ML20155H894
| ML20155H894 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 01/06/1986 |
| From: | Daniels B, Dieterich B SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20155H523 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-1195 NUDOCS 8605160453 | |
| Download: ML20155H894 (84) | |
Text
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o? L-O UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF:
DOCKET NO:
DISCUSSION WITH BOB DANIELS AND BOB DIETERICH O
LOCATION:
HERALD, CALIFORNIA PAGES:
1 - 79 DATE:
MONDAY, JANUARY 6, 1986 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
O OfficialReporters 444 North CapitolStreet 8605160453 860306 Washington, D.C. 20001 DR ADOCK 0500 2
(202)347-3700 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE
. _a
1 BEFORE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO1BiISSION 2
3 In the Ilatter of:
4
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5 DISCUSSION WITH BOB DANIELS
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)
6 and BOB DIETERICH
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7 8
9 JANUARY 6, 1986 10 RANCHO SECO gy 12 13 O
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Il 24 25 O
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APPEARANCES:
2 3
FRED HEBDON, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4
GORDON EDISON, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 5
J. T. BEARD, Nuclear Regulatory Commission 6
BOB DANIELS, Sacramento Municipal Utilities District 7
CHUCK HAZARI, Sacramento Municipal Utilities District 8
BOB DIETERICH, Sacramento Municipal Utilities District 9
JERRY DELEZENSKI, Sacramento Municipal Utilities District 10 HERB HECKERT, Sacramento Municipal Utilities District 11
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3 MR. HEBDON:
This is a meeting to discuss some of 4
the history of the Integrated Control System, particularly 5
as it relates to some operational experience that occurred 6
in the late 1970's, early 1980's.
7 Before we start I'd like to have each person just 8
introduce themselves so that we know on the record who is 9
here at the meeting.
My name is Fred Hebdon and I'm with 10 the Incident Investigation Team.
11 MR. EDISON:
Gordon Edison with the NRC Incident 12 Investigation Team.
13 MR. BEARD:
J.T.
Beard with the Incident Investi-D 14 gation Team.
15 MR. DELEZENSKI:
Jerry Delezenski, Licensing, SMUD.
16 MR. DIETERICH:
I'm Bob Dieterich, Manager of 17 Licensing, SMUD.
13 MR. DANIELS:
Bob Daniels, Supervisor, Electrical 19 Engineers, SMUD.
20 MR. HAZARI:
Chuck Hazari, Electrical, SMUD.
21 MR. BEARD:
We probably ought to say that we're 22 still sort of waiting for Norm Brock.
23 MR. HEBDON:
Yeah, let me go through and I'll give 24 a little background.
I thought since Norm has been involved 25 with this a little bit, maybe we could go ahead and do this AV PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER ORIVE, SulTE A SACRAMENTO. CALWORNIA.55 5 t
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much of it at least because I think he's heard most of this
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2 already.
3 Basically what we're doing is this is an Incident 4
Investigation Team that has been established by the NRC as 5
a result of the incident that occurred on December 26 of last 6
year.
One of the issues associated with that, of course, is 7
that the transient initiator was a loss of ICS power.
And 3
so we're concerned about any issues associated with the ICS 9
power.
to In a more general sense,the purpose of the Incident 13 Investigation Team is to be purely a factfinding effort.
We're not here to determine regulatory compliance.
We're 12 13 not here to decide on corrective action.
We're not here to O
14 determine restart of the plant.
Those are all decisions 15 that will be made within the normal line organization.
16 However, we are responsible for determining facts surrounding 17 the event and in this particular case, surrounding some of 13 the history of the Integrated Control System because of the 19
' fact that that was the initiator of the event.
20 So we have a very narrow scope, however, what we're 21 trying to do is to go into the issues associated with that 22 scope in considerable detail.
So that's the reason, for example, we're going back and looking at events that occurred 23 24 several years ago and some of the different regulatory 25 involvements.
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1 Just to give you a little bit of background, in 2
general we are making a transcript of this meeting.
We do 3
that for a couple of reasons.
One is that it's just a 4
convenient mechanism for us so that we have a complete 5
record that we can use for reference later on.
As you 6
can imagine after you've talked to the first 20 or 30 people 7
it all starts to run together.
And having a written 8
transcript is the easiest way of taking very complete notes.
9 The other point is that all of these transcripts will go 10 into the public document room after we have completed our 11 work and issued our report, 6hich will be about the middle 12 of February.
And so when that happens all of these 13 transcripts, all of the documents which we have collected, 14 all the records that we have available, will go into the 15 public document room and will be available then for anyone 16 who wants to come along and review what was done by this 17 particular Incident Investigation Team.
So all the bases 18 will be there for all the observations and conclusions that 19 we reached in the report.
20 Just as a mechanical question, we do take the 21 transcript, if at any time for some reason you want to discuss 22 something for a moment, if you have a procedural question 23 or whatever that you'd like to ask and you'd rather that it 24 not be on the transcript, you can simply ask that we go off 25 the record.
And when we do that we',ll ask the Court Reporter PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER ORIVE, SusTE A SACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95535 TELEPHONE (916) 973 3394
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to srop the transcript.
And then we can discuss things for 2
as long as we need to and then go back on the record.
And 3
if necessary we can summarize any conversation that took place 4
while we were off the record.
5 MR. BEARD:
That would be for administrative --
6 MR. HEBDON:
It can be administrative items, 7
anything for some reason you want to do that.
Really 8
anything from simple administrative logistics questions to 9
do you want to discuss something for a moment before we 10 discuss it on the record.
So really it can be anything we it want it.
If you just want to take a break and we go on for 12 some period of time, you'd like to just take a break and get 13 up and walk around, we can do that, too.
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14 That's about all I can think of in the way of 15 introductory remarks.
Just to go back I guess to this 16 question of the purpose of this meeting.
We are aware 17 because of some documentation that we've seen that there's is been a fairly long history in B&W reactors and at Rancho 19
' Seco in particular of concerns associated with the Integrated 20 Control System.and problems with power loss to the Integrated 21 Control System and to the non-nuclear instrumentation.
And 22 what we would like to try to do is to basically go through 23 that history as we understand it and to try and get some 24 understandings of the background associated with some of the 25 various documents that were prepared and some of the positions tV PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE, butte A BACRAMENTO. CALIFDRNIA 95825 TELEPHONE (916) 973 3394
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I that were taken.
I realize that some of this stuff is cix, 2
seven years old and we're relying on memory.
And that always 3
has some problems associated with,it obviously but we would 4
like to try and get as much informition as we can on these 5
particular issues that we're concerned about.
6 Anyone else have any comments \\before we go into 7
all of this?
8 MR. BEARD:
Yes, there's one thing I would like to 9
add just to supplement what Fred's already said. 'We have 10 the documentation and we can read that.
I think the primary yy purpose of this get together is to make sure we all como 12 out with a common understanding and not just what the words 33 say but what was the 'htent. So that as we go back to assess
/G k-any implications or try to determine what bearing, if any, 34 15 this thing has on the event, we do it in proper context'and 16 don't misunderstand something.
That, in my mind, is themost 17 important aspect of it.
In other words, the question might yg come up and I expect it to come up many times of when you y9 wrote this what did you intend or why did you say this, 20 those kinds of questions.
MR. HEBDON:
And getting back to this point of the 21 22 Purpose of this is factfinding, we wilst try very carefully 23 to not be7 judgmental in the way we ask questions.
And that 24 really is the focus of the effort, is not to be judgmental.
25 We're just trying to find the facts associated with the sJ PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE. SulTE A BACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95835 TELEPHONE (916) 973 3394
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particular circumstance.
So take all of our questions in
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2 that context, I think it will help a little bit.
3 The place I would think we would want to start is 4
that we are aware that there was an event that occurred in 5
January of 1979 where you had an event that resulted in a 6
shorteircuit in the 25 volt VC power supply to the ICS.
The 7
feedwater valves went to the 50% position, the reactor 8
pressure increased and the reactor tripped on high pressure 9
and had a transient that was surprisingly similar to the one 10 that occurred about a week.or so ago.
13 I have a copy here of the licensee event report 12 that was submitted in response to that particular event and 33 my first question is were any of you involved with that
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14 event.
Do you recall it at all?
Just to get some basic 15 understanding of history as far as your involvement.
I have 16 a copy of the licensee event report if you would like to 17 take a moment and look at that to refresh your memory at all, is we can certainly do that.
19 MR. BEARD:
I think also for the sake of the record 20 we ought to identify specificly what this --
21 MR. HEBDON:
Yes, please go ahead and identify 22 what --
23 MR. BEARD:
The letter that Fred is referring to 24 is a letter from SMUD dated January 26, 1979 addressed to 25 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region 5, subject of report
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1 of occurrence 7901.
And I guess the other aspect is who 2
signed it, and it was Matimore.
And attached to that is 3
the actual LER form, licensee event report form.
Maybe this 4
will help you Bob, in terms of the initials that are down at 5
the bottom of the letter, sometimes in some companies they 6
give you a hint as to its principal ingredients.
7 MR. DIETERICH: Yeah, I was going to point out the 8
way we're organized at SMUD, licensee event reports 9
reportable items are handled by regulatory compliance.
10 There's nobody in this room from regulatory compliance.
The 1T initials RWC on here are Ron (inaudible) and he sent this 12 letter to Ron Rodriguez whose initials are RJR and Matimore.
13 MR. BEARD:
Who is H.H.?
14 MR. DIETERICH:
I'm not -- oh, Herb Heckert.
I 15 suppose it was Herb Heckert.
Herb Heckert is on -- yes, 16 that's he.
