly during staff briefings. Access to the EOC was controlled.

The County Commissioners directed the EOC operations with the LCEMA Director serving as chief of staff. Overall amergency responso decisions were made by the Executive Group with input from the Operations Group and the ?ccident Assessment Group.

The EOC staff mado decisions with respect to their specific emergency i i response activities and provided periodic updates to the

! Executive Group.

4 The ability to communicate with all appropriato l oca t ic,nc , I organizaticns and field personnel was demonstrated. For example, dedicated telephones provide the primary communications link .

between the State, utility and Counties (5-way); the three r Counties (3-way,r and the County and the JPIC. Radio and commercial tolerhone provide backup communications capability.

Communications with the County's Field Monitoring Teams was adequately accoeplished through the use of walkie-talkies, mobile i i radies and public telephones.  !

l i Lake County Health Department Field Monitoring Teams (FMTs) were ,

j mobilized and deployed, by the County Health Commissioner, in a timely fashion, nadiation monitoring and air sampling equipment '

used by the FMTs were extensiva, recently calibrated, and determining ambient radiation levele I

appropriate for and I

radioiodine concentrations in air to a level as low as loE-07 c uCi/cc. Written SOPS were used by the FMTs for all sampling.

l The LCHD vehicles, used by the FMTs, did not provide adequate I

space for completion of all FMT activities. Analysis of air i sampler media require FMTs to work outside the vehicles.

Numerous survey meters, operated on the floor of Yna vehicle, also were exposed to contamination due to their location and the

) nonuse of protective shot. coverings.

The infozv. tion obtained from the field monitoring teams was osed by the EOC Accident Assessment Group to determine the location 1

and content of the plume. This information was furtlwr used to l verify infc mation from the utility and the State. However, the

operations of their respective field monitoring teams could be enhanced through better coordination of their combined activities.

i 14 i

The utility reconnendation f >r sheltering in subareas 1, 2 and 3  !

was received by the County along with the General Energency notification at 2121. However, the State of Ohio indicated that evacuaticn was being considered for these subareas and that this reconnendation was being coordinated with the Governor. Lake County discussed protective actions with Ashtabula and Geauga

, Countius while awaiting the State's protective action deelsion.

At approximately 2140 the Counties decided that they would nake a protective action decision at 2145 if they did not receive a '

reconnendation from the State. The State of Ohio reconnended i evacuation of subarcas 1, 2 and 3 at 2144. The three Counties innediately coordinated a protective action of evacuation in subareas 1, 2 and 3 and sheltering in subarcas 5 and 6 with siren ,

, activation scheduled for 2152 and EBS activation for 2155. The ,

instructions to the public concerning these protective actions j were formulated at Lake County. i At 2150 A-htabula County called back to add sheltering in subarea

' 4. The additional sheltering area was quickly incorporated into i J the EBS nessage. The sirens were sounded at 2152 and EBS [

] activation occurred at 2155 as scheduled. The radio station was l l instructed to repeat the EBS nessage every 15 ninutes for one i

! hour. This was subsequently extended for an additional hour by

] Lake County. The EBS nossage utilized prescripted naterial and l l included all of the appropriate information such as sheltering ,

1 instructions, information for transients and a geopolitical

! description of the affected areas. Information for schools was  :

) excluded because the county had ascertained that schools were not ,

j in session during the evening.  !

J i Concurrent with the reading of the EBS message to the radio j station, a copy was prepared which could be datafaxed to other locations. This copy was prepared utilizing a decond set of i prescripted information which was consolidated by cut and paste  ;

! techniques. This second set contained erroneous des.criptions of l

the affected areas and was datafaxed to the State EOC, JpIC, COF and Ashtabula and Geauga Counties. After Ashtabula County notified Lake County of the error, Lake Coun*,y reaf f trned that

the prover natorial had been ra d over the EBS and that the Jp.h

! had the proper material because they also assembled the

) prescripted natorial there. However, La kt- 'Tunty did not t J inmediately inform the State EOC and the EOF t i erroe. Lake i i County then prepared a revised consolidatt, U. nessage and agsin datataxed it to all of abose contioned lo' d onc.

j Lake County should conuider installation of a nultiple datafax capability which would permit then to datafax naterial to several 4

locations simultaneously. This woub shorten the amount of tine required to distribute hard copy of the EBS nessage and other <

! important natorial.

15 l

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I The EOC staff demonstrated the organizational ability, necessary coordination, resources, knowledge and use of procedures to implement an evacuation. Other activities included discussion end simulation of traffic and access control points, ability to deal with impediments to evacuation routes such as read closures d!.i BCCiC.ents, spOCial 9vacuation needs of mobility impaired and ursing homes, planning transportation for people without it, the establishment of referral points and congregate care centers, and opening an emergency worker decontamination station. The EOC staff also monitored the evacuation of onsite personnel.

Lake County traitic control was evaluated at US 20 and Narrows Road. This traffic control point was manned by two Sherif fs' Deputies in a fully equipped patrol car. The individuals were fully equipped with dosimetry devices and were knowledgeable of radiation, dosimetry and traffic control. Radio communication occurred with the County EOC which can also provide additional resources. Lake county demonstrated the ability to handle traffic control smoothly and efficiently with multiple communication means.

Access control was evaluated at the intersection of State RT 44 and Auburn Road. The access control point was staffed by a State Highway Patrol Trooper. The Trooper was fully equipped and knowledgeable in radio communication, radiation level measurement, and personal radiation dosimetry. The trooper was

. knowledgeable of access control and traffic control responsibilities. He was responsive to the assignment by his dispatcher who could also furnish additional resources. The access control of the exercise was ef fective as part of a well coo"dinated team effort.

Following instructions frce the Lake County EOC, the Great Lakes Mall Referral Point was manned rapidly and efficiently taking only ten minutes to become operational after arrival of the staff. They established two-way radio communication with the EOC, set up traffic control lanes, readied strip maps and instructions for distribution to the evacuating public and donned safety and identification vests. All activities were carried out in a very professional manner.

Responding to orders to activate from the Lake County EOC, the Transportation Staging Area (TSA) was manned promptly and fully operational by 2035. Tha TSA personnel were voll trained and equipped and carried out their assignments in an excellent manner. They had benefitted from a recent training drill and were well aware of their duties and responsibilities. Excellent communications, with the EOC and units in the field, were maintained by two-way radio.

The Lake County S mool Evacuation was demonstrated out-of-16

r sequence from the exercise. The Notification calls to the Lake County School Superintendent that would have been received frem the EOC where simu]cted by the controllers. The Lake Cour.ty School Superintendent made notification in a timely manner for each emergency classification.

At the "alert" classification declaration a school census was determined and the necessary number of buses were identified. At the "site Area Emergency" Classification (SAE) the bus drivers were issued emergency worker exposure packets and briefed. At the "General Emergency" and evacuation order the bus driver responded to the Perry Center Road Elementary School.

The bus driver received her maps and directions to the receiving school from the Perry Center Road Elementary School Principal.

The Principal initiated the sample evacuation of one class. The students were loading on the bus in a orderly manner. A staff person was available to assist in traffic control. The students demonstrated excellent discipline. The teacher and bus drivers expressed knowledge of procedures which reflected comprehensive training. The Principal was quite knowledgeable and demonstrated strong commitment to this and all hazards planning. It is recommended, though, that the school district Transportation Supervisor maintain a log.

Each emergency response organization had dosimetry kits which contained ;simeters, TLD, KI, release form, instructions and a record ke ping card. The EOC Radiological Officer (RO) had a supply of dosimetry kits which could be used to supplement those available within each response organization or supply EOC staff such as the EOF liaison who was dispatched from the EOC. The RO was quite knowledgeable of his duties and responsibilities. He was aware of exposure limits, reporting requirements, the use of KI and worker decontamination, etc. All of the personnel evaluated in the field had the proper dosimetry kit and were knowledgeable of .'ts use.

The State recommended the use of KI in subarea 1. The Lake County Executive Group concurred in this recommendation and promptly notified their emergency response personnel in the field through the respective agency EOC staff.

The PIO liaison in the EOC generated information for the news releases a ssued at the JPIC. There was some distribution of news releases r om the JPIC to the County but it is recommended that all n o w." aleases from the JPIC be promptly transmitted to the County. ror control was established within the Lake County

! EOC. 1 staffed by three individuals who continuously monitores alephone lines. These individuals were quite knowledgeable of the emergency situation and response activities j and effectively responded to several simulated calls during the exercico, i 17

r An emergency worker decontamination station was established at the Auburn Career Center. Individuals manning the center were properly equipped and knowledgeable of their procedures. The j procedures for decontamination of an emergency worker and a vehicle were demonstrated or explained as appropriate. i An ambulance drill was conducted at the decontamination facility. l A emergency worker was simulated to have been contaminated and injured while conducting vehicle decontamination. The Concord Fire Department personnel attended to the worker's immediate >

needs and prepared him for transport to the hospital by strapping him to a full body board. The ambulance was at the vehicle staging area in a standard availability posture.

Upon receipt of' the call from the Auburn decontamination station to transport a contaminated injured individual, the ambulance floor was covered with paper and the two man ambulance crew was outfitted with full body protective gear. The .moulance crew was i provided with survey meter and dosimetry and the proper use of each was demonstrated. The crew knew the hospitals that were capable of handling contaminated inj eed individuals and could  !

contact these hospitals over a radio system. The ambulance team was aware of procedures to handle a contaminated injured individual.

I The congregate care conter for Lake County was located at the I Wickliffe Senior High School. This facility can house l approxjmately 2,700 evacuees. The center is established and staffed by the Lake County Red Cross. Security is provided by the local Police Department. Functional areas of the center were I the registration area, the nursing station, the housing area with  :

cots and blankets, recreation and information center, and the cafeteria for feeding. The Red Cross has excellent two way radio ,

communication with the chapter house, EOC, mobile telephonc, and l R.A.C.E.S. The center was well organized with knowledgeable  ;

trained personnel. '

r The EOC staff conducted a thorough tabletop discussion of the ,

procedures for reentry into the evacuated area. This discussion ,

was intended to provide a logical close out to the exercise. l The Lako Hospitals System is composed of Lake County Hospital East and Lake County Hospital West. East is the primary facility i for treating contaminated individuals and West serves as a back-  !

up facility 3 ,

Lake County Hospital West treated the contaminated injured worker j and demonstrated adequate facilities and procedures for handling this ind!vidual. Proper communication was demonstrated upon i

18 i

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o *..

notification that the worker was being transported. Protective measures to control contamination were taken iraediately and the hospital was ready to receive the worker within 30 minutes of notification. Survey equipment was available, properly calibrated, and utilized. A plant health physicist accompanied the injured worker and provided information on degree of contamination. A nurse ensured contaminated material was not released from the emergency room. Decontamination of the patient was well controlled and patient treatment was appropriate for the injury.

A second health physicist arrived soon after the rescue and performed surveys to release restricted areas and material from the emergency room. Security and traffic control was maintained throughout the exercise.

4 Rescue squad members demonstrated proper radiation control procedures by isolating the contaminated injury, utilizing protective clothing, and covering the ambulance interior with plastic drop cloths. The ambulance crew also demonstrated proper removal of personal protective clothing. Survey equipment was on board the rescue squad but not used during the exercise.

EXERCISE REPORT INTRODUCTION

1. EXERCISE BACKGROUND This was the third joint exercise for the Ohio Disaster Services 4

Agency and the Counties of Ashtabula, Geauga and Lake resulting from a simulated accident at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. It

, was an announced, off-hours exercise conducted between 1800-2400 hours. The first joint exercise was conducted November 28, 1984

, and involved full participation by the State of Ohio and the three Counties. The second joint exercise was conducted on April 15, 1986 and involved partial participation by the State of Ohio

. and full participation by the three Counties. This report addresses the most recent joint exercise for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant which was conducted on May 4, 1988.

2. PARTICIPATING AND NON-PARTICIPATING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS The ten (10) mile plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant impacts on portions of Ashtabula, Geauga and Lake Counties, as well as Lake Erie, with the major portion of the zone falling within Lake County. The 1980 permanent population within the ten (10) mile EPZ is estimated at 90,867. The influx of summer vacationers increases l 19

the population considerably.

The fifty (50) mile ingestion exposure pathway EPZ encompasses parts of eight (8) Counties within the State of Ohio and three (3) Counties within the State of Pennsylvania. The remaining portion of the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ is located over Lake Eric. In addition to Ashtabula, Geauga and Lake Counties other Ohio Counties within the fifty (50) mile ingestion exposure pathway EPZ include Cuyahoga, Summit, Portage, Trumbull, and Mahoning. The Pennsylvania Counties are Erie, Crawford and Mercer.

The scope of this exercise was developed to simulate a release creating conditions to provide a demonstration of plume exposure pathway (EPZ) emergency response activities. This was a full participation exercise conducted during the evening, after normal working hours for the State of Ohio and the three (3) plume exposure pathway counties. The scope of the exercise was not designed to include activities to test ingestion exposure pathway EPZ emergency response capabilities. Therefore, the fifty (50) mile ingestion exposure pathway political jurisdictions were not required to participate in this exercise.

3. LIST OF mVALUATORS For this exercise there was a total of thirty (30) Federal evaluators observing offsite exercise activities. Onsite exercise activities were evaluated by a separate team from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The offsite evaluation team included seven (7) evaluators from FEMA Region V, one (1) from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), one (1) from the U.S.

Department of Transportation (DOT), one (1) from Health and Human Services (HHS), one (1) from the Department of Energy, one (1) from Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) , and eighteen (18) from contract evaluators. The evaluator assignments were as follows:

OFFSITE EXERCISE EVALUATION TEAM DIRECTOR Dan B. Soment, FEMA STATE OF OHIO Woodie Curtis, Team Leader, FEMA Fred Carlson, INEL Jim Benetti, EPA Frank Wilson, Contract Evaluator JOINT PUBLIC INFORMATION CENTER Jim Sutch, Contract Evaluator 20

ASHTABULA COUNTY Ray Kellogg, " 'ader, FEMA Ed Hakala, ' aluator Lowell Har ... Evaluator (Trainee)

Walt Kisi ract Evaluator Marty sint ..ct Evaluator Gail Van Gw ~ ract Evaluator (Trainee)

Jerry Starob 4 tract Evaluator GEAUGA COUNTY Gordon Wenger, Team Leader, FEMA  :

Al Lookbough, Contract Evaluator Paul Fudacz, FEMA (Trainee)

Floyd Davis, Contract Evaluator Norman Furth, Contract Evaluator (Trainee)

Bill Munyon, Contract Evaluator (Trainee)

Kent Jaf fe, HHS Christine Klimczak, ANL LAKE COUNTY Wally Weaver, Team Leader, FEhn Janet Quissell, FEMA Paul Fudacz, FEMA (Trainee)

Tom Carroll, Contract Evaluator Bob Utesch, Contract Evaluator (Trainee)

Bill Knoerzer, Contract Evaluator Ken O'Brien, DOE Bill Small, Contract Evaluator Roger Stokes, DOT

4. EVALUATION CRITERIA ,

i

The criteria used in this exercise evaluation process are i

established in the Federal Planning guide entitled "Criteria for l Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response  ;

Plans and Preparedness In Support of Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Revision 1. In addition, the FEMA Guidance Memorandum entitled "Modular Format For Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluation: dated June 1983 and those actions described in the -

participants plans and procedures were also used for exorcise evaluation.

1

5. EXERCISE OBJECTIVES Objectives for this exercise were selected from among the thirty-five (35) standard objectives listed in Tab HM" of the "Modular Format For Uniformity Evaluation", dated June 1983. The off-site

, 21 l i

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objectives selected for this exercise are listed in Attachment 1.

A.

