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Forwards Insp Repts 50-528/86-27,50-529/86-26 & 50-530/86-20 on 860804-0907.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Observation & Comments on Initial Reactor Startup & Low Power Reactor Physics Tests Encl
	ML20215E890
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	09/30/1986
From:	Kirsch D; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:	Van Brunt E; ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
Shared Package
ML20215E893	List: IR 05000528/1986027; ML20215E890; ML20215E929;
References
	NUDOCS 8610160014
	Download: ML20215E890 (2)
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~ SEP13 01986 -

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s Doc 1det Nos. 50-528, 50-529, and 50-530

~ ArizonaNuclear[PowerProject

.P.'O. Box 52034

Phoenix, Arizona- 85072-2034~-

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Attention: Mr. E. E. Van Brunt Jr.,

Executive Vice President

- Gentlemen:

Subj ect: NRC Inspection of Palo Verde Units 1, 2 sad 3.

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This refers to the inspection conducted by Messrs. R. Zimmerman, C. Bosted,

G. Fiorelli, J. Ball, K. Ivey and P. Phelan of this office on August 4,

through September 7, 1986 of activities authorized by NRC License Nos. NPF-41,

NPF-51 and Construction Permit Number CPPR-143, and to the discussion of our

findings. held with yourselfJand other members of your staff at the conclusion

of,the inspection.

- Areas examined during this inspection are described in the enclosed inspection

report. Within.these areas, the inspection consisted of-selective-

examinations of. procedures and representative records,. interviews with

personnel, and observations by the inspectors.

No violations or deviations of NRC requirements were identified within the

scope of this inspection.'

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In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosure

will be placed in.the NRC Public Document Room.

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-Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will Le pleased

to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

Origtn::I signe'd Q

D. F. s h',' Director

.

~ Division of Reactor Safety

and Projects

Enclosure:

' Inspection Report Nos. 50-528/86-27, 50-529/86-26

and 50-530/86-20 -

cc w/ enclosures:

J. .G. Haynes, Vice President, Nuclear Production

J. 'R. Bynum, PVNGS Plant Manager

W. -F. Quinn, Manager, Nuclear Operations Licensing

T. D. Shriver, Manager, Compliance

W. E.-Ide', Manager, Corporate QA/QC

C. N. Russo, Manager, QA Audits / Monitoring

Arthur C. Gehr, Esq.

.Ms..J. Morrison

- Ms. L. Bernabei, GAP '

,

D. Railaback, Arizona Corporation Commission.

bec w/cnclosure:

RSB/ Document Control Desk (RIDS)

' Project Inspector

Resident Inspector

G. Cook

. B.' . Faulkenberry

J. Martin

A. Hon.

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bec.w/o_ enclosure: LFMB

Region V

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

~ Report Nos: 50-528/86-27, 50-529/86-26, 50-530/86-20

Docket Nos: 50-528, 50-529, 50-530

License Nos: NPF-41, NPF-51, CPPR-143

Licensee: Arizona Nuclear Power Project

P..O. Box 52034

' Phoenix, AZ. 85072-2034

Facility Name: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2 & 3.

Inspection Conducted; Augus - e ember 7, 1986

Inspectors: b~ b

R.Mi erman, r' ident Inspector Date Signed

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C. Bost' d , Res n ector Date Signed

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P. Phe'i'ai f React sp etor Date Signed

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Approved By:

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L. Milldr', ' Chief, Kejprtor Projects Section 2 Date Signed

Summary:

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Inspection on August 4, through September 7, 1986 (Peport Nos.-50-528/86-27,

50-529/86-26, and 50-530/86-20)

Areas Inspected: Routine, onsite, regular and tackuhift inspection by the

five resident inspectors, and one Region V reactor inspector. Areas inspected

included: followup of previously identified items; reviev of plant activities;

plant tours; engineered safety system walkdowns; surveillance testing;

maintenance; startup test witnesting and test results; preoperational test

procedure review and test witnessing; Licensee Event Report followup; periodic

-and special report review; IE Notice followup review; Hotline Program review;

and allegation followup.

8610160020 860930

PDR ADOCK 05000528

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During.this. inspection the following Inspection Procedures were covered: '

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'.30703, 36700, 37301, 41400, 61726,--62703, 70329,'70341,-70362, 70462, 70562,.

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.70441,'71302, 71707, 71710,~.72301, 72302, 72596, 72608, 92700, 92701,';92702,.

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Results: Of the fifteen areas inspected, no violations were identified.

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DETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted:

The technical and supervisory personnel listed below were among those'

contacted:

Arizont Nuclear Power Project.(ANPP)

R. Adney, Operations Superintendent, Unit 2

-*J. Allen, Operations Manager

J. R. Bynum, PVNGS Plant-Manager

B. Cederqu'.st, Chemical Services Manager

J. Dennis, Operations Supervisor, Unit 1

W. Fernow, Training Manager

D. Gouge, Operations. Superintendent, Unit 3

J.-G. Hayaes, Vice President Nuclear Production

W. E. Ide, Corporate Quality Assurance Manager

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W. Jump, Startup Manager,, Unit 3

J. Kirby, Project Transition Manager

j A. McCabe,- Assistant Startup Manager, Unit 3

D. Nelson, Operations Security Manager

R. Nelson, Maintenance Manager

G. Perkins,. Radiological Services. Manager

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J. Pollard, Operations Supervisor, Unit 2

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F. Riedel, Operations Supervisor, Unit 3

T. Shriver,' Compliance _ Manager

L. Souza, Assistant Quality Assurance Manager

E. E. Van Brunt, Jr. , Executive Vice President

JR. Younger, Operations Superintendent',' Unit 1

.

0. Zeringue, Technical Support Manager

'Bechtel Power Construction (Bechtel). ~

D. Anderson, Chief Resident. Engineer

D. Hawkinson, Project QualityjAssurance Manager .

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G. Hierzer, Field _. Construction Manager

, J. Houchen, Project Manager a

The-inspectors also talked with other licensee and contractor personnel

during the course of the inspection.

Attended the. Exit Meeting on September 5, 1986.

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2.- Previously Identified Items ,

Unit I

a '. . (Closed) Followup Item (50-528/85-06-09): Emergency Lighting To Be

Installed Prior to 5 Percent Power

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LDuring an Appendix R inspection, the licensee was in t'he process of

' installing 8-hour battery powered emergency lighting in all areas-

needed for operation _of safe shutdown equipment, and the access and

~ egress-routes thereto. The licensee committed to have.the lighting

installation work _ completed by April 30,'1985 or prior:to exceeding

five percent power.

By letter dated' April 15, 1985;to NRR,' Licensing Branch'No.

