ML20207P293
| ML20207P293 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 12/23/1986 |
| From: | Jape F, Larry Nicholson, Schnebli G, Matt Thomas NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207P280 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-424-86-118, NUDOCS 8701150365 | |
| Download: ML20207P293 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000424/1986118
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON
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REGION 11
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Report No.: 50-424/86-118
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
P. O. Box 4545
Atlanta, GA 30302
Docket No.: 50-424
License No.: CPPR-108
Facility Name: Vogtle 1
Inspection Conducted:
November 12-24, 1986
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Inspectors:
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Approved by:
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Test Programs Section
Engineering Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of
preoperational test witnessing and review.
Results:
One violation was identified - Failure to adequately document and
evaluate diesel generator performance.
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REPORT DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Licensee Employees
- R. E. Conway, Senior Vice-President, Vogtle Project Director
- P. D. Rice, Vice-President, Vogtle Project
- R. H. Pinson, Vice-President, Project Construction
- C. E. Belflower, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Operations
- R. M. Bellamy, Project Manager
- W. C. Gabbard, Senior Regulatory Specialist
- A. L. Mosbaugh, Superintendent, Engineering Services
J. Aufdenkampe, Lead Test Supervisor
Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians,
operators, mechanics, and office personnel.
Other Organization
H. M. Handfinger - Assistant Startup Manager, Bechtel
NRC Resident Inspectors
- J. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector - Operations
- R. J. Schepens, Resident Inspector
- Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 21 and 24,
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1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.
The inspectors
described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection
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findings.
No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
Violation 424/86-118-01, Failure to Adequately Document and Evaluate Diesel
Generator Performance - paragraph 6.b.
Inspector Followup Item 424/86-118-02, Investigate 4.16 kV Switchgear
Racking Incidents - paragraph 7.b.
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The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided
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to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.
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3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters
This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
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4.
Unresolved Items
Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.
5.
Preoperational Test Procedure Review (70304, 70305, 70306)
The inspectors reviewed preoperational (preop) test procedure 1-300-01,
Integrated Safeguards and Load Sequencing Test, to verify that it was
consistent with applicable portions of FSAR Chapters 6, 7, 8, 9 and 14;
Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and its supplements; and, Regulatory Guides
(RGs) 1.68,1,79 and 1.108.
The review included verifying that pertinent
prerequisites were identified; initial test conditions and system status
were specified, acceptance criteria were specified; the required reviews
were performed; and, management approval was indicated.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
6.
Preoperational Test Results Review
a.
The inspectors reviewed the results of the preop tests listed below.
The test results were reviewed to verify that:
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Test changes were approved in accordance with administrative
procedures.
Test changes did not change the basic objective of the test.
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Actions required by test changes had been completed.
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Test deficiencies had been resolved, including retesting where
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required.
Individual test steps and data sheets were completed properly.
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Test data were within the acceptance criteria specified.
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Evaluation and approval of the test results had been completed by
appropriate engineering and management personnel.
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Results for the following tests were reviewed:
1-3BJ-02, Safety Injection Check Valve
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1-3KJ-04, Diesel Generator Train B Switchgear, Controls, and
Auxiliaries
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1-3KJ-06, Diesel Generator Train 8 Sychronization, Load Rejection, Five
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Air Starts, and 35 Consecutive Starts
1-300-10, Remote Shutdown
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Procedures 1-3KJ-04 and 1-3KJ-06 still had a few minor outstanding
items to be completed.
These partial test results packages have been
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reviewed and approved by the licensee. The inspectors will review the
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resolution of the outstanding items during a followup inspection after
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the items have been completed and the results receive final approval.
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Procedures 1-300-10 and 1-3BJ-02 had received final review and
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approval.
All questions raised during review of these procedures were resolved
except one.
The question concerned some of the data taken for the
Train B remote shutdown room. This question will be reviewed during a
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followup inspection.
No violation or deviations were identified.
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b.
