ML20207P293

Insp Rept 50-424/86-118 on 861112-24.Violation Noted: Failure to Adequately Document & Evaluate Diesel Generator Performance

ML20207P293
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	12/23/1986
From:	Jape F, Larry Nicholson, Schnebli G, Matt Thomas NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207P280	List: ML20207P279 ML20207P287 ML20207P293
References
50-424-86-118, NUDOCS 8701150365
Download: ML20207P293 (7)

See also: IR 05000424/1986118

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON

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Report No.: 50-424/86-118

Licensee: Georgia Power Company

P. O. Box 4545

Atlanta, GA 30302

Docket No.: 50-424 License No.: CPPR-108

Facility Name: Vogtle 1

Inspection Conducted: November 12-24, 1986

Inspectors: w / R# Y

D' ate S~igned

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L.NicholsYonVV

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. Thomas _

Date Signed

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G. Schnebli 06te Signed

Approved by: 4 /

F. Jape, Criief f/ / Date Signed

Test Programs Section

Engineering Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of

preoperational test witnessing and review.

Results: One violation was identified - Failure to adequately document and

evaluate diesel generator performance.

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

• R. E. Conway, Senior Vice-President, Vogtle Project Director

• P. D. Rice, Vice-President, Vogtle Project

• R. H. Pinson, Vice-President, Project Construction

• C. E. Belflower, Quality Assurance Site Manager - Operations

• R. M. Bellamy, Project Manager

• W. C. Gabbard, Senior Regulatory Specialist

• A. L. Mosbaugh, Superintendent, Engineering Services

J. Aufdenkampe, Lead Test Supervisor

Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians,

operators, mechanics, and office personnel.

Other Organization

H. M. Handfinger - Assistant Startup Manager, Bechtel

NRC Resident Inspectors

• J. Rogge, Senior Resident Inspector - Operations

• R. J. Schepens, Resident Inspector

• Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

i The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 21 and 24,

I 1986, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspectors

described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection

l findings. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

Violation 424/86-118-01, Failure to Adequately Document and Evaluate Diesel

Generator Performance - paragraph 6.b.

Inspector Followup Item 424/86-118-02, Investigate 4.16 kV Switchgear

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Racking Incidents - paragraph 7.b.

l The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided

I to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

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3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

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4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during the inspection.

5. Preoperational Test Procedure Review (70304, 70305, 70306)

The inspectors reviewed preoperational (preop) test procedure 1-300-01,

Integrated Safeguards and Load Sequencing Test, to verify that it was

consistent with applicable portions of FSAR Chapters 6, 7, 8, 9 and 14;

Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and its supplements; and, Regulatory Guides

(RGs) 1.68,1,79 and 1.108. The review included verifying that pertinent

prerequisites were identified; initial test conditions and system status

were specified, acceptance criteria were specified; the required reviews

were performed; and, management approval was indicated.

No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.

6. Preoperational Test Results Review

a. The inspectors reviewed the results of the preop tests listed below.

The test results were reviewed to verify that:

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Test changes were approved in accordance with administrative

procedures.

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Test changes did not change the basic objective of the test.

- Actions required by test changes had been completed.

- Test deficiencies had been resolved, including retesting where

required.

- Individual test steps and data sheets were completed properly.

- Test data were within the acceptance criteria specified.

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Evaluation and approval of the test results had been completed by

l appropriate engineering and management personnel.

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Results for the following tests were reviewed:

i 1-3BJ-02, Safety Injection Check Valve

1-3KJ-04, Diesel Generator Train B Switchgear, Controls, and

, Auxiliaries

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1-3KJ-06, Diesel Generator Train 8 Sychronization, Load Rejection, Five

Air Starts, and 35 Consecutive Starts

1-300-10, Remote Shutdown

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Procedures 1-3KJ-04 and 1-3KJ-06 still had a few minor outstanding  :

items to be completed. These partial test results packages have been

i reviewed and approved by the licensee. The inspectors will review the .

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t resolution of the outstanding items during a followup inspection after

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the items have been completed and the results receive final approval. t

Procedures 1-300-10 and 1-3BJ-02 had received final review and ,

approval.