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3', the

licensee confirmed-that all of!theer'equired 8-hour emergency lights

needed for the operation of safe shutdown equipment were installed

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and operational. 'The inspector ~ walked down the access and egress

routes as well as the safe shutdown'~ equipment _itself, and verified,

on a sample basis, that the= emergency lights were operational. This

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item is closed. - -

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b .- (C1'ose'd) Enfo$ cement ' Item- (50-528/85-31-06) : iWork' Performed On

Diesel Generator-Without'a Procedure.

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Duringia tourfof the plantt thi inspector: observed an; operator

cross-connecting the ' air' re'ceivers of_ the "A" Diesel Generator

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(DG),

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a'nd determined that no procedure for the configuration change

existed.'lThe. Final Safety Analysis Report describes'the DG air

start system as consisting of two independent air start systems.

The cross-connection of the two air receivers resulted in a change

to the_ plant design without the required 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation

being performed. ,

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Plant procedure 40AC-9ZZO2, " Conduct of Shift.0pera'tions",-allowed

the shift supervisor to verbally direct activities for.which no

procedure exists, if he deems a. temporary procedure to ben

unnecessary. The licensee revised procedure 40AC-9ZZ02,to prohibit

modifications to operable safety related-systems without first

performing a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation, using the Temporary

Modification Process or Nuclear Safety Review process, unless the

modification is made'to avoid immediate entry into or recovery from

a plant emergency. The inspector reviewed the^ implementation of the

revised procedure and found no apparent discrepancies. This. item is

closed.

Unit 2

c. (Closed) Enforcement Item (50-529/86-02-01): Personnel Error

Involving Instrumentation / Control (1/C) Activities.

This matter deals with a violation involving ineffective corrective

setfon associated with the prevention of a series of several I/C

personnel errors which occurred over a short period of time. _The

licensee has implemented several corrective actions which include

the use of prework assignment check lists and the incorporation into

training sessions of the lessons learned from specific errors.

While the work performed since the implementation of the actions has

not been error free, the frequency has been reduced somewhat. The

item is considered closed; however, future inspection reviews of the

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licensee's performance in this. area will be made as part of the?

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normal. inspection program..

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(Closed) Followup Item (50-529/86-20-01):- Modification:of

Maintenance Work Control Procedure.

This item' refers to.a need identified for the licensee to' revise the

primary work" control, instruction to highlight a requirement for work

order amendments to be_ reviewed for necessary radiation protection

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. controls prior to performing the new work. The inspector confirmed

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that a change to procedure 30AC-9ZZ01 " Work Control" was made to

include the referenced action.~ This item is closed.

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.e. (Closed) Enforcement Item (50-530/84-07-17): Cable Reels In

, Quarantine Without Hold Tags. .

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( + During a previous inspection of the cable. storage and issuing area,' , , ,

,- it was found that five reels of safety grade cable were stored in a n .

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quarantine area for nonconforming material without being;identifiedi

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'by " Hold Tags".. This was identified as a violation of,Bechtel

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Lprocedures and NRC requirements and a notice of. violation _was ,

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A followup NRC inspection (50-530/84-24) revealed that the

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licensee's response to the notice'of violation was incomplete in

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However, upon further investigation, the inspector concluded that ' - 'S

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were not:sufficiently made clear in the response letter. ,The ,

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licensee committed to provide a revised response which'would address

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all of the cable reels cited in the notice.of violation. The

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revised response was submitted by letter on December 24', 1984 '

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'C (ANPP-31572, WFQ/TJB).

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During this inspection, the inspector reviewed-applicable

documentation including: licensee correspondence, procedures,-and

nonconformance reports (NCRs) and concluded that the licensee's

revised response was complete. This item is closed.

f. (Closed) Followup Item (50-530/85-09-02): Under Torqued Bolts on-

Electrical Raceway Installations.

This item relates to a finding by the inspector of under torqued

bolts on electrical raceway installations. During the previous-

inspection period, the inspector identified'four out of 112 splice

plates on 18 tray sections to contain loose bolts. Each-of the four

plates.containing loose bolts were found to lack construction-

markings (i.e. torque indications) found on other plates.

Subsequently, the licensee performed visual inspection of all

Q-Class tray runs for similar conditions. Of 5559 plates inspected

on 1711 trays, 118 plates were found to lack construction markings

with only 28 of the 118 plates found to have loose bolts. An

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,, engineering evaluation. performed by the. licensee indicated that.the

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( 5 "small' percentage, sand random nature of the-bolting discrepancies did "

.- not effect the structural integrity or-required electrical grounding

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continuity'of the cable tray system. Based on the inspector's _

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g. (Closed) . Followup Item (50-530/86-03-01): Adequacy of Class 1E-

Raceway Separation Walkdowns.

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During the NRC CAT inspection, a need to perform a subseque'nt NRC

inspection was identified which would verify the adequacy _of the

licensee's walkdowns of plant areas for the purpose of assuring

compliance with Class 1E raceway separation criteria. At the

- conclusion of this reporting period, the licensee had completed

walkdowns of a large percentage of the plant areas. .The inspector

walked down various areas previously inspected by the licensee.

These included areas in the Unit 3 Containment, Auxiliary, and

' Control Buildings and the Main _ Steam Support Structure. The

inspector's examination indicated that.the licensee's program

appeared to have been effective in' assuring compliance with FSAR

commitments related to implementation'of Regulatory.Cuide 1.75

" Physical Independence of Electrical Systems".. This item is closed.

h. (Closed) Followup Item (50-530/86-03-05 and 06): -Diesel Generator

Control Cabinet and Battery Charger Wire Termination Deficiencies.

These items relate to several deficiencies which were identified

with vendor' wiring in the diesel generator (DG)-control cabinets and

battery chargers during the NRC CAT inspection.

As a result of the CAT findings, detailed inspections of the DG

control cabinets and battery chargers were performed and documented

by the licensee on Special Construction Inspection Plans 696.0 and

698.0. A number of nonconformance reports were generated-as a

result of the inspections. Subsequently, this data was combined

1 .into Deficiency Evaluation Report (DER) 86-06 which not only

addressed the specific type of deficiencies identified and their

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' safety significance, but also provided an evaluation of the

L transportability of these_ findings to other Class 1E panel wiring in

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all three, units. Engineering Evaluatien Report (EER) 86-DG-024

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documents inspection of the DG control cabinets in Unita 1 and 2 and

( 'EEK 86-PK-008 documents inspection of the battery chargers in the _ ,

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two units. Minor termination discrepancies were identified and work.

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orders issued to repair terminations, cs necessary; however,'no

, detrimental effect on component operability was identified. In

f, addition, corrective, action request (CAR) S-86-26 was issued by the

licensee for~the inspection of three cabinets in Unit 3 supplied by.

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three other vendors. Minor termination discrepancies _were found and'

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, subsequently repaired as needed.