The inspectors reviewed the documentation of diesel generator start
attempts that have occurred since the completion of the reliability
tests (35 starts) per test procedures 1-3KJ-05 and 1-3KJ-06.
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Instructions for the operation of the diesel generators are contained
in a general operating procedure 13145-1, Diesel Generators, and a
surveillance procedure _14980-1, Diesel Generator Operability Test.
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Both procedures require that all start attempts be logged in the Shift
Supervisor's logbook with specific information to include the start
time, reason for start and the success or failure of the start attempt.
Revision 1 to the above procedures, dated November 7,
1986, and
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September 23, 1986, respectively, adds a further requirement to
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document and forward this information to the Engineering Support
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Superintendent, whom is tasked with tracking and evaluating each start
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attempt.
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A review of the Shift Supervisor's logbook revealed that most log
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entries contain only the time and diesel that is started.
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Engineering Support Superintendent had received documentation of only
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two start attempts.
Discussions with key operations, test and
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engineering personnel indicated a general confusion over the lines of
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responsibility.
The inspectors noted for example that on November 8,
1986, Diesel Generator
"B" was started per surveillance procedure
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14980-1.
Discussions with the personnel involved revealed that a
procedure sequence error caused the generator to unsuccessfully accept
and carry the load.
The surveillance procedure was subsequently
changed and reperformed successfully.
The licensee could produce no
documentation of evaluation of this failed start attempt to the
Engineering Support Superintendent.
The Shift Supervisor's log entry
was of insufficient detail to permit a meaningful evaluation of the
failure.
RG 1.108, Periodic Testing Of Diesel Generator Units Used As Onsite
Electric Power Systems At Nuclear Power Plants, as stated in Regulatory
Position C.3.a. that all starts attempts, including those from bona
fide signals, should be logged.
The log should describe each
occurrence in sufficient detail to permit independent determination of
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the validity of each start in accordance with Regulatory
Position C.2.e.
Cumulative analysis should include examination of the
trend of critical faildre mechanisms, human errors, and common mode
failures.
Subsequent intervals for periodic testing should depend on
this demonstrated performance.
The inspectors noted -that the
documentation available for most start attempts on the diesel generators
performed since the completion of the reliability tests per test
procedures 1-3KJ-05 and 1-3KJ-06 lack sufficient detail to permit
independent determination of statistical validity of each start.
The
licensee acknowledged this finding and has formulated an effort to
gather as much information as possible for each diesel generator start
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attempt.
Failure to adequately document with sufficient detail and
evaluate diesel generator start attempt violates 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
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Criterion V, which states that activities affecting quality shall be
prescribed by and accomplished in accordance with documented instructions,
procedures or drawings.
This item will be identified as
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Violation 424/86-118-01, Failure to Adequately Document and Evaluate
Diesel Generator Performance.
7.
Preoperational Test Witnessing
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The inspectors observed specific tests being conducted to determine if
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requirements were being met relative to NRC requirements such as contained
in RG 1.68 and the Final - Scfety Analysis Report (FSAR).
The following
attributes were among those verified in this review.
Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures.
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Latest revisions of the approved test procedures were available and in
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use by personnel performing the tests.
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Test equipment required by the procedures was calibrated and installed.
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Test data were properly collected and recorded.
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Adequate coordination existed among personnel involved in the test.
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Test prerequisites were met.
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Proper plant systems were in service.
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Temporary modifications such as jumpers were installed and tracked in
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accordance with administrative controls.
Problems encountered during testing were properly documented.
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The following tests were witnessed:
a.
Procedure 1-300-01, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)
Test (70315,70316)
The inspectors witnessed portions of Section 6.1 of the test.
In this
portion of the test, an ESFAS signal was actuated on Train A, followed
approximately five minutes later by a simulated loss of offsite power
(LOP) in conjunction with the ESFAS signal.
Train 8 was de-energized
during this portion of the test.
During performance of the test on November 18, 1986, all equipment
appeared to perform as required in response to the ESFAS actuation
signal.