17 MR. BEARD:
Is there any way we can find him and 18 ask him.
19 MR. EDISON:
What about Ron --
20 MR. DIETERICH:
Ron (Inaudible) should be around.
21 MR. BEARD:
Herb would be the technical one I 22 think since he's closer --
23 MR ~ DIETERICH:
Well Herb's not an engineer.
Herb 24 was a technician type.
He may have gathered some of the 25 information but to answer your previous question, I don't PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE, SulTE A SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 98525 TELEPHONE (916) 973-5894
8 1
think any of us in this room can really address that event 2
with any intelligence.
I can't.
3 MR. HEBDON:
Well really I'm more concerned --
4 MR. DIETERICH:
In fact I had forgotten about it 5
until I read about it in reference to one of these other items 6
here.
7 MR. DANIELS:
After the event, and you've probably 8
seen in the documentation, that there was a committee formed.
9 My direct supervisor was on the committee.
10 MR. DIETERICH:
Wait, this is not the lightbulb --
11 MR. DANIELS:
This is not the lightbulb event?
12 MR. HEBDON:
No, this is not the lightbulb event.
13 This is a --
14 MR. DANIELS:
I thought it was the lightbulb.
15 MR. HEBDON:
No, no.
This is not the lightbulb.
16 The lightbulb was I think about a year earlier, it was in 17 1978 as I recall.
18 The point, by the way, just to make sure we keep 19
'the perspective straight here, is I'm not as much concerned 20 about the document as I am concerned about the event.
What 21 I'm interested in is if we could try and locate anyone who 22 was involved with the engineering evaluation of the event 23 because the question I~have is what concerns did you see 24 as a result of this event.
Did you feel that any corrective 25 action or any additional analysis or whatever needed to be OO PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER ORivE. sulTE A 5ACRAMENTD. CALIFORNIA 95825 TELEPHONE (916) 972 5394
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I cone as a result of this particular event.
2 So I'm not really so concerned about the piece of 3
paper as I am about the event itself.
4 MR. DIETERICH:
If I remember this event and I 5
was just reading over Bob Daniels' shoulder, it was caused 6
by some frayed wire in the cabinet -- was in the cabinet 7
doing something that -- I don't know what caused these 8
to shorteircuit out.
I don't know any more than that.
9 MR. HEBDON:
Well they did have a rather severe 10 overcooling transient.
They cooled down about 120 degrees, 11 150 degrees in less than an hour.
And if you read it, it ' s --
12 you need to change a few of the numbers but other than that 13 and changing the date, you could almost use it as an LER O)
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14 for the event that occurred a few days ago.
15 The point I'm trying -- the question I would have 16 is if anyone looked at the event, did anyone look at the 17 event and what sort of issues or questions came out of it 18 from the current operational perspective.
I would venture to say 20 having --
21 (Off the record to attend to tape 22 problem.)
23 MR. HEBDON:
Now that we've resolved the problem i
24 with the tape recorders, we'll go ahead and continue.
l 25 Again, as I said, what I would really like to try
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1 to do is talk to the technical people that reviewed the 2
particular event if they're available or what have you, to 3
try and get a feel for what they saw as the issues coming out 4
of this event, if anything.
5 You know that very many of;the same characteristics 6
occurred.
All of the demand signals went to 50% and as a 7
result the plant went through a fairly severe transient.
It a
wasn't quite as severe as this one but had many of the same 9
characteristics and did cool down rather rapidly, about 150 to degrees is less than an hour.
yi If there any way or does anyone know who would have 12 reviewed that.
33 MR. DELEZENSKI:
Herb Heckert is on his way, p
14 MR. DIETERICH:
Herb Heckert is on his way I 15 understand.
16 MR. DELEZENSKI:
I don't know if he remembers 17 anything about it though.
13 MR. BEARD:
Well, let me see if we can attack it 19 in a little bit different way and get to the same objective.
20 MR. DIETERICK:
Let me, I think what you're 21 driving at, if I could answer your question.
I would 22 venture to say that the Three-mile Island incident came 23 along so soon after this that any outfall from this was 24 thrown into TMI actions.
If you remember there was a shut-25 down order on B&W plants.
One of the items on the shutdown O
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE, BulTE A BACRAMENTD. CALIFORNIA 95825 TELEPHONE (916) 972-5594
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order was to perform a reliability study of the Integrated 2
Control System.
That's where I read about this event.
3 It is discussed in that reliability study.
And I would 4
assume that it just got folded into the bigger picture.
5 I don't. remember us, SMUD, doing any engineering 6
evaluation per se on this particular event.
I could be 7
wrong though.
I was not involved myself.
8 MR. BEARD:
Let me still try it the other way.
9 I can appreciate what you're mentioning Bob.
There were a 10 lot of things happening in 1960, that's for sure.
11 MR. EDISON:
It started in '79 I think.
12 MR. DIETERICH:
'79, yeah.
13 MR. BEARD:
After bulletin 7927 was issued in late tO V
14 1979, like two months later, an incident o. curred at 15 Crystal River where they lost power to the E&I system.
16 Now as a result of that, since we basically had 17 not received responses to the bulletin 7927, which was very 13 closely related, I remember being involved in asking all 19
' the B&W plants to come in for a number of meetings.
And 20 as a result of that the B&W plants, as a group, were asked 21 to expand their review on the bulletin 7927 by answering 22 some supplemental questions.
23 Now in that set of of supplemental questions and 24 the answers, your company provided a letter dated March 12, 25 1980, and one of the questions that was in there, in fact PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMEmlCAN RIVER DRIVE, BulTE A SACNAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95825 TELEPHONE (916) 972 3394
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1 the very first question says summarize the power upset 2
events on N&I and ICS that have previously occurred at your 3
plant.
4 Now I think that the way Fred and we are trying to 5
approach this is this is one of the events that --
6 MR. DELEZENSKI:
Pardon me, what page is that.
7 Do you have our response or you just have your --
8 MR. BEARD:
Yes, I have your response and the letter 9
itself is like a page or so long.
10 MR. EDISON:
What's the date of it?
11 MR. BEARD:
The letter was dated March 12, 1980.
12 Well the letter itself is a cover letter, a transmittal 13 letter and it's only one page long.
But then there's like,
14 a 20 page attachment to it that says SMUD response to NRC 15 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Request for Information 16 dated March 6, 1980.
Okay.
You know it's just a title 17 page.
Is And then the very next page, the f.irst question.
19 Okay, the very top of the page, the first request was and 20 it's repeated here, summarize the power upset events on 21 N&I and ICS that have previously occurred at your plant.
22 Now in your response you go through about four 23 Power loss situations in 1974.
You go through the other ones 24 including coverage of the lightbulb event, they're done 25 chronologically and at the top of the next page there's l
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN MlVER DRIVE. SulTE A SACRAMENTD. CALIFDRNIA 95535 TELEPHONE (916) 973-8994
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I event No. 8 dated 1/5/79, reactor is at full 100% full 2
Power when you had this short on the bus that caused the 3
loss of the ICS power supplies and resulted in loss of automatic control and excassive cooldown, actuation of the 4
5 engineer safety features, aux feedwater, blah-blah-blah, 6
and it goes on and on.
7 Now the reason I'm referring you to this document is it's in the context that we're looking back from a loss 3
9 of ICS power situation to you provided this response to a question which we said tell us about your past experiences 10 and what you've learned from them.
And we're trying to yy understand better what did you learn from this event.
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12 mean you had this experience of losing ICS power and gg obviously causing a transient at the plant, much like 14 15 todays.
MR. HEBDON:
Well let's go back and --
16 MR. DELEZENSKI:
That's Herb Heckert.
17 MR. HEBDON:
Okay.
Let me explain to you what ig we're doing here a little bit.
If you could go ahead and 19 introduce yourself just so your name is on the record.
20 MR. HECKERT:
My name is Herb Heckert.
21 MR. HEBDON:
Okay.
What we're doing is we're 22 trying to collect some information on the event that 23 24 occurred on the 26th of December.
And obviously one of 25 the initiators of that event was the loss of ICS power.
And b
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we've been going back and looking at the history of ICS
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I 2
power and we find when we review the history that there 3
was an event back in 1979.
And I have a copy of the LER 4
for that particular event and from trying to decript the 5
initials that are on it, it appears that you wrote that 6
particular LER.
I can go ahead and let you take a look at 7
that, realize that that's about seven years ago, which is 8
relying alot on memory.
But what we're trying to do 9
really for that particular event is just get a feel for what 10 sort of analysis was done, what sort of issues did you all 11 see coming out of that particular event.
Particularly in 12 light of the fact that it's very similar to the event that 13 occurred about a week and a half ago.
Do you recall the 14 event at all, first of all?
15 MR. HECKERT:
No, offhand I would have to read 16 this.
17 MR. HEBDON:
Yeah, go ahead and take a minute or 18 two and review it.
19 MR. EDISON:
Do we want to go off the record while 20 you're doing that.
21 MR. HEBDON:
Yeah, we can go off the record for 22 a couple of minutes, give you a minut e or two to read that.
23 (Off the record. )
24 MR. DIETERICH:
Does the LER talk about corrective 25 actions and so forth back in those days?
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1 MR. HEBDON:
Yeah, the LER is for the event and 2
as I said, we're really more concerned about the event then 3
the actual piece of paper.
What we're trying to get a feel 4
for is what sort of analysis was done as a result of the 5
event, what concerns were raised as a result of the event.
6 So that we can get a good understanding of the history of 7
the Integrated Control System and some of the different 8
issues associated with it.