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, extent of the termination problems and corrective actions taken,

this item is closed. -

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3. ' Review of Plant Activities

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=a. Unit 1

At the start of the inspection period, the. plant was operating at

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100%. On August 6,'a loss of one startup transformer, caused by a

electrical-fault in Unit 2, (see part b. of this paragraph) resulted

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in a. loss of one train of non-vital power, which tripped two reactor

- coolant pumps and' tripped the reactor on low Departure from Nucleate

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Boiling Ratio (DNBR).. Slight overcooling of_the plant when several

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motor operated valves in the main steam system failed "as is" on the

loss of power produced a Safety Injection, Containment Isolation,

and Main Steam Isolation Actuation. An Unusual Event was declared

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- due to the complication of the reactor trip.

~ The plant was restarted on August 13 and operated at 50% power until

a reactor trip, occurred on August 15. During a load rejection test,

the steam bypass control system.did not maintain sufficient' cooling

of the reactor coolant system (RCS) to_ prevent the reactor trip on

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high pressurizer pressure due to reactor' coolant system heatup.

The plant was restarted on August-16 and power raised to 100% on

August 17. The unit tripped on August 30 from' Jow Steam Generator

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1 delta-pressure,,which provides low re' actor _ coolant flow

protection.- The licensee has. submitted a Technical Specification

change to revise,the: delta-pressure trip setpoint following an

evaluation by Combustion Engineering which concluded the existing

. setpoint was overly conservative. The' unit was restarted August 31

and.again tripped from 100% on September 2 from a low Steam

Generator #2. delta-pressure signal. The plant'was restarted

September 5 and power was raised to 100% where it remained at the

end of the reporting period.

- The licensee performed _ power ascension testing at the 50, 80 and

100% power plateaus during the inspection period.

b. Unit 2

On_ August 5, a turbins trip accurred from a power level of 50%. The

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- reactor' power was reduced to 6% following the turbire trip. The

cause of the trip could not be confirmed during the licensee's

troubleshooting efforts.

On August 6, the reactor tripped from projected low D!!BR when

protective relays for the power supply to the Startup Transformer

-X03-isciated the transformer, resulting in a loss of one train of

non-vital power, including two reactor coolant pumpr. A

i- malfunctioning current transformer associated with X03 sensed the

13.8 KV faulted condition and isolated the transformer. The i

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transformer relaying was preceded by an electrical fault in the 13.8

KV load control center LO2. An overhead feedwater vent valve

leaking water into the LO2 cabinet caused a phase to phase fault

E which resulted in load center damage. Following efforts to repair

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identified component problems the, reactor was restarted xnt August '13

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On August:13.a' turbine trip occurred'fromaip'ower level of'50% as a:

- result of: a moisture separator rehea't'er '(MSR) high level trip. -

Reactor: power level was reduced to 6%. ": Licensee investigative:

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efforts reveale'd that an isolation valve" closed .to repair a .leaksin

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l? a' sensing line to the'"D"LMSR level. instrumentation had leaked:

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'through, and~ condensing steam actuated the high wat'er level ,

L switches. . Following~ repair of the problem reactor power was raised

to a new 80% plateau.

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On August,25 a reactor! trip ~ occurred,from a-high. pressurizer

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pressure signal as a~ result of a main generator-trip caused by a

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main generator excitation problem. The excitation problem was

determined by the: licensee to be an improperly; calibrated field:

current measuring transducer whose-signal was used_in the generator

protective circuit. The plant was restarted and power increased to

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On August.28 the reactor again tripped on high pressurizer pressure.-

i ~The reactor trip was preceded by a main generator trip caused'again ,

by an excitation problem. . Investigation revealed a current .

transformer in the excitation controls was wired: improperly. This

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problem was corrected by reversing leads, and the reactor restarted-

on August 30. Power level was increased to 100% for the first; time

on September 5 and power ascension testing resumed.

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c. " Unit.3

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During the inspection period system prerequisite and preoperational' .

testing continued. Major test activities included the'initiali

hydrostatic tests of the reactor. coolant and main steam systems, ;

testing of the Train "A" Diesel Generator 'and local' leak rate

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i' testing of containment penetrations in preparation for.the s

containment l structural integrity andzintegrated leak rate tests.-

! Construction activities in Unit-3 were estimated to-be over 99

[- percent complete by the licensee.

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.d. Plant Tours ,

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The following plant areas at Units 1, 2 and 3 were toured by-the

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f o Auxiliary Building

o Containment Building .

o Control Complex Building.

, o Diesel Generator Building.

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o Radwaste1 Building .

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o Technical Support Center ...

o Turbine Building _

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! o , Yard Area and. Perimeter *

The fellowing areas were observed during the tours:

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(1) Operating Logs and' Records. Records were-reviewed againct'

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Technical Specification and administrative' control procedure

requirements.

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(2)? Monitoring Instrumentation. Process' instruments'were observed

. 'for correlation between channels and for conformance with

Technical Specification requirements.

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(3): Shift Manning. . Control room and' shift-manning were observed

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'for conformance with 10 CFR 50.54.(k), Technical

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Specifications, and administrative procedures.

(4) Equipment-Lineups. Valve and electrical breakers were verified

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to be in the position or condition required by Technical

Specifications and administrative procedures for the applicable

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plant mode.- ThisJverification included routine control board'

indication reviews and conduct of partial system lineups.

(5)' Equipment Tagging ~ 7 Selected: equipment,'for which tagging

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requests had been initiated, was observed to' verify that tags

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were'in place and-the equipment in the condition:specified.

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(6) General Plant Equipment Conditions. . Plant equipment was

observed for indications of system = leakage,' improper-

-lubrication, or other conditions that would prevent the system

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~ Duringla p1' ant tour of. Unit.2,tthe inspector noted that

temporary blowersLhad been put in use to provide additional

heat removal!from: Technical Specification Class IE radiation ,

monitors: RU-1, a containment-atmosphere process monitor; and

i- RU-37; a power: access purge area monitor. The portable blowers

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were non-class.1E and were supplied by non-vital power. -The

t inspector informed the licensee that if'the-monitors were

! dependent on the blowers to remain) operational, the operability

i of the monitors would be suspect'..!The licensee representative

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stated'that there have been some problems with the monitors

which were believed to be heat related; however, the blowers

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were not considered necessary for the operation of the

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enhance the life time of varioua compoaents within the monitor.

j- 'Further, the licensee stated that several modifications are

l under consideration to improvs the cooling to the monitors.

This item will remain open pending further review by the

inspector of the expected performar.ce of the monitors without

,

-

the support of the additional ~non-class 1E blowers.-

(529/86-26-01)

i (7) Fire Protection. Fire fighting equipment and controls were

,

observed for conformance with Technical Specifications were

[ administrative procedures.

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(8)<tPlant Chemistry. Chemicalt analysis re'sults were. reviewed for

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-conformance with Technical Specifications and administrative- ,

-

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control procedures.

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2(9)L Security. Activities observed for conformance with regulatory

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requirements,' implementation of the site security plan, and 1

I'

.

