ML20055H926

Advises That 900119 Response to NRC Bulletin 89-003, Potential Loss of Required Shutdown Margin During Refueling Operations, Acceptable

ML20055H926
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	07/25/1990
From:	Hebdon F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Kingsley O Tennessee Valley Authority
References
TAC-75458, TAC-75459 IEB-89-003, IEB-89-3, NUDOCS 9007310154
Download: ML20055H926 (3)

Text

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ef' o,, UNITED STATc8 ,

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k ... / July 25, 1990 Docket Hos. 50-327, b328 Pr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr.

Senior Vice President,fluclear Power Tennessee Yh11ey Authority 6N 3CA Lookout Place 1101 Market Street i

Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402-2801

SUBJECT:

BULLETIN 89-03, POTENTIAL LOSS OF REQUIRED SHUTDOWN MARGIN  :

DURINGREFUELINGOPERATIONS(MPAX9-003)(TACNOS. 75458/7C459)-

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 On November 21, 1989, the staff issued Bulletin 89-03, " Potential Loss of Required Shutdown Margin During Refueling Operations." The bulletin requested that you take the following actions to ensure that an adequate shutdown fr.argin is maintained during refueling cperations at Sequoyah:

1. Assure that any intermediate fuel assembly configuration (including l control rods) inte.nded to be used during refueling is identified and i evaluated to maintain sufficient refueling boron concentration to l result in a n.inimum shutdown n.argin of approximately 5%.

2. Assure that fuel loading procedures only allow those intermediate  ;

fuel assembly configurations that do not violate the allowable shut-down margin and that these procedures are strictly adhered to.

3. Assure that the staff responsible for refueling cperations is trained in the precedures reconcended in Item 2 above and understands the potential consequences of violating these procedures. This training should include the fundamental aspects of criticality control with l enriched fuel assemblies, i

By letter dated January 19 1990, you tesponded to Bulletin 89-03 and stated l that a program is in place to 6ddress the actions described above. You stated that potential fuel assembly configurations and fuel enrichments have been.

evaluated to determine the allowable configurations that maintain a minimum l shutdown margin of five percent. This assumed a maximum enrichment of five weight percent Uranium-235, to be consistent with your submittals of February 14 and May A,1990 on using fuel up to this enrichment at Sequoyah, and current  ;

and future core design plans for Sequoyah. The refueling operations and core loading procedures were to be revised to reflect this evaluation and the individuals responsible for refueling operations were to be trained on the revised procedures before refueling operr,tions during the next refueling #j outage for a unit. The training would reflect the fundamental aspects of 1 criticality controls with higher enrichnent fuel assemblies and the potential consecuences of violating these procedures.  ?

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Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr. During his visit to Sequoyah on April 10 to 13, 1990, the Sequoyah Project Manager reviewed the procedures at Sequoyah for fuel handling instructions in +

refueling operations (Revision 27 of FHI-7 dated March 16,1990) and ft,r core reloaa ; (Revision 9 of RTI-2 dated March 23,1990), and the schedule for the training for the individuals responsible for refueling operations at Unit I during the Unit 1 Cycle 4 refueling outage which began it: flarch 1390. The Unit 1 Cycle 4 refueling outage was the first refueling ceage for either unit since the bulletin was issued. The first refueling outage for Unit i since the bulletin was issued will begin in the Fall of 1990.

The refueling operation and core reload procedures include restrictions on where a fuel assembly may be positioned in an intermediate fuel assembly configuration. This alternate core location is supported by an approved 1 calculation dated October 13, 1989 for five weight percent U-235 2000 pre boroninthereactorcoolantwhichisrequiredinTechnicalSpeelfication i 3/4.9.1, and a minimum shutdown margin of five percent. The training for core reload activities is documented in a training certificate form in Attachment 3 of Procedure RTI-2, Core Reloading. The topics that must be covered are the following: the core reload activity, fundamental aspects of criticality 4 control with higher enr khed fuel, potential consequences of violating these '

procedures, and test pas ticipants responsibility for assuring that any interrediate fuel assembly configuration is identified anti evaluated to maintain a minimum shutdown margin of five percent. For the Unit 1 Cycle 4 refueling outage, this training certification was signrd off on March 27, 1990 before the beginning of any core reloading. The trair.ing itself was not -

reviewed.

4 Based on the above, the staff considers your response to Bulletin 89-03 to be acceptable and TAC Nos. 75458 (Unit 1) and 75459 (Unit 2) to be closed.

l Sincerely,

,l -

l

' Frederick J. HeMon, Director Project Directorate 11-4 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 1

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Mr. Oliver D. Kingsley, Jr. 2-During his visit to Sequoyah on April 10 to 13, 1990, the Sequoyah Project Manager reviewed the p(Revision 27 of FHI-7 dated Marchrocedures refueling operations at Sequoyah for f 16,1990) and for core reloading (Revision 9ofRTI-2datedMarch 23,1990), and the schedule for the training for the individuals responsible for refueling operations at Unit I during the Unit 1 Cycle 4 refueling outage which began in March 1990. The Unit 1 Cycle 4 refueling outage was the first refueling outage for either unit since the bulletin was issued. The first refueling outage for Unit 2 since the bulletin was issued will begin in the Fall of 1990.

The refueling operation and core reload procedures include restrictions on where a fuel assembly may be positioned in an intermediate fuel assembly configuration. This alternate core location is supported by an approved calculationdatedOctober 13, 1989 for five weight percent U-235, 2000 ppm boron in the reactor coolant which is required in Technical Specification 3/4.9.1, and a minimum shutdown margin of five percent. The training for core reload activities is documented in a training certificate form in Attachment 3 of Procedure RTI.2, Core Reloading. The topics that nust be covered are the 1 following: the core reload activity, fundamental aspects of criticality control with higher enriched fuel, potential conse:;uences of violating these procedures, and test participants responsibility for assuring that any intermediate fuel assembly configuration is identified and evaluated to maintain a minimum shutdown margin of five percent. For the Unit 1 Cycle 4 refueling cutage, this training certification was signed off on March 27, 1990 before the beginning of any core reloading. The training itself was not reviewed.

Based on the above, the staff considers your response to Bulletin 89-03 to be acceptable and TAC Nos. 75458 (Unit 1) and 75459 (Unit 2) to be closed.

Sincerely, Frederick J. Hebdon, Director Project Directorate 11-4 Division of Reactor Projects . I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation cc: See next page Distribution bocket File W. Little SQN Reading file NRC PDR J. Brady L. Reyes, Region 11 Local PDR M. Krebs S. Varga OGC G. Lainas E. Jordan F. Hebdon D. LaBarge S. Black ACRS (10)

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