9 MR. EDISON:
Whzt did the NRC do, you know, what 10 did the owners group do.
11 MR. HEBDON:
You had a chance now to.take a look 12 at it, do you have any recollection of the event or the 13 document?
14 MR. HECKERT:
I do have a recollection of the 15 event but not -- yes.
16 MR. HEBDON:
Could you summarize that for us.
17 MR. HECKERT:
Well really I can base the LER on 18 the trip report that was written at that time.
At that 19
' time the trip report was done by the Tech Support Group
~
which I believe was Mr. Whitney at the time.
20 21 MR. BEARD:
I think you are going to have to 22 speak up so that they can --
23 MR. HECKERT:
On that particular event a lot was, 24 if I recollect correctly, was based on the fact that they 25 only had indication of one of the channels having gone into lO l
l PETERS SHDRTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE. SulTE A SACRAMENTO, CALWORNIA 95835 TELEPHONE (916) 973*SO94
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safety features actuation --
2 MR. HEBDON:
Yes.
3 MR. HECKERT:
And a lot of emphasis was placed on 4
that to:my recollection because they felt since they didn't 5
realize or it wasn't apparent that both had actuated.
It 6
was the feedwater pump (inaudible) coolant replaced on that.
7 That's to my recollection.
3 MR. HEBDON:
Now you say that that was based on 9
a trip report.
Would it be possible, is that available in to your files.
Would it be possible to get a copy of the trip 11 report resulting from that event and possibly, if it can 12 be done, if we can identify who actually prepared the trip 13 r eport and if it would be possible to maybe talk to them 14 at some later point.
15 MR. DIETERICH:
Yeah, we can certainly get you a 16 copy of that trip report.
Trip reports are prepared by 17 the technical support group here in Operations.
Yeah, we 13 can get you the report and the name of who is responsible 19 for preparing it.
20 MR. HEBDON:
Just as a point of background, would 21 the person who prepared the trip report be responsible for 22 assessing the implications of the event.
Is that part of 23 the trip report effort or is it mostly just a documentation 24 effort.
25 MR. DIETERICH:
Not necessarily, the trip report l
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I basically is documentation such as you people are after, 2
what happened, what caused the trip, what was the sequence 3
of events, etcetera, etcetera.
4 MR. HEBDON:
Who would haverbeen responsible for 5
looking at the event from the perspective of what additional 6
things do we need to do, are there any lessons to be learned 7
from this particular event, that sort of thing.
8 MR. DIETERICH:
In today's world the Management 9
Safety Review Committee would review this as they review to all licensee event reports to discuss safety significance 11 and possible corrective actions, etcetera.
We also today 12 have a root cause program which looks at all events like 13 this and comes up with recommended corrective actions that 14 are reviewed by management.
15 The question in my mind is if we had that formal 16 of a process back in those days even for the MSRC that have 17 reviewed each of these to determine if there were any la corrective actions required.
19 MR. HEBDON:
If you could just review your 20 Procedures or review your recollections and then let us 21 know at some later point whether this event was reviewed 22 by anyone for lessons learned, generic or general implications, 23 that sort of thing.
And then if there is any, either 24 recollection based on individuals or documentation of the 25 results of that, we would appreciate that.
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRlVC, butte A SACRAMENTD. CALIFORNIA 95833 TELEPHONE (9HS) 973 3894
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1 MR. DIETERICH:
Okay.
I'm afraid I'm going to have 2
to because I certainly can't answer the question.
3 MR. HEBDON:
I understand that and we'll just 4
leave that as an open item for right now.
Okay.
I'd like 5
to now go ahead and --
6 MR. BEARD:
Let me get the letter back.
I want 7
to -- Bob, when you're through I want to get the letter back, 3
is the main thing.
9 MR. HEBDON:
Did you have any more questions on 10 the letter itself?
11 MR. BEARD:
Well I had sort of a question that's 12 right along this same point of view.
Maybe now is as good 13 a time as any to bring it up.
I'm looking at that event
(
14 in the context of this request that I refer to earlier and 15 your response about you know your plant's previous 16 experience with loss of instrument power or control system 17 power.
And that was response to question No. 1 and I 13 referred to earlier.
19 And in the context of your response to question 20 No. 1, I'd like to understand a little bit better.
You a
21 report that you had four events --
22 MR. HEBDON:
Wait a minute J.T.,
if I could 25 interrupt just a little.
I think we need to back up a 24 little on it.
If we're going to go onto that document we've 25 got to get a feel for who was involved with what associated
(~)
s_/
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER ORIVE. SUITE A SACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95555 TELEPHONE (916) 973*5594
19
([];
I with that document.
2 MR. BEARD:
Not this question you don't.
But go 3
ahead.
4 MR. HEBDON:
All.right.
Well let me just ask a 5
couple of things in the way of background first.
There's 6
an event that occurred at Aconi in 1979. There's also another 7
event that occurred at Crystal River in 1980.
As a result of that there was a considerable amount of communications 8
that came out from the NRC.
There was an I&E bulletin 7927 9
that came out and asked all the licensees to look at some 10 certain issues.
As a result of the Crystal River event gg there was another letter that came out from NRR that was 12 directed I think principally at B&W plants and asked them y,
O V
to look at it.
g4 Y u all Prepared a number of responses to that and 15 that information then was submitted to NRC.
That's really 16 ne f the things that we would like to discuss in quite a 17 bit of detail.
But before we do I'd just like to try and gg get a feel for what your involvement was with that so we 19 have an understanding of how much you were directly involved 20 with thoso particular documents.
21 MR. DIETERICH:
First of all, bulletin -- w611 22 as y u indicated, bulletin 7927 came out the end of 1979, 23 November timeframe if I remember right.
The response to 24 25 that bulletin was augmented, supplemented by another response PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTINO CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER ORIVE. SulTE A SACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95e35 TELEPHONE (916) 973*SO94
20 l
I which came about as a result of the 1980 Crystal River 2
event.
3 During that same period of time SMUD was involved 4
with a public hearing here in Sacramento due to the Three 5
Mile Island event.
The State of California had requested 6
the hearing to determine if Rancho Seco could still operate 7
safely in 3ight of what we learned in Three Mile Island.
8 From the period about mid-1979 until mid-1980 9
several key SMUD people were tied up essentially full-time 10 on those hearings.
The responses to the bulletin, to the 11 Crystal River event questions, if I remember correctly, 12 basically came out of Operations at that time.
I don't know 18 who was the person most directly involved.
I was not Os 14 personally involved.
15 MR. HEBDON:
We can try the initials game again.
16 The March 12 letter is written by --
17 MR. DIETERICH:
Pierre Oubre.
18 MR. HEBDON:
RPO.
19 MR. DIETERICH:
Yeah, I don't know what the R 20 stands for, Pierre Oubre.
He was Plant Superintendent at 21 the time.
22 MR. BEARD:
Would you dare take a chance at spelling 28 that last name?
24 MR. DIETERICH:
0-u-b-r-e.
25 MR. EDISON:
Not too hard.
OG PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING cDRPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE SulTE A BACRAMENTD. CALIFORNIA 95535 TELEPHONE (996) 973-5594
21 1
MR. HEBDON:
And WCW7 e
2 MR. DIETERICH:
That's Halbridge, William C.
3 Walbridge who signed the letter.
4 MR. HEBDON:
Oh, I see.
That's right.
Is 5
Mr. Oubre available?
6 MR. DIETERICH:
Pierre is available.
He's 7
downtoim.
He's no longer involved with Rancho Seco 3
Operations.
He's a Special Projects Manager downtown.
But p
yes, he'd be free to talk about it.
I don't know who --
to you caught me off guard today because I don't know who was 11 intimately involved with these responses.
I truly don't.
12 MR. HEBDON:
Is there any way you could maybe contact Mr. Oubre and if he's not the one that actually 13
(
put it together himself, possibly he recalls who did put L/
14 15 it together and we could talk to them.
Obviously I would doubt that the Plant Manager put them together by himself.
16 I'm sure somebody staffed it for him and then he probably 17 13 concurred in it before it went out to be signed.
Were 19
' you all involved with it at all?
20 MR. DIETERICH:
I was not.
I was on the witness stand when all of this came about.
21 22 MR. BEARD:
Let me ask Bob Daniels the same 23 question.
Were you involved in the generation of this 24 response dated March 12, 1980 at all Bob?
25 MR. DANIELS:
I don't remember being involved in O
PETERB BHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN MlVER DRIVE. BulTE A BACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95535 TELEPHONE (916) 973 3334
22
()
I the response.
I was involved in doing some of the engineerins'
\\_/
2 the implements to commitments and the like.
3 MR. BEARD:
So it's more like commitments were 4
made or were talked about in the letter and then you took 5
it from after that I guess.
Okay.
6 MR. HEBDON:
Any of the others of you, did you 7
recall this particular bulletin and response.
Were you 8
involved with it at all?
9 MR. BEARD:
I have a technical question, it doesn't 10 involve the letter.
11 MR. DIETERICH:
Okay.
Let me go back.
Maybe I 12 can answer the question better.
The letter basically refers 13 to a study that was done inhouse at SMUD revolving around tO x_/
14 our so-called lightbulb incident.
15 MR. BEARD:
That's one of the studies it refers 16 to.
17 MR. DIETERICH:
Starting on page 2 the review of 18 the Crystal River event,naddress your susceptability to it.
19 In general our responses on page, I guess I'm on the wrong 20 page.
I'll take that back.
Page 3 is to set forth 21 information presented by each licensee in a meeting on 12 March 4.