. administrative procedures included vehicle and personnel' ,

3

'

l access, and protected and vital area integrity. ,

'

,

. .,

.

"

m(10) Plant Housekeeping. -Plant conditions and material / equipment ,

'f storage were observed.to determine the general state of

f cleanliness and housekeeping. Housekeeping in the .

radiologically controlled area was evaluated with respect to

, controlling the spread of surface and airborne contamination.

(11) Radiation' Protection Controls. Areas observed included control

, point operation, records of licensee's surveys within the

radiologically controlled area, posting of radiation and high

radiation areas, compliance with Radiation Exposure Permits,

personnel monitoring devices being properly worn, and personnel

frisking practices.

.

No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.

4. Engineered Safety Feature System Walk Down - Units 1 and 2.

' Selected engineered safety feature ' systems (and systems important to

safety) were walked down by the inspector to confirm'that the systems

were aligned in accordance with plant procedures. During the walkdown of

the systems,' items such as hangers, supports, electrical cabinets,

instruments, and cables were inspected to determine that they were

operable, and in a condition to perform their required functions. The

inspector.also verified that the system valves were in the required

. position and locked as appropriate, and that support systems essential to

system actuation or performance were operable. The local and remote

position indication and controls were also confirmed to be in the

required position and operable.

Unit 1

Accessible portions of the following systems were walked down on

August 6,19, and 26, .1986:

,

High Pressure Safety Injection, Trains "A" and B".

Low Pressure Safety Injection, Trains "A" and "B".

Containment Spray Systems, Trains "A" and "B".

Essential Cooling Water, Trains "A" and "B".

Diesel Generato7 Systems, Trains "A" and "B".

'

Hydrogen Recombiners, Trains "A" and "B".

'1 , Unit 2

.

Accessible portions of the following system were walked down on

.

'

August 15, 21, 28 and September 3, 1986:

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" Safety Injection, Tanks.

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High Pressure Safety Injection, Trains-"A" and B".

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d' Low Pressure Safety Injection,-Trains "A":and "B".

>

Containment Spray System, Trains ."A" and "B".-

Auxiliary Feedwater System, Trains "A" and'"B".

-Diesel Generator Train "A" Air Supply. System.

'

No viol $tions of NRC requirements or deviationr were identified. .

~

5. Surveillance" Testing:- Units 1 and 2.

a. Surveillance tests ~ required.to be performed by the Technicali

.

Specifications (TS)~were' reviewed on a sampling' basis to verify-

4

that: 1) the: surveillance tests were. correctly included on the-

. facility schedule; 2) a technically: adequate procedure existed.for-

performance of the surveillance: tests; 3) the surveillance tests had

-been performed at the frequency.specified.in the TS; and 4) test.

i results, satisfied acceptance criteria or were properly

dispositioned.

Portions of the following surveillances were witnessed by the

'

b.

i inspector on the' dates shown:

. Unit I

t

,

r. Procedure Description. Dates Performed

!, . .

.

36ST-9SB09 Plant Protective System "

August 5, 1986

i~ RTD Response Time Test -

36ST-1SE03 Excore Safety Channel . August 8, 1986

,

Quarterly Calibration

41ST-17Z06 . Inoperable Power Source August-26 1986

i >'

-

- i" ' '

. 72ST-9SB02 CPC/CEAC Auto Restart Check August 26, 1986' . ,

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41ST-12Z18 Routine Surveillance August 26, 1986

.. Mode 1-4

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41ST-12Z23 CEA Position Data - August 26, 1986 -

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Dates Performed

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Procedure Description ,

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42'ST-2ZZ23 CEA Position-Data Log August 21, 1986 , , ; ,

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PPS Bistable Trip Units August 21 and 4 .

.

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Functional Test 22, 1986-

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73ST-2ZZ05 Section XI Check Valve August 22, 1986 ,

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Operability Normal Operation

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(CS' Check valves'157i.185 and-

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} LPSI check valves ,451"and 201)

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No violations o'f NRC: requirements or deviations.,were identified.

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$6. Plant Maintenance UnitJ1'and 2 c.

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'During the inspection, period, the inspector' observed and reviewed

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documentation' associated'with' maintenance"andiproblem investigation

activities to verify. compliance with, regulatory requirements,

compliance with administrative'and; maintenance procedures,-required-

^ QA/QC involvement, . proper use of safetytta'gs, proper equipment

- 1

alignment and use of- jumpers, personnel qualifications, and proper

retesting. The inspector verifie'd reportability for these "

activities was-correct.

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i b. The. inspector witnessed portions of the following maintenance

activities:

.

s

Unit'l

Description Dates Performed

o Troubleshooting steam generator September 3 and

low flow condition. 4, 1986

Unit 2

i

Description . Dates Performed

o Installation of recorders to monitor August 13, 1986

lockout relays on generator. protection

panel.

o Troubleshooting main steam line August 14, 1986

radiation monitor..

o Installation of charging pump suction- August 27, 1986-

'

dampener vent system.

l <

No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.

7.; Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup - Units 1-and 2.

> a. .The following LERs associated with operating events were reviewed by

-the inspector at.the time of the occurrence. In addition, the

inspector performed an in-office review and based en the information

provided in the report concluded that reporting requirements had

- been met, root causes had been identified, and corrective actions

were appropriate. These LERs are closed.

Unit 1 Description

.

+

, - . ---e - ,a4

- .

. .

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11

-

.

LER 85-04 Automatic Actuation of BOP ESFAS by Spurious

Signal.

'LER'85-30 Section XI Test Not-Performed on Time.

'

SLER 85-54 -Airlock Seal Leak Test Not Performed Within

Time Limits.

LER 85-57 Safety Injection Tank Not Surveilled Before

Increasing Pressure Above 1837 psia.

~

LER 85-71 Reactor Trip Initiated by Load Rejection Test.

'

LER.85-80' Reactor Trip Due to Out of Tolerance Setpoint

on a Turbine Runback.

LER 86-01 Diesel Generator Failure and Technical

Specification Action Statement Exceeded.~

LER 86-06 Reactor Trip Caused by Turbine Trip During

Testing.

LER 86-13 Spurious Actuation of BOP ESEAS by Electrical

,

Noise.

LER 86-18 Reactor Trip Due to Low SG Level.

LER 86-19 Loss of Power to DC Bus and ESF Actuation Due

to procedure deficiency.

LER 86-20-01 . Reactor Trip Initiated by_Feedwater Anomaly.

~

LER 86-24 Reactor Trip Due to Low Steam' Generator Level.

LER 86-27 Spurious Actuation.of' BOP ESPAS-(MSIS) in

Mode 5.

LER 86-3d Inadvertent MSIS Actuation.Due'to Personnci

' Error in Mode 5.

!

l LER 86-37 Spuriouc Actiation of FBEVAS.