SUMMARY

OF EXERCISE SCENARIO ,

Representative of the Perry Nuclear Power Planc, the State of Ohio, Ashtabula, Geauga, and Lake Counties and F:c.MA Region V met November 18, 1987 in the Ashtabula County Emergency Operations Center to determine exercise objectives and to discuss the scope of the exercise. Submission of the scenario to FEMA Region V was accomplished according to the guidelines outlined in Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) guidance. Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Company Incorporated reviewed the offsite portion of the exercise scenario for FEMA and found the scenario adequate to exercise the 1

objectives selected. A summary of the scenario is included as Attachment 2.

7. STATE AND LOCAL RESOURCES PLANNED TO BE USED IN THE EXERCISE During this exercise the State sf Ohio act;vated the State EOC in Worthington, Ohio and the JPIC at the LaN1and Community College, Kirtland, Ohio. The State of Ohio der.oyed (prepositioned) the mobile communication van and demanstrated various State communication resources. Three (3) field monitoring teams and one (1) milk sample collection team demonstrated their capabilities. FEMA Region V agreed chat the field monitoring teams could be prepositioned but the milk sample collection team was activated and deployed "real" timn. Representatives of the State and three participating Counties served as Liaison staff at the utility Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) .

Ashtabula, Geauga, and Lake Counties mobilized staf f to activate EOC facilities, communications and rumor control systems.

Emergency response personnel were also mobilized and deployed JPIC staff. The three (3) Counties also demonstrated facility

and personnel resources for reception / congregate care, emergency worker decontamination centers, as well as, conduct ambulance and hospital drills. Resources and personnel for school evacuations were also demonstrated. In addition, Lake County mobilized and deployed field monitoring teams and esthblished Transportation Staging Areas and Referral points. All three participating Counties deployed personnel and resources to demonstrate access control capability.

8. EX5'RCISE FINDINGS I., PAST EXERCISES 1

There was one (1) Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) identified for the State of Ohio during the evaluation of the l April 15, 1986 joint participation exercise for the Perry Nuclear Power Station. Corrective actions for this ARCA for the State of

, Ohio was demonstrated as a result of the May 4, 1988 exercise of 22 l

the Perry Nuclear Pcver Plant. There were no ARCAs identified for the three Counties during the April 15, 1986 joint exercise participation.

9. EXERCISE OR7ECTIVES STILL TO BE EFFECTIVELY ACHIEVED Objectives listed below still need to be der,onstrated to meet the TEMA six (6) year exercise cycle requirements. The list below is taken from the TEMA list of thirty five (35) objectives.

State of Ohio

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.

Note: Ohio needs to conduct an unannounced drill or exercise.

2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.

Note: Ohio needs to demonstrate their ability to maintain staffing on a continuous 24-hour basis by conducting an actual shift change. This is scheduled for the 1989 Davis Besse exercise.

11. Demonstrate ability te project dosage to the public via ingestion pathway exposure, based on field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures based on PAGS and other relevant factors.

Note: The state of Ohio has demonstrated a partial ingestion exposure pathway exercise. A full ingestion exposure pathway exercise is scheduled for the 1989 Davis Besse exercise.

12. Demonstrate ability to implement protective action for ingestion pathway hazards.

Note: The State of Ohio has demonstrated a partial ingestion exposure pathway exercise. A full ingestion exposure pathway exercise is scheduled for the 1989 Davis Besse exercise.

13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an instructional message within 15 minutes.

Note: Although this objective was met, it was determined, that personnel of the Governor's office need training in REP cxerciso procedures.

35. Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for a controlled recovery and reentry.

Note: Previous exercises have partially demonstrated recovery 23

I and reentry issues. A full demonstration is scheduled for the 1989 Davis Besse exercise.

Ashtabuls County

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities prouptly.

Note: Ashtabula County needs to conduct an unannounced drill or e:tercise.

2. Demonstrate ability to fully staf f facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.

Note: Ashtabula County needs to demonstrate their ability to maintain staffing on a continuous 24-hour basia by conducting an actual shift change.

t

35. Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for a controlled recovery and reentry.

Note: Previous exercises hava partially demonstrated recovery and reentry issues. A full demonstration needs to be conducted.

Geauca County

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.

Note: Geauga county needs to conduct an unannounced drill or exercise.

2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain i staffing around the clock.

Note: Geauga County needs to demonstrate their ability to mainthin staffing on a continuous 24-hour basis by conducting an actual shift change.

35. Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures for controlled recovery and reentry.

Note: Previous exercises have addressed recovery and reentry on a limited basis. A full demonstration still needs to be conducted.

Lake county

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate facilities promptly.

24

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i Note: Lake County needs to conduct an unannounced drill or exercise by November 28, 1990.

2. Demonstrate ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.

Note: Lake County needs to demonstrate their ability to maintain staffing on a continuous 24-hour basis by conducting an actual i shift change.

13. Demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message, within 15 minutes.

Note: Although this objective was met, the hardcopy of the EBS message which was datafaxed to various exercise location contained an incorrect description of the area affected by the protective action. The EBS message contained a correct description of the area affected by the protective action.

35. Demonstrate ability to determine and implement appropriate measures fo controlled recovery and re atry.

Note: Previous exercises have addressed recovery and reentry issues. A full demonstration still needs to be conducted.

10. PAST EXERCISE MEETINGS Although the Perry Nuclear Power Plant has an NRC license to i operate at 100% of power the State of Ohio has yet to request a Regional Director's Evaluation as outlined in 44CFR part 350. In compliance with 44CFR350 two post exercise meetings were conducted by FEMA Region V within forty eight (48) hours of the exercise.

The first meeting conducted May 6, 1988 provided briefing for the exercise participants to outline the preliminary findings of the exercise.

A second meeting (also conducted Friday, May 6, 1988) was held for the public/ media to present the preliminary findings.

Approximately thirty-five to forty people were in attendance with representatives from various local newspapers, State and local officials, Perry Nuclear Power Plant officials and the Public/ Sunflower Alliance members. The NRC and FEMA Exercise Director gave brief comments covering the preliminary exercise findings.

NARRATIVE 25

e

1. State of Ohio Activation and Staffina The communications link between the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, the Ohio Disaster Services Agency and the affected Counties of Ashtabula, Geauga and Lake, is a five-way dedicated telephone line. The emergency notification communications link is located in the communications center of the Ohio State Patrol and the communications center of the Ohio Disaster Services Agency. The Ohio State Patrol communications center is monitored 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day. The Ohio Disaster Services Agency has an answer service for emergency notification after working hours.

The call initiating partial activation of the State EOC was received at 1820 P.M. and advised of the Alert conditions at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. The call was received from the Utility via the five-way dedicated telephone system. The utility verified that ODSA, Ashtabula, Geauga, and Lake Counties received the call by conducting a "roll call". Staff mobilization procedures were initiated by personnel of the ODSA by use of an up-to-date call-up roster. According to State EOC exercise participants the use of a call-up roster is the system in place to receive calls directing emergency activation of the State EOC.

ODSA personnel irriving in the EOC in response to the Alert notification are responsible to contact key individuals of the EOC staff. The key individuals then become responsible to notify and/or mobilize staff of their respoctive organizations. The EOC was staffed in a timely manner and in accordance with the State plan.

Around the clock (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) staffing was demonstrated by double staffing some positions and the presentation of a roster of personnel for subsequent shifts. The EOC staff were aware of their respective responsibilities and knowledgeable of the State plan.

Emercency Operations Manacement Briefings were held to update the staff on the current situction.

However, it was difficult to determine the individual in charge of the EOC operations. Several different EOC staff members coordinated the periodic briefings, but the individual designated as the EOC coordinator neve.r particiented in the briefings. His visible role was restricted to keeping the status board current.

Briefings were scheduled hourly, but were in the form of announcement and part.icipate input by organizations, rather than cohesive reporting and updating.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEM'dNT: It is recommended that the individual designated in the Stato plan be identified during exercises and demonstrate ability to ef fectively take charge of 26 1

.s

the EOC operations.

Copics of the plan were available in the EOC for reference and tne staff had excerpts of the plan that pertained to their respective responsibilities. Message logs were kept and messages Nere reproduced and distributed, as necessary, by use of an effective message handling system.

Access to the EOC was controlled by use of personal identification, a sign-in log and badge system.

The State EOC staff were notified of the Alert status at the utility at 1820 P.M.; Site Area Emergency at 1938 P.M. and the General Emergency at 2121 P.M.

At 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> the Governor declared a State of Emergency and cctivated the Ohio National Guard. At 2010 hours0.0233 days <br />0.558 hours <br />0.00332 weeks <br />7.64805e-4 months <br /> EOC staff contacted Conrail and the Norfolk and Western Railway to restrict rail traffic in the EPZ. The FIA was also contacted to restrict air traffic within the EPZ. At 2020 hours0.0234 days <br />0.561 hours <br />0.00334 weeks <br />7.6861e-4 months <br /> the Directors of the Ohio Departments of Health and Agriculture recommended, as a precaution, that dairy animals within 2 miles of the utility site should be sheltered and fed stored feed and water. The sheltering and feeding of lactating livestock was later expanded out to a 10 mile radius of the utility site.

At 2123 hours the utility recommended the sheltering of individuals in all sectors 0-2 miles, and 2-5 miles in the downwind sectors F-G-H. However, when the recommendation was made to the State, the EOC staff revised the. recommendation and sought to implement an evacuation of sub areas 1, 2, and 3. ODSA staff conferred with the Governor's representative in the EOC regarding the recommendation and was informed that she would have to report the information to the Governor's Office. A neriod of approximately twenty-one minutes expired before the approval, allowing the ODSA to release the recommendation to the Counties, could be obtained from the Governor's Office. Meanwhile, Lake County officials telephoned the State EOC and reported that the County would implement their own protective actions if the State was indecisive or could not obtain the Governor's approval. The Governor's Office gave the approval for the release and the State informed the Counties at 2144.

AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: EOC Personnel of the Governor's staff needs training in REP exercise procedures, for a more oftective understanding of informat. ion and requests to be made to the Governor's Office, and to eliminato delays in reviewing the content of protective action recommendations.

(PTUREG 0654/ FEMA REP-1, REV.1, Critoria Item 0.1.b & 0.5)

RECOMMENDA TIONS : The Governor's representative (s) Participating in REP exercises should attend appropriate REP Training Programs 27

. l I

and drills to learn all aspects of REP for which the Governor is i responsible. As a minimum, the REP training should provide l instructions on protective action development and implementation, Public Alert and Notification, as well as provide an effective understanding of the types of information requests and decision-making responsibilities expected from the Governor's representative.

Facilities The State EOC is located in the basement level of the Ohio National Guard Armory, Worthington, Ohio and is not impacted by any nuclear power plant. The EOC facility has sufficient i furniture, space, lighting, telephones, backup electrical power and other amenities to support extended EOC operations. However, the noise level in the EOC was not controlled during the briefings. The noise level made it difficult for individuals interected in the briefings to hear.

AREA RECOMM6 OSD FOR IMPROVEMENT: The noise level in the EOC should be controlled during briefings. An announcement prior to the start of each briefing should be made to address the need to keep the noise level to a minimum.

Emergency classification levels and a status board were posted and were clearly visible to the EOC staff. The status board was kept up to date with significant ever.ts by the individual designated as the EOC Coordinator. The required maps were posted in the EOC.

Communications The EOC Staff demonstrated the ability to communicate with all appropriato locations, organizations, and field personnel by use of primary and backup means of communications. The primary and L backup systems demonstrated at various times at the exercise l include: the five-way dedicat'ed telephone, commercial telephone  ;

i two-way radio and datafax. Conferencing by telephone was r available in the EOC. The datafax machine provided the utility l

EOF, was hardcopy capability between the State EOC, Ashtabula,  ;

i Geauga and Lake Counties, and the JpIC. The datafax was reliable  !

j and reasonably fast.

State communication Van The Stato conmunications van was pre-positioned at the Ledgemont School. The van was equipped with a telephone, primary / backup radio and power generator. During this auercise the communications van tied into a 110 volt line located at the school. primary and backup radio checks were demonstrated to the

EOC, State Radiological field menitoring teams and the three i

28 I

county EOC's. The JPIC and EOF had prepositioned radio's on the same frequency.

Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation The EOC staff demonstrated ability to project dosage to the public, make protective action decisions and implement protective actions via the plume and ingestion exposure pathways. The projectives were based on plant data from the EOF and field data from the field monitoring teams. The State Protective action decisions were given to Ashtabula, Geauga, and Lake Counties over the 5-way dedicated telephone system. The protective action guidelines evacuation on Federal Prctective action guidelines, evacuation time estimates, plant conditions field data and other appropriate factors.

Field Team communications problems, discussed above, at times detracted from their suppi;4ng supportative actual field monitoring information. So, must decisions were based on the dose assessment computer programs using plant release information. Later, when field monitoring data were available, comparisons were made with the dose assessment computer program results to check its accuracy. As discussed above, there was a Governor's approval of the evacuation and shelter protective

~

action recommended by the Ohio Department of Health. The Ohio Department of Health authorized the use of thyroid blocking agent (KI) to emergency workers and those institutionalized persons unable to evacuate the affected area.

1 Emercency Onorations Facility (EOF)

During this exercise the State staff assigned to the EOF was activated when the "Site Area Emergency" was di4clared and they were operational within 45 minutes after activat!.on. Twenty four hour staffing capability was demonstrated by double staffing.

Two county represen.'atives were also present in the EOF.

The State liaisons perform emergency responss functions in the same area where the utility's on-site emergency staff is located.

This co-location was offective and enhanced the State Liaison performance because they were able to obtain current data simultaneously with the utility's EOF staff.

1' The EOF is an MRC approved facility with filtered air supply. It is designed .04 equipped for long term emergency operations.

Displays showing the current status were in full view easily read. The space to the state was limited. The coordination of staff activities between the State and the utility was effective.

Good coordination of information between the utility dose assessment group and the dose assessment group in the state EOC.

This information was given over an open "dedicated" phone. No 29

hard copy capability between the EOF and the State EOC existed.

AEEA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: It is recommended that hardcopy capability be installed to enhance the speed in notification and follow up to the counties. This would eliminate the need to read protective guidelines over the telephone.

KI was recommended for emergency workers in sub-area I. The Stato staff at the EOF was in sub-area I but did not take KI because they were in the EOF which is a protected facility.

State Liaison staff at the EOF, though, were supplied with a TLD and one self reading dosimeter, 0-500mR.

State Field Monitorina Teams Per FEMA, Region V agreement, the State Communications Van and the field monitoring teams were prepositioned for this exercise.

The State field monitoring teams were activated at 1906 when the staff at the State EOC called the Communications Van to activate the teams. The team equipment was prepacked for rapid deployment. The field teams were dispatched to the field at 2000 to begin their monitoring assignment. The teams were in their assigned areas by 2015 and the Communications Van Dispatcher requested the first sample at 2049.

The field teams are made up of members from ODSA and the OEPA.

Before deployment, the State Field team members were briefed on current plant conditions, current meteorological conditions, exposure control procedures, equipment check procedures and the division of responsibility among members. The ODSA members were called to the staging area approximately 45 minutes earlier than the OEPA members which delayed the field teatas reaching full strength for 45 minutes.

The ODSA equipment was adequate for rad measurements and air sample measurements. The air sampler calibration is performed >

with a filter paper and charcoal cartridge in the sampling head.

