W3P83-2085, Forwards Response to Subsection 3.11.3.1 & Suppl 5 to SER Re Lists of Equipment in NUREG-0737,nonsafety & safety-related Electrical Equipment & post-accident Monitoring Equipment. Issues Should Be Closed Out

Forwards Response to Subsection 3.11.3.1 & Suppl 5 to SER Re Lists of Equipment in NUREG-0737,nonsafety & safety-related Electrical Equipment & post-accident Monitoring Equipment. Issues Should Be Closed Out

ML20085N613
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	11/07/1983
From:	Cook K LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 W3P83-2085, NUDOCS 8311110133
Download: ML20085N613 (3)

Text

. .

LOUISIANA 442 Ca m o~OeerAeer . oeOxewe P O W E H & L 1 G H T ! NEW CALE ANS70174-6000 LOUISLANA9 [504)368-2345 MIDDLE SOUTH UTluTIES SYSTEM November 7, 1983 W3P83-2085 3-A20.16 )

L.09.02 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. G.W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch Number 3 Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT:

Waterford 3 SES Docket Number 50-382 Environmental Qualification 10 CFR 50.49

Dear Mr. Knighton:

The purpose of this letter is to address subsection 3.11.3.1 of the 5th Supplement to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER 5). Attachment 1 lists the NRC request (condensed from SSER 5) and the Louisiana Power & Light Company response.

We understand that this submittal is adequate to close out the four issues discussed in Attachment 1. If you have any questions or comments, please advise.

Very truly yours,

'f[kJ f4 K.W. Cook Nuclear Support and Licensing Manager KWC/RMF/ch Attachments cc: J. Wilson,Ilukam Garg, E.L. Blake, W.M. Stevenson, G.L. Constable f

8311110133 831107 -

PDR ADOCK 05000382 I E PDR \l

ATTACHMENT 1 A) Request "A list of all TMI Action Plan equipment (by Categories listed  !

in NUREG-0737)"

Response

This was provided by W3P83-1784 dated August 3, 1983.

B) Request "A list of all nonsafety-related electrical equipment, located in a harsh environment, whose failure under postulated environmental conditions could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of safety functions by the safety-related equipment."

Response

l See Attachment 2 l

C) Request "A statement that all safety-related electrical equipment in a harsh environment, as defined in the scope of 10 CFR 50.49, is included in the list of equipment identified in the February 11, 1983 submittal."

Response

LP6L letter W3P83-1783 dated June 13, 1983 transmitted to the NRC Waterford 3's latest revision of its NUREG 0588 submittal. That transmittal encompassed all safety-related electrical equipment in a harsh environment as defined in 10 CFR 50.49.

D) Request "A list of all post-accident monitoring equipment. . .. .that is specified as Category 1 and 2 in Revision 2 of R.G. 1.97 and is located in a harsh environment."

Response

This was provided by W3P83-1784 dated August 3, 1983.

i

_ , _ . , . - ,, . , _ _ _ , , -, _m ,

ATTACHMENT 2 The concern that nonsafety-related electric equipment under postulated environmental conditions could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of safety functions is addressed by virtue of acceptable compliance

• to Regulatory Guide 1.6, " Independence between Redundant (Onsite) Power Sources and Between Their Distribution Systems," Regulatory Guide 1.75,

" Physical Independence of Electric Systems," IEEE Standard 308-1971, "Critaria for Class IE Electric Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations," and IEEE Standard 384-1974, " Criteria for Separation of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits." The inclusion of qualified isolation devices in the electrical design where it is possible to degrade safety system circuitry prevents credible failures due to non-class 1E equip-ment malfunctions. The fact that all cable (safety and non-safety) is IEEE-383 qualified and is routed in segregrated raceways and dedicated conduits also helps insure the integrity of Class 1E systems.

In order to maintain the power to Class 1E equipment, those non-safety related loads connected to Class 1E electrical buses will be automatically disconnected from the Safety Onsite Power Systems when offsite power to the 4.16 KV buses is lost. The details of Waterford 3's electrical design criteria are provided in Chapters 7 and 8 of the FSAR.

Furthermore, with regard to IE Information Notice 79-22 " Interaction Between Non-Safety Grade and Safety Grade Systems" the following information is contained in the response to F9AR question 030.37:

Combustion Engineering (CE) conducted a review of CE supplied operating plants for potential control systems interactions during high energy pipe break events. A list of control functions considered in the CE study is provided as Table 030.37-1.

The behavior of these control functions when subjected to post High Energy Line Break (HELB) conditions was analyzed to determine if any events are more limiting than those previously analyzed in the FSAR. Louisiana Power & Light, in conjunction with its consultants, has reviewed the results of the CE study to determine if any modifications are necessary to ensure that this problem does not exist at Waterford.

Of the limiting events which CE identified, in all cases the events have been reduced to non-limiting either by providing safety grade equipment or by confirming that a control grade equipment failure would not increase the consequence of accidents already analyzed in Chapter 15.

• The extent of compliance is detailed in the FSAR Section 8.3.1.2 That the l

NRC has reviewed Waterford 3's compliance is shown, for example, by virtue of NRC FSAR questions 030.1, 040.17, 040.84, 040.86, 040.97, 040.101 and SER Chapter 8.

i l