'

LER 86-42 Reactor Trip on Low DNBR Due to CEA

Misalignment.

LER 86-47 Reactor Trip Caused by Too Conservative Steam

Generator Low Flow Setpoints.

Unit 2 Description

LER 86-34 Reactor Trip Initiated by an Unanticipated

Turbine Trip.

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Surveillance Tests Not Performed Within-

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Required Time Due to Personnel Error.-

, LER 86-35 Surveillance Performance Exceeded Maximum

,

Allowable Time Due to Personnel Error.

[ . Technical Specification 3.0.3. Entered Due to.

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LER 86-18 ..'

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Loss of. Charging Pumps.

'

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/ LER 86-36 Reactor Shutdown Due to Faulty' Control Elemen't- > ,-

'

,

Assembly Timer Card. '

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LER 86-37

. Main Steam Isolation Signal Actuation Due ,

,

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4

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.to Steam Generator Swell.. 3 r'

.

s

.

LER'86-40 Limiting Condition for Operation 3.0.3 Entered

,

'

Due to Personnel Error. .

4

LE,R 86-43 Inadvertent Engineered Safety Features

.s Actuation Due to Personnel Error.

b. The following Unit 1 events were also reviewed during the inspection

period to the same criteria as stated in paragraph "a" above:

(1) .(Closed) LER 528/85-50: Isolation of Plant Protective Channel

On July 17, 1985, a containment pressure transmitter isolation ,

'

valve was discovered closed. The transmitter provides one of

four inputs to the logic-that activates the containment spray

<~

portion of the ESEAS. The valve position was last checked on

April 25, 1985. The'date the valve was closed and the reason

for closure were not determined. The other three channels of

input to containment spray remained operable during the time of

April 25 to July 17.. Technical' Specifications require that a

minimum of three channels be operable.

For corrective actions, calibration procedures were revised to

require specific steps to restore the isolation valves to

service rather than the previous general terminology, " return

the transmitter to service". The inspector reviewed 36ST-9SB28

"PPS Loop Input Calibration for Parameter 13, High Containment'

Pressure" and verified that the procedure had been revised.

Through conversation with Control Room operators and I6C

technicians, the inspector verified that they were aware of the

sensitive nature of the containment pressure isolation valves

and the consequences of these valves being inadvertently shut.

This LER is closed.

(2) (Closed) LER 528/85-059: Failure to Check Unlocked Fire Doors.

The licensee's Quality Assurance organization identified that

certain unlocked fire doors.were not being properly checked

every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months 'as required by Technical Specifications.

Additionally, several other unlocked fire doors were also

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. . identified by Fire Protection' personnel, as not being properly' i,

checked. It was determined that the root cause of the problem

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was. associated with the administrative controls governing the' , 4

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' procedure review and approval. process. 'The administrative a

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~ controls'were not written such that all applicable plant change

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. notices (PCNs) from one revision were being incorporated into

,

the next revision of the procedure.

,

.

The licensee made a comprehensive review and walk. down of all

' ,

fire doors required by the-Technical Specifications, which

s resulted in the identification of five unlocked fire doors not _

being checked. These five doors, along with all locked fire

doors, were added to plant procedure 14ST-1ZZ24, " Unlocked Fire

Door Position Verification". Additionally, plant procedure

70AC-0ZZ02, " Review and Approval of Station Procedures", was

revised to include a step to verify'that_all PCN's/TPCN's were

being incorporated in the revised procedures. This LER is

closed.

(3) (Closed) LER 528/85-82:-Diesel Generator Failure to Load During

Test not Reported.

As the result of a review of the Diesel Generator (DG) Start

Log conducted on March 7, 1986 a misclassification of a DC

failure was identified. The event was initially classified as

an invalid test failure when the DG output breaker failed to

receive a permissive. This was'due to a loose wire at the

termination. The misclassification was the result of the

misinterpretation of the Technical. Specifications associated

with the number of diesels required to be: operable when in

Mode 5.

The root cause of the error was the failure of responsible

personnel to properly implement the approved procedures for

classifying DG failures. As corrective action, Operations

Department Guideline #49, which is used by Operations to

classify DG failures, was revised to include more detailed

information to assist personnel in classifying DG failure

related events. Additionally, responsible personnel were

briefed on the overall reporting requirements for DG failures.

The inspector reviewed the classification of DG events since

the implementation of the corrective action. The corrective

actions taken appear to be effective, in that no further

classification errors were noted. This LER is closed.

t. (4) (0 pen) LER 528/85-83: Spurious ESF Actuations Caused by

overheated ESF Sequencer Module. ,

As the result of an electronics failure in the train "A"

'

Engineering Safety Features (ESF) cabinet, several ESF signals

'

spuriously actuated. Spurious auto-start of the train "A"

'

o - Emergency Diesel Generator (DG), along with the operation of

the ESF load sequencer and load shed signal occurred as the.-

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result of/the electronics fail'ure.- The root ~ cause of -the = event ~

'

was the failure of the fan in the ESF cabinet, which cause'd the

.;

ESF load sequencer to overheat an'd malfunction.

.

As a~ corrective action, the failed Nan was replaced by two

' larger. capacity fans,~ and'the malfunctioning load sequencer was

replaced under Work Order :125048. - Additionally, design change

package (DCP)~10JSA017 was completed on-March 24,- 1986 which

-

installed a control room, alarm which annunciates on high exit

J

air temperature'fromithe ESF cabinet.

'

, ,

-

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The licensee is planning to submit an assessment of the safety-

consequences of this event in'a' supplement-to this LER. All

other corrective action's-were timely' and'. effective. This LER

~

r will sremain open' pending' review of thet licensee's supplemental'

'

"

greport.] ,

/

'

(5) (Closed) LER 528/86-01: Dies'l e Genera'tdr F ilure and Technical

Specification Action Statement Exceeded.- .

, ,

During.a manual start of' Diesel:Gener'ator~(DG) "B", the DG came

~

up to running speed,-decelerated and tripped. The~DG was'

declared inoperable. Accordingly, Action Statement 3.8.1.1 of

the Technical' Specifications was~ent'ered. The Action Statement

required the remaining A.C.. sources to be' demonstrated operable

within I hour-and at least once per eight hours thereafter.

The initial performanc'e test was performed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ,

however, the subsequent test was not performed within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months

as required. .The root cause of the. error was personnel error

by the licensed operators. The Control Room personnel were.

aware of the surveillance requirement, but failed to remember

to perform it. The surveillance was satisfactorily conducted

following identification of having been missed, and all other

subsequent surveillances were performed within the required

time. frame.

As a result of this event the responsible personnel were

counseled in the importance of satisfying all action statements

and were directed to.use the plant personal computer to assist

in tracking action statement time limits. The inspector.

reviewed the Control Room log and noted the, corrective actions

were effective, in that over the past ten wonths no similar

operator errors have occurred. . This LER is closed.

