W3P87-1759, Forwards Addl Info in Response to Violation 8710-02 from Insp Rept 50-382/87-10.Fire Rated Assembly Penetration Seal IIA-0155 Identified by NRC Inspector as Being Suspicious Due to Temporary Damming Matl Left on Seal.Firewatch Initiated

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Forwards Addl Info in Response to Violation 8710-02 from Insp Rept 50-382/87-10.Fire Rated Assembly Penetration Seal IIA-0155 Identified by NRC Inspector as Being Suspicious Due to Temporary Damming Matl Left on Seal.Firewatch Initiated
ML20237J455
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 08/24/1987
From: Cook K
LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
W3P87-1759, NUDOCS 8708260177
Download: ML20237J455 (2)


Text

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l LOUISIANA P O W E R & L i G H T! WATERFORD 3 SES

  • P.O. BOX B + KILLONA, LA 70066 wwem August 24, 1987 W3P87-1759 A4.05 QA I

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Waterford 3 SES Docket No. 50-382 License No. NPF-38 NRC It.spection Report 87-10

References:

1) NRC Region IV letter (Docket: 50-382/87-10) dated 7/24/87, E.H. Johnson to J.G. Dewease, LP&L
2) LP&L Letter W3P87-1708 dated 7/7/87, K.W. Cook to NRC l

Attached is additional information as requested by the reference I letter.

This information supplements the response to Violation No. 8710-02 which was provided by the reference 2 letter.

If you have any questions on the information, please contact G.E. Wuller, Operational Licensing, at (504) 464-3499.

1 Very truly yours, j h[k )DC 2 jf a /

O K.W. Cook Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs Manager Attachment KWC:GEW:pmb cc: R.D. Martin, NRC Region IV J.A. Calvo, NRC-NRR j J.H. Wilson, NRC-NRR I E.L. Blake W.M. Stevenson l NRC Resident Inspectors Office j t

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Attachment to W3P87-1759 Additional Information on LP&L Response to Violation No. 8710-02 On May 1, 1987, the Fire Rated Assembly Penetration Seal IIIA-0155 was identified by the NRC Resident Inspector as being suspicious due to temporary damming material being left on the seal. This. condition was brought to the attention of the Loss Control Engineer who initiated actions to investigate the situation. Plant Maintenance- Electrical removed the damming material and found several locations of the seal surface to be gouged out to a depth of approximately 2.5 to 3.0 inches. Upon discovery of this, a fire impairment and firewatch was initiated. This is a typical response to any damage to a seal and is in compliance with Technical Specification 3.7.11.

A Condition Identification Work Authorization was generated to repair the surface damage to the seal. At this point in time it appeared the damage would cause the seal to be inoperable and require repair and firewatch.

The seal was repaired and firewatch terminated on May 8, 1987. During this period research was conducted to determine what work had damaged the seal surface and left it unrepaired. However, through an extensive records search, no documented work was found associated with the seal, leaving us to believe it was at a time in the latter stages of construction.

Following this, LP&L received Violation No. 8710-02 regarding the incident.

Upon review by site personnel, it appeared that the Violation was directed at an inadequate response to a potential problem identified to Plant Management. This issue was addressed in a July 7, 1987 letter from K.W. Cook to USNRC. Subsequently, LP&L received a letter dated July 24, 1987 advising that the original violation response was incomplete.

This was due to the 1sck of discussion regarding the condition leading'to the damaged fire seal.

Upon receipt of this information, a follow-up investigation was conducted as to the specifics of the seal. From this it was found that seal IIIA-0155 is filled to the full wall thickness of 3'-0". Therefore, the fire seal was operable during the entire episode. This information was not determined initially in that the repairs effected were more expedient than the research to determine the specifics related to the seal. A minimum of 8" of seal material is required for a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rating. The depth of the seal is clearly in excess of this even with the surface damage noted.

Additionally, it is postulated that the repair activities that left the damming material in place were terminated when the excess seal depth was j recognized and the damming material never removed.

It is believed that this is an isolated incident in that a great percentage of seals have been inspected under the routine surveillance l program and no similar conditions have been identified.

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The repair of the seal can now best be characterized as cosmetic in nature and will prevent any future confusion regarding the operability of the seal.

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