The Federal evaluator suggested this calibration, in the future, be performed with a zeolite cartridge instead since this is what will be needed for an actual emergency. The ODSA Team Leader indicated this would be considered. The ODSA accessory and protective equipment was packed in a deep wood case, necessitating the rcmoval of upper layers in order to find something at the bottom. It was suggested that a two (2) tiered box (removable tray) or a longer, shallower case would be more convenient. The OEPA equipment was adequate for environmental sampling and was conveniently packed. ,

The ODSA rad measurements team use of the PRS-1 with Geiger and SPA-3 probes were demonstrated adequately. All operating perimotors including high voltage (as listed on the probes) were 30 l

l i

properly adjusted when switching between probes. However, this is time consuming and a separate Geiger instrument would be a good addition to the equipment.

The ODSA air samplers require a portable generator for power.

Both the sampler and the generator were placed upon unprotected ground during sampling, thus there was a possibility of contamination. The ground placement of the sampler is too low to be representative of the breathing zone and the co-location of the generator with its exhaust about four (4) feet from the sampler heads and at the same level increases the likelihood of exhaust entrainment and thus, a non representative sample. A suggested method for air sampling would be to place the sampler (on a pad to avoid contamination) on the vehicle roof, while the generator remains on the vehicle rear gate. To achieve a 10 to 15 foot separation an extension cord could be used.

The ODSA team members would assist the OEPA merJoer by holding collection Dags, labeling, etc. On occasion, the OEPA team membe: placed bags and sampling equipment on unprotected ground when not in use, thereby possibly spreading contamination. Just prior to the end of the sample collection it was noticed that the samples were being taken in close proximity to a tree approximately 60 feet in height which shaded the sampled area.

Since it was dark no one noticed this. The team SOP should point out the need to survey a sample site adequately under night time conditions before taking samples.

The State field teams maintained direct radio contact with the ODSA communications van through out the exercise. Messages radioed to the van were not repeated to ensure accuracy. The teams were able to monitor and be monitored by the State EOC in Columbus, Ohio through out the exercise since a single radio frequency was used and the ODSA communications van acted as a repeater. This had the affect of keeping the teams informed. It also, at times, led to confusion as to who was in charge of assigning duties to the State field teams.

On one occasion the State EOC staff requested the teams be sent to three (3) sampling points. A moment later, the dispatcher at the ODSA communications van gave a sonewhat different assignment.

Subsequent attempts by the ODSA communications van Dispatcher and the State EOC staff to sort out the location of the of the field monitoring teams were monitored by the State field teams but the field team with the Federal evaluator did not initiate communications to quickly clarify this location. Perhaps it would improve communications with the field teams if the Stato communications van and the State EOC were on a separate frequency than that used by the field teams to communicate with the State communications van.

The Federal evaluator did not observe any communications to the 31

9 State communications van from the Lake County EOC concerning data collected by the Lake County field teams. The State may want to consider a method to integrate data from the Lake County field teams.

While gloves were used appropriately during air sampling and environmental sampling operations no booties or boots were worn.

The Federal evaluator was told the State Field Team Kits no longer contain booties. The kits do contain boots. While it is questionable whether booties, when used, might lessen contamination of the vehicle interior, the boots, gloves and possibly anti-C suits should be used in field operations to protect the wearer from external contamination and possibly internal exposure.

AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT:

(1) Air sampling procedures should be revised so that samplers are deployed on a clean pad atop the vehicle to obtain a sample more representative of the breathing zone and to ensure contamination is not spread.

(2) Air sampling power supply generators should be located well away from the sampler heads to avoid entrainment of exhaust.

(3) Sampling procedures should require teams to carefully survey the surrounding areas of a potential sampling site with

] flashlights during periods of darkness to avoid sampling too close to trees, etc.

(4) The field teams should repeat messages to verify accuracy.

(5) Maintain a separate radio frequency between the State communications van and the State TOC from that used between the State communications van and the State Field teams in order to avoid heavy traffic or enforce strict frequency discipline if a single frequency is used between the State EOC, The State communications van and the State field monitoring teams.

(6) The State of Ohio may want to review their procedures to ensure that ODSA and OEPA members of the State Field Monitoring Team arrive to the staging area at approximately the same time.

(7) The State Field Monitoring Teams may want to consider using for air sampler calibration a zeolite cartridge instead of a filter paper and charcoal cartridge in the sampling head.

(8) The State of Ohio may want to consider using an equipment case that has two (2) tiers (removable tray) or a longer, shallower case.

(9) The State Field Monitoring Teams may want to consider 32

separate Geiger instruments rather than continue the process using the PRS-1 with SPA-3 probes.

(10) State Field Monitoring Team members should be cautioned about placing collection bags and sampling instruments on unprotected ground.

(11) The State of Ohio may want to consider procedures to interface the Lake County Field Monitoring Team communications / data with the State Communications van.

(12) State Field Monitoring Team members may want to consider revising their procedures to require members to wear boots, gloves and possibly anti-C suits in field operations. During this exercise gloves were appropriately used but boots / booties were not worn by the State Field Monitoring Team members. i Milk Sanolina Team t The milk sampling team was comprised of Ohio Department Of Health (ODH) district office staff (Environmental Sanitarian and- Milk Inspector). An ODH Rad Health staff member met the team at a pre-arranged location and provided the Milk Sampling Team with dosimetry and details of where sample transfers would take place.

Team members, though, were not instructed on exposure control by the Rad Health staff member. The Milk Sample Team members explained to the Federal Evaluator that they were on a written call list and that they could be reached 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day for deployment. When deployed to the field, the Milk Sampling Team would use commercial telephone to communicate with their superiors.

The Milk Sampling Team equipment had been pre-packed for rapid deployment. It was neatly stowed and adequate for the purpose of collecting milk samples. The ODH Milk Sampling Team followed SOPS for sanitization of equipment and milk collection. The sampling ladle, though, was awkward to use in filling the sample container without spilling. Milk was spilled on the floor and on the exterior of the sample container. Perhaps a ladle with a pour spout should be substituted.

The Federal Evaluator observed the Milk Sampling Team putting a container, with spilled milk on the exterior, into a clean cooler with bare hands. The Milk Sampling Team were wearing gloves but took them off prior to putting the milk sample container into the cooler.

AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: Revise the current Milk Sampling Team SOP to inform the team when to wear gloves and bootics and when to take them off and that they should wash any spilled milk off the exterior of the milk sample container prior to pittting it into a clean cooler. (NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP-1, REV.

33

,t *.-

1, Criteria Item P.4)

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMEliT: ODH Milk Sampling Teams should be equipped with sampling dippers having pour spouts and with larger funnels to avoid spilling milk on the floor and/or on the outside of the container holding the milk sample.

Public Alertina and Instruction Activation of the siren system and EBS is a local responsibility in the State of Ohio. The State action under this objective is to support the Counties by confirming, through the SEOC, the emergency conditions necessitating sheltering in place and evacuation. Implementation of the protective action recommendations are addressed in the Ashtabula, Geauga and Lake Counties portion of this report.

Protect.ve Actim1_

Evacuation activities such as the activation and staffing of reception centers and congregate care facilities, the relocation of special needs individuals, and the establishment of traffic / access control points are the responsibility of local government.

Radiolocical Excesure Control State personnel of the field monitoring teams, emergency operations facility, and other sites near the Perry Nuclear Power Plant were issued low (0-20mr) and mid (0-20r) range self reading donimeters kits for emergency workers also include KI and written procedures for the use of KI (when it should be taken and who directs the taking of KI). Shortly after the "General Emergency" (Approximately 2156) was declared, the ODH staff in the State EOC instructed emergency workers to take KI. This decision was based on data provided from the utility.

The team members know how often to read, record their dosimeter readings and they periodically reported their dosimeter readings to the staff at the State communications van and the ODH staff in the State EOC. The team members know what to do if they receive an excess dose and they are aware of procedures for decontamination. Ohio emergency workers, other than State field team monitors, are not allowed to exceed a whole body dose of 5 rem without euthorization. State field team monitors are allowed to receive a whole body dose of 25 rem. The Federal evaluator determined that the State field team members were unclear on whether a specific dose limit less than 5 rem exits for seeking further authorization. The State of Ohio may want to review their plans and procedures on dose limits for State field team 34

J.

• members to determine if it is consistent with that of oteer State emergency workers. The State field team members would routinely l proceed to an emergency worker decontamination center before '

leaving their shift.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: The State may want to review their plans and procedures on dose limits for State Field Monitoring team member to determine if it is consistent with that of other State emergency worker.

Media Relations The State EOC media briefing area was not activated during the exercise. All media briefing were conducted at the JPIC.

Recoverv and Reentry The recovery and reentry objective for this exercise was limited to just a few minutes table top discussion to bring the exercise to a logical conclunion. A complete demonstrated in a future exercise. During this exercise the EOC staff were briefed by the ODSA Chief of State and the ODH representative. The briefing centered on procedures and the need to implement recovery and reentry.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: EOC participants should participate in the EOC demonstration and fully understand the requirements of recovery and reentry, as it pertains to their respective organizations.

2. Joint Public Information Center Activation and Staffina The Joint Public Information Center for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant is located at the Lakeland Comm'anity College theater building. Mobilization procedures for the Public information Officer for the State of Ohio and the Counties of Ashtabula, Geauga, and Lake were observed. There is a regular system in place to roccive a call directing activation and to call up staff at any hour of any day. This system consist of commercial telephone, car phone (state), pagers, and/or radio (Geauga County).

The Public Information Officer (PIO) of the State of Ohio and the Counties of Ashtabula, Geauga, and Lake arrived at 1953, 2012, 2020, and 1955 respectively. These Pios along with the PIO for the Perry Nuclear Power plant displayed adequate skill and knowledge of their functions and responsibilities. The capability to staff the JPIC on a 24-hour basis was demonstrated through a combination of double staffing of positions (State of Ohio and Ashtabula County) or a roster of replacement staff 35

l, *

(Geauga and Lake Counties). The replacement PIOS for the State of Ohio demonstrated adequate skill and knowledge of their responsibilities. The second shift PIO for Ashtabula County was a trainee. There was adequate clerical help available for message handling, duplicating and other support activities.

Facilities The Joint Public Information Center at the Lakeland Community College is located outside the 10 mile EPZ of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. It has sufficient space, furniture, lighting, typewriter, copier, and other equipment to support the staff.

The JPIC has sufficient space, furniture, lighting, etc. are also adoquate to support between 100-200 media representatives.

Separate private areas are available for the Pios to confer and coordinate their information prior to briefing the media.

Conversely, the media representatives have access to a private place to conduct interviews, make tapes, film, etc. Backup power is available but was not demonstrated during this exercise. Maps and displays were available to facilitate the dissemination of information to the media.

Communication The primary communication system between the State PIO and the Joint Public Information Center and the utility's EOF was a dedicated phone. Backup communication systems were commercial phone, radio, and facsimile machine.

The primary communication system for the Ashtabula, Geauga, and the Counties PIO at the Joint Public Information Conter and their county Emergtncy Operation Centers was also dedicated phone.

Backup communication system include commercial phone and facsimile machine. Hardcopy capability for both the State and Counties were the facsimile machines. Five way conferencing on the 5-way dedicated phone system was dedicated between the utility, the Stato and the three counties.

Twenty seven telephones were available for use by media representatives at the Joint Public Information Contor.

Informational Function Media kits containing information on the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, nuclear power and radiation and the local area and were availa).le for media representatives at the JPIC. Four media briefings were conducted. Technical jargon was avoided during those briefings. Maps and displays were offectively used during these briefings. Hard copy news releases woro also availablo shortly after each briefing was completed.

36

The utility, State, and County PIOS exchanged information, keeping each other up to date. They also coordinated media releases. Local radio and television broadcasts were monitored to keep track of what the public was actively receiving.

Rumor Control Media briefings and written news releases were used by The State and County PIOS to rectify errors (rumor control) in information received by the public. Rumor control telephone numbers were activated at the JPIC. These rumor control telephone numbers were included in media briefings , news releases, EBS announcements, and are printed in the emergency public information pamphlet. Four Cleveland Electric Illuminating '

Company personnel trained in rumor control staff the rumor control telephones. The rumor control staff keep up to date on current events and they were generally well prepared to answer questions. A total of eight (8) (four rumor and four media) telephone calls could be handled simultaneously.

3. Ashtabula Coun'.v j Activation and Staff (ng Activation and sta!.fing of the Ashtabula County EOC commenced when the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> duty Sheriff's dispatcher received the verified "Alert" notification at 1820 from the utility over a dedicated

telephone. Staff mobilization procedures were immediately ,

initiated, using current written call lists. The mobilization '

j system provides for the Sheriff's dispatcher to receive and relay calls at any hour from and to the utility. Electronic pagers provides a means of call advisories during off hours if telephone cTnnot be used.

The EOC was fully staffed at 1930. In accordance with the plan, representatives of the following were present in the EOC: County Commission; Emergency Management Agency; Sheriff's office; Fire / EMS; Schools service; Radiological office; Health department; Cooperative Extension Agent; Human Services; Transportation (public works); Red Cross; Communications '

including amateur ridio; and EOF liaison, j l Round-the-clock staffing was demonstrated by submission of I i roster. Evaluation of the EOC first shift indicated a high

level of knowledge in the various staff functions. Two staff members were sent to other activities

one to the JPIC as county representative, the other to the EOF for liaison and verification '

functicns.

l i

37

I Enercency Manacement Emergency operations management in the Ashtabula County EOC was of fectively carried out by the Executive Group under the plan-designated President of the County Board. As the exercise situation expanded, periodic briefings were held to update the EOC staff on the situation; as appropriate the staff was involved in decision making.

Copies of the plan were available for references, as well as written procedures and checklists which were used for reference.

Accordingly, the work of the EOC staff sections was extremely well-organized. Message logs were kept, messages reproduced and distributed through an efficient message handling system.

The EOC was notified of: Alert at 1820; Site Area Emergency at 1938; and General Emergency at 2121. Protective action orders to take shelter were received at 2144. This applied to the limited eastern portion of the EPZ in Ashtabula County. An evacuation order, affecting Lake County only, was received at the same time.

Subsequently, calls were made to activate the reception center at 2108; calls activating the congregato care center were made at 2207.

Facilities The EOC space was adequate and sufficient equipment was in place.

The walls of the EOC are carpeted so the noise level was controlled. A gas powered emergency generator for the lights and equipment in the EOC was in place and is tested weekly. Since this facility is adjacent to the county Sheriff offices, space for dining and bathing is available. (The kitchen that prepares jail inmates food is adjacent to the EOC and is well stocked for emergencies.) Personnel are assigned to work in shifts so provisions are not made for sleeping at the facility.

The visual displays were well maintained and information was posted as it became available. One display was a schematic of the PNPP showing all components. Developing problems at the plant could be pinpointed on this display.

.C.gmnunication Communication systems available to the Ashtabula County EOC more than capably demonstrated an ability to communicate with appropriate individuals, organizat!.ons, and other locations.

Carrying the heavy communications workload was the State / County Emergency Response Network, a five-way dedicated telephone line linking Ashtabula, Geauga and Lake Counties, the State, and the utility. A separate three-way dedicated line, connecting the three counties, also received extensive use. Both systems have radio and commercial telephone back-up, and conferencing was 38

=

possible on either system.

Commercial telephone, radio,- and pagers provide means for contracting schools. hospitals, and ambulances. Communications to the JPIC were over dedicated line backed by commercial telephones. Also, a reliable and reasonably fast facsimile machine linked the EOC to the JPIC.

Dose Assessment and Protective Action 4

Through dose assessment and protective action recommendations are  !

not within the scope of Ashtabula County's EOC responsibilities, .

the staff was thoroughly cognizant of the possible hazard should '

a plume have affected its position of the EPZ. The EOC correctly determined protective action through analysis of all appropriate factors, considering local constraints.

Public Alertina and Instruction The public alerting system is generally activated by Lake County.