From that page on it's discussing our lightbulb 23 incident, loss of power to the NNI that occurred back then 24 and our action statement of that.
And that was all addressed 25 by a team that's spelled out on page 3 there.
Who none of t
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN MIVER DRIVE. SulTE A SACNAMENTO. CALIP ONNIA 95535 TELEPHONE (916) 973*S894
23 p
I them are involved with Rancho Seco anymore.
V 2
MR.
BEARD:
None of those people.
The team, 3
according to the letter, was a supervising electrical 4
engineer, a supervising ~.-hanimi engineer and a SMUD 5
nuclear engineer and you had a senior licensee.
You say 6
that none of those people are still around.
7 MR. DIETERICH:
No, wait.
I'm not sure who the 8
supervising was -- was that Lee Keelman?
He wasn't on the 9
committee, was he?
10 MR. DANIELS:
'78, that was Larry Smith.
'79/80, 11 wasn't that Larry.
12 MR. DIETERICH:
No, would have been Lee Keelman~.
13 But anyway, the first one is no longer associated with
/3 O
14 Rancho Seco, his name is John Dunn.
The third one is 15 Stan Anderson who's with Pacific Gas and Electric now.
16 MR. HEBDON:
The electrical engineer was who?
17 MR. DIETERICH:
John Dunn.
i 18 MR. BEARD:
And Stan Anderson.
l 19 MR. DIETERICH:
The third one was -- the nuclear 20 engineer with licenses, Stan Anderson.
l 21 MR. BEARD:
No, I mean Stan Anderson was the third l
22 person?
23 MR. DIETERICH:
Right.
l 24 MR. BEARD:
Who was the second person?
25 MR. DIETERICH:
That's what I'm confused of.
It l
i k
1 l
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE. SulTE A SACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95535 TELEPHONE (916) 973 3394
24 I
was either Lee Keelman or would have been Dan Whitney.
Was 2
he called Supervising Mechanical Engineer at that time 3
instead of Technical Support --
4 MR. DANIELS:
I don't know.
5 MR. DIETERICH:
I don't remember Lee Keelman being 6
on this team.
He was the engineering department's 7
supervising mechanical engineer but I don't think this is 8
referring to him.
9 MR. HEBDON:
Well if you could find out particularly 10 if it turns out it is Dan Whitney because he if, of course, 11 availaole.
12 MR. DIETERICH:
Yeah.
That may be John McCoyan 13 is the person I'm thinking of.
14 MR. BEARD:
I think John is still available.
15 MR. DIETERICH:
Yeah.
John is.
16 MR. BEARD:
He's around.
You'11 notice that this 17 response is basically a documentation of what was presented 18 at the meeting on March 4th at which I was a participant.
19
'And I remember that presentation, I remember the lightbulb 20 event.
There were a lot of investigations of the lightbulb 21 event.
It developed a lot of notoriety as you remember.
22 May I go back and ask a technical question.
23 MR. HEBDON:
Sure.
24 MR. BEARD:
Going back to the first page of this 25 response, after the first four loss of power events that you
].
k PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATlDN 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE. SUITE A SACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95535 TELEPHONE (916) 973 3594
i 25
(~)N had, all of which involved the loss of inverter.
And I 1
\\_
2 recognize that the inverter is the source of power to the 3
bus as c'
'rasted to the loads on the bus.
But at any rate, 4
there's a statement following those four events that said 5
following these events above parallel inverter supplies 6
were added to the ICS and NNI DC power supplies.
7 All right.
I am particularly curious to see if 8
there's a way we can retrieve the information that would say 9
this is the way the ICS power supply, not the NNI but the 10 ICS DC power supplies were configured prior to and after Il this change that's talked about here.
I'm just wondering 12 if that information is retrieveable because what they do 13 is they refer you to a figure 1 that's attached which I 10 believe is the NNI power sc'eme and while the NNI power kl 14 h
15 scheme and the ICS power scheme in a lot of regards, they 16 are also different in a lot of regards.
And I'm more 17 interested because of this event in what the ICS power 18 scheme was from the varinos buses where they got 120 volts 19 down to the 24 volt buses.
I'm just asking is that 20 retrieveable information?
21 MR. DIETERICH:
Yes, we can get that.
22 MR. BEARD:
Okay.
Would that -- do you happen 25 to remember any of that stuff Bob?
What the old, old system 24 was?
Yes.
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE. BUITE A BACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95535 TELEPHONE (916) 973 5594
l
?6 m
(
)
1 MR. BEARD:
Maybe I can ask you and you maybe can 2
solve my problem.
But I would like to get a cartoon later 3
if we could.
4 Do you remember if the ICS X power was separate 5
from the ICS Y power.
6 MR. DIETERICH:
By separate do you mean coming 7
from separate inverters.
8 MR. BEARD:
No, I'm thinking in context --
9 (Off record to change tape. )
t2 1o
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12
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13
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14
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15
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16
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11
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Is
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G V
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE. SulTE A BACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95535 TELEPHONE (996) 973 3394
27
.p 1
1 MR. HEBDON:
Just for the record, two people v
2 have joined us, so if you would gc ahead and introduce your-3 selves, so we have your names on the record.
4 MR. WELLS:
Ron Wells, INPOL.
5 MR. FLYNN:
Joe Flynn, INPOL.
6 MR. BEARD:
I guess we should say Herb Heckert 7
has left.
8 To continue, I was asking the question about 9
the original design of the ICS power sources and supplies 10 and what not, trying to probe into the area of whether, m ICS-Y.
To what 11 what you might call ICS-X was separate frw 12 extent were they separate is what I'm trying to get to.
13 MR. DANIELS:
I don't remember that detail.
14 MR. BEARD:
Okay.
15 MR. DANIELS:
We can find all that out and show 16 on the drawing, show you the changes--
17 MR. BEARD:
Fine.
18 MR. DANIELS:
--and also go through why the changer 19 were made the way they were.
20 MR. BEARD:
You mean sort of a chronology of 21 this is the way it started and here it went to this and 22 later it went to that, the whys and wherefores?
23 MR. DIETERICH:
Yeah.
I was the one that bought 24 the switches, did all the designs.
25 MR. BEARD:
That kind of chronology would be i O PETERB SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER ORIVE, SulTE A l
BACRAMENTD. CALWDRNIA 95835 l
TELEpMONE (eio eva ses4
28 2
D 1
(G extremely valuable, if you could get that for us.
I guess 2
we have to formally request that or something?
Or that 3
will come out of this meeting?
4 MR. DIETERICH:
We'll get it.
5 MR. DANIELS:
Do you know when you're going to 6
be leaving here?
7 MR. HEBDON:
Probably not before the middle of 8
the week.
9 MR. DANIELS:
Does Bob have to get this for you 10 tomorrow or can--is this something that could be provided 11 in the next couple of weeks?
12 MR. BEARD:
We really need it a little bit 13 quicker than the next couple of weeks.
O V
14 MR. HEBDON:
Yeah.
If we could get it in the 15 next day or so it would'be very helpful.
16 MR. DIETERICH:
Let me try and shoot for the 17 end of tomorrow.
It would probably take me just about--
18 I won't be able to get anything done today.
It will take 19 me all day--a'll tomorrow morning to go through the files 20 and pull it out.
And it's going to'be that thick, I'll 21 have to copy it.
And we'll give you some--
22
'MR. BEARD:
That would be very helpful.
23 MR. HEDDON:
Any documents, if you could give 24 us, if you could, I'd hate to ask this, but unfortunately 25 for the record' purposes, we need to--if you could give us PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN MlVER DRIVE. BulTE A BACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95555 TELEPHONE (916) 973 3394
~
29 1
two copies, I think that would be helpful; because we need g
i i
2 one for a file copy and one for'a working copy.
3 MR. DANIELS:
I'm not sure if you guys have had 4
this, but just let me say it now, because when you get this 5
documentation, you won't even know thia.
The way we changed 6
the plan was with a document called an ECN, Engineering 7
Change Notice.
Have you been through our process for doing 3
that?
9 MR. BEARD:
I have not been through your particular 10 process, but I've been through it at other plants.
11 MR. DANIELS:
Okay.
So that's the package we'11 12 give to you, ECN and DBR.
13 MR. HEBDON:
Okay.
That will be very helpful.
O 14 N w, getting back t the responses to this par-15 ticular bulletin itself, I think we've decided or we've 16 agreed that the people that are here were not really involved 17 with actually preparing the responses.
So I'm not sure 13 if there's'a l'ot to be gained by going into--trying to go 19 into them in much detail, because obviously you all weren't 20 there.
It would be rather hard for you to comment on what 21 the people understood or didn't understand or what they 22 thought the questions meant, uhat they-thought their answers 23 meant.
Is that a true statment?
24 MR. DANIELS:
I'd have to agree with you, yes.
25 MR'. DEARD':
In my own mind, I think the only O
PETERE SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE. BUITE A BACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95555 TELEPHONE (916) 973 3394
30 4
/'3 1
questions that we can ask would be the type that I just V
2 asked of, you know, what was the plant configuration at 3
some point in time, that kind of just strictly technical 4
question rather than an intent type question.
5 MR. HEBDON:
I agree.
I agree.
Because you 6
obviously can't ask what did you understand of the people 7
who weren't the ones who understood.
8 MR. BEARD:
What I'd like to do is before we 9
basically release these folks from that conversation is
~
to to sort of take a minute and flip through the pages and 11 see if I 'had any questions that were of the type that maybe
^
12 we could get an answer to.
13 MR. HEBDON:
I agree.
