IR 05000321/1978028

IE Inspec Repts 50-321/78-28 & 50-366/78-36 on 780815-18 During Which No Items of Noncompliance Were Noted.Major Areas Inspected Incl:Surveillance Activity on Pipe Support & Restraint Sys for Unit 1 Incl Examination of Procedures

ML20150D858
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	11/20/1978
From:	Martin R, Whitener H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20150D849	List: IR 05000321/1978028 ML20150D847
References
50-321-78-28, 50-366-78-36, NUDOCS 7812070148
Download: ML20150D858 (9)

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% pp Mao UNITED STATES

/ 'o, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[* f REGION f t 101 M ARIETT A sTRE ET. t

• t ATLANT A. GEORGIA 30303

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Report Nos. : 50-321/78-28 and 50-366/78-36 Docket Nos. : 50-321 and 50-366 License Nos.: DPR-57 and NPF-5 Iacensee: Georgia Power Company 270 Peachtree Street, N. Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Facility Name: Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 Inspection at: Plant Site Baxley, Georgia Inspection conducted: August 15-18, 1978 Inspectors: H. L. White r Approved by: A N, i ,

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'Date R. D. Mattin, Chief ~

Nuclear Support Section N Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Inspection Sunnary Inspection on August 15-18, 1978 (Report Nos. 50-321/78-28 and 50-366/78-36)

Areas Inspected: A routine unannounced inspection of surveillance activity on pipe support and restraint systems for Unit 1 including examination of procedures, test results and installed restraints, and, examinationThe of records and restraints on Unit 2 subsequent to the initial bestu inspection involved 29 man-hours of insoection by one NRC inspecto Results: Of the two areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identifie L _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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s RII Rpt. Nos. 50-321/78-28 and 50-366/78-36 I-1 f

DETAILS I Prepared by: _6 d H. E' WIif tener , React 9( Inspector M

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Nuclear Support Sectibb No. 1 Reactor Operations an' Nelear Support Branc'

Dates of Inspection- August 15-1b, Reviewed by: [ @2 R. D. Martin, Chief

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'D4te Nuclear Support Section No. 1 Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch Persons Contacted Georgia Power Company (GPC)

• 11. Nix, Assistant Plant Manager R. Bellamy, Associate Plant Engineer .

C. Coggio, Nuclear Engineer

• J. Edwards, Engineering Associate

• C, E. Belflower, QA Field Supervisor

• R. Glisson, Associate Engineer

• W. Barrett, QA Field Engineer

• M. Upchurch, Jr., QA Field Representative

• D. Barnett, Maintenance Foreman H. Anderson, Engineer (Corporate)

B. Trice, Associate Engineer W. Nettleton, Construction General Electric Company

• A. Schneider, Operations Superintendent

• M. Wyatt, Lead Engineer

• Denotes those present at the exit interview.

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s RII Rpt. Nos. 50-321/78-28 and 50-366/78-36 I-2 Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (0 pen) Unresolved Item 366/78-32-01: Evaluate mechanical and hydraulic shock suppressor piston settings (midrange at cold condition).

Discussion with. licensee' management indicates that a preliminary 10 CFR 50.59 review was performed to evaluate the installation of shock suppressors centered at the midpoint of the full stroke at the cold condition rather than centered about the midpoint of total travel range at the hot condition as specified in Section 14.B 15.a of the FSA Licensee representatives stated that a preliminary evaluation indicates that the current installation is adequate and a formal review per 10 CFR 50.59 will be completed prior to approval of the system expansion test results. This item remains open pending inspector review of the final evalutio (Closed) Unresolved Item 366/78-32-02: Determine operable limits of piston travel. For the system expansion test the licensee has estab-lished a minimum reserve stroke of k inch for mechanical and hydraulic snubbers based on a letter to GPC (Georgia Power . Company) from Bergen Paterson dated July 11, 1978. This letter states that both types of snubbers are effective over full travel range. This item is considered closed relative to the system expansion snubber inspections but is discussed further under procedure review, paragraph 6.a.1 of this repor (Closed) Unresolved Item 366/78-32-03: Verify that scales indicating piston positions are absolute and for externally mounted scales determine that scales have not been inadvertently moved. The licensee has verified through' construction records that the scale measurements are absolute position indicators and has specified that scale alignment be verified during the inspection by checking a reference point provided on the snubbe . Unresolved Items None identified during this inspectio . Exit Interview Areas of inspection and inspection findings were reviewed with Mr. Nix and members of his staf f on August 18, 1978 and are discussed in this report. Attendees at this interview are identified in paragraph 1.