All questions raised during review of these procedures were resolved

except one. The question concerned some of the data taken for the

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Train B remote shutdown room. This question will be reviewed during a

followup inspection.

No violation or deviations were identified.

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l b. The inspectors reviewed the documentation of diesel generator start

attempts that have occurred since the completion of the reliability

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tests (35 starts) per test procedures 1-3KJ-05 and 1-3KJ-06.

l Instructions for the operation of the diesel generators are contained

in a general operating procedure 13145-1, Diesel Generators, and a

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surveillance procedure _14980-1, Diesel Generator Operability Test.

Both procedures require that all start attempts be logged in the Shift

Supervisor's logbook with specific information to include the start

time, reason for start and the success or failure of the start attempt.

Revision 1 to the above procedures, dated November 7, 1986, and

! September 23, 1986, respectively, adds a further requirement to

j document and forward this information to the Engineering Support

l Superintendent, whom is tasked with tracking and evaluating each start

i attempt.

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A review of the Shift Supervisor's logbook revealed that most log

j entries contain only the time and diesel that is started. The

! Engineering Support Superintendent had received documentation of only

I two start attempts. Discussions with key operations, test and

! engineering personnel indicated a general confusion over the lines of

i responsibility. The inspectors noted for example that on November 8,

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1986, Diesel Generator "B" was started per surveillance procedure

14980-1. Discussions with the personnel involved revealed that a

procedure sequence error caused the generator to unsuccessfully accept

and carry the load. The surveillance procedure was subsequently

changed and reperformed successfully. The licensee could produce no

documentation of evaluation of this failed start attempt to the

Engineering Support Superintendent. The Shift Supervisor's log entry

was of insufficient detail to permit a meaningful evaluation of the

failure.

RG 1.108, Periodic Testing Of Diesel Generator Units Used As Onsite

Electric Power Systems At Nuclear Power Plants, as stated in Regulatory

Position C.3.a. that all starts attempts, including those from bona

fide signals, should be logged. The log should describe each

occurrence in sufficient detail to permit independent determination of

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the validity of each start in accordance with Regulatory

Position C.2.e. Cumulative analysis should include examination of the

trend of critical faildre mechanisms, human errors, and common mode

failures. Subsequent intervals for periodic testing should depend on

this demonstrated performance. The inspectors noted -that the

documentation available for most start attempts on the diesel generators

performed since the completion of the reliability tests per test

procedures 1-3KJ-05 and 1-3KJ-06 lack sufficient detail to permit

independent determination of statistical validity of each start. The

licensee acknowledged this finding and has formulated an effort to

gather as much information as possible for each diesel generator start

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attempt. Failure to adequately document with sufficient detail and

evaluate diesel generator start attempt violates 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, '

Criterion V, which states that activities affecting quality shall be

prescribed by and accomplished in accordance with documented instructions,

, procedures or drawings. This item will be identified as

Violation 424/86-118-01, Failure to Adequately Document and Evaluate

Diesel Generator Performance.

7. Preoperational Test Witnessing

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- The inspectors observed specific tests being conducted to determine if *

l requirements were being met relative to NRC requirements such as contained

in RG 1.68 and the Final - Scfety Analysis Report (FSAR). The following

attributes were among those verified in this review.

- Tests were performed in accordance with approved procedures.

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Latest revisions of the approved test procedures were available and in

use by personnel performing the tests.

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- Test equipment required by the procedures was calibrated and installed.

- Test data were properly collected and recorded.

I - Adequate coordination existed among personnel involved in the test.

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- Test prerequisites were met.

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Proper plant systems were in service.

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Temporary modifications such as jumpers were installed and tracked in  !

accordance with administrative controls.

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- Problems encountered during testing were properly documented.

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The following tests were witnessed:

a. Procedure 1-300-01, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)

Test (70315,70316)

The inspectors witnessed portions of Section 6.1 of the test. In this

portion of the test, an ESFAS signal was actuated on Train A, followed

approximately five minutes later by a simulated loss of offsite power

(LOP) in conjunction with the ESFAS signal. Train 8 was de-energized

during this portion of the test.

