ML20235F144

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Submits Rept on Plant,As Discussed in ACRS 150th Meeting on 721012-14.Listed Items Can Be Resolved During Const & Facility Can Be Constructed W/Reasonable Assurance for Operation W/O Undue Risk to Public Safety
ML20235F144
Person / Time
Site: Columbia, 05000000
Issue date: 10/19/1972
From: Seiss C
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To: Schlesinger J
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
Shared Package
ML20235B311 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-87-111 NUDOCS 8709280431
Download: ML20235F144 (3)
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y ADVISORY _ COMMITTEE M REACTOR SAFEGUr.RDS UNITED STATES ATCMIC ENERGY COMMIESION WASHINGTON. D.C. 20H5 October 19, 1972 Honorable James R. Schlesinger Chairman U. S. Atomic Energy Connission Washington, D. C. 20545

Subject:

REPORT ON HANFORD NO. 2 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

Dear Dr. Schlesinger:

At its 150th meeting, October 12-14, 1972, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards reviewed the application of the Washington Public Power Supply' System for a permit to construct tFe Hanford No. 2 Nuclear Power Plant. This project was considered at a Sub- I committee meeting on September 30, 1972, at the plant site. Dur-ing its review, the Committee had the benefit of discussions with representatives of the Washington Public Power Supply System, Burns and Roe, Incorporated, the General Electric Company, the AEC Regulatory Staff, and their consultants. The Committee also had the benefit of the documents listed.

The Hanford No. 2 Plant will be located in the State of Washington on the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission's Hanford Reservation, three miles west of. the Columbia River and approximately 12 miles north of Richland, Washington, the nearest population center (1970 popu-lation 26,290). The makeup water Antake structure will be located on the west bank of the river. The low population zone (LPZ) radius is three miles and the minimum exclusion area radius is 1.2 miles. Both of these areas are within the Hanford Reservation and have zero permanent population. The Fast Flux Test Facility will be the only installation within the LPZ. It has an expected i

normal day shilt of about ninety persons. By 1980, the resident population ir projected to be 528 within 10 miles.

The 'ilanford No. 2 Plant will utilize a General Electric boiling '

water reactor to be operated at power levels up to 3323 MW(t). It

' is of a design similar to that of the LaSalle County Station units, previously approved for construction.

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4 Ilonorable James R. Schlesinger October 19, 1972 Waste heat is to be rejected to the atmosphere by mechanical draft '

cooling towers to which makeup water will be supplied from the Columbia River. TVo seismic Category I spray ponds will be pro-vided and will have sufficient capacity to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition for 30 days independent of water makeup.

The containment system includes the primary containment which utilizes the pressure suppression concept, and secondary confinement provided by a low-Icakage reactor building. The primary containment consists of a conical drywell and cylindrical wetwell, the two separated by a reinforced concrete floor penetrated by 102 vent pipes. The entire structure is a free-standing steel pressure vessel designed in accord-ance with the ASNE Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III. The applicant is developing a seal design for the peripheral joint between the drywell floor and the steel containment in order to preclude deck bypass leakage which would affect the pressure suppression capability of the containment system. Four vacuum breakers provide' a return flow path from the suppression chamber to the drywell. Tnese provide

- another potential bypass path which could bnpair the performance of the pressure suppression system. The design of both the seal and vacuum breakers should be such as to avoid excessive bypass leakage.

This matter should be resolved in a manner satisfactory to the Regula-tory Staff.

The Committee believes that protection against pipe uhip should be provided by the applicant in accordance with criteria being developed i by the AEC Regulatory Staff. l Active pumps and valves of the reactor coolant pressure boundary required to perform safety functions will be designed to deformation limits for which the calculated primary stresses will be in the elas-tic range. Acceptable design criteria for inactive pumps and valves are yet to be established. This matter should be resolved in a manner sat-isfactory to the Regulatory Staff.

The applicant has proposed to install a sealing system to ensure mini-nal leakage through the main steam line isolation valves following a j postulated loss-of-coolant accident and has in progress a study to establish the design of such a system. The Committee believes that a sealing system should be installed. This matter should be resolved in a manner satisfactory to the Regulatory Staff prior to completion of construction of the plant.

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Honorable James R. Schlesinger October 19, 1972 Analyses :f postulated control-rod drop accidents occurring in similar c:res during certain portions of the fuel cycle indicate unaccepta*:le results. Studies of provisions to reduce the probabil-ity of this accident to negligible leve.ls are underway. This matter should be resolved in a manner satisfactory to the Regulatory Staff prior to :ompletion of construction.

The applicant has studied design features to make tolerable the con-sequences of failure .to scram during anticipated transients, and has concluded that automatic tripping of the recirculation pumps and injection of boron could provide for a suitable backup to the con-trol rod system for this type of event. The Committee believes that this appr:ach represents a substantial improvement and should be pro-vided for the Hanford No. 2 reactor. However, further evaluation of the sufficiency of this approach and the specific means of imple- l I

menting the proposed pump trip should be made. This matter should be '

' resolved in a manner satisfactory to the Regulatory Staff and the ACRS duri:3 construction of the plant.

Other pre:1 ems related to large water reactors have been identified by the Re;ulatory Staff and the ACRS and cited in previous ACRS reports. The Cocnittee believes that resolution of these items should apply equally to the Hanford No. 2 plant.

The Advis ry Committee on Reactor Safeguards believes that the items mentioned above can be resolved during construction and that, if due considera: ion is given to the foregoing, Hanford No. 2 can be con-structed with reasonable assurance that it can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.

Sincerely yours, f O%

C. P. Siess Chairman References

1. Washidgton Public Power Supply System letter dated August 10, 1971 transmitting PSAR, Volumes 1 through 6 to Hanford No. 2 Nucicar Power Plant I
2. Amend:ents 1 through 9 and 12 to the License Application for l l Hanford No. 2 Nuclear Power Plant l

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