I have one question and 3
%)
14 maybe you can help a little with this, procedures were written 15 for loss of NNI and both NNI-Y and NNI-X and both NNI-Y 16 and X simultaneously.
What organization would have been 17 involved with writing those procedures?
13 MR. DIETERICH:
Nuclear operatins does all 19 procedure writing here.
I couldn't begin to give you a 20
'name of who wrot'e the procedures back that--
21 MR. HEBDON:
The reason I'm asking is the 22 point--the thing I'm trying to clarify in my own mind is 23
'that it seemed like we were hitting all around this particula r
24 question of ICS power supplies.
Now, you all have had events 25 involving ICS power supplies.
There were bulletins that i
W)
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER ORIVE. SUITE A SACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95825 TELEPHONE (916) 973 8894
31
("] 5 1
came out associated more so I think with NNI than ICS, but Li 2
certainly ICS was within the scope.
I'm just trying to 3
get a feel, for example, ifprocedureswbrewrittenfor 4
NNI why weren't they written for loss of ICS at the same 5
time.
6 MR. DIETERICH:
I agree with you.
Our focus 7
was on NNI back in those days.
And ours, SMUD in particular, a
was because of light bulb incident.
That was the most c
9 significant event in the history of this plant up till recent go days here.
And the attention was on NNI.
I think the only 33 attention really given a great deal of study to with the ICS was a loss of'NNI generated signaled to the ICS.
We 12 33 didn't think about or even worry about a loss of ICS, 14 because it had two AC power suppli'es with automatic transfer 15 switches in there.
We honed in more on NNI as a possible, 16 y u know, where you could lose the entire system, because 17 it happened here.
I think our own--
13 MR. HEBDON:
But the ICS power--loss of ICS had 19 happened here too, and particularly after Crystal River.
20 The Crystal--you know,'before Crystal River tho'pr'oblem 21 was with t'he source,'the Acony event was with the power 22 source not the--not the 24-volt power supply themselves.
23 But Crystal River was the other way around.
The problem 24 was caused by a fault on the 24-volt bus.
And I was trying 25 to get a fee'l for whether that subtlety was--was understood iQ PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORAT10N 3433 AMERICAN RIVER ORIVE. SulTE A BACRAMENTO CALIFORNIA 95825 TELEPHONE (916) 973 GG94
32 6
1 by the people and if it had any impact on their review,
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2 for example, of ICS and NNI.
3 MR. DIETERICH:
You know, I just really can't 4
answer that question.
I don't think any of us in this room 5
were in enough of a position back then to direct activities 6
that--you know, be the one to put the thrust of an investiga-7 tion o'ff in a certain area.
8 MR. DANIELS:
I agree there.
But I--this is 9
going back eight years.
But my recollection is, we were 10 aware of sensitivity of ICS power supplies.
First of all, 11 we changed the power supply of the I'CS.
12 MR. HEBDON:
That's right.
MR'. DANIELS:
So when you see that in this letter, 13 r~N
(_)
14 you see NNI, NNI, NNI, and then,all of a sudden you see 15 power supplies were changed to NNI and ICS and we added 16 automatic ' transfers.
We changed the plus to minus 24-volt 17 power supply in the ICS.
That was done.
I'll get you that 13 informat' ion'.
~
19 MR. HEBDON: I understand.
20 MR. DANIELS:
Another thing is you see it happen 21 around me, is you see a design that's being developed that 12 begins to make overcooling transient with the ICS causes.
13 A design was started to take that control away from the 24 ICS an'd give it to another system.
So back in '80, we began 15 engineer'ing work to de-couple some of the important overcooling PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE. SulTE A SACRAMENTD. CALifPORNIA 95535 TELEPHONC (916) 973 SS94
33 7
I factors of the ICS cause and take it out of the ICS.
(~)
V 2
MR. DIETERICH:
That's very true.
3 MR. ' HEBDON:
Where was thdt put?
4 MR. DANIELS:
That was being'part of the overall' 5
auxiliary feedwater modification upgrade.
6 MR. HEBDON:
What's the st.atus of that?
7 MR. DANIELS:
Scheduled to be--first phase will 3
be installed, cycle A-~
You'll see a lot of--a lot of the 9
features that are. problems that the ICS generates, that jo system will solve.
]y MR. BEARD:
This system that you're talking about, 12 the AUX feedwater upgrade', is that the one that we referred yg to as EPICS, Emergency Feedwater Initiation Control System?
14 MR. DANIELS':~
Yes.
15 MR. BEARD:
I just want to.make sure I'm referring 16 to the same animal here.
17 MR. DANIELS:
EFICS is.
13 MR. DIETERICH:
Basically the same sytem.
So I'd answer your question, what 19 MR. DANIELS:
I thh.nk ' 'd come back arid tell you,, firsti of 20 did you do, I
21 all, we changed the 120-volt power supply system.
That 22 we did.
We put in automatic transfer systen, to change 23 the p1'us er minus 24-volt system for'the ICS'specifically;,
and 't' hen we went back and we iden'tified the real causes 24 25 of the overcooling event.
I think you can probably narrow p,
'i..,
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AETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION ~
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34 8
1 it down to maybe two key items, one is even in the LAR, 2
you see the comment in there that SFAS initiates AUX 3
One of the commitments in there--I remember 4
this one.
One of the commitments in there is that engineerinc 5
will do an analysis, look at, taking SFAS away from AUX f
6 feedwater.
And operations came and said take SFAS signal 7
away from AUX feedwater, and we said no, you can't do that.
3 MR. DIETERICH:
We were in the middle--
You're 9
absolutely right, Bob.
We were in the middle of that study, 10 when the Three Mile Island accident happened.
And nobody yy ever again mentioned, should we do away with auxiliary feed-12 water initiation, is MR. HEBDON:
Did you ever do the study or did ym V
34 that just get overtaken by events?
15 MR. DANIELS:
No.
I would say, if you say, show 16 me the study, we couldn't show you the study.
If you'd 17 say, did you think about it, did you review it, the answer is is yes.
~Our feeling was, there's no need to do a study.
19 I mean, how can we do a study two days after TMI says we're 20 going to take SFAS off AUX feedwater.
21 MR. HEBDON':
Understand.
MR. DANIELS:
And our response is, that's not 22 23 a reasonable request.
24 MR. DIETERICH:
I'd never find it, I shouldn't 25 offer.
I'm not sure but what that study wasn't completed.
IU PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE. BulTE A SACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95325 TELEPMONE (916) 972 3394
35 1
I think it was reviewed by the MSRC.
2 MR. DANIELS:
Maybe we did one?
3 MR. DIETERICH:
I'm not sure.
I have a vague--
4 MR. HEBDON:
Well, we can certainly--
5 MR. DIETERICH:
I know it was discussed with 6
MSRC.
7 MR. DANIELS:
I was involved in the answer, and 8
the answer was our viewpoint was no, there's no need to 9
do a study.
10 MR. EDISON:
Was it whether SFAS off of AUX 11 feedwater?
12 MR. DIETERICH:
Yeah.
13 MR. DANIELS:
See, what the answer came out to (O
_)
14 be is that we need to de,.is we need to have better control 15 of the feed flow when there is an SFAS, when there is a
~
16 demand for AUX feed.
The solution presented isn't the right 17 solution, because it solves the wrong problem.
The problem 18 is not initiating AUX f'eed on SFAS.
That's not the problem.
19 The problem is controlling it, once it is initiated.
20 MR. BEARD:
Wouldn't the new system, the EFIC, 21 help you substantially in that area?
22 MR. DANIELS:
Oh, absolutely.
23 MR'. BEARD':
I understood w' hat you said earlier, 24 Bob, is that the installation of EFIC is going to be a phased 25 in situation.
The first phase is in the next refueling i
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36 10 1
outage, which is, what, sometime in '86 or what?
O 2
MR. DANIELS:
'87.
3 MR. DIETERICH:
Trobably January '87 now.
4 MR. BEARD:
January '87, okay.
And presumably 5
there's a second or a third phase.
6 MR. DANIELS:
The first phase turns out the AUX 7
feedwater flows.
Th'at's the phase that has the highest
~
3 priority, because of all the things that AUX feedwater can 9
do to the plant.
Eo I think we did respond to this.
10 MR. HEBDON:
Now, I had a question, and I'm going 33 to ask this--
12 MR. DIETERICH:
Can we go off the record?
gg MR. HEBDON:
Yeah.
We can go off the record t( )
14 for just a second.
15 (Discussion off the record.)
16 MR. HEBDON:
Back on the record.
17 MR. BEARD:
I guess as soon as we get back on 13 the record, we should announce that Bob Bietrich was called 19 out for other matters.
20 MR. HEBDON:
Let me ask you a question, and I 21 really don't mean this question to be at all judgmental, 22 so please take it in th'at sense.
You had the event and 25 you did the study in 1980.
And I guess the decision was 24 made to install'the EFIC system.
~
j-25 Is it typically the case that it takes six or O
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING c0RPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER ORiVE. SUITE A 5ACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95825
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TELEPHONC (916) 973-8894
37 11 1
seven years for a system to go from the statement of need 2
to installation?
3
- 12. DFT M WSKI:
It depends on the system.
It depends 4
on the degree of the complexity of the system and the other 5
issues th'at are being discussed, especially something EFIC 6
where there were several other B&W owners involved.
I don't 7
know the sp'ecific history, why we ended up being last 8
installed EFIC'.
But I do know that because of the other 9
experience of the other two plants that do have EFIC, we 10 are taking the closer look at EFIC, as far as how it is implement'd and which way is it going to go with EFIC, the 11 e
12 plan, specific aspects of it, because of certain start-13 up problems and difficulties that the other plants with C,o 14 EFIC an'd actual use of EFIC.