However, after the LOP was actuated, several problems were
identified concerning equipment response to the LOP. Some of the more
significant problems identified included:
(1) Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) A did not restart.
(2) The Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) pumps cycled off and on.
(3) The ESF chiller did not restart.
(4) Power was lost to the emergency response facility (ERF) computer,
which was being used to verify valve positions during the test.
(5)
The post LOCA cavity purge fan tripped.
After performing the largest single load and 100% load rejection tests
on the diesel generator (these tests were also a part of Section 6.1
but were not affected by the ESFAS/ LOP problems), the licensee
discontinued ESFAS testing while troubleshooting was being performed to
determine the causes of the problems.
Through troubleshooting and
analysis of test data, the licensee was able to determine the causes of
the various problems.
Several design changes were implemented to
correct the problems.
In order to test the design changes, the
licensee wrote several start-up operating instructions (50I) to
re-perform portions of preop test 1-300-01. The S01s were not intended
to be a substitute nor take credit for any portions of preop test
1-300-01. The inspectors witnessed performance of several of the S0Is.
Additional problems were identified during performar.ce of the S0Is
which resulted in more design changes being implemented.
One of the
more significant problems occurred during performance of S01-155 on
November 23, 1986.
An ESFAS only signal was actuated but a
simultaneous LOP also occurred.
The emergency bus did not lwd shed
after the LOP which, according to licensee personnel, resulted in an
instantaneous loading on the Train A Diesel Generator (DG) of
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approximately 2000 KW-2500KW. The licensee was analyzing the test data
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in order to determine why the LOP occurred and why the emergency bus
did not load shed.
It was speculated that the problem may be related
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to the Train A sequencer because prior to performing S01-155, the
licensee had replaced the Train A sequencer logic card with one from
Unit 2.
The Unit 2 sequencer card had been tested prior to leaving the
vendor's shop, but had not been preop tested at Vogtle.
The original
Train A sequencer card was reinstalled and the S0I re-preformed.
The
ESFAS signal was actuated and the problem with a simultaneous LOP and
no load shedding did not occur.
The Unit 2 sequencer card was sent
back to the vendor for further testing in order to determine if there
was a problem with the card.
An evaluation was being performed to
determine what affect did the instantaneous loading have on the DG.
The licensee had not received the test results from the vendor and the
other problems identified during performance of S01-155 were still
being evaluated at the conclusion of this inspection.
The licensee
stated that ESFAS testing would not resume until the problems were
resolved.
The licensee further stated that all of ESFAS testing
performed thus far would be repeated, including the DG load rejection
tests (which was being repeated because of the excessive instantaneous
loading).
The inspectors will review licensee efforts to resolve the
problems identified during ESFAS and S0I testing and will continue to
witness ESFAS testing during a followup inspection,
b.
1-3BC-01, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System (70436)
The inspectors witnessed portions of Section 6.19 that verifies RHR
system performance during filling and draining of the reactor cavity.
During performance of Section 6.19.8 that pumps water from the reactor
vessel to the refueling water storage tank, the RHR pump 2 failed to
start when the control switch 1-HS-0620 at Control Room Panel QMCR was
placed in the " Start" position.
Operators were dispatched to
troubleshoot the problem and discovered that the 4.16KV Brown-Boveri
Switchgear for the pump had not been correctly racked in. Discussions
with control room operators and a review of incident reports indicated
that numerous problems of this nature have occurred during the testing
program. The licensee has demonstrated their concern over this problem
by creating a task force to investigate and determine the necessary
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corrective action.
A previous investigation was conducted by the
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licensee regulatory compliance section as documented in a memorandum,
dated October 27, 1986.
The result of this effort indicates operator
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error in racking the breakers as a root cause.
The licensee stated
that subsequent operator training has been implemented and the problem
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continues to occur. This item will be identified as Inspector Followup
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Item (IFI) 86-118-02, Investigate 4.16KV Switchgear Racking Incidents.
No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.
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