(6) (Closed) LER 528/86-08-00, 01: Three Inoperable Charging Pumps

and Entry Into Technical-Specification 3.0.3.

On February 18, 1986, Unis I was operating at 100% and

experienced a temporary loss of all three charging pumps for

approximately 18 minutes. The root cause of the loss of pumps

was a leaking bladder within the discharge pulsation dampener

on the "B" charging pump. The gas charge in the dampener

leaked by the discharge relief valve, then to the common

suction line for the three pumps.. causing the pumps to become

. .

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. gas bou d. As ' corrective action, the leaking bladder was

replaced and the condition.of the bladders in Units 1-and 2 ,

.were inspected, and the surveillance procedure of the pulsation-

'

-

dampeners was enhanced to verify the conditien of~the bladders

monthly. *

The: inspector has reviewed the weekly and monthly surveillance

4 procedures and has reviewed the actions'following a similar

event in Unit 2 in July, 1986 (LER 529-86-18).- This LER is

' '

closed.

(7) (Closed) LER 528/86-026: T9 operable Class 1E' Batteries Due to'

' Inadequate Surveillance Testing.

During an evaluation of the applicable Technical Specifications

,

(TS) the licensee determined that the preoperational test data-

associated with.the intercell resistance of the Class IE-

'

batteries.was unacceptable. The instrument used to measure the

+

-cell-resistance was accurate enough'to establish base line

data, but.not accurate enough to satisfy TS criteria.

4

Upon ' discovery, the 18 month surveillance test of the 125 volt

batteries was performed, and the~intercell resistance was=found

, to'be within the TS limits. As corrective action, responsible .

personnel were counseled. Additionally, a sample review of

other surveillance test credit based on preoperational testing'

was performed. About 20 surveillances were reviewed by the.STA

Group, with none containing discrepancies which resulted in the.

requirements of the TS not being met. - The inspector found~no

other discrepancies since the implementation of-the' licensee's

corrective actions. This LER is. closed.

No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified..

. .

8; "Preoperational Testing - Unit 3

a. Test Procedure Review

t

The inspector reviewed the following preoperational test procedure

for technical and administrative adequacy:

Procedure ' Description

< , ,

,

'

)

93PE-3PE01/ Diesel Generator Electrical Tests

The; inspector2 foundTthe procedure ~provided:a' clear explanation of'

the purpose,~ prerequisites for' performance. appropriate sign-off- .

'. steps.,*and' quantitative or qualitative; acceptance criteria as

required.' s4 ,

. -

- b. Test Witnessing ,

,

The inspector witnessed the performance of preoperational testing to-

verify that.the procedure in use'was properly approved and

adequately detailed to assure satisfactory performance;-test

.

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-instrumentation required by the procedure was calibrated and in use;

,

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, work _was performed by qualified personnel;.and'results satisfied

'

procedural. acceptance criteria,or were properly.dispositioned. -

,ts The; inspector witnessed the performance'of portions of the'following

' '

' . system' testing = activities:

. Procedure- : Description ,

' '

s 391PE-3EC01= Essential Chilled Water System Test .

. .i1* 3 JIPE-3RC01 Reactor Coolant. System Test .

' if" i:;;% i

,

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92PE-3SF04- ' Steam Generator Bypass control. System Test '%

~ '~ ^ * .93PE-3PE01 Diesel Generator Electrical Tests <

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.

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s violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.

..

,3.

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% y l9.,,PriEry/Seconda'ryHydrostatic' Tests,-Unit'3.4

~

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> . ; E h Y During this report period, the inspector witnessed the initial ,

.

'

y]; , { i+. hydrostatic! test-of the, reactor coolant system primary pressure boundary ( /

~w i. _ ' J uin Unitf 3.1The teer was conducted in accordance 'with the requirements o' f y ~

.

, , . . -- Section III of the c3ME Boiler and Pr' essure Vessel Code and the

. .I flicensee's' test procedure 91CM-3RC01. ,During the test, reactor coolanti ~ N

fM- '9

Isystemipressure was raised to a maximum value of 1175 psig. This

'

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3 '

\t,i(

~ '

5-

,. ' pres'sure was maintained-for ten minutes before lowering pressure to 2490 -

m - psig,for the' conduct of~ visual inspections'oflall. boundary welds.. No

i/}j 7'

'

discrepancies were identified by the licensee-or the inspector during the ~

'

"q inspection., Likewise, thetlicenseeLalso conducted hydrosta_ tic testing of" ,

? j' , the main4 steam system up to,and including the main steam and feedwater

~

-

,. 4; -isolation valves. The test; was conducted in accordance with requirements

~

.

'

1 of theiASME Code and~the 71censee's test; procedure 91CM-3SG01. No

' V . discrepancies were identified by!the licensee.

P ..

,

['" .Upon completion of the secondary hydrostatic test on August 14, 1986, the

-

.. licensee initiated a~cooldown of the reactor coolant system'to ambient

temperature. During the cooldown the licensee started Reactor Coolant

[ Pusop 1A;in order to maintain an even temperature" distribution. With both

i

the , primary 'and secondary systems still in a solid condition, and the

. secondary at a higher temperature, the starting of the pump produced;a

~

J

temperature. transient in the primary system of approximately plus 20

'

degrees F resulting in probable lifting'of the Train "A" shutdown cooling-

! system low temperature over pressure relief valve.. Pressure recordings

-indicated. peak pressure reached was approximately 460- 480 psig. An

approximately 10 gallon per minute leak developed at the bolted flenge

connection between: the relief ' valve - and the shutdown cooling suction

'

Eline. - An.~ attempt was made to isolate the leak by' closing shutdown '

cooling isolation valve?3JSIC-UV653. This failed and the leak was

subsequent 1y'. stopped by closing valve 3JSIA-UV651. An inspection of

valve 3JSIC-UV653 found the motor, operator to be. damaged so as to render

it inoperable. At the end 'of this report period, the licensee was-

-continuing to investigate the nature of the transient and the probable

causes for.the damage to the valve' motor operator. Additional inspector

" followup of the licensee's investigation of this event shall be conducted

~during a future inspection. (530/86-20-01)

.

'

e ,, /

'

.

'17

.+ -

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.

Preoperational and Power Ascension Testing - Units 1 and 2

,

, J10.

'

Unit l'

A review of the licensee's administrative. practices with respect to the

it ,

- evaluation of preoperational test data review was conducted. The

< inspector. reviewed administrative procedure 90AC-0ZZ18 "Startup Test.

