ML20212M191

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Discusses Exercise of Enforcement Discretion Re Apparent Violation Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/99-04 & 50-328/99-04 Associated with Implementation of Procedural Changes Which Resulted in Three Containment Penetrations Being Left Open
ML20212M191
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 09/21/1999
From: Reyes L
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To: Scalice J
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
References
50-327-99-04, 50-328-99-04, EA-99-207, NUDOCS 9910080217
Download: ML20212M191 (3)


See also: IR 05000327/1999004

Text

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September 21,1999

EA 99-207

Tennessee Valley Authority

ATTN: Mr. J. A. Scalice

Chief Nuclear Officer and

Executive Vice President

6A Lookout Place

1101 Market Street

Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT: EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION (NRC INTEGRATED

INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-327/99-04 AND 50-328/99-04)

Dear Mr. Scalice:

On July 17,1999, the NRC completed an inspection at your Sequoyah 1 & 2 reactor facilities.

The results of the inspection were discussed on July 26 and again on August 9,1999, with

Mr. M. Bajestani and other members of your staff, and were formally transmitted to you by letter

dated August 13,1999. This letter provides you with the results of our deliberations regarding

Apparent Violation 50-328/99-04-05 documented in the subject inspection report.

During the inspection, the NRC identified an apparent violation associated with the

implementation of procedural changes which resulted in three containment penetrations being

left open during the April 1999 refueling outage. These procedural changes, which in effect,

resulted in a change to Technical Specification (TS) 3.9.4.c, were implemented without prior

Commission approval as required by 10 CFR 50.59. TS 3.9.4.c is applicable during core

alterations or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment, and requires that each

containment building penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to

the outside atmosphere be either closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or

be capable of being closed by an operable automatic containment ventilation isolation valve.

The three containment penetrations documented in the inspection report included one used for

ice blowing equipment (to provide ice makeup to the ice condenser), one used for the ice

condenser melt drain system, ar'd one penetration used for steam generator sludge lancing

,

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equipment. As discussed in paragraph 1R20 of the inspection report, the installation and

operation of the ice blowing equipment to the containment penetration and the modification of

the penetration used for steam generator sludge lancing equipment were previously discussed

in NRC Inspection Report (IR) 50-327,328/91-23, dated November 18,1991. This IR indicated

that, based on discussions between Region ll and the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,

these two issues were not safety significant from a regulatory standpoint. The IR, however,

failed to properly characterize the 10 CFR 50.59 issue, and thus did not identify a violation in this

area.

9910000217 990921

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As you are aware, the Sequoyah facility is participating in the pilot plant study for reactor

oversight. As discussed in Appendix F of the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for

Enforcement Actions" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600, violations of 10 CFR 50.59 at

facilities participating in the pilot plant study are not evaluated by the Significance Determination

Process. Instead, violations of 10 CFR 60.59 may have the potential to impact the effectiveness

of NRC's oversight activities, and are thus dispositoned in accordance with the normal NRC

Enforcement Policy.

As part of the determination of the severity level of violations of 10 CFR 50.59, the NRC

considers whether the procedures and plant configuration creating the TS change would have

been approved, had your staff requested a formal change to TS. Notwithstanding the

conclusion of the 1991 IR, in this case, the NRC determined that had a TS change request been

submitted for the as-installed plant configuration and applicable fuel handling procedures

involving the penetration used for ice blowing equipment, the request would likely not have been

approved. Violations such as this are generally characterized in accordance with the NRC

Enforcement Policy at Severity Level 111. The two issues involving the penetration used for the

ice condenser melt drain system and the penetration used for steam generator sludge lancing l

equipment would likely have been approved had a TS change request been submitted.

Violations such as these are generally characterized at Severity Level IV. However, as provided

in Section Vll B.6 of the Enforcement Policy, the NRC may refrain from issuing a Notice of

Violation for issues involving special circumstances.

After consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, I have been authorized to exercise

discretion and refrain from issuing a Notice of Violation in this case. Discretion is warranted in

this case because the NRC's review of these issues, as documented in the 1991 inspection

report, contributed to the failure to address the complete spectrum of regulatory issues at that

time. In particular, the NRC's 1991 review, as well as your staff's review, did not recognize the I

TS and 10 CFR 50.59 compliance issues, which contributed to your staff's continued use of the

10 CFR 50.59 process to change procedures, resulting in a TS violation. The NRC also notes

that your staff has been responsive in actively considering options to fully address these issues

for any upcoming refueling operations.

This letter closes Apparent Violation 50-328/99-04-05, and no formal response to this letter is

required.

in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter will be

placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

Sincerely, l

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Original signed by LAR l

Luis A. Reyes

Regional Administrator j

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Docket Nos. 50-327,50-328  !

License Nos. DPR-77, DPR-79

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Distribution:

WTravers, EDO

FMiraglia, DEDO

. DDambly, OGC

EJulian, SECY

BKeel!ng, CA

Enforcement Coordinators

Rl, Rlli, RIV-

RBorchardt, OE

GCaputo, Ol

WBeecher, OPA

HBell, OlG

CEvans, Ril

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MSatorius, OEDO

LPlisco, Ril i

BMallett, Ril

PFredrickson, Ril

ABoland, Rll

SSparks, Ril l

HBerkow, NRR I

DNelson, OE l

TMorrissy, Rll )

OE:EA File (BSummers, OE)(2 letterhead)

PUBLIC

NRC Resident inspector, Operations

U. S. Nuclear Regulatpry Commission I

1260 Nuclear Plant Road

Spring City, TN 37381

NRC Resident inspector

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant  !

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

2600 Igou Ferry Road

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