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s RII Rpt. Nos. 50-321/78-28 and 50-366/78-36 I-3 System Expansion and Vibration Testing The inspector reviewed a portion of vibration test procedure and results, discussed system expansion data with licensee aqd GE representatives, and performed an inspection of certain drywell piping supports and restraints. These matters are discussed belo Vibration Tests The inspector reviewed the reports of tests perfomed at cold condition?, tc determine if flow induced excessive vibrations were observed in the RCIC, HPC1, Core Spray or RHR. Test instructions were included as portions of procedures as follows:

RCIC -

10029 HPCI -

10030 Core Spray -

2E21-3510 RHR -

2E11-3510 No excessive vibrations were observed as a result of pump starts, stops, and operatio System Expansion The inspector discussed the piping displacement data taken from instrumented points on the - drywell piping during heatup with licensee and GE representatives. It appears that a number of points had not moved as predicted but no obvious pattern is detected. Some of these data are as follows:

- Recirculation System Vertical Movement: indicated movement 1.1 to 1.3 inches; expected movement 1.6 to 1.8 inche Recirculation B Discharge Line: indicated movement 0.33 inches; expected movement 0.04 inche Main Steam Lines: One point indicated movement of 0.1 inch where the expected movement was 0.2 inches in the opposite direction. One point has not indicated movement where the expected movement was 0.35 inches. In general the points indicate movement in the expected direction but at about two-thirds the expected distanc RHR Discharge to Recirculation Line A: indicated 0.45 inches; expected 0,17 incher .

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k RII Rpt. Nos. 50-321/78-28 and 50-366/78-36- I-4

- RHR Head Spray Line: indicated 0.5 inches, expected 0.77 inche RWCU: indicated 0.39 inches; expected 0.45 inche HPC1 Steam Line Supply: indicated 0.015 inches; expected 0.06 inches in opposite directio Based on a preliminary analysis the licensee and GE repre-sentatives believe no serious problem to exist but all data points not performing as expected have been reported to the designer for reanalysis. The inspector identified examination of the data analysis results as an item for future inspection (366/78-36-01). Vibration Measurements - Heatup The licensee stated that data taken during HPCI and RCIC starts performed at selected temperature plateaus during heatup indicated essentially zero vibrations. Some vibration was observed in the safety relief valve lines during. valve actuatio A maximum amplitude of 0.2 inches at about 15 cycles per second was observe The vibrations damped out and no permanent displacement was observe This data has been sent to Bechtel for evaluation. Additional data will be obtained during the power ascension testing. Review of the evaluation-of transient vibration was identified for future review (366/78-36-02) . Dryvell Inspection The inspector examined a number of pipe supports and restraints in the dryvell at rated condition Due to the drywell ventilation system probler otJy those in the lower levels were accessible at this tim Syste'is inspected included the Recirculation System and Relief Valve Discharge Piping. Snubbers and bangers which cou'.4 be observed appeared to be within the operating ranges. The licensee will perfom a complete inspection subsequent to resolution of the drywell temperature proble . Pipe Supports and Restraints l The inspector reviewed the licensee's surveillance program for safety-related hydraulic supports and restraints. This included a l

review of procedures for technical adequacy; examination of various

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installed dynamic and fixed pipe supports and restraints; and review of recent surveillance records. Pertinent aspects of this review are discussed belo _ .

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i RII Rpt. Nos. 50-321/78-28 and 50-366/78-36 I-5 Shock Suppressor Surveillance Procedures (1)' Visual Inspection Procedure The inspector reviewed Surveillance Procedure 3915, liydraulic Shock and Sway Arrestor Inspection and Functional Tast (Revision 3) for technical adequacy and discussed his findings with the licensee as follows:

(a) Inspection of vent holes to ensure the vents are open is not identified in the procedure nor included in the check off list on the data shee (b) Acceptance criteria specifying the minimum operable fluid level is not defined in the procedur (c) Use of baseline piston position data as a guideline to l determine appropriate piston positions has not been specifie (d) Acceptance criteria specifying limits of operable range for piston rod stroke is not defined in the procedur (e) The procedure does not specify that for any discre-pancies identified during inspection, and for which corrective action is not planned inanedia tely , the evaluation to determine that the snubber is operable as found must also include an evaluation to ensure that the snubber will remain operable during the next inspection interva (f) As found - as left data are not recorded on the data shee (2) Functional Test The inspector reviewed the functional test instructions in surveillance Procedure 3915 for ' technical adequacy and discussed this findings with the licensee as follows:

(a) The acceptance criteria does not include a correction to the measured lockup velocity and bleed rate to correct for the dif ference between test temperature and operating temperatur (b) The procedure does not require that free motion of the piston rod ba verifie .- - - _ _ - - - _ _ - _ - _ _ - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - ._

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I RII Rpt. Nos. 50-321/78-28 and 50-366/78-36 I-6 (?) Maintenance Procedure Licensee personnel are in the process of developing a comprehensive maintenance procedure to include detailed instructions for the installation, removal, repair, filling and venting of hydraulic shock suppressor The licensee will evaluate the items in 6.a. (1) and 6.a. (2)

above and address these matters in a revision to Procedure 391 Ptacedure revision will be completed or prior to reus Revision of Procedure 3915 and development of an adequate maintenance procedure is identified for inspector followup (321/78-28-01 and 366/78-36-03) . Administrative Control /LER 50-321/1978-57 The inspector reviewed Administrative Procedures HNP-831,

" Technical Specification Surveillance Program," to determine that adequ' ate controls had been established for implementing the shock suppressor inspection and test procedure The inspector found that HNP-831 provides an adequate mechanism for tracking the performance of routine surveillance testing but does not specifically address tracking tests whose f requency vary in accordance with test results as is the case with the' visual inspection of shock suppressors. The licensee stated that the variable frequency is picked up in another sanner. A deviation report is written for inoperable shocks and forwarded to appro-priate personnel through the Plant Review Board. The inspector reviewed LER 50-321/1978-57 which reported a late surveillanee test on hydraulic shock suppressors. From discussion with the maintenance and scheduling personnel it appears that the late surveillance (3 days) was an isolated event caused by the reclassi-fication as inoperable of snubbers thought to be operable after the f requency had been assigned. The inspector concluded that based on a single event the tracking system appeared to be adequate and closed LER 50-321/1978-5 The inspector reviewed recent visual inspection and functional test results and had no questions except as noted under procedure review in paragraph 6.9.1 and 6.9.2 of this repor Acceptance Criteria /NRC Positions The inspector reviewed the baais of the hydraulic shock suppressor acceptance criteria and discussed NRC requirements with licensee personnel as foirows:

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l RII Rpt. Nos. 50-321/78-28 and 50-366/78-36 I-7 (1) Lockup Velocity and Bleed Rate The- inspector reviewed the NRC interpretation of an adequate acceptan"e criteria for lockup velocity and bleed rate for functional testing as follows:

(a) Determine the operating range in which the snubber is designed to operate from the vende (b) Determine the upper and lower limit allowable for lockup velocity and bleed rate which is consistent with the piping design analysis f rom the Architect Enginee (c) Detennine the temperature correction f actor required to correct the measured values f rom test temperature to operating temperature. The licensee will determine the temperature correction factor. These corrections will be applied to the 1978 refueling outage functional test data for Unit 1. This item was identified for inspector followup (321/78-28-02).

(2) Seal Material The inspector discussed the NRC position that for shock suppressors with non ethylene propylene seals, a seal life-time must be determined on the basis of the material charac-teristics and operating conditions. The licensee believed that all seals were ethylene propylene but agreed to perform a record review and confirm this. This matter will be reviewed at a subsequent inspection (321/78-28-03, 366/78-36-04).

(3) Representative Sample The inspector advised the licensee that the term,

" Representative Sample", as used in the Technical Specification, requires evaluation of the factors af fecting shock suppressor operation. The licensee agreed to develop written guidelines for selection of the snubber test sample (321/78-28-04, and 366/78-36-05) .

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RII Rpt. Nos. 50-321/78-28 aad 50-366/78-36 I-8 (4) Verification of Visual Inspection The inspector advised the licensee that functional testing cannot be used to determine operability of a snubber which does not meet the visual inspection acceptance requirement The operability of the snubber must be determined on the basis of an engineering evaluation of existing conditions; and furthermore, if a deficiency is identified and not corrected at that time, the evaluation must confirm operability over the next inspection interval.

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