They've even cautioned us 15 to take a slow look at it and make sure that, you know, 16 you learn from our experience.
17 In fact, they even said, try out a phase before 18 you actually put it into full implementation, that's part 19 of our pl'an.
~
20
~ MR. HEBDON:
Is EFIC a particularly complex system ?
21 The impression I get is that it's a major change in the--
22 it's a' major system modification.
23 MR. DANIELS:
First o'f all, I'll answer your 24 question dire'ctly, yes, it's a very major change.
If you
'ould say, how do you rate a change?
~
~
25 w
One way is dollars.
(%
PETERS SHORTHANo REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER ORIVE, SUITE A SACRAMENTD. CALIFORNIA 95325 TELEPHONE (916) 972-3394
~ _ -.
38 12 O
1 It's probably a 10 to 15 million dollar modification all O
2 by itself.
Another way is how many engineering man hours--
3 how many engineering man years will we spend on it to get 4
it up?
We'll probably spend 15 to 20 man years, roughly, 5
to get it implemented.
That's just engineering.
6 So in that sense, it's a very, very major effort.
7 The other part though of your comment is should 3
it take five or six years.
I think Jerry's comments are 9
valid there.
But the other comment is, in that five or to six years, if we didn't do zero, we did make modifications 11 tothe AUX feedwater system, because TMI required that 12 we make some of those modifications.
As it turns out, TMI
~
33 wanted AUX feedwater to be upgraded.
14 So in this five-or'six-year period, you shouldn't 15 have the impression that the AUX feedwater system has been 16 stagnated.
We have the modifications that I feel was trying 17 to address some of the issues that came out of the '78 event.
18 MR. BEARD:
I guess you're giving me the 19 impression that we should view those as interim upgrades 20 un'til EFIC came on the scene.
21 MR. DANIELS:
Sure.
Because, I think we were 22 sensitive the issue you raised.
Well, you guys are going 23 to sit here Jor five years and do nothing.
24 M'R.
HEBDON:
No.
I understand it.
I really 25 didn't mean to be judgmental by the question, because I JD i
l PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE SUITE A I
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95325 TELEPHONE (916) 972 3594
(
39 13 1
certainly understand the major engineering modifications, v
2 that things take time.
It's not just something you can 3
do in a matter of a couple of days.
If nothing else, the 4
budgeting of it, it takes so long to come up with $15 million 5
to make a modification of this k'nd of magnitude.
i 6
MR. DANIELS:
But again, we didn't use that as 7
an excuse to do noth'ing.
8 MR. HEBDON:
I understand.
4 9
MR. DELEZENSKI:
A considerable amount of work 10 has been done.
The parts have been purchased already.
11 MR. DANIELS:
We have made some plan modifications 12 MR. HEBDON:
Now, I think, as I recall back when 13 we started the conversation, you--did you mention that you mU 14 had been involved with some of the engineering changes that 15 were done as a result of the bulletin 7927?
16 MR. DANIELS:
Okay.
Take a look at the response 17 to 7927, starting at about page 3.
18 MR. B'EARD:
This is the response to the supplemen-19 tary questions--
20 MR.'DANIELS:
Right.
21 MR. BEARD':
--for the B&W plans.
22 MR. DANIELS:
Now, this is where I was getting 23 confused in your fir'st question.
What you see on page 3 24 is 'a synopsis of a report that was made in response to the
~
25 light bul'b incident.
About the middle of the page, supervising A
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE. BulTE A SACRAMENTO CALIFORNIA 95325 TELEPHONE (916) 972 5594
40 14 D
1 electrical engineer, that's the position I have today.
That ij 2
person was my direct supervisor.
I reported directly to 3
that person.
4 MR. EDISON:
Who is that?
5 MR. DANIELS:
That's John Dunn.
6 I had the responsibility then for doing 85 to 7
95 percent of all electrical design that was required to 8
implement the commitments in here.
9 MR. BEARD:
Those design changes were not trivial?
10 MR. DANIELS:
Oh, no.
They were major changes.
11 And what we did is that--and again, looking back at what 12 happened with the overcooling, we integrated the March '78 13 incident, the light bulb incident with 7927 and with 14 Appendix R.
I't turns out that Appendix R was forcing some 15 of these same issues back in this timeframe.
What do you 16 do with a spurious operation?
And that's what the ICS causes, 17 a spurious operation.
18 So even back in that timeframe, we were making 19 modifications in the plans to deal with those issues, and 20 we did.
21 So I get the feeling you have the impression 22 that we haven't done a lot.
23 MR. HEBDON:
No, no, not at all.
I really didn't 24 mean it to be judgmental at all.
I was just trying to get
~
25 a feel for what was done and what in what sort of timeframs.
O PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE. SulTE A SACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95325 TELEPHONE (916) 972 3394
41 1
You know, we can certainly see that a lot of things were 2
done.
There were procedures written and a lot of modificatior.s 3
were made to the ICS and to the NNI.
And what we're trying 4
to do is get a feel for what the concerns that you were 5
trying to address with those modifications; because--a lot 6
of analysis was done of what would happen if you lost NNI's 7
and we were trying to get a feel for how much of that was 8
also done on the ICS.
And the ICS is sort of--to some 9
extent on the periphery of the issue.
The real focus, I 10 think, in many cases, with the NNI system, because that's 11 where the events have really taken place, the light bulb 12 incident, the acony event, the Crystal River event.
13 And we were trying to get a feel for how much
\\
b 14 of that concern spilled'over into the ICS system.
15 MR. DANIELS:
I think a lot.
I think that was 16 probably one of the driving factors way up front that made 17 EFIC something we committed to.
18 If you look at what the plant will look like 19 once EFIC is installed, you'll see that the concern with 20 the ICS is so great that what we've done is we've taken 21 all the areas of concern out of the ICS, installed them
~
22 in EFIC.
Now that we've done that, you have to realize 23 that EFIC is a safety grade four-channel system.
So it 24 is even more than a normal safety grade system, which is 25 a two-channel system.
/7 PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE, SUITE A BACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95825 TELEPHONE (916) 972 8394
42 16 1
So I think the concern was tremendous to go to O
2 that amount of effort.
3 MR. EDISON:
Does SFAS still exist?
4 MR. DANIELS:
Yes.
5 MR. EDISON:
It just replaces ICS?
6 MR. DANIELS:
It doesn't replace ICS, but it 7
solves a lot of the problems.
8 MR. EDISON:
It takes AUX feed out of ICS.
9 MR. DANIELS:
It takes the atmospheric dump valves 10 out of ICS, which was something that added to the overcooling 11 transient, as they have a capacity for, I'm not sure how 12 many valves we had.
They can dump 25 percent steam, you 13 can get a tremendous overcooling transient.
(]
14 MR. BEARD:
Let me ask you a little bit about 15 EFIC, maybe since you did a lot of work on it, you can help 16 me remember things.
I've forgotten a lot about it.
17 It seems as though that one of the advantages 18 that you're alluding to is 'that upon actuation of engineering 19 safet'y features, you would not get AUX feedwater immediately, 20 bu't it would probably be initiated on the basis of something l
21 like steam generator low level.
Is that correct?
22 MR. DANIELS:
No.--
Yes and no.
Engineering 23 safety features, SFAS sends a signal to EFIC that says the P ant n'eeds AUX feedwater.
l 24 i
25 MR. BEARD:
Yes.
l
\\
l
\\
l PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE. SUITE A I
SACRAMENTD. CALIFORNIA 95325 TELEPHONE (916) 972-5594
. = _ _.
43 17 1
MR. DANIELS :
EFIC sends a signal off that starts
(]
2 the AUX feedwater pumps.
And then EFIC will control the 3
steam generator level automatically, based upon the status 4
of the plant, how many feed pumps do we have running, how 5
many RCP's do we have running, what else is going on, so 6
that it automatically controls the level.
7 MR. BEARD:
And you won't have these EDP converters 8
in them that fail to mid scale when you lose power and things 9
of that nature?
10 MR. DANIELS:
That's correct.
11 MR. BEARD:
And when EFIC is in operation, does 12 it provide any mechanism for preventing--putting too much
~
13 water in the generator?
14 MR. DANIELS:
Right now, there is an overfill 15 feature in the EFIC design.
I'm not sure--that design is
~
^
16 Progressing along on the overfill feature, and I'm not sure 17 if it's going to stay in or come out.
18 MR. BEARD:
Okay.
l 19 MR. DANIELS:
Because it creates a conflict.
20 On the one hand you don't want to put too much water in, 21 but you want to make sure that that system doesn't stop 22 if you're adding water when you need it.
l 23 MR. BEARD:
Yes.
It's a sensitive balance.
Okay.
24 MR. HEBDON:
One of the things getting back to 25 the concern about ICS, I notice that one of the interim l
o l
1 PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE. BulTE A BACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95525 TELEPMONE (916) 972*5894 h
44 18 I
solutions in the case of the NNI was that developed some m
2 procedures for loss of NNI.
Do you have any feel or any 3
recollection of why similar procedures weren't prepared 4
for loss of ICS?
5 MR. DANIELS:
I'm the wrong person to answer 6
that.
7 MR. HEBDON:
I thought you might have some recollec -
8 tion from having been around it at the time.
9 MR. BEARD:
I have sort of a technical design 10 question maybe you could help me with though.
11 On the ICS 240 volt power supplies feeding in 12 from 120-volt sources, do you happen to remember if they've 13 always had only the four power supplies in a single power
()
14 monitor or if--like it is today, or if in the past it was 15 ever different from that, in particular were there two 16 Power monitors.