Results-Review", FSAR Chapter 14.2.5 and Regulatory Guide 1.68 and

,

' compared the procedure with the results of sample of completed

l preoperational test from the Unit I startup test program. Preoperational

tests that were reviewed included:

,

-

,F o 91PE-1SIO8 SI Full Flow Verifications Test

'

. o 93PE-ISA01 Integrated Safeguards Test

,

4

o 92PE-ISB11 Safety System Response Time Test

The inspector determined that the preoperational tests results were ,

l

' evaluated in accordance with the required administrative controls and'the l

program appeared to meet the requirements'of the FSAR and Regulatory ,

Guide 1.68.

Unit 2

' a. Power Ascension Test Witnessing

The inspector witnessed portions of the following tests:

Description Dates Performed

o 72PA-2RX15 Variable Tave (ITC and August 20, 1986

Power Coefficient Test

at 50%).

o 73PA-2SF04 Control System Checkout August 21, 1986

-

Test at 50%.

o 73PA-2ZZ05 Unit Load Transient August 22, 1986

Test at 50%.

The_ inspector verified that approved procedures were used, test

personnel were knowledgeable of the test requirements, and data was

properly collected. Procedure changes and test exceptions were

identified and significant events were recorded in the test log.

Other test related activities such as the use of calibrated

measuring and test equipment and completion of test prerequisites

were also verified to have been accomplished in accordance with

administrative control procedures.

b. Low Power Physics Test Results Review

A review of the low power physics tests conducted prior to the

increase in power above 5% was conducted by a consultant to the NRC.

The review of the test results are included as Attachment'1 to this

report.

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c.. Power Ascension Test Results Review

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The following test' package was reviewed: ,

o 73PA-2NA01 - Loss of offsite power.- 40% (natural flow-

conditions verified).

~

The. inspector verified that the test'wasTproperly: completed,' test

exceptions were properly addressed and resolved,Ldata acquisition-

was completed.as required, proper approvals had been made .

authorizing power level increase-from 20% to 50% and test results

were planned to be submitted to-the test results review group.,

No violations of'NRC requirements or deviations'were. identified.

~

- . 11., Review of Periodic and Special Report's - Units 1 and 2.

Periodic and special-reports su'mitted b by'the licensee pursuant to

Technical Specificati ns 9 6.9.1 and.6.9.2 were reviewed by the; inspector.

,

This review included;the following considerations: .thelreport contained

the information required to be reported by NRC requirements; test'results-

a nd/or supporting 'information.were consistent 'with ' design predictions and

J

performance specifications; and the' validity of'the reported information.

.

Within the scope;of the above',:the following: reports were reviewed by the-

inspector.

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Periodic Reports-

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a. Unit 1

o Monthly Operati g Report for July,.1986.

b. Unit'2 ,

o Monthly Operating Report for July, ca6.

.

Special~ Reports - Unit 1

' a. (Closed) Special Report 85-13-X0: Diese1' Generators Failure to

Start.

i

During the surveillance test of Diesel. Generator (DC) "B", the DG

was determined to be iroperable due to its failure to achieve

required speed within the required time. Troubleshooting attempts-

were inconclusive as the test failure could not be repeated. The

only discrepancy noted was with the presence of a green abrasive

substance inside air supply valve DGN-UV-250 and its associated

tubing.

!

A sample of the substance was sent to Chemistry for analysis, but

was to small to run the full array of tests. No conclusive

information was obtained from Chemistry. The similar valve on DG

"A" was checked, and had none of the abrasive material present. The

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licensee initiated Engineering. Evaluation] Request 85-DG-034[to

- determine ~ whether the contr'ol' air Lregulator set points needed to be -

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. adjusted'. AfterLanalysis'and consultation with~the DG supplier,- ,

Cooper' Energy,"it was determined;that the regulatorzshould be

increased to 35 psi =to provide-morefrapid opening of the' fuel racks.

~ ~

9

p ' It was the licensee's~op'inionithat the.DGN-UV-250 valve was the main

'

cause of the DG failure, and no similarlproblems has been

l_ - encountered. The revised setpoint'has'been-applied to:all diesels

on. site. This Special Report is closed.- -

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b., (Closed) Special Report 85-15-X0: Diesel Generator-Failure to-Start

,

Within Allowable Time.

,

Diesel Generator-(DG) "A" failed to attain the required speed within

].. the time limits specified in the Technical Specifications.- Analysis

of the parameters monitored by the DG strip chart recorder showed

that the IN3 cranked at an adequate -speed, but. apparently did not -

4- ,

receive sufficient fuel.- The licensee concentrated its

troubleshooting efforts on the fuel control system. -During the

troubleshooting effort',' an air start control valve was found to

contain a slight amount of contamination' The_ inspector reviewed the .

work packages that inspected the starting and control air system for'

additional contamination, and reviewed,' Engineering Evaluation >

l~ Request 85-DG-101 which assessed the need for additional air

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filtration down stream of the starting air receivers. No'further-

! contamination'was~found and additional filtration was not considered

I necessary.- To assist troubleshooting efforts in.the' future, the

,

, licensee-temporarily installed fuel rack and governor response strip.

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chart monitors per Work Order 108494.

.

The root cause of the failure was inconclusive, however, the

licensee impicmented several modifications'to governors which-

appears to have enhanced its performance. 'This Special Report.is

-

closed.

c. (Closed) Special Report 528/1-SR-85-027: Diesel Generator Failed to -

Start During Surveillance Testing.

[. During an attempt to start Diesel Generator (DG) "A" from the

Control Room, as part of a regularly scheduled test,'the DG failed

to start. -The failure occurred as the result'of a failed fiber

l' optic cable causing the test mode starting relay to malfunction. As

(- -with all fiber optics associated with the DG, this fiber optic relay

j- would have been bypassed in the event of an actual emergency

(accident) start.

l Work Order 126181 was issued to replace the faulty fiber optic

cable,

i Additionally, the licensee initiate'd Plant Change Request (PCR)

[ 85-13-DG-058, which entailed.three activities;~1) changing out the

L ' fiber optic receiver boards'with those of greater capacity, 2)

changing out the connector: blocks 'and 3) routing all fiber optic

cables in their own conduit. .These. activities are still being

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_ oworked.:1Wh'en completed the' changes.are~ expected by the licensee.to

enhance thetreliability of the fiber optic system.s This Special: *

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Report is closed.- '

'

?d.- (Closed) Special Report 85-34-X0: Nonvalid Diesel Generator Failure

Due to Fuel Fitting Leak.

The surveillance test of Diesel Generator ~ (DG) "B" was terminated :

when a fuel--leak was observed in the area ~of the fuel. injection pump

- for cylinder 6L. Upon discovery,: the fuel leak was monitored and :

subsequently-determined to be a fire hazard.- The leaking. fuel pump-

was removed'and sent to the manufacturer,.Bendix, for repair and

evaluation. A' leaking-fitting was determined to'be'the.cause.of the

problem. A new fuel pump was installed and the DG was' returned.to ,

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operable statusLafter successfully satisfying the: surveillance test

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requirements. This Special Report is closed.

e. (Closed) Special Report 86-07-X0: Nonvalid Diesel Generator Failure

Due to a Fiber Optic Transistor Failure.