During performance of the test on November 18, 1986, all equipment

appeared to perform as required in response to the ESFAS actuation

signal. However, after the LOP was actuated, several problems were

identified concerning equipment response to the LOP. Some of the more

significant problems identified included:

(1) Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) A did not restart.

(2) The Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) pumps cycled off and on.

(3) The ESF chiller did not restart.

(4) Power was lost to the emergency response facility (ERF) computer,

which was being used to verify valve positions during the test.

(5) The post LOCA cavity purge fan tripped.

After performing the largest single load and 100% load rejection tests

on the diesel generator (these tests were also a part of Section 6.1

but were not affected by the ESFAS/ LOP problems), the licensee

discontinued ESFAS testing while troubleshooting was being performed to

determine the causes of the problems. Through troubleshooting and

analysis of test data, the licensee was able to determine the causes of

the various problems. Several design changes were implemented to

correct the problems. In order to test the design changes, the

licensee wrote several start-up operating instructions (50I) to

re-perform portions of preop test 1-300-01. The S01s were not intended

to be a substitute nor take credit for any portions of preop test

1-300-01. The inspectors witnessed performance of several of the S0Is.

Additional problems were identified during performar.ce of the S0Is

which resulted in more design changes being implemented. One of the

more significant problems occurred during performance of S01-155 on

November 23, 1986. An ESFAS only signal was actuated but a

simultaneous LOP also occurred. The emergency bus did not lwd shed

after the LOP which, according to licensee personnel, resulted in an

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instantaneous loading on the Train A Diesel Generator (DG) of

! approximately 2000 KW-2500KW. The licensee was analyzing the test data

in order to determine why the LOP occurred and why the emergency bus

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did not load shed. It was speculated that the problem may be related

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to the Train A sequencer because prior to performing S01-155, the

licensee had replaced the Train A sequencer logic card with one from

Unit 2. The Unit 2 sequencer card had been tested prior to leaving the

vendor's shop, but had not been preop tested at Vogtle. The original

Train A sequencer card was reinstalled and the S0I re-preformed. The

ESFAS signal was actuated and the problem with a simultaneous LOP and

no load shedding did not occur. The Unit 2 sequencer card was sent

back to the vendor for further testing in order to determine if there

was a problem with the card. An evaluation was being performed to

determine what affect did the instantaneous loading have on the DG.

The licensee had not received the test results from the vendor and the

other problems identified during performance of S01-155 were still

being evaluated at the conclusion of this inspection. The licensee

stated that ESFAS testing would not resume until the problems were

resolved. The licensee further stated that all of ESFAS testing

performed thus far would be repeated, including the DG load rejection

tests (which was being repeated because of the excessive instantaneous

loading). The inspectors will review licensee efforts to resolve the

problems identified during ESFAS and S0I testing and will continue to

witness ESFAS testing during a followup inspection,

b. 1-3BC-01, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System (70436)

The inspectors witnessed portions of Section 6.19 that verifies RHR

system performance during filling and draining of the reactor cavity.

During performance of Section 6.19.8 that pumps water from the reactor

vessel to the refueling water storage tank, the RHR pump 2 failed to

start when the control switch 1-HS-0620 at Control Room Panel QMCR was

placed in the " Start" position. Operators were dispatched to

troubleshoot the problem and discovered that the 4.16KV Brown-Boveri

Switchgear for the pump had not been correctly racked in. Discussions

with control room operators and a review of incident reports indicated

that numerous problems of this nature have occurred during the testing

program. The licensee has demonstrated their concern over this problem

by creating a task force to investigate and determine the necessary

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corrective action. A previous investigation was conducted by the

! licensee regulatory compliance section as documented in a memorandum,

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dated October 27, 1986. The result of this effort indicates operator

i error in racking the breakers as a root cause. The licensee stated

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that subsequent operator training has been implemented and the problem

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continues to occur. This item will be identified as Inspector Followup

Item (IFI) 86-118-02, Investigate 4.16KV Switchgear Racking Incidents.

No violations or deviations were identified in the areas inspected.

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