17 MR. DANIELS:
You had a couple of questions.
13 One question you had is, is the system today, the number 19 of Power supplies, different from the system yesterday?
20 MR. BEARD:
We're not talking about the 120-21 volt fees, but just at the 24-volt level.
~
22 MR. DANIELS:
The syst'em today is dif ferent with 23 the number of power supplies, that much I know.
MR.' BEARD:
Okay.
~
24 25 MR. DANIELS:
And this synopsis I'11 give you, PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE, SUITE A SACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95325 TELEPHONE (916) 972*SG94
45 19 (3
1 I'll try and give you all our paperwork and a little
%.)
2 synopsis.
On the number of power monitors, I can't remember 3
that detail, if we've always had one.
I know we've always 4
had one.
I think the question is, have you ever had more 5
than one.
I can't answer that.
I think, have you had 6
more than one for plus or minus 24-volt monitor.
7 MR. BEARD:
Yeah.
That's part of what I'm getting 8
at.
I guess I'm really trying to focus in on the design, 9
question of, the question design, if you do lose ICS power,
~
10 you get two major undesirable effects.
The first one is 11 that a lot of valves go to their mid scale position, they
~
12 get a 50-percent demand.
Okay?
The second one is that 13
' automatic repositioning is accompanied by the loss of the 3
b 14 manual repositioning that the operator.'could take normally 15 from the control board.
~
16 And in the earlier ICS designs, the 721 design 17 like Alcony and TMI have versus the 820 design here, they is have a separate power coming in for what they call hand l
l 19 from power from auto.
So when you lose the automatic you l'
20
' don't lose 'the hand.
Do you follow the line of thinking 21 I'm ge'tting to?
l 22 MR. DANIELS:
Sure, sure.
1 23 MR. BEARD':
So I'm trying to investigate if maybe
'he 820 design, which was the daugh'ter generation from 721 c
24 l
25 originally h'ad' separate hand and auto power sources and PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE. SulTE A j
SACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95825 TELEPHONE (916) 972-3894
46 20 1
for some evolutionary type reason no longer have that.
And O
2 maybe if there were separate sources, you didn't have a 3
single. power monitor, they could wipe out the whole shooting 4
match.
Do you see what I'm getting at?
5 MR. DANIELS:
Yes.
6 MR. BEARD:
Al'ong that same line, I think you 7
thought I was heading up to this earlier, but it would seem 3
to me that if one looks at the 24-volt power supply design 9
today--
Presume for a minute it's been that way at least 10 for a number of years.
--that one almost has to trip over 11 the fact that if the power monitor behaves spuriously, either 12 malfunctions, failure or whatever, that you have a credible 13 sin'gle failure point that can really cause relatively O
14 severe transient in the plan from a single failure.
15 I'm trying to look at a lot of different aspects, 16 as you can see, we all are.
We are probing--is the exact 17 word in my mind--we are probing, trying to get a full under-13 standing of a what and w'y, what are the facts.
h 19 MR. DANIELS:
Okay.
I'd have to do some research.
20 MR. BEARD:
I understand.
21 MR. DANIELS:
We looked--
Again, this is not 22 a new issue.
We loo'ked--
In this case, I wasn't involved 23 in this analysis, I was on the fringes.
We looked at the 24 power supply" monitor.
We looked at how that monitor monitors l
~
25 the vario'us power supplies and we analyzed potential changes l
l
'Id j
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE. SusTE A SACRAMENTD, CALIFORNIA 95325 l
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47 4
21 1
to how that device functions.
/
2 MR. BEARD:
That's in this material we're just 3
talking about.
4 MR. DANIELS:
The result of that analysis was 5
the system, the way it's designed today, is acceptable.
6 MR. BEARD:
In fact, your statements--your SMUD 7
statements, in the correspondence, indicate even much stronger 3
than that.
This is the most desirable configuration or 9
words to that effect.
10 MR. HEBDON:
It's preferable to have it tripped 33 completely than to have it very unstable.
It's better to have a k'nown than an unknown.
12 33 MR. BEARD:
What I'm trying to get to, Bob, or t
-O i4
==other e rect or it 1 -
thi=x, 11xe e
eia eer11er-15 there was 'a lot of attention given to the stpplies on the 16 NNI and then it almost seems as though the ICS was thrown 17 in on the side.
'Oh, yes, and we did something similar on is the ICS.
I'm trying to understand really to what depth
~
~
39 was that done.
20 MR'. DANIELS:
I don't think it was thrown in 21 on the side.
22 MR. BEARD:
Well, that's what I'm trying to under-
~
23 stand.
I'm not criticizing, but I need to understand that 24 a little bit better.
25 MR. DANIELS:
I think the changes in the ICS PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATIDN 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE. SulTE A SACRAMENTD. CALIFORNIA 95835 TELEPHONE (916) 973-3894
48 22 I
were made very cautiously with an understanding that those 2
were changes that were necessary to make the changes ~in 3
the NNI worthwhile.
4 MR. BEARD:
I have a couple of just technical 5
-things you may or may not remember; but--
6 MR. HEBDON:
Can we take a break for just a second' 7
Go off the record for just a moment?
8 MR. BEARD:
Sure.
9 (Off the record.)
10 MR. BEARD:
Like I said earlier, I've got a couple 11 of sort of design-related questions that hopefully you will 12 b'e able to remember.
I won't get into this thing again 13 of asking you questions that are going to come out of this 14 c'hronology of changes.
15 Part of the response talks about the corporate 16 decision to get around the NNI-X and NNI-Y cross-contaminatior t
17 problem by putting in this separate set of instruments.
13 And the way the response talks here, it gives me the reading l
19 that these are goin'g to be computer outputs, computer read-20 outs.
21 I'm curious about the Boron analyzer cabinet.
22 I think you have some extra instruments over there.
I'm 25 just wondering, are these separate?
How should I understand
'his, do you remembr.?
t 24 25 MR. DANIELS:
The Boron panel was actually l
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49 rm23 1
installed to implement this.
U 2
MR. BEARD:
Thank you.
3 MR. DANIELS:
They may also go to the computer, 4
that's a detail I don't remember.
But the real resolution 5
to the problem was not the computer.
The resolution of 6
the problem was to install the instruments in the board.
7 MR. BEARD:
That's--
8 MR. HEBDON:
I had a question, too, maybe you 9
can help us with it a little bit.
Is the question on the 10 history of starting AUX feedwater on loss of main feedwater, 11 there's a statement in the report from back in 1980, that 12 the auxiliary feedwater pumps will start on low main feed 13 pump discharge pressure.
O
~
deo* then, the guma sterted i.
^s 1 understend it, 15 but none of the valves responded.
Did that correct?
That's a fairly recent modification, in fact, maybe within the 16 17 last ye'ar or so, that the system--the valves now come open 18 as well as the pump starting on a loss of main feedwater.
19 MR. 'D A N'I E L S :
That's not--
^
l l
20 MR. BEARD:
That's not electr dal.
l 21 MR. DANIELS:
Well, no.
Obviously, that's not l
l 22 a straight forward issue either.
The design went through 23 three evolutions.
I
[
24 MR. HEBDON:
- Okay, i
25 MR. DANIELS:
I'm trying to put--give me a minute i
v l
l PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORAT.ON 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE. SulTE A SACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95525 l
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50 24 1
to try and put together in my mind.
s 2
MR. HEBDON:
Sure.
3 MR. DANIELS:
They were set up where the starting 4
of the ump motor, AUX feed motor, class one system,
~
5 independent of ICS, on loss of main feedwater pumps, the 6
AUX 'feedwater pump will' start-automatically independent 7
of ICS.
s MR. EDISON:
Did you say loss of main feedwater 9
pumps?
10 MR. DANIELS:
Low main feedwater pump--that's 13 another--you've got 'to make sure that--low main feedwater 12.
pump discharge pressure will initiate the start of the 33 auxiliary feedwater pump.
14 MR. EDISON:
Is that today or is that phase one?
15 MR. DANIELS:
Always.
16 MR. HEBDON:
That's in the letter, you know, 17 way back in 1980, it says that in that many words, low main 13 feedwater pump discharge pressure for both pumps, 850 PSIG, 19 keill start'the pumps.
' DAN'ELS: -That's always been that way.
I 20 MR.
I 21 shouldn't say always.
22 MR. DIETERICH:
Excuse me, since Three Mile Island 23 right after Three Mile Island, during the shutdown,.we 24 installed a control grade initiation of AUX feedwater on 25 low opening feedwater discharge pressure.
That has since PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER ORIVE. SulTE A SACRAMENTD. CALIFORNIA 9583S TELEPHONE (916) 973-3894 l
51 25 q
1 been upgraded to safety--
O 2
MR. DANIELS:
We had this feature for a long 3
time. these two low main feedwater discharge pressure switches.
4 MR. DIETERICH:
Starting in 1979, after Three 5
Mile Island.
6 MR. DANIELS:
When we upgraded, we made it 7
redundant.
Remember, we added one that automatically added 8
to the diesel.
9 MR. DIETERICH:
We're going to get into an argu-10 ment here.
I don't think we had the initiation of AUX 11 feedwater prior to Three Mile Island on main feed pump 12 discharge.
13 MR. DANIELS:
Okay.
So let's say that's a detai.1 we'il have to work out.
~
14 15 MR. EDISON:
At least six years?
16 MR. DANIELS:
Today.
17 MR. EDISON:
At least it's been several years.
13 MR. DANIELS:
To' day, the ICS controls one of the AUX feedwater va'lves.