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'During surveillance ~ testing Diesel Generator (DG) "B". failed'as a .

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d< g , i i result of'an over speed trip. The trip:was the result of a failed ,

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. Fiber Optic optical transistor. The' fiber-optic system serves as a

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e boundary between Class IE' system components and non-Class 1E'

components. During an actual emergency the fiber optic system is

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bypassed. ',

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9.. The fiber optic printed circuit board containing the faulty optic , 4

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transistor was replaced. .The DG. tested' satisfactorily and was ['

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- ' declared operable. This Special Report is' closed. ,

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,f. l(Open).Special Report 86-11-X0: ' Valid Diesel Generator Failure'Due f:

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to Failure to Meet Start Lip Times.2 ,

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E - I During the performance of the start and load surveillance test, *

'

Diesel Generator (DG) "A" faile'd to start within 10 seconds as "

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' required. It was determined that: the cause of the failure was a

'

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. ~ seized, output. shaft from the DG governor. The governor was,replacede '

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and.the original governor was sent to the manufacturer for -

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'

e' valuation. To date, the manufacturer, Woodward Governor. Company,'

~has not provided a root cause analysis.of the. governor shaft

J ' seizure. 'With the new governor installed, the DG' was successfully

~

tested and declared operable. No other similar events have

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occurred. This Special Report willl remain.open pending the

inspector's review of the manufacturer's evaluation into the cause

.of the shaft seizure.

g. -(Closed)Special Report 86-33-X0: ' Valid Diesel Generator Failure Due

to Malfunction of Intake Air Dampener.

Durfng"the regularly scheduled surveillance of the Diesel Generator

(DG) "A", the engine tripped on an apparent overspeed condition.

Further investigation revealed that the overspeed butterfly valve

disk had deflected past the normal position. It was determined that

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this; condition was caused by_.the detensioning of the springs that

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i assist the. valve in closing.

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' ' As corrective' actions, . the. licensee -adjusted the springs on the

affected'DC, ordered new springs and initiated an Engineering .

-Evaluation as to the need for periodic. spring' replacement.- The new.

,

-springs were received and will be installed per Work Order 00148920..

c. , Addit ionally, the DG'l-8 month maintenance procedure, 31ST-9DG-01 is

ab it -sL. being revisedLto include the. replacement.of the-springs every 18

im ' months. This Special' Report is closed.

'.ji rlo, .cy

. 3

(Closed) Special-Report 86-42-X0: Nonvalid-Diesel Generator Failure

'

4

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ip? * f- During Troubleshooting.

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h g- 's During' troubleshooting of the cause of'the Diesel Generator (DG)

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trip a clamp was found on the sheathed steel cable that runs to the

governor. The clamp was apparently installed by maintenance workers

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o who had'ere'cted scaffolding in the area. The clamp affected the r

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(# ., - bend' radius of the cable, which in time resulted in the closing'of: + '

>/' -- 'sJ . the air intake-valve, and the subsequent trip of the diesel ' ,

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< Per egulatory Guide 1.108 Rev. 1,' August 1977, the' failure was- 4

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, classified as nonvalid, as the' test was-for troubleshooting-purposes '

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t 'y; i * , only. The clamp was removed andithe engine was tested. -

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- satisfactorily. This Special Report is closed.

,

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. No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.

, ,

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12. (Clo' sed)- TI 2515/75:

,

, Followup to IE Notice No. 86-03 " Potential Deficiencies in Environmental

. Qualification of Limitorque Motor-Valve Operator Wiring" - Units 1, 2

and 3.

The inspector reviewed actions taken by the licensee on the subject

l .~information notice with respect to Units 1 and 2. The question of

'

.

environmental qualification of Limitorque motor valve operator wiring was

,

previously reviewed with the licensee during the Construction Appraisal

,

Team (CAT) inspection of Unit 3 conducted in. January;and February of this

year as documented in~ Inspection Report 50-530/86-03. During the CAT

inspection four motor valve' operators vere. inspected in Unit 3. This

[ inspection disclosed that wire having no distinguishing markings were

~ ~

- installed in these valveLoperators. The 1icensee was however able to

festablish the origin of the wiring through the review of work documents,

^

.

.and'during a subsequent inspection by a region based inspector, provide

r specific. environmental qualification reports for'the subject wiring

l(Reference: Inspection Report 50-530/86-15). Based in large part upon

'

'the results of the CAT inspection, the licensee performed an engineering

evaluation in order to provide a basis for the acceptability of wiring in

motor valve operators located in Units I and 2. The licensee concluded ~

that similar conditions could be expected to exist in Units 1 and 2 as

were found in Unit 3 based on the similarity of work controls that

-

existed.throughout the construction and startup testing of all three

,

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. units. During this inspection, the' inspector physically inspected the

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internal wiring of two valves each in Units 1 and 2 and reviewed work

documentation for two additional valves in'each unit. The inspector's

visual examination of the motor valve operator wiring in the. valves

,

inspected found the installed wiring to be identifiable as qualified

'

wire. In the review of work documentation, the inspector noted one case

in which the particular wire type and reel number was not recorded on the

inspection record, preventing traceability of the installed wiring back.

to a particular-purchase-order. The work documentation and inspection

record did however indicate the appropriate wire type specified for use

and that the quality control inspector had verified that the specified

wire was installed. This is therefore considered to have been an-

oversight.in the documentation process and not representative of an error

in the installation. Based on the inspector's review of the licensee's

response to the'information notice and the independent observations made,

this item is closed.

No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.

13.' Review of QA Hotline Program

During this inspection, the inspector reviewed the licensee's

organization associated with the QA Hotline Program, recent activities

within the program and actions taken as a result of recent QA Hotline

" concerns. The inspector reviewed the following administrative procedures

-

which control the conductLof the Hotline program:

o 6N417.19.00, - Hotline Procedure

o 6I417.19.01, - QA " Hotline Program"

o 6N417.16.00, - Corrective Action

The inspector reviewed nine Hotline investigations which were closed by

the licensee over the past six months. The inspector found the

investigations to be thorough in the; review of-the stated concern. The

inspector also reviewed six corrective actionirequests (CAR'S) written as

a result of the licensee's' findings during.the. course of their

investigations. The inspector found.the documentedfcorrective actions

taken to appropriately address the stated concern. The inspector also

interviewed three investigators within'the-Hotline ~ organization. Each

appeared well versed in the responsibilities of their position and the

means by which to accomplish the stated mission of the Hotline program.

No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.

14. Allegation RV-85-A-022

Characterization

A site employee expressed concern that the corrosion in the essential

spray ponds piping was not microbiologically induced but rather from the

use of too strong a cleaning solvent.

Implied Significance to Plant Design, Construction or Operations

ML20215E890

Text

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