When Lake County is unable to activate the system Geauga County 1

and Ashtabula County, in that order will activate the system.

During this exercise Lake County activated the system. The  ;

activation was coordinated with and agreed to by the Ashtabula County Executive Group. Sirens and alert monitors were activated at 2152. Sirens in Ashtabula County did not activate and route alerting was initiated by Lake County at 2213.

a The formulation of EBS messages is a joint effort of the -

executive groups of Ashtabula Geauga and Lake Counties. The EBS system wa . activated by Lake County at 2155. The message was to be repeated every 15 minutes for an hour. This instruction to the radio station was later extended to cover an additional hour.

] Protective Action Ashtabula County has only a small eastern portion of the 10-mile L j EPZ. During the exercise, only shelter was prescribed as a i protective action. However, the County EOC was fully prepared to handle any aspect of evacuation.

The county demonstrated the ability and resources to control  !

access to a specific geographical area through establishment of access control point A62 at the intersection of I-90 and State Route 45, using two officers who were knowledgeable of their ACP duties, dosimetry, KI, and communications. i The officers were familiar with evacuation routes, locations of reception / care centers, and the general requirements of access control. The car radio provided a means of relay contact with

f 39 l i

)

the EOC, and through sheriff's dispatch or other radio net to other points. Periodic radio reports were made. The officerc were knowledgeable of procedures for obtaining tow vehicles or similar equipment to clear obstructions, where such equipment was located and how to obtain it. The Ashtabula County EOC did an overall excellent job of access control, from activation of ACPs through total matening at 2227.

Other traffic and ACPs were promptly ordered in consideration of traffic volume and areas with either shelter or evacuation protective actions in effect.

All roads according to plan were controlled. At State request, rail and air traffic were rerouted. The Coast Guard was notified for water patrols. Though not activated for the exercise, the resources lists for keeping evacuation routes clear in bad

, weather or for other reasons, were reviewed as a precautionary 1 measure.

i Reception centers were activated in a timely fashion for evacueos from Lake County. The EOC staff was aware of the location of mobility-impaired individuals, using computer-generated printouts to indicate persons with special necds.

Arrangement for transportation of these individuals are made with l local community fire departments who have or can obtain appropriate vehicles Schools l The school superintendent receives notification of emergency ,

actions from the county school official in the County EOC. He is notified of each emergency classification level and takes the appropriate action as defined in his SOP for that emergency classification level. The superintendent administration

> assistant and his secretary are both aware of the procedures and may act in the absence of the superintendent. ,

Contacts are made with the transportation supervisor and the schools at each emergency classification level to include private r schools. '

! Telephone is the principal communication track with the EOC with radio as back-up. Radio is used to the transportation supervisor

and the schools with telephone as the backup.

When the transportation supervisor received notico of the alert i classification he calls the schools involved for a consus report to determine the number of buses required at each location. He then alerted the necessary driver. Following thia he reported his activities to the superintendent. Telephone and radio were i used for these activities.

40

At the "Site Area" energency classification the drivers are directed to report to the garage by the transportation supervisor. The superintendent calls the receiving . school (s) with the number of students being evacuated and the number of buses being used.

When the drivers report to the garage they were briefed on the situation, assigned schools and provided with a dosimetry kit.

This kit contains direct reading dosimeters, a TLD, and a supply of KI with instructions for its use. The kit also contained forms for recording their readings. The drivers are also briefed on when to read and report their dosimetry readings. At this time the drivers are given the name of the receiving school and a map designating the roads to be used during the evacuation. The drivers were then dispatched to the Cork Elementary School. The EOC was notified that the buses had been dispatched.

The Cork Elementary School Principal receives his notification of emergency classification level from the superintendent and takes the actions specified in his SOP. When he received the Alert classification he notified all staff and requested a revised attendance which he reported to the superintendent. When the Site Area" was received he notified all staff, suspended outside activities and posted signs designating parking areas for buses an for the cars of parents who might come for their children. Instructions directing parents to the cafeteria to pick up their children were also posted.

At the time the buses arrived at the school the Principal notified the Superintendent. The first protective action received was for sheltering. The children and staff were assembled in the all purpose room, doors and windows were closed and ventilation systems were shut down.

When the second protective action, evacuation, was received the drivers went to their buses and the students filed out of the school and boarded the buses for evacuation to the receiving schools. Noticos were posted on thn doors of the school notifying parents where the children had been taken. This information is also published in the public information brochure and provided to the parents, in written form, at the beginning of each school year.

The school district has a total of 34 buses, 28 of which are in regular service. All these buses havs two way radio. Backup buses are to come from the Jefferson schools (24) and the Grand Valley School (20).

Concronato Care Center The activation and staffing of the Ashtabula County congregate care facility at the Pymatuning Middle School was tiwly with 41 f

excellent participation (35 players). Fire departmont ... Jere '

mobilized (22 persons) within 15 minutes of initial notifico. ion (1948). Upon arrival at Tne fire house they checked their equipment, responsibilities were assigned and they were placed in a ready standby state condition. Other agency personnel were  ;

also notified and on standby. Complete staffing was accomplished by a]1 agencies at 2130. Double staffing was also demonstrated for twenty four hour operation. Five agencies had the following assigned areas of responsibilities.

t

-Red Cross- Registratio" of clean evacuees, billeting, i clothing, foca distribution and evacuee control t and instruction

-Fire Department- Radiological monitoring, decontamination '

(vehicular and personnel), worker exposure-control and security support  ;

I -Police- Security l

-Amateur Radio- Radio communications and messnge handling '

-School Personnel-Custodial, building operation and maintenance all areas were very ably demonstrated and all objectives met with no prior deficiencies or areas or weakness to be corrected.

Evacuee registration, billeting, issuance of personal essentials and food distribution procedures were wel) controlled and documented. An evacuee always would have two forms in hand and a stamp on the back of the hand after determination that they were not contaminated. Special commendation should be given of the entire fire departments training and performance in demonstrating radiological monitoring and decontamination proceduren. They AH (22 persons) have received prior training G5 houre) in radiological monitoring and wor).or exposure .: mtrol . They i employed floor covering in critical areas, used pretactive clothing and probe covering and correct measurement wiaues.  ;

They displayed very good knowledge and attentivenese 1,o m < 'tarly

&- tien of and the containment of contamination. -

were un monitoring teams (by gender) in each snu-: area

m- trating proper monitoring, decon and wacto disposal d

' iques, j

congregate care capability was very ably demonstrated. The I facility is a spacious middle school with a very good floor '

pattern for evacuee movement, control, decontamination and sheltering. The adjacent high school is a back-up facility with a primar/ school (1/2 mile away) also available. The prinary ,

mass care center could support 1064 persons with the others have '

capacition of 1391 and 924 r3spectively. Food available at the  !

42 l

[

r

,. s ,.

center is estimated as ample to feed the rated capacity of the primary center for 5 days. The school is the central distribution point for the entire valley school district. The facility is very modern and clean with all necessary space and equipment to sustain extended emerger.c f operations. The large emergency Red Cross staff has been trained in emergency procedures and many have past experience in actual recent disaster situations.

Three trained nurses were on hand at 7e hours and 5 amateur radio operators were availabic to ope a the radios. Police were also available for securitv.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR II:PROVF. MENT: Employ additional visual aids for evacuee information and control; le., floor arrows, posts 1 with plastic chains and more and larger signs for r*ot or. i identification location etc.

Emercepcv Worker Decontanination Center The Ashtabula County Decontamination was established A' the Grand River Academy. Communications between the decontamir.;ti '.n center and the Asntabula EOC was by commercial telephone anci. W dio. No problems woro experienced with either system da rng this demonstration.

The Perry Nuclear Power Plant declared a "Site Area" emergency at 1932. Ashtabula county received this information at 1938 and disseminated this information to EOC and field staf f. Emergency call out numbers were not used at this time since this was an exercise. According to Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS) responding fire departments do not have a set time in which to respond to a fire station. Their only requirement is to be ready to move to the decontamination center at *he General Emergency which was declared at 2121.

Ashtabula County, at 2019, decided that the emegency worker monitoring / decontamination center would be established at the Grand River Academy. The Chief, Austinburg Fire Department, at 2020, was "tone out" at 2023 and at 2054 the Austinburg Fire Department notified the EOC FIRE / EMS Coordinator that they were moving to the Grand River Academy. The "General Emergency" was declared at 2121.

The Austinburg Fire Department personnel arrived promptly, were brieted and distributed dosimetry kits and KI. A roster of 25 people was given to the Federal evaluator to verify around the clock staffing capability at the decontamination center. Both personnel and vehicle monitoring was demes trated. However, one CDV 700 radiation monitoring instrument (S/N 198::2) was not  ;

working properly nor were the n-rmal set up procedures for the instrument followed. Thy cadiation level in which l 43

( -

\ l .

l decontamination was needed was stated to be anythLng above background which is not in accordance with the Ashtabula County plan. One CDV 700 instrument did not have a proper calibration sticker stating when tne instrument was last calibrated, by whom, and the date calibration was due to be performed.

AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: The nonitoring demonstration by the Austinburg Fire Department staff indicated refresher training is needed on the proper use of the CDV 700 radiation monitoring instrument in monitoring personnel and vehicles.

(NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP-1, REV.1, Criteria Item H.10)

RECOMMENDATION: The Radiological Moni.toring Team SOPS be revised to require each shift, once activated, to review their procedures and the proper use of radiation monitoring equ'pment.

AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: One CDV 700 radiation monitoring instrument (S/N 78212) did not have a proper ca?,1bration sticker stating when the instrument was last calibrated, by whom, and the next date calibration was due to be performed. (NUREG 0654/ FEMA, REP-1.REV.1, Criteria Item H.10)

RECOMMENDATION: Steps should be taken to ensure all radiological monitoring instruments receive periodic calibration as required in NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP-1, REVISION 1. Further, stickers be placed on the instrut.ent indicating the date the instrument was calibrated, who calibrated the instrument and the next date the instrument is to be calibrated.

The decontamination center had brown paper on the floor to indicate the path that radiologically contaminated persons should follow to get the decontamination shower. The shower area also had brown paper on the floor to prevent the spread of radiological contamination. The shower had one entrance. Brown paper was again used tu indicate the path to the shower and te distinguish the clean area from the dirty area.

AmbulancL Drill The staff at the Grand River Academy Decontamination center contacted the Saybrook dispatcher at 2224 requesting the EOC FIRE / EMS Coordinator to dispatch an ambulance for a simulated, contaminated, injured patient. The lead controllet in the EOC informed the FIRE / EMS Coordinator, who is responsible for obtaining ambulance resources and dispatching per field request, that this would be simulated for the drill. The lead controller, i: cording to Ashtabula County, failed to tell the FIRE / EMS

.Jordinator that Northwest Ambulance was actually expected to respond to a call concerning a simulated, contaminated, injured patient. The EOC FIRE / EMS Coordinator, according to Ashtabula County, followed his SOP and generated all appropriate messages in a timely fashion as the log below reflects:

44 m

,7 '.'

w i

TIME OF EVENT First Request 2224 <

FIRE / EMS Dispatch 2228  ;

Second call at 1238  !

Call from Field 2258 Dispatch 2300 Arrived 2307 The drill imposed error was not discovered until a call was generated from the field. The times above, though, bear out that l when the real need for response by the ambulance was identified the response was timely. ,

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: Exercise controllers need to be cautioned that in future exercises they insure that their instructions to exercise participants are understood so that the exercise participants implement the scenario as written.  !

. Orte the ambulance arrived proper procedures for the handling of  !

the simulated, contaminated, injured patient were efficiently and ,

effectively demonstrated. The insides of the ambulance was covered with brown paper to prevent the spread of radiological contat.ination into the ambulance. However, one ambulance crew

member was not familiar with the proper procedures and use of the CDV 700 radiation monitoring instrument.

ARZA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: One Northwest Ambulance crew member was not familiar with the proper procedures and use of the CDV 700 radiation monitoring instrument in monitoring the simulated, contaminated, injured emergency worker at the Grand River Academy decontamination center. (NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP-1, REV.1, Criteria Item 0.lb) l RECOMMENDATION: The ambulance crew SOPS be revised to require each crew, once activated, to review their procedures and the proper use of radiation monitoring equipment.

Medical Drill The Brown Memorial Hospital has direct communication capabilities with surrounding ambulance services and asociated radiological consultants.

The hocpital physical facility was well organized and tbo 45

- . - - , _ ~ - . _ ~ . , . - . . .,

e emergency medical staff including health physics support were capable and efficient. All necessary equipment including radiation monitors were on hand and properly calibrated. proper procedures were utilized in patient monitoring and decontamination. The emergency staff had direct and immediate access to radiological consultants.

The hospital medical drill demonstration was held out-of-sequence. The patient arrival at the hospital emergency room for treatment was simulated. The ambulance and crew did not actually drive the patient to the hospital. A simulated contaminated, injured emergency worker was prepositioned at the hospital. The i hospital staff received and treated the victim who was a male with suspected fracture of the left leg. The victim was working i in a known radioactive contaminated area and who was believed to l be contaminated. The medical drill began at the entrance to the emergency room.

The adequacy of hospital facilities and procedures for handling injured and contaminated individuals was demonstrated. Brown Memorial Hospital and its emergency medical staff performed very well in handling and trea.ing a simulated, injured and contaminated individual. The hospital was well prepared with attending medical staff, health physics support, and appropriate medical and radiological equipment. All vital signs of the patient and radiation readings were recorded promptly and medical treatment was given priority. Proper procedures were utilized to prevent the spread of contamination including proper disposal of radioactive waste. All monitoring equipment including personal dosimetries had been recently calibrated. The medical staff and the support services carried out their duties in a most professional manner.

Radioactive waste was stored in plastic containers for disposal by a radiological consultant group attached to the Radiology Department. The equipment for handling and decontaminating the patient was quite ideal and the staff, just rec 6ntly trained, performed their functions efficiently and effectively.

Appropriate aquipment for radiation monitoring and handling waste materials were on hand.

Innlementation of Incestion Pathwav Protective Actions Through implementation of ingestion pathway protective actions did not take place in this exercise, the EOC staff agriculture representatives were cognizant of the potential threat. Using reference information on dairy farms and the one processor plans were being made to provide appropriate guidance if necessary.

The EOC was aware of the need to shelter lactating animals in the 10-m'le EPZ, and to put them on stored feed and covered water.

Ey 2154, calls had been made to the five major dairy farms to advise of the foregoing and discuss future actions. The 46

Extension Agent would call on the other Federal-State-County

]

agricultural staffs for assistance.

Radioloaical Exoosure control The ability to continuously monitor and control emerging worker exposure was fully demonstrated at the Ashtabula County Eoc and at the Sta. Highway Patrol access control point in Austinburg.

i Personnel d spatched from the EOC to the JPIC and EOF were briefed on losimetry, exposure hazards, exposure limits and record keer 7 when issued dosimetry kits and KI.

At the EOC adequate supplies of dosimeters were demonstrated, along with . elated dosimetry items. These included: mid-range

, (0-20R) and high-range (0-200R) dosimeters, chargers, record j keeping cards, TLDs, KI, and personal briefing sheets. A trained

radiological officer issued instructions with dosimetry kits; he was knowledgeable of KI, it use, the maximum radiation dose without authorization, and decontamination procedures.

Emergency worker exposure control was demonstrated at the ACP by the two Highway Patrol officet's whose thorough knowledge of

protection techniques was evident. Each had a plastic bag

dosimetry packet containing mid-range and high-range dosimeters, f

a TLD, a bottle of KI tablets whose date was current, a dosimetry l report form, and a personnel briefing sheet. The officers knew j proper procedures for reading and recording desage, the maximum l dose allowed without authorization, procedures when to take KI, and decontamination check procedures in event of possible j radiation hazard to purson or vehicle.

l Media Relations I

i No media briefings were conducted at ti.m County EOC. Releases i from the JPIC were coordinated with the EOC staff prior to

release. Hard copy of all county and utility releases were transmitted to the EOC.

