IR 05000327/1986020

Discusses Operational Readiness Insp Repts 50-327/86-20 & 50-328/86-20 on 860303-14.Violations Noted:Failure to Verify Positions of Containment Isolation Valves in Sys 62,70,72,78 & 87 & No Procedure for 18-month Manual ESF Input Check

ML20210G691
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	03/25/1986
From:	Olshinski J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	White S TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
References
NUDOCS 8604020579
Download: ML20210G691 (2)

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llAlt 2 51986 Tennessee Valley Authority JTTN: Mr. S. A. White Manager of Nuclear Power 6N 38A Lookout Place 1101_ Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: -SEQUOYAH OPERATIONAL READINESS _ INSPECTION - REPORT NOS. 50-327,

~328/86-20 Duri.ng the period of March 3-14, 1986, the NRC' conducted an Operational Readiness Inspection of the Sequoyah facility which included: selected areas of the Sequoyah Nuclear Performance Plan, Volume II; findings from the December 1985 Sequoyah Operational Readiness Inspection (NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-327, 328/85-46); and testing associated with Environmental Qualification modifica-tion This inspection identified two safety significant items which may have generic implications. The first of these items involves an apparent violation for not verifying the positions of containment isolation valves in systems 62, 70, 72, 78. and 87 as required by Technical Specification (TS) 4.6.1.1.a. The second item, identified as unresolved, involves the existence of five (5) Chemical Volume Control System containment penetrations which do not appear to meet-General Design Criterion 55, 56, or 57, and no exception appears to have been -

take Additionally, two apparent violations of lesser safety significance were identi-fied as follows:

(1) The 18 month manual engineered safety feature functional input check of the reactor trip system per TS 4.3.1.1.1. was not being performed, nor was there a procedure for this tes (This involved one missed relay on a multicontact switch.)

(2) Procedure SQA21 improperly implements TS PORC requirements in that the membership of PORC is expanded to include the assistant operations supervisor and the engineering section supervisor. Regarding these extra members as alternates, many examples of PORC meetings were found where the TS quorum requirements were not met. (These extra members do however meet the ANSI qualification.)

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Tennessee Valley Authority 2 W29 W The inspection team also noted that little progress had been made towards

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i correcting those items identified during the December 1985 Operational Readiness Inspection due .to the TVA management and organizational changes taking plac

Sincerely, Original signed by John A. 01shinski Deputy Regional Administrator for TVA cc: ,H : L. Abercrombie, Sequoyah Nuc. lear Plant Site Direct A,P.R.Wallace,PlantManager W. Whitt, Chief, Nuclear Safety Review Staff D'.~ L. Williams, Jr. , Supervisor

Licensing Section C B. Kirk, Compliance Staff Supervisor M E. Wills, Project Engineer bec: J. N. Grace

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W. R. Denton, NRR W. L. Thompson, NRR 4 M. Taylor, IE-LB.,B. Hayes, 01 ,

tRRC Resident inspector Document Control Desk

State of Tennessee i

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