It is now also initiated on--
19 20 to be controlled by ' level on low discharge pressure of the 21 main feed pumps.
I 22 MR. EDISON:
Till it gets an able signal out.
l 23 MR. DANIELS:
Yes.
And prior to that, what would have
[
24 MR. BEARD:
(
25 been the situation, the pump would have gotten started but V
I
~
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE, SulTE A BACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95325 TELEPHONE (996) 972 3894 U
52 26 O
'I the valve could not have responded to the ICS demand?
O 2
MR. DANIELS:
Okay.
Now, prior to what we have 3
today, and this is within the last six months we've made 4
this change, the ICS received a different signal that siad 5
that the main feed pu ps were locked.
It was a different 6
type of signal.
So you could have a situation where the 7
ICS was detecting loss of main feedwater pumps in one way 8
.and the electrical circuit for the pumps, AUX feedwater 9
pumps was detecting it.in a different fashion.
10 MR. BEARD:
ICS detecting it on breaker trips?
11 MR. DANIELS:
No.
They detected it on main feed 12 Pumps trip.
13 MR. BEARD:
That's what I mean.
O
' V 14 MR.. EDISON:
Lube / oil pressure.
15 MR. DANIELS:
Lube / oil pressure, that's the main 16 feed pump.
17 And from-And from a control logic viewpoint, 18 both for trying to talk about loss of main feed pumps, 19 unfor'tunately they came up with different ways of detecting 20 th'e loss of'the main feed' pumps.
21
' MR. EDISON:
The pumps could have run back, started
~
22 the AUX feed pumps but not enabled the valves.
23 MR. DANIELS:
Absolutely.
24 MR. EDISON:
That would have required a manual 25 action.
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE, SUITE A I
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53 p
1 MR. DANIELS:
That's correct.
U 2
MR. EDISON:
So you fixed that in the last six 3
months essentially--
4 MR. DANIELS:
Yes.
5 MR. EDISON:
--from the October event, I guess.
6 MR. DANIELS:
That's correct.
7 MR. HEBDON:
I understand.
8 MR. BEARD:
I've lost track of where we were 9
headed.
10 MR. HEBDON:
Well, I think we were going to 13 try and see if you h'ad any additional technical questions
~
12 that you wanted to get into, on what the system does or 33 doesn't do and when did it start doing or not doing whatever 14 it does.
15 MR. BEARD:
Oh, okay.
16 MR. HEBDON:
I don't know that there's much point 17 in pursuing any of the responses to 7927 because of course 18 the wrong pecple are here or the people that need to answer 19 that are'n't available.
20 MR. DANIELS:
I'd say if you have any question 21 on 7927 that deals with modifications to the niant, you 22 can ask me.
If I can't anser, I'll tell you.
23 MR. HEBDON:
Sure.
24 MR. BEARD:
That's what I was doing earlier.
25 MR. DANIELS:
If you have any that deal with v
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE. SulTE A SACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95325 TELEPHONE (916) 972-5894
54 1
procedural changes or tech specs, those issues I really I^)
\\'
2 can't give you an accurate answer.
3 MR. BEARD:
Okay.
I have one or two minor ones.
4 MR. HEBDON:
The two questions that I have really 5
are just in the area of the comments that were provided 6
in the document itself.
I don't think you were involved 7
with that.
Is that correct?
3 MR. DANIELS:
Which comment?
9 MR. HEBDON:
Well, the comments about the 10 susceptibility of the system to a loss of ICS power.
11 MR. DANIELS:
Well, I may not have written it, 12 but I may have been involved in making sure it was true.
13 MR. HEBDON:
Yeah.
Let's see if I can find the 14 Place I'm referring to.
It's back*in the February 22nd
[}
15 letter.
16 MR. DANIELS:
Oh, okay.
17 MR. HEBDON:
It says, the effects of loss of 13 power to the loads, referring to the various systems, and l
19 it talks about on'page 5 of that particular letter--it talks l
20 about the effect of loss of power to the ICS.
And the comment 21 is that there's a power transfer.
So there is no effect 12 on operations.
l 23 MR. DANIELS:
- Okay, i
i l
24 MR. HEBDON:
And what I was trying to get at was i
25 the idea of there's no effect on operation, power supply t
l PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION l
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is lost, the 120-volt 1C power supply, the buses; but there
)
2 would be an effect on cperation, as is noted here, if the--
3 if the ICS power supply is lost by some of the mechanism.
4 And I was trying to get a feel for what the thought process 5
was in making that kind of a decision, in making that sort 6
of a comment.
7 MR. DANIELS:
Oh, okay.
This response is in 8
response to 79--
9 MR. HEBDON:
27.
10 MR. BEARD:
27, 11 MR. DANIELS:
--27.
7927 deals with loss of 12 the bus.
And this is a written from an electrical engineer-13 ing perspective.
And it talks about the loss of bus, here
(]
14 are all the things on the bus, here are the inverters.
It's 15 whole mindset is strictly from the electrical engineer that's 16 responsible for providing power to that ICS.
17 MR. HEBDON:
I understand.
And this really goes 18 to the heart of what I'm trying to understand.
Crystal 19 River comes along.
Crystal River is the other way around.
20 Crystal River is caused by a fault in the 24-volt DC bus.
Did th't cause you to go back and re-think the things that 21 a
22 you had said, for example, in the February 22nd memo, where 23 the perspective is from the source of power into the ICS?
24 MR. DANIELS:
My recollection is it did, because 25 we changed not only the power supply--
My recollection e
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{}
is we made changes in the plus or minus 24-volt DC power 1
2 supplies in the ICS, based upon the Crystal River event.
3 Now, I'll have to go back and pull out all of 4
our changes and I'll do that tomorrow and then we can sit 5
down and look at it.
I think that answer will be clear.
6 MR. HEBDON:
Finc.
7 MR. BEARD:
I guess, in summary, what I hear 8
you--I think what I hear you saying, Bob, is that when you 9
guys responded to 7927, done from an electrical viewpoint 10 of looking at the sources that would provide power to the 11 bus, and saying, all right, if I lose some source, where 12 do I end up.
And your answer basically is switch to a different 13 source and we'll think we're okay.
But it didn't ever address,
()
14 suppose I lose the bus, because of a load side fault rather 15 than a source side fault, supply side fault.
16 MR. DANIELS:
Well, back in the--you have to 17 realize we had the light bulb incident, 7927, Crystal River
~
18 and then our March 12th one.
19 MR. BEARD:
Sure.
You had the whole gamut to 20 look at, t
21 MR. DANIELS:
Okay.
So responding to our own f
12 light bulb incident, we had to be sensitive to that plus 13 or minus 24-volt power supply, because the light-bulb incident really dealt with p'us or minus 24-volt power supply l
24 25 MR. BEARD:
Well, as far as the 120-volt bus
.G G'
1
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1 goes, that's a load-side fault, not a supply-side fault, (O
2 like inverter blows its fuse.
3 MR. DANIELS:
That's right.
4 MR. BEARD:
And what I'm trying to get at here 5
is a better understanding or make sure I understood what 6
you said a minute ago in response to Fred's question about 7
the response here sort of talks like we asked the question, 8
evaluate the effect of loss of power on the bus, and the 9
response we got back says, well, we won't get loss of power, 10 becaause we'll transfer from one supply to a different 11 supply.
12 It appears as though load-side faults should 13 not have been adequately considered, if you read the words.
r~'
i 14 Do you see what I'm getting at?
s 15 MR. DANIELS:
Yeah.
I understand what you're 16 getting at.
What I'm trying to say is that your perception--
17 I'm really tring to say is that we were answering a question 18 that wa's raised.
19 MR. BEARD:
Yes, right.
20 MR. DANIELS:
That doesn't mean that was the 21 only question that we were dealing with at that time.
22 MR. BEARD:
But the point is, your perception 23 or your understanding of the question had to do with supply-
~
l 24 side faults, not load-side faults.
25 MR. DANIELS:
That's right.
But we had already l
l 0a i
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had a load-side fault that we were dealing with.
We were 2
making the design modifications to deal with load-side faults, 8
even before you came out with this IE bulletin.
4 MR. BEARD:
All right.
5 MR. DANIELS:
What I'm trying to say is, when 6
we made this answer, we were answering the IE bulletin.
7 We didn't tell you all the other things we were doing, based 8
upon our own investigation with our failures.
9 MR. BEARD:
All right.
One could present the 10 case then that if we were interested in all possible ways 11 power on the bus could be lost and we're looking for those 12 kinds of answers, we could say you'd have to consider 15 supply-side faults and load-side faults both, because I O
'4 thini< whet vou're te11ine me is, es vou reed the euestien 15 in the bulletin, you talked about supply-side faults only.
-16 I don't mean to be putting words in your mouth.
I want 17 to make it very clear.
But that's the flavor I'm getting.
18 MR. DANIEL'S :
The way the initial response--
19 When you read the bulletin and you read our response, I 20 think it is quite clear the February 22nd letter deals with 21 a problem of a classical electrical' engineering viewpoint.
22 Here's this inverter, what happens if this inverter fails, 25 what is the plant going to do.
24 M
BEARD:
That's my point.
Let me stop you 25 right there.
You're looking at it as a source or supply-n V
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Due to an error in page numbering there is no page number 59.
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60 A
1 side question and you gave an answer to a supply-side V
2 question.
3 MR. DANIELS:
Butnow you come back and say, now 4
if you're asking--
5 MR. BEARD:
Yeah.
6 MR. DANIELS:
--did you look at tailures on the 7
plus or minus 24-volt