The 1-800 rumor control member can be answered at three locations in the EOC. One position in continuously manned on a day-to-day

basis in the dispatch center. The other two locations are in the 1 operations room and are manned only during an exercise or i emergenc.y. This number and other emergency information is I

~

distributed within the EPZ as part of the annual Emergency Information Brochure mailing.

i i Recovery and Reentry Ashtabula County executives and staff in the EOC were cognizant

of the limited recovery and reentry activities required in this i scenario. The executive group discussed the activities that

{ would continue while county EPZ residents remained in shelter, i

j 47 a

5 i

and Lake County evacuees were housed in congregate care centers.

Among considerations woro: actions required when evacuees departed; modification or te rmination of traffic and access control points; notification of major forms; advisories en health matters if required; and coordination with other counties. All of the foregoing were discussed by operations room staff sections, who were prepared to implement them as the exercise terminated. A more complete recovery and reentry demonstration will be conducted in a future exercise that emphasizes ingestion pathway protective actions and recovery and reentry actions.

4. Geauca County Activation and Staffino The Emergency operations Center has a direct communication link to the utility. The system is a dedicated "5 way telephone".

The drops to the system are Ashtabula, Geauga, and Lake Counties, the State of Ohio, and the Perry Nuclear Power Plant. In Geauga County the system is monitored by the cheriffs dispatch 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day.

The initial call initiating activation of the EOC was received at 1820. It was received by the sheriff dispatch from the utility's control room. The call was verified and procedures for mobilization of EOC staff began. Written call lists were used.

The lists were accurate and up to date. Staffing was completed at approximately 2000.

Those organizations represented in the EOC were: the County Communications Officer and 8 staff members, County Board of Commissioners (3), County sheriff, County Superintendent of Schools, County Rumor Control, County Engineer (transportation),

County Public Information Officers (2), County Extension Service, County Radiological Officer, County Human Services, American Red Cross, County Health Department, fire /emorgency medical services, State Highway Patrol and the Army National Guard.

An actual shift change was not demonstrated. However, a roster of staff was presented showing considerable replacement personnel and 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> staffing capability. Also, the exercise was : sed for training and familiarization of emergency response procedures.  !

Energency operations Managenent Responsibility for the emergency response is in the hands of the ,

three County Commissioners. They, as a body of three, make the i decisions and create the actions for the County Emerger  ;

Management Coordinator (CEMC) to implement. The CEMC he periodic briefings to keep the EOC staff informed or- th; emergency response activities. The decision making process was 48

' i

~ e- ,

l .'

e  !

mainly conducted by the executive group which included the three  !

County commissioners, the sheriff and the CEMC.

i l Copies of the emergency response plans for the three counties and  !

the state are shelved in a convenient location in the emergency i operations room and an additional set is in the executiva group  ;

room in the EOC. '

)

j The EOC staff had written procedures and checklists to assist  !

them in conducting their emergency response activities. Messages j were received, reproduced and distributed. Message logs were  !

maintained and all functions related to the message flow was  !

efficient. Control to the EOC was by sign in and badging. The l process was appropriate. j k

The County EOC was notified of the following events at the cimes  !

stated: Alert 1820, Site hea Emergency 1938, and General  !

Emergency 2121. The County declared a "State of Emergency" at  !

1945 and the Governor declared a "State of Emergency" at 2000.

The Red Crost, and the County schools Superintendent coordinated  !

the activatina of the reception and congregate care centers.  !

1 1_cilities i I I The EOC is a new facility. This was the first time an exercise }

j was conducted from the facility. The buildir.g is located four ;

i miles south of the village of Chardon on State Route 44. i j Furniture, space, lighting and telephone are sufficient for [

! emergency operations under the present staf fing pattern. Noise 3 l could be kept to a lower level if consideration was . given to  !

relocating the message handling and reproduction process.

i ,

) AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: Consideration should be given to relocating the message handling group and the reproduction i process, one possibility is to relocate the function to the  !

administrativa office of the operations room. This would isolate  !

l noise. Messages could be passed out the window to a "runner" for

, distribution.

i

! Limited space is available to support long term emergency

! operations. However, the EOC is located well outside the ten

! mile EPZ and living accommodations could be arranged in nearby i

County facilities. Back up power is available with sufficient l reserve to power the facility. The power generation system was

, not demonstrated. A well equipped kitchen is within the facility

and could be utilized to prepare food for emergency workers.

l Emergency classification levels were posted on a timely basis

except for the "General Emergency" accident classification. The l posting of the "General Emergency" lagged somewhat. This did not j detract from the emergency response.

49 i

i f

j '.'

. =

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: The posting of all emergency classification could be posted in a more timely basis.

Status boards were well placed and visible to all staff members.

Good use was made of the boards to post specific information vital to the emergency response. Other visuals posted in the Eoc on the walls were maps showing the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) with labeled sectors, evacuation routes, relocations centers, access control points radiological monitoring points and

, population by evacuation area.

communications

- one system is a "5 way" telephone and a second system is a "3

, way" telephone. The "5 way" telephone was described previously.

The "3 way" telephone is a dedicated telephone connecting the 4 three Counties in the EPZ. These two systems were utilized fully

! during the exorcise. Back up communications VLth Ashtabula and

] Lake counties and the State was radio. Back up communications with the Perr*j Nuclear Power Plant was commercial telephone.

Comnunications with the Emergency Broadcast Stations (EBS) is

handled by Lako County. Communication lead County. Communication with the Joint Public Information Center is commercial telephone and datafax, communication with local schools is conanercial te.'.ephone and FM radio as backup. Support hospitals can be contacted by radio or commercial telephone. Ambulances have

radio contact with the hospitals.

Conferencing was available, especially on the "5 way" and "3 way" 4 telephones.

1 i Hard copy equipment was available and utilized throughout the 1 exercise, especially from the Joint Public Information Center 1

(JPIC) . It was fast and reliable.

Dose Assessment and Protective Action Recommendation i

i The radiological officer in the County EOC received information

from the utility and posted the information in the E00 on a board at the f*ont of the operations room. His func11on was to coordinate significant events and information to the executive

group and staff in the County EOC. He made no calculations or projections.

Information on the release of radiation (below the threshold of being a health hazard) was transmitted from the State one hour

and fifteen minutes after the event had taken place at the l utility. Even though there was no affect offsite this concerned j the officials of the executive group in the County EOC. The 3

notification of the "General Emergency" was received from the 50 i

l

j .,.

O utility at 2121, following the notification at the JPIC (2116).

The notification from the State was in a message which advised of protective actions (2145). The County officials were concerned that they had received no response to inquiries made to the State in the time from 2121 to 2145. This is discussed in further detail in the State portion of this exercise.

Public Alertina and_ Instruction The County EOC did play a part in the coordination of the public notification system. Activation of the system is accomplirhed by Lake County. Geauga County does have the capability and equipment to notify the public in the ten mile EPZ. Their preference is to coordinate the notification process with both Lake and Ashtabula Counties.

Information received at Geauga County indicated the sirens were activated by Lake County at 2152; along with tone alert radios and the EBS stations. Once the initial EBS message was implemented they were repeated every fifteen minutes for one hour.

Public instructions, were discussed in Geauga County but not physically developed. Public instructions were broadcast by Lake County. It should be noted that the ten mile EPZ affects only the northeastern portion of the County.

Protective Action Traffic control points were coordinated through the County sheriff and the State highway patrol procedurally in the EOC.

The County engineer reviewed estimates of traffic volume over the roadways and found no problem based on the area being evacuated and the number of vehicles anticipated. Also, discussed by the County engineer was the asailability of County trucks to keep roadways c. lear of obstructions. There are sufficient personnel and vehicles to cover the traffic flow in and out of the County.

Mobility impaired were taken into consideration. A current list of those individuals indicating their requirements was reviewed and the necessary actions could have been implemented on a moments notico.

The County Superintendent of Schools coordinated the schools requirements and the buses and drivers for the buses. A separate evaluation of the County schools was conducted by the Federal evaluators and is a part of this evaluation document.

In that the ingestion pathway was not a part of the exercise, the County Extension coordinated table top activities. They either have the necessary resnurces within their office locally or they know how and where to get them. Much of this kind of information 51

s,.

1 is on file at the State Department of Agriculture.

Access Control A Ohio State Patrol (OHSP) trooper manned the traffic and e.:coss contro'. point located at State RouteP 166 and S6. He was already on location when the FEMA evaluatior, team arrived at 2126.

The trooper did not have detailed knowledge of evacuation routes, but knew his assigned responsibilities and that he would receive additional instructions depending on actual traffic and/or weather conditions at the time. He knew the location of the nearest reception / care center.

The state trooper communicates mainly through his District Command Post, however he had the capability to communicate directly with the Geauga County Emergency Operating Center (EOC) and other control points. Standard operating procedures (SOP) dictate that he communicate with his command post at least once per hour, or more frequently, depending on actual conditions.

Procedures for clearing obstructions were not demonstrated.

However, the trooper stated, if possible, obstructions could be cleared on the spot without towing equipment. Otherwise, necessary equipment would be requested through normal procedures and coordinated with the Geauga County Sheriff's Department and OSHP representative at the county EOC. A current list of towing equipment operators with thef.r locations 3s maintained at the EOC. Normal procedures include keeping a lane or shoulder open for access by emergency vehicles.

Scheci Evacuati.pn Denonstration Interviews at the Ledgement School district office were conducted with the school Superintendent, the Transportation Supervisor and, the bus driver.

Ledgemont Elementary School demonstration prior to the scheduled conducted their exercise. The Ledgemont School District conducted a walk through demons

• ration of capability to implement protective actions ror school children in the Ledgemont School District.

The School District consists of two schools; Ledgemont High School (grades 9-12) and Ledgemont Elementary School (grades K-8). The present school population is 870 students; 5$0 students in grades K-8 ond 320 students in grades 9-12. The high school is located in the Thompson Township; the elementary school is located approximately four miles south of Thompson Township.

The school district owns thirteen sebool busas and replaces one bus every year with a new bus. The capacity of the buses is as 52

... t t

It is confirmed by the superintendent that there are sufficient buses and drivers to move the high school population to the elementary school. The drivers are provided with copies of the evacuation route to travel and in the event that evacuation takes place in winter and if the Lnow is blowing so that drifting could occur, the drivers have established an alternate plan to take s another route to avoid the drifting snow on State Route 528 which is a north couth route. ,

i There aJe students attending the school who have handicaps.

Provision has been made for them. They are provided a special bus for daily use and it will be used in an emergency.

! concrenate care  !

The Congregate Care Center is located at Cardinal High School in Middlefield. It is a large facility capable of handling 300 (

evacuees. It was activated by the Red Cross at the ALERT stage. T It was fully staffed and operational within 30 minutes of initial staff arrival, soon af ter the Site Area Emergency was declared.

j The large staff included approximately 35 volunteer Fire Department personnel from Middlefield and surrounding areas. The l organizations represented weret the Red Cross, the Clergy, the  !

Geauga County Amateur Radio Club, Nursing, and the Police  !

! Department. All displayed knowledge of their duties, and j demonstrated thom effectively.

The shelter was equipped to handle the total amount of evacuees. r once 75% of the shelter capacity would be met, backup shelters at l Berkshire High School and Cardinal Elementary School would be ,

i activated. Supplies were on hand for the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, after l l which the Red Cross would have additional supplies sent to the  !

facility. The shelter was located on the first floor, and there '

were no steps at the entry, making the facility accessible for the handicapped.

r

Incoming evacuees were monitored for radiation by Fire Department (

personnel, and registered by Red Cross. These procedures were demonstrated. A copy of the plan was kept at the registration  !

desk. The Clergy assisted Red Cross by informing evacuees of mass care procedures and by calming their fears. ,

Nursing provided first aid, and assisted evacuees with tha i handling of their personal medication. They also handled an l l infant / mother room. If medical treatment beyond first aid was l

necessary, the person would be transported to the hospital via  ;

! ambulance. The Geauga County Amateur Radio Club provided a >

l communication link to the ECC. This was demonstrated via a radio i

! transmission and acknowledgement. The Fire Department radio

} provided a backup communication system. The Police Department

! provided building security. t 54 '

m -dn '"

o The Fire Department personnel demonstrated their capabilities with expertise. All wore Dosimetry /KI packets clipped to their clothing, and were knowledgeable of their contents and usage.

They were fully activated within 25 minutes. The activation included lining the walkway with paper, putting on protective clothing, posting radiation and instructional signs, and the parking lot being readied for vehicle survey. Portable outdoor lighting was also set up.

Fire Department team members demonstrated radiological monitoring, personal decontamination procedures, vehicle Decontamination procedures, and initial care of an injured, contaminated victim. All showed exceptional proficiency at each of their duties, demonstrating many procedures well beyond the scope of this exercise. The group was professional, knowledgeable, and competent.

The entire staff worked well together and should be commended for their effort. Thay are a prime example of how a congregate care facility should operate.

Il3nbden Decontamination Center The decontamination facility in the village of Hambden is located just outside the outside boundary of the 10-mile EPZ in the Hambden volunteer Fire vepartment. The facility has 1500 KW of emergency power available, an adequately equipped kitchen and good restrrom facilities. Necessary maps were on hand but not displayed. The facility is well suited for supporting emergency operations.

The ability to activate and fully staff the facility was demonstrated. The staff was called up by radio pagers beginning at notification of a Site Area Emergency. As staff members reported, each was logged in. Staffing was completed by 2030 hours0.0235 days <br />0.564 hours <br />0.00336 weeks <br />7.72415e-4 months <br />.

Operations were capably directed by the Fire Chief who had his Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) constantly at hand. He frequently referred to them.

Communications equipment was of excellent quality. 'Ih e ability to communicate with other emergency organizations was demonstrated. The primary system is a multi-channel, ultra-high frequency radio with telephone as backup.

Radiological exposure control procedures were demonstrated. Each worker was icsued a packet containing two self-reading dosimeters (1 - 20 R and 1 - 200R), a thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD), and a vial of potassium iodide (KI) tablets. All workers were instructed in the use of KI and by a team coordinator to cro 55

? ...

check all self-reading dosimeters and to log the results. The coordinator also told the workers to check their dosimeters at least hourly and to record their exposure levels. Two people were assigned to check the survey instruments for proper operation. The Geiger-Muel.ler (GM) instruments were battery and source checked before uso, but the results did not appear to be recorded anywhere. The Victoreaa ion chamber exposure rate meters apparently were not source checked, but they were not used. All of the instruments used were within their calibration periods. Two of the G-M instruments failed the source check, but were properly labeled and set aside as defective. The coauga County EOC was notified.

Upon receipt of a General Emergency notification at 2121 hours0.0245 days <br />0.589 hours <br />0.00351 weeks <br />8.070405e-4 months <br />, the team coordinator instructed the team members to set up the necessary equipment and prepare for potential monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles.

According.ly, background surveys were made. Curvey results were prominently posted and recorded in counts per minute.

'Ihe spaces used for decontamination were stocked with appropriate equipment. Floors were covered with paper, waste containers

positioned and plastic sheeting hung to prevent spreading of contamination.

Decontamination of a vehicle and an emergency worker were demonstrated. After a simulated determination of the need for decontamination done outside, an automobile was driven inside. A four member team conducted the survey covering the grill, tires, and undercarriage. Floor mats, interior fire wall, and the engine air cleaner were also identified as possible sources. A G-M counter with the probe properly encased in a plastic bag was moved along suspected areas about 1 cm from the surface. When the meter moved off-sculo, scales were properly switched. The controller inserted an unusually high background reading, well above the 0.3 mR/hr level which triggers the decontamination procedures. The Fira Chief stated that if the contamination could not be reduced to acceptable levels the County Radiological officer would be consulted. The brush used for the vehicle  ;

washing was not surveyed, but when prompted, the team agreed that

• the need to do so was obvious.

, An emergency worker known to be contaminated was admitted to the facility and registered. A two member team (one monitoring and one recording), performed a whole body survey using an open window G-M probe encased in plastic. The front and rear of the body from head to toe was checked. Proper technique with the probe close to the body was used. All off-scale readings were re-evaluated after appropriate changes in range were made. After completing the whole body survey, an in-vivo measurement for possibic radioactive iodine distribution within the thyroid gland was made. A G-M probe with the window closed was placed at the 56 1

l

a base of the throat and measuremerks were recorded in mR/hr. Tne team members correctly identified regions of the body requiring decontarination (over 0.3 mR/hr) and prescribed scrubbing and showering with mild soap and water. A second team performed a re-survey and prescribed the same procedure if excessive contamination remained. After this, if contamination was still excessive (over 0.3 mR/hr and/or 0.13 mR/hr thyroid) the worker would be transported to the hospital. All liquid waste containers centaminated or suspected to be contaminated was collected in a 3,000 gallon tank for ultimate disposal as directed by the county Environmental Agency.

Med pal Drill The handling of a Medical Response involving radioactive contamination was demonstrated during this exercise. Por the scenario, an emergency worker was injured when he was inadvertently hit by a car that he was decontaminating. The car struck him below the left knee, causing him to fall to the ground, and become contaminatad. His right side became contaminated to 0.9 mR/h. He also suffered a possiole fractured left leg.

The Middlefield Fire Department provided initial patient care, until the Trask Ambulance Company arrived. Trask Ambulance personnel divided into teams: on-the-scene handling (contaminated) and ambulance (non-contaminated).

A Control Line was observed. Radiation Safety procedures were handled well.

The patient was placed in leg and neck braces and wrapped to contain contamination. He was then handed across the control line. The back of the ambulance was paper-lined to contain contamination. The crew wore dosimetry and protective clothing.

Radiation instrumentation was plastic wrapped. On-the-scene personnel were monitored for contamination at the completion of their duties. The patient was transported to the Geauga Hospital. The ambulance travelled in normal traffic, and without lights or sirens.

The awaiting Hospital staff was fully prepared. All personnel wore full protective clothing and respiratory protection. The ambulance pulled into an onclosed bay area. The radiological room was just beyond the door, and was secluded f rom the main Emergency Room facilities. The walkway and radiological examining room were plastic lined, and signs and barriers were in place. A control line was established at the examining roca door. Nuclear medicine personnel were the Health Physicists.

The Emergency Room had an alternate ambulance entcance that was removed from the contaminated area. The ambulance and ambulance personnel were monitored before leaving the scene.

57

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The patient was decontaminated prior to sending to x-rey. At this time, the hospital exercise was terminated. All operations followed radiation safety procedures.

Radiolocical Exposure control 4 This function was not specific to the County but, the staff did discuss the possible need for oosimetry for emergency workers and the potential need for the adminstration of potassium iodide.

The OHSp assignnd to the access control point located at the intersection of State Routes 166 and 86 had the following exposure control equipment with him at the time of the FEMA evaluation:

- one mid-range dosimeter (0 - 20 R)

- one high range dosimeter (0 - 200 R)

- one Theinoluminescent Dosimeter (TLD)

- a supply of KI and information sheet on KI

, - a dosimeter report torm j 1 He was aware of the proper procedures for reading and reco. ding 3

the readings and that the maximum dose allowed without l

authori;:stion (25R). He was knowledgeable of the proper procedures concerning when to take KI. He was also aware of l procedures for decontamination.

Media Relations 1

The County's position on the release of information to the press

! is to refer them to the News Media Center. No briefings were

. planned or took place at the County Eoc. Unannounced visitativn 1 to the EOC by a local media person was made during the exercise.

They were escorted into the Eoc for a photographic session and then referred to the News Media Center.

j Recovery and ReentJ:y

.li The County discussed recovery and reentry activities when the emergency classification level changed from General Emergency to Alert. Discussed were the after effects of auch the accident and its near term and long range effects on the community. The discussion was good and nearly everyone participated. Things to reconsider are the suggestion that the sirens be sounded through the recovery phase in order to get attention of the people.

A beneficial aspect of the County's participation camo after the exercise. The EOC staff held a self evaluation which exceeded the expectations of the Federal evaluator. Many of the problems discussed and pledged by the County to take action to correct were not observed by the Federal evaluator dus to the massive workload. Among those problems were the need to revise the SOPS for the sheriff, the concern over message flow and the message 58

. ,' l

., i priority system, the need to prepare advance identification of those involved in agriculture for their reentry back into the evacuated area to tend to animals and crops, and a temporary disruption of the telephone system. The combined efforts of the three Ccunty commissioners should bring forth correction to the areas discussed.

5. Lake qounty Activation and Staffina The 5-way dedicated telephone line which connects the plant, ,

State and three counties is continuously monitored at the Lake County Communications Center co located at the EOC. The dispatcher at the Center received the notification of Unucual Event from the plant, filled out a notification form and notified key staff utilizing a call list which is contained in the dispatch procedures. This dispatcher failed to indicate that the calls she placed were part of an exercise. A second dispatcher in the Center corrected this error and subsequent calls indicated that they were part of an exercise.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: All personnel associated with the exercise chould be directed to begin and end each message with a statement that "This is an exercise".

EOC staff activation was initiated following receipt of the Alert notification. The Director of the Lake county Emergency Management Agency exercised the option to activate the EOC at the Alert classification as stated in the plan. Notification took approximately 30 minutes with the EOC functionally staffed within one hour. An initial staff briefing was conducted by the Director at that time.

The FOC Fxecutive Group decided to activate their EOF liaison prior to the bite Area Emergency. He reported to the EOC, was provided with dosimetry and dispatched to the EOF at 2005 This individt al was sent to the EOF to provide information directly to the Executive Group.

Lake Cot.nty Health Department (LCHD) Field Monitoring Teams (FMTs) were activated by the LCHD Field Team Coordinator (FTC) at approximately 1850. Individual FMT members were instructed, by telephone, to report to the LCHD offices, based upon an exerc!se scenario involving the Perry NPP. FMT members arrived at the LCHD between 1854 and 1906. FMT members were provided, by radio, with a status update of current plant and meteorological cceditions, and their assignments upon arrival at the LCHD offices. FMTs $1 and #2 were dispatched from the LCHD offices at approximately 1955 and arrived at their first assigned locations at 2012.

59

o 4

According to FMT members, a formal system is in place to contact and activate individual team members on a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> basis. Call lists, containing office and home telephone numbers of the FMT l members, are maintained by the Lake County Her.lth Commissioner I and the FTC.

Around the clock staffing capability was evidenced by some double i staffing and presentation of a roster showir.g multiple staffing capabi,lity. All of the EOC staff demonstrated a thorough I knowledge nf their duties ar.d responsibilities and the ability to implement their emergency response functions.

Emercenev Ocorations Manacement

< Emergency operations were conducted under the direction and i control of the Lake County Commissioners. This is consistent with the Lake County Emergency operations Plan. Periodic j briefings were conducted by the Director of the Lake County i Emergency Management Agency who also functioned as the Chief of i

Staff in the EOC Operations Room. The overall emergency response l

decisions were made by the EOC Executive Group with input from 4 the EOC Operations Group and the EOC Accident Assessment Group.

I The Eoc staff made decisions with respect to implementation of l their specific emergency response activities and provided periodic written and/or oral summaries to the Executive Group.

A full copy of the Lake County Plan and Procedures were available

( in the Executive Group Room. In addition.; each EOC staff 1 positier, including the Executive Group had a copy of the plan and

! their specific procedures. Each person also maintained an I individual message log of incoming and outgoing contacts. Formal

message traffic between EOC staff was routed through a mossage j control station for logging and distribution. A multiparty message form was used for this purpose. overall, message handling procedures were efficient and effective.

l Access to the Eoc was controlled and all of the entrances to the EOC facility were monitored. Anyone entering the EOC was required to sign in at a reception desk and were badged as

appropriate, i.e. player, observer, controller, evaluator or

! visitor.

]

The EOC was notified of the Notificatira e' .;ovual Event (1733) at 1736, the Alert (1817) at 1820, tho site Area Emergency (3932) l at 1938 and the General Emergency (2116) at 2121. At 2118,

during the upgrade to General Emergency, the Executive Group was in contact. with the Lake County EOF liaison who provided them with current information from an eof briefing concerning the j upgrade. The Site Area Emergency and General Emergency classification Levels were promptly announced to the Eoc staf f.

1 The Lake County Declaration of Emergency was made at 1944 and the

! Governor's declaration of a State of Emergency (2000) was 60

e  % e received at 2002.

i The EOC roccived three dairy advisories: 0-2 miles at 1945, 0-10 miles at 2122 and 0-20 miles at 2334. The first advisory was relayed to appropriate farms by the County Agricultural Agent.

The second advisory was released as part of an EBS message. The third advisory was relayed by the County Agricultural Agent to Lake County farms within 20 miles of the plant.

Faci?.ities The EOC was set up prior to the exercise with each work station properly eqaipped with supplies, message forms, message logs, the plan and procedures. The EOC provided ample space for security and access control at the entrance, a large operations room, breakout rooms for the Executive Group and the Accident Assessment Group, and communications. The facility also conta' ins a kitchen, dining room, men and women dormitories aaj acer.t to locker rooms, toilet facilities and a decontamination area. A copier and datafax machine were available to the EOC s*.aff.

l The following maps and displays were posted in thu EOC: school locations; ingestion zone; primary and alternate care centers; operatione map showing EOC; decontamination stations; hospitals

and transportation staging areast USCG Lake Safety Zone;

reception and congregate care centers EPZ map with wind direction and protective actions plotted; evacuation routes; j status board; access control points; traffic control points

! (inside and outside the EPZ) ; population by subareat and

) emergency classification levels.

The status board was maintained with significant events. Traffic l

and access control points were also p1Ltted on the wall maps. The majority of the other wall maps were not utilized to any extent.

! Each participant had the necessary maps at their individual work

station and tended to use those during the exercise.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVFMENT: The EOC staff should consider i using the various maps and displays during the periodic briefings

! which are conducted in the EOC Operations Room.

Communications The EOC staff demonstrated the ability to entablish and maintain communications with the various exercise locations. The primary

, communications link between the utility, State and Counties is a i 5-way dedicated telephone. Backup systems include commercial telephone or radio. In addition, the three C w.t ns have a 3-way dedicated telephone system. This systu v.perience minor operational problems during the exercise. In one instance commercial telephone was used to backup this system. Radio could also be used as a backup for the dedicated tel.ephone.

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The primary link to the EBS station is commercial telephone with  !

han radio ac backup. This backup system is located in the  ;

amateur radio room. Three separate frequencies exist for thit i communications link. There is a dedicated telephone link with j the JPIC which is backed up by commercial telephone and radio. A <

courier could be used in extreme circunstances.

School Superintendents' offices and school buildings have alert l j monitor receivers and commercial telephone as communications }

links. E=crgency vehicles are equipped with radio for -

g communication with their dispatch staff. i Communications between the FMTs and the Lake County 'EOC were f

performed using telephones, walkie-talkies, and mobile radios.  !

5 Padio contact was maintained with the FTC at the EOC throughout, i i the exercise. Communications between the FTC and the FMTs were l 1

very professional and well handled. Individuals communications i were always repeated, by the receiving party, to ensure accuracy.

l A listing of public telephones, locates throughout the EPZ, is included in the FMT SOP Manual as a backup to the radio systems.

l Dose Assessrent and Protective Action Recommendations [

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! In accordance with the plan, the Health comnissioner was notified  !

l at 1833. He, in turn, notified his deputy who activated two Lake i a County field monitoring teams. The deputy then reported to the  !

I County EOC where he served as controller for the field teams. [

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A listing of the monitoring equipment used by the FMTs is [

l provided in both the Lake Co anty Emergency Plan and the Standard t

operating Procedures (SOPS) Manual for the FMTs. Some of the  !

!. equipment kits are sealed to minimize the need to conduct an  !

inventory of all the equipment at the time of dispatch.

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The radiation monitoring and sampling equipment included in the h i

two FMT kits is extensive. The equipment inventory included an l Eberline model ESP-1 survey meter with three probes, a two 4

channel Bictron Labtech scaler with NAl probe, a RAB-1 air j sampler, and two civil defense survey meters, models 700 and 715.

Boil, vegetation, water and milk sampling equipment is not t

! included in the FMT kits. This type of sampling is a State 1 responsibility. A set of replacement instruments is also t available form the LCHD Environmental Lab.

Calibration of the FMT radiation monitoring and sampling j equipment is performed by the manufacturer. The equipment is .

recalibrated once every six months. All equipment, observed  !

during the exercise, possessed recent calibration stickern. l LCHD mid-sized station wagons were employed by the FMTs for transportation during the exercise. The vehicles are adequate 62 f i

i

i for the purpose of transporting alad providing a coreaunications  !

base for the team members during an emergency. Mowever, the vehicles do not provide enough room for the team members to ,

perform in-field analysis of the air sampler particulate filters and radiciodine cartridges, or to avoid the contamination of some of the survey items kept on the floor of the vehicle. FMT members are required to perform most of the setup and analysis of the air sampler media outside of the vehicle. The floor of the  !

vehicle, where some of the survey meters are kept, is subject to contamination due to the nonuse or absence of disposable ,

protective shoe covers. '

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMsROVEMENT: Conduct a review of the vehicle space requirements of the field monitoring teams.

Set up and operational checks of the FMT's equipment were I performed by the FMT members, upon their arrival at the LCHD l offices. These activities were conducted in a very officient ,

manner using written SOPS. '

members adequately demonstrated the operation of the FMT individual instruments included in the kits, during the course of i the exercise. Written SOPS were used by most team members to i ensure the reproducibility of their results. Ground and air  !

radiation levels were measured using the ESP-1 with the HP-270 '

Probe. Both open and closed shield reading were taken. Air ,

samples were collected using the RAB-1. The procedure used is ,

adequate to measure iodine concentrations as low as 10-7 uCi/cc [

in the presence of noble gases. '

l coordination of the monitoring and sampling efforts of the FMTs  !

with the State FMTs was not observed during the exercise. i Numerous times throughout the exercise both the LCHD FMTs and the State FMTs obtained measurements within eyesight of each other.

Coordination of these two groups of FMTs could greatly increase l the amount of field data available to governmental decision  ;

makers.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: The use of field team [

resources would be enhanced through the coordination of l activities between the State and County.  !

Both LCHD FMTs were familiar with the region being monitored. [

Laminated maps, which are included in the FMT equipment kits, I were used by the FMTs to assist in locating indivndual sampling I locations or routes.

(t Samples obtained during the course of the exercise were not I transported to a laboratory for further analysis. This activity I was simulated. )

i The field monitoring teams were directed to tnck the plume, j 63  !

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e dcuermine the conterline and take radiation measurements. This process was conducted efficiently by the fic1d team controller "ho com: unicated with his teams by radio and used a wall map to monitor the location of the County and State field monitoring tears. The information obtain2d by the field monitoring teams was used to make dose calculations at the County EOC. These calculations were developed promptly utilizing a compater model.

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'1 hey were compared against information which was received from the State and the utility concerning the magnitude of the release from the plant.

The State recommended the use of KI for emergency workers and institutionalized populations in subarca 1. The County Executive Group concurred in this recommendation and it was promptly disseminated to the emergency workers in the field through their respective agency representatives in the EOC.

Public Alertina and Instruction The utility recommendation for sheltering in subareas 1, 2 and 3 was received by the County along with the General Emergency notification at 2121. However, the State of Ohio indicated that evacuation was being considered for these subareas and that this recommendation was being coordinated with the Governor. Lake Coun*.y discussed protective actions with Ashtabula and Geauga Counties while awaiting the Stete's protective action recommendation.

At approximately 2140 the Counties decided that they would make a protective action decision at 2145 if they did not receive a recommendation from the State. The State of Ohio recommended evacuation of subareas 1, 2 and 3 at 2144. The three Counties immediately coordinated a protective action of evacuation in

, subarcas 1, 2 and 3 and sheltering in subarcas 5 and 6 with siren activation scheduled for 2152 and EBS activation for 2155. The instructions to the public concerning these protective actions j were formulated at Lake County.

At 2150 Ashtabula County called back to add sheltering in subarca

4. The additional sheltering area was quickly incorporated into the EBS message. The sirens were sounded at 2152 and EBS activation occurred at 2155 as scheduled. The radio station was instructed to repeat the EBS message every 15 minutes for one hour. This was subsequently extended for an additional hour by Lake County. The EDS message utilized prescripted material and included all of the appropriate information such as sheltering instructions, information for transients and a geopolitical description of the affected areas. Information for schools was excluded because the County had ascertained that schools were r.ot in session during the evening.

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Concurrent with the reading of the EBS message to the radio station, a copy was prepared which could be datafaxed to other locations. This copy was prepared utilizing a second set of prescripted information which was consolidated by cut and paste techniques. This second set contained erroneous descriptions of the affected areas and was datafaxed to the State EOC, JPIC, EOF and Ashtabula and Geauga Counties. After Ashtabula County i notified Lake County of the error, Lake County reaf firmed that the proper material had been read over the EBS and that the JPIC had the proper material because they also assembled the prescripted material there. However, Lake County did not immediately inform the State EOC and the EOF of the error. Lake ,

County then prepared a revised consolidated EBS message and j again datafaxed it to all of above mentioned locations.

AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: The hard copy of the EBS message which was datafaxed to various exercise locations contained an incorrect description of the areas affected by tho i protective actions. (NUREG 0654/ FEMA-rep-1, REV.1, Criteria Item l E7)

RECOMMENDATION: The hard copy of the EBS message which is  ;

prepared for datafax use should be formu'.ated from an exact copy i of the EBS message which is read to the radio station.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: Lake County shoubt consider installation of a multiple datafax capability which would permit <

them to datafax material to several locations simultaneously. l This would shorten the amount of time required to distribute hard copy of the EBS message and other important material.

l Protective Action Lake County's traffic control was observed at the junctions of US  ;

20 and Narrows Road appr3ximately 4 miles Southwest of the Perry l Nuclear Power plant. his was establirhed to facilitate the i evacuation of onsite pet onnel.

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Sheriff's Department cruiser Number 15 arrived at 9:03 p.m. The car was manned by two Sheriff's depties. The deputies each '

carried small radio's on their Mlts which allowed for communications with the County EOS and other services if they moved away from their car.

The deputies each had high range and low range pocket dosimeters film badges, potassium Iodido tablets and radiation exposure logs in zip lock clip on plastic pouches. The personnel were knowledgeable of radiation, radiation effects, radiation safety levels and risk factors.

The personnel were knowledgeable and experienced in traffic 65

control. Additional resources of barricade materials, lights and road clearance equipment were available by dispatch from multiple sites on request through the dispatchers at the county EOS. The personnel had multiple means (3 or more) of radio contact with the dispatcher at the county EOS.

In summary, Lake County demonstrated ability to handle traffic control smoothly, ef ficiently and with multiple back up to the communication means.

! Once the Commissioners decided to evacuate sub-area 1, 2, and 3 at 2147, the Lake County Engineers and Sheriff's Deputies evacuation routes, identified the appropriate predesignated l

traffic control points and access control points. The County j Engineer plotted the traffic control and access points on the wall displays. One traffic control point and one access control actually staffed the rest were simulated. The organizational i ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation I of sub-areas 1, 2, and 3 was procedurally demonstrated in the EOC. Coordination with local law enforcement, state patrol and 4 national guard was discussed by Lake County cheriff deputies.

Once the sub-areas were evacurted access control was discussed.

The Sheriff's Deputy indicated anyone requesting entrance in the

, area (i.e., vendor to plant) would be escorted. The field teams car license numbers would be given access control points and i

security patrol to insure knowledge of who had authority to be in j evacuated area. National Guard resources would be utilized to augment county personnel for long term access control.

Authorization for anyone to enter the evacuated area is to be coordinated through the county EOC and communicated via radio to ficid.

Lists identifying residents with special evacuation needs was kept by the Human Services staff. There was a mobility impaired

. list, a list of responders to the public information brocnure i

requesting assistance and a list of people identified by the Human Services Department (.ie., elderly) with special medical I treatment needs. Human Services staff discussed procedures for l facilitating the evacuation of the people listed with special needs.

Timely staffing and activation of the referral points by the j Human Services Department and the care centers by American Red

- Cross was demonstrated in the EOC. Coordination on transportation with the Transportation Officer was discussed. The coordination between the Human Services and American Red Cross i for opening additional care centers when 75% capacity of a center

is reached was also discussed. The Emergency Medical officer utilized his procedures and maps to procedurally demonstrate the

, evacuation of the special facilities. There were hone in the J

sub-area 1. In sub-areas 2, and 3 there were 3 nursing homes.

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He had conducted a population census by facility; planned nacessary transportation and wrote necessary messages to initiate coordinatien.

Transcortation Stacina Area Emergency personal manning both the Fire-Rescue Ambulance and the school bus at the Lake County Fairgrounds Transportation Area (TSA) activated their functions at 2026 and 2055 respectively.

All TSA emergency personnel were well trained and equipped and carried out their assignments in excellent fashion. They were knowledgeable about their potential assignments, equipped with necessary maps, had excellent communications with the EOC and

other units. TSA personnel demonstrated the benefits of recent prior training by their knowledge of assigned duties and the reason for their participation. They were also kept informed of radiological conditions in the protective action areas and their site by Lake County EOC.

One Fire-Rescue Ambulance was assigned to the Lake County Fairgrounds Transportation Staging Area (TSA) on standby at the TSA to respond to calls from the Lake County EOC for pick-up of unassigned mobility impaired or injured persons: at 2219 the EOC ordered the ambulance to a pick up point to assist an injured mobility impaired individual. The run was completed and the ambulance returned to the station at 2312.

The ambulance crew at Lake County Fairground Transportation Stating Area (TSA) was well trained, all 6 persons were qualified EMT(A)'s manning a well equipped fire rescue ambulance and auxiliary truck used for radio base. The ambulanca crew had taken part in an exercise two weeks prior to this activity and were equipped with map and individual 0-200R dosimeters and TLD's. All crew members were knowledgeable in the use of these self protection devices and the Fire Department Lieutenant in charge had completed radiological monitor training and was prepared to use the CDV 700 an CDV 715 survey metces carried in the ambulances. Two-way radio communication was maintained with the EOC and the unit when on assignment.. The ambulance va ordered by the EOC to make one run and the Exercise Controller on-site noted that they completed this operation in less time than in the recent exercise.

A two-way radio equipped school bus also reported to the TSA at 2035. The driver was well trained, equipped with maps of pick-up points and reception / care areas, and knowledgeable about his role in the exercise. However, the school bus was not given an assignment.

The Fire-Rescue personnel and bus driver assigned to the Lake County Fairground Transportation Staging Area (TSA) were equipped with 0-200R dosimeters and TDL's. The ambulance was equipped 67

r with two-way radio and the CDV700 and CDV 715 survey meters and the Fire Department Lieutenant in charge of the ambulance crew had received Radiological Monitoring training and was knowledgeablo about the use of the radiological equipment.

As planned, personnel at the Great Lakes Mall Referral Point were not equipped with radiological equipment.

Peroval of Irredirente to the Evacuation A controller inserted a problem message t> the shoriff deputy that identified a traffic accident that blocked an evacuation route, which had caused a back up to 25-30 cars. The deputy consulted with the County Engineer, planned the re-routing, simulated communication of deploying squads to implement re-routing; simulated calling out of tow trucks to cicar roads and estimated one-hour to clear the obstruction. This was an adequate procedural demonstration of organizational ability and resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation.

Access Control Access control was evaluated at the intersection of State Route 44 and Auburn Road just outside the 10 mile radius southwest of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant.

This point was staffed by a Trooper of the Ohio State Highway Patrol. The evaluator arrived at the control point at 2100 hrs.

The Trooper indicated that he initially arrived at 2000 hrs but had responded to two real traffic accidents between 2000 hrs an 2100 hrs in addition to exercise participation. The access control point was not expected to be operational until about 2A30. In exercise play the Lake county EOS had activated 7 Access control points to get feed back on traffic movement and voluntary precautionary evacuation taking place.

The patrol car is equipped with a Citizens Band radio as well as the normal complement of p1!ce not radios. The trooper also had a small portable unit that permitted communication with the State Highway patrol dispatch and the EOC while away from his vehicle.

The vehicle was equipped with a low level and high range radiation meter. The Trooper also carried the pocket pouch of dosimetric materials that Lake County has standardize for response personnel. The pouch contents consisted of : (a) a pen style dosimeters high c.d low range (b) a film badge (c) potassium Iodine tablets in a small bottle (d) an exposure log.

The officer was knowledgeable in access and traffic control. The State Highway Patrol is initially responsible for some access and traffic control points. Actual personnel assignments are made by the State Highway Patrol Dispatcher who is in communication with 68

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the Lake County EOC.

The Trooper had a 20 page "Nuclear Emergency Manual" which he carries in his personal brief case at all times. The manual contains detailed procedures and background information. The '

Trooper was thoroughly familiar with the "manual contents" and prepared to handle either Access control or traffic control activities as assigned, i

Additional resources of lights, barricades, and road clearance equipment are availabic from multiple locations on call from the County EOS.

The "Manual" calls for 4 levels of access control as directed by the Dispatcher from observation to total denial of access.

Observation level was performed as part of the exercise. The officer provided information and directions to two passing ,

motorists demonstrating his ability to provide clear and ,

appropriate directions and information even though it was not an ,

intended part of the exercise.

While the access control activity was. being evaluated, the dispatcher checked with the office about our location. This along with handling real life accidents during the exercise period demonstrated communications capability e.nd responsiveness.

The access control portion of the exercise was well executed and ,

demonstrated human flexibility and response based on sound judgement as the situation and events unfolded. The Trooper was effectively functioning as part of a well coordinated team.

Referral Point Referral point emergency personnel were well trained and equipped and established a Referral Point, ready for service, with in ten minutes of their arrival at the site. RP personnel posted direction signs, placed traffic cones to establish traffic lanes,  ;

readied strip maps for distribution to persons seeking referral to reception / care centers, established two-way radio (RACES) contact wit the EOC and donned reflective vests for safety and ,

identification purposes. RP personnel demonstrated benefits of t recent prior training by their knowledge of assigned duties and ,

the reasons for their participation. i Reception /Concrecate Care and Decontamination  ;

Activation and staffing of the primary congregate care center at [

the Wickliffe High School was coordinated by the American Red Cross representativos in the Lake County EOC. During the Site Area Energency classification, the congregate care center staff >

were notified to respond to the Wickliffe High School and to 69 ,

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_ _ _ _ . , _ - ~ . _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ , _

I prepare the facility to receive evacuees if evacuation would be ordered.

Personnel from the ARC, Wickliffe Fire and Police Department and RACES staffed the center. The Lake County Chapter of ARC has 700 ,

volunteers providing sufficient personnel to maintain the center '

in a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> extended operation.

The Wickliffe Police Department would provide traffic control and l security to the center. The Wickliffe Fire Department demonstrated their responsibility of monitoring evacuees and .

operating the decontamination station. Two teams using CDV 700's  ;

monitored the evacuees at a rate of approximately 20 persons per hour. If contamination was found the evacuees would be routed  :

through either the girls or boys shower room. Barrels lined with  !

plastic liners were supplied for disposal of contaminated clothes decontamination procedures were adequately discussed.

Once uenitored the evacuees were registered on the standard ARC forms and routed to the shelter area. This facility has a capacity to shelter 2,700 people. Additional shelterr, are identified in Lake County if needed. The ARC has supplies of cots, and blankets for sleeping evacuees. The school food supply

.in addition to local purchases would be used to feed the evacuees in the school cafeteria. A nursing station was also established to meet the evacuees health needs.

Besides commercial telephone, there were the Red Cross radio and mobile telephones, RACES, Police and Fire radios available for communications.

The facility was adequate, all necessary equipment and supplies were demonstrated. The staff was knowledgeablo of procedures and fully demonstrated their responsibilities.

School Evacuation The Perry School district evacuation was demonstrated out-of-sequence from the exercise. The notification calls by the Lake County School Superintendent to the Perry Schcol District that would originate from the county EOC were simulated by a controller.

For each emergency classification notification the Perry School District Superintendent called the transportation supervisor and the principals of the four risk schools which were Perry High School, Perry Middle School, Center Road Elementary School and Manchester Elementary School.

At the Alert emergency classification the census of each school was taken and the necessary number of buses were determined. The need for 20 buses was communicated to the transportation 70

3 supervisors at the bus garage.

When the Site Area emergency classification was reached the transportaticn supervisor would call in the necessary number of ,

bus drivers, usue to them their dosimetry, conduct a oriefing  !

and keep then on stand-by. The buses would be gased up and i readied for use. For this demonstration two bus drivers were y called into the bus garage.

j Emergency worker exposure control was demonstrated for the i drivers. Each driver was issued a small packet containing mid and high range dosimetry. TLDs, KI and written instructions that included their exposure limits and decontamination station.

When evacuation was ordered during the General Emergency one bus actually responded to the Perry Center Road Elementary School.

[; Upon arriving at the school the bus driver called in her l dosimetry reading to the transportation supervisor via radio.

Every bus in the district is equipped with a radio.

AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: Recommend that the Perry l School District Transportation Supervisor maintain a log of his l radio and telephone communications.

1 i The Perry Center Road Elementary School Principal initiated the l sample avae etion of one class and gave the bus driver a map and j directions .o the receiving school. The students were loaded on

the bus in a orderly manner and were accompanied by their

teacher. A school staff person was available to assist in i traffic control. The students demonstrated excellent discipline.

) The teacher and bus drivers expressed kr.owledge of procedure j which reficcted comprehensive training. The Principal was actively managing the schools simulated evacuation and demonstrated a strong commitment to emergency preparedness.

i j Ambulance Drill j An ambulance drill was conducted at the decontamination facility.

4 A emergency worker was simulated to have been contaminated and 1 injured conducting vehicle decontamination. The concord Fire Department personnel attended to the worker's immediate needs and prepared him for transport to the hospital by strapping him to a j full body board. The ambulance was at the vehicle staging area in j a standard availability posture.

Upon receipt of the call from the Auburn decontamination station to transport a contaminated injured individual, the ambulance floor was covered with paper and the two man ambulance crew was outfitted with full body protective gear. The ambulance crew was provided with survey meter and dosimetry and the proper use of each was demonstrated. The crew knew the hospitals capable of handling contaminated injured individuals and could contact these 71 1

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v hospitals over a radio system.

Hosnital Drill The Lake County Hospitals is composed of Lake County Hospital West located in Willoughby, and Lake County Hospital East located in Painesville. Hospital East is the primary reception center ror contaminated patients from the Perry Power Plant because of it's proximity to the plant. Hospital West is the back-up j hospital. For this exercise it was determined to test the capabilitios of the back-up hospital.

The hospital was notified at 1751 that an on-site injured 4 employee with contamination was being transported to the hospital by the Perry Rescue Squad. This notification was verified by the Chief Nurse in the Emergency Room.

Mobilization of the Emergency room began with protective sheeting being placed on the floors, reception area was roped off, the staff dressed in protective clothing, dosimetry equipment checked ,

and distributed and all necessary equipment available. Staff was i ready to receive the patient upon arrival.  ;

! A health physics technician accompanied the patient from the

plant into the treatment room of the hospital to assist the '

t medical staff as needed. The second health physics technician

! follow the ambulance in his car tn the Mspit.a1 to survey the I

ambulance and outside are of the hospital to secure the area and prevent possible spread of contamination.

1 i Patient handling and treatment by the hospital staff was smooth and professional. Contaminated or potentially contaminated wastes, both liquid and solid were carefully controlled in plastic bags for later disposal. Procedures in control of

material passed in and out of the treatment room as well as  ;

4 entrance and departure from the treatment room was well '

j demonstrated. Although the exercise was terminated earlier than  !

- intended, (because of real patient influx) all necessary d

activities were fully demonrtrated. ,

1 t j This medical drill adequately demonstrated that the hospital and l

Rescue Squad have been well trained have the necessary equipment. i

, communications, supplies, facility and abilities to effectively  !

l transport, treat and manage injured / contaminated patients.

i Radiolecical Exoosure control l Each emergency responso organization maintains a supply of I i dosimetry kits for their emergency workers. The Radiological  !

Officer in the EOC also has a supply of dosimetry packets [

available which could be issued as needed to supplement the other t j supplies or to equip Eoc staff who might travel into the EPZ.  !

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Each dosimetry packet contains a mid-range (0-20R) and a high range (0-200R) dosimeter, a record keeping form, a TLD, KI with a  :

release form, and instructions. l 1 The Radiological Of ficer was quite knowledgeable of his duties and responsibilities. He knew the system whereby the emergency  ;

3 -

workers in the field would report their dosimeter readings and ,

j how 1.e would obtain that data. He was aware of the appropriate emergency worker exposure levels, how to balance the exposure among workers so as to approach exposure levels incrementally and  ;

how to obtain authorization to exceed preset exposure levels. He knew the location of the emergency worker decontamination station I and when to direct emergency workers there. He was also .

knowledgeable of the procedures for the distribution and use of  ;

KI by emergency workers including the reassignment of personnel  ;

who would not take it to duties outside of the EPZ.

The FMT kits include supplies of anti-contamination clothing, I disposable boots and gloves, tweezers and respirators. The L disposable gloves and tweezerc were used throughout the exercise r i to limit the spread of contamination when handling the air l

! sampling equipment. The disposable boots were not used during j the exercise even though the potential existed for ground contamination. Clear guidance as to when the individual items of -

protective clothing are to be used by the FMTs is not included in j their SOPS Manual. l i

Dosimetry equipment consisting of three pocket dosimeters, a dosimeter charger, record keeping sheets, and a TLD badge are included in the FMT kits. All FMT members were aware of: 1) how I of ten to read and record their dosimeters: 2) what the maximum dose without authorization was; and 3) what to do if they  ;

received a dose in excess of the predescribed limits. A listing j of this type of information is included in the FMT SOPS Manual ,

and was posted in one of the vehicles for reference. Potassiu= l

Iodide (KI) is also included in the FMT's kits for use in the event of an radioiodine release from the nuclear power plant. -

Radio communication with the FTO, at 2156, directed the FMTs to  !

simulate the taking of KI. Request forms for the KI, an example l of which is included in the FMT SOPS Manual, have been signed by

, all team members. All team members were aware of the purpose for i j taking the drug and the possible side effects.

, Decontamination of FMTs is conducted at the end of each shift or i as necessary. Decontamination is performed at the Auburn career i i Center. FMTs #1 and 92 were directed by the FTO to Auburn Center for decontamination at 2330 hours0.027 days <br />0.647 hours <br />0.00385 weeks <br />8.86565e-4 months <br />. ,

, AREA REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: The field procedures need to j incorporate a policy concerning the use of protective shoe  :

covers, specifying if, when and where they would be used. (NUREG I 0654/TEMA REP 1, Rev. 1, Criteria Item I.7) [

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Ereraency Worker Decontamination i

i Lake County utilizes the Auburn Career Center as an emergency worker decontamination center. The facility is used as a high school vocational facility during the day and as an adult i ed.ucation facility during the evening. The auto shop areas designated as personnel and vehicle inspection locations provided i t

a large, well illuminated and enclosed space to operate. Written procedures for determining the need to decontaminate people and i vehicles are in place and were effectively demonstrated during  :

this exercise.

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Two teams of five people and a team leader arrived to staff and  ;

activate the Auburn facility. An adequate supply of survey 1 meters (CCV-700 kits), glovus, booties, anti-C coveralls, full i'

face masks, dosimetry and KI were brought by the concord Fire Department. A list containing the names of five people was left

at the fire station as back-up to the first two response teams. ,

j The standard dosimetry kits were issued to each person working at i the decontamination station. .

Scanning procedures for people and vehicles were methodical. The l probe window was in the open position and covered with a latex  !

glove. It took twelve minutes to survey the simulated  !

contaminated individual. This rate averages out to five i i inspections per hour. l

) Prior to entering the shower area a second personnel monitoring i team was available to resurvey the individual prior to stripping j

! and to resurvey after a scrub / shower session was required. Before .

any washing was done the individual stripped (out of the anti-C l suit) and placed it in a plastic lined basket and personnel -

belongs were bagged and identified in a plastic lip seal ll container. The wash water from personnel and vehicles used the j schools regular plumbing system. The plumbing system is a self I contained septic system whose tank would be pumped out and the .

bagged waste would be hauled away under Utility direction.

l j Media Relations ,

The PIO Liaison in the EOC generated news releases and i i transmitted them to the JPIC. Five of six CEI news releases were  !

l transmitted to the Lake County EOC from the JPIC. The State  :

generated news releases were apparently not available in the EOC.

Enter Contrql l

! A rumor control station with two lines was established within the  !

l EOC. This was manned by three people during the exercise. This

station is located just outside of the Executive Group Room where  :

l the media liaison works. The rumor control staff received [

74 l

)

i

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. 1 I

several calls during the exercise. They were able to respond to them effectively. The staff were quite diligent about keeping i up-to-date about the status of the emergency and the County's i l response activities. ,

4 t l AREA RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT: The availability of news i releases generated by others would enhance the PIO Liaison / Rumor control functions.  !

l Recovery and Reentry r Prior to termination of the exercise, the EOC staff conducted a i tabletop discussion of the procedures they would follow to allow i unrestricted reentry in the evacuated areas. These discussions  !

included a report from each of the functional areas present and i' were quite thorough. This activity was conducted in such a manner as to permit a logical termination of exercise play.

l 75

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UTILITY: Per g t*,scicar Power Plant Summary Listing of Exercise findt ng t,tay_4 1938 .

1. Deficiencies 1 lf FEC Narrative Statement Corrective Action item of Deficiency Scheduled Actual Psoposed Date  !> ate

-St at e of Ohio t:r)ftE Ar.fitabula County, 1:01:C Ceauga County 1:07:E Lake County 1:01:E 77 I

\

.. _ , _ _ . - _ _ , _ , , , , . _ , _ , . - , . _ . . _ - . _ . . _ _ . - . ~ _ . . , _ _ , _ _ _ - - - - _-

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UTILITY: Perry Nuclear Power Plant l

Summary Listings of Exercise Findings Flay 4, 1988

2. Areas Pequiring Corrective Action Corrective Action Scheduled Actual UUMEG Marrative Statement Date Date of w<akness Proposed Item ,

State of Ohio Identify members of Governor's Oct. 1988 0.1.b Personnel of the Governor's staff 1.

staff who will participate in 0 . ', needs training in REP exercise pro-cedures, for a more effective under- Executive Group.

standing of information and requests to be made to the Governor's Office, 2. Conduct training for Executive and to Eliminate delays in reviewing Group in the following:

the content of protective action recommendation. (N11HEG 0654/ FEMA REP- a. Offsite implications of 1, REV.1, Criteria item 0.1.b & 0.5) nuclear power -

(1) Release pathways to the envircnment.

(2) 10-mile Coz actions and threats.

(3) 50-mile EPZ impacts on food pathways.

b. Table top exercise prior to dry run action.

c. Participation in dry run prior to each nuclear power plant exercise.

d. Participate in evaluated exercise and exercise critique.

70 l

o'~.

d IITI T.17Y : Perry t'uclear Power Plant Sumnary I.intings of Exercine rindings flay 4, 19H8 l

7._ 7rean Pe<1ui r ing Corrortive Action fil11ti:G flarrative Statement Corrective 3ction Scheduled Actual Item of weaknenn Proposed Date Date State of Ohio (con t. ' d . )

0.1.b 3. If the Chief Executive cannot 0.5 he contacted for npproval, the (cont'd.) State Executive Group in the EOC will approve protective action recommendations. Senior officials of the Administration vill be notified periodically and/or as required by the Exe-tive Group.

A. Senior representatives of the State who arc programmed for duty in the EOC will receive a briefing cn procedures and standards for protective action measures before being assigned to the Executive Group.

0.4.c Revise the current Milk Sampling Team 1. Current procedures for collection Dec. 1988 SOP to inform the team when to wear of milk samples during radiological P.3 gloves and bootics and when to take emergency response operations vili be them off and that they should wanh reviewed.

any spilled milk of f the er.terior 79

o'..

O' UTILITY- Perry Nticicar Power Plant Summary Listings of Exercise Findings May 4 QH8

2. Areas pequirin,q Corrective Action NUPEG Narrative Statement. Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of weakness Proposed Date Date 1

l State of Ohio (cont'd) 1

! 0.4.c of the milk sample container prior 2. Meeting will be held with all individ-P.3 to putting it into a clean cooler. unis in the Ohio Department of Health (con) (NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP-1, PEV.1, involved in milk sampling operations to Criteria Item P.4 determine what revisions to current nampling procedures are necessary to correct the deficiencies observed during the deficiencies chserved during the May 4, 1988

3. Procedures for collection of milk sampics will be revised and all individuals involved in the collection of milk sampics during radiological emergency response operations will be trained in the revised procedures.

80 l

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IlyII.ITY : Perry Unclear Power Plant Summary I,irtingn of Ey.e rc i s e Findings flay 4, 1938 l

2. Arcan requirin,q corrective Action NUPIG Narrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of w akness Proposed Date Date Ashtabula County 0.1.h The monitoring demonstration by Ashtabula County will arrange for Nov. 1, 1988 Austinburg Fire Department staff refresher training for the proper indicated refresher train- use of the CDV-700.

ing is needed on the proper use of tha CDV 700 radiation monitor-ing instrunent in monitoring per-connel and vehicles. (NUREG 0654/

FEMA REP-1, REV.1, Cri teria Item 11 . 1 0 )

11 . 1 0 one CDV 700 radiation monitor- Ashtabula County will arrange for May 13, 1988 ing instrument (S/N 78212) did the instruments to be picked up for not have a proper calibration proper calibr.? tion.

sticker starting when the inst-rument wan last calibrated, by whom, and the next date calib-ration was due to be performed.

(NUREG 0654/ FEMA, REP-1. REV.1, Criteria Item H.10) 0.1.b One Northwest Ambulance crew Ashtabula County will arrange for NovJ.,

1988 member was not familiar with refresher training for the proper the proper procedures and use uce of the CDV-700.

of the CDV 700 radiation moni-toring the simulated, contanin-ated, injured emergency worker 81

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UTILITY: Perry f:uclear Power Plant Summary Listings of Exercise Findings May 4, 1988

2. Arcan Requiring Corrective Action fH f REG  !!arrative Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Item of vcakness Proposed Date Date Ashtabula County (cont'd) at the Grand River Academy decon-tamination center. (NUREG 0654/

FEftA REP-1, REV.1, Criteria Item 0.1b)

Geauga County NONE Iake County E.7 The hard copy of the EDS message The Standard Operating Procedures EBS/ SOP -

which was datafaxed to various (SOP's) for the EMA Director, the Oct. 1988 exercise locations cont,1ced an PIO Liaison, and EBS will be PIO Liaison -

incorrect description of the areas revised to correct the possibi.lity SOP -

affected by the protective of an inaccurate message being Dec. 1988 actions. (NUREG 0654/ FEMA-REP-1, transmitted. To accomplish the EMA Director REV.1, Criteria Item E7) above, a formal checklist for each SOP -

checklist for each SOP referenced Dec. 1988 will be developed and implemented.

l Included will be: message develop-ment; document control; confirmation 82 l

c. % .

e UTILITY: Perry Nuclear Power Plant

_Summarv Lirtings of Exercine rindings f13y 4, 1988 L Arean Pequiring Correcti.ve Action fHilrEG fla rra ti ve Statement Corrective Action Scheduled Actual Iteu of woakness Proponed Date Date Lake County (cont'd),

of accuracy; approval; and, distrib-ution. During refrenher training nennions, accuracy of mensage content will be <mphasized.

I.7 The field proceduren need to The SrP for the Lake County Field To be deter-incorporate a policy concerning rionitoring Team (FMT), componed of mined by the une of protective shoe personnel from the Lake County Health cov<rs, specifying if, when and availability District ( LC#ID) , was developed of OEMA reps.

where they would be uned. (r2UREC primarily by representatives of State- Tentative -

0654/ FEMA FEP 1, R EV . 1, Icvel agencies, (i.e., OEMA). This Feb. 1989 Criteria Item I. 7) is due to high level technologies involved in FMT responsibilities.

Initial ar. subsequent biannual training of the FMT's has also been conducted by the aforementioned.

In an effort to correct the stated weakness (use of protective shoc covers)

LCEPTA planners will meet with repre-sentatives of LCHD and OEMA to incor-porate an SOP revisio- to reflect if, when, and where shoe covers should be used. The revision will be supported by 83 follow up training at the biannual sessions.

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!!ay 4, 19 ml .

2. Area. Peroonen,:ed l'o r 1rnrovenent State of Ohio

17. l oC par t icipaut - should participate in the 13x' der.rustration and fully understand the requirment. of recovery an.1 rerntry, as it per t a ins to their respective organizations.

A.htabula Countv

1. Iwploy addit ional vi nal aids for cvaruce informat ion an.1 cont rol; lc., floor a r r osis . po*:ts with plast ic cha i ns and snore and larner ninns for station ident i f icat ion locat ion etc.

2. Exerci-- controllers aced to be cautioned that in futote ex-rrises they insure that their instructions to exercise par t ic ipants are underst ood so that the exercine part icipant s implement the scenario as written.

Ceauc; Countv

1. Conside ration should be given to relocating the messanc handling group and the reproduction process. One po.:Ibilit, is to relocatc the functinn to the adminst rat Ive of fIce of t he operat ions room. This would I.olate nol c. "cse.ancs could be- pawed out t he w i ndow t o a "runner" for distritmtion.

7 The posting of all cncrnency classification could be posted in a more timely basis.

1.a k e Countv

1. All personnel as .ociat ed wi t h the exercisc -:hould be dire-cted to begin and end enrh nessage with a neatement that "Ibis is an e-xcrc i se".

7. The I f t: staf f +.h mid consider using t he varlems maps and displays durinn the periodic briefinns which are conduc t ed in the EOC Operat ions R oe m .

1 Conduct a review of the vehicic space requi rement s of t he- f iel d mon i t or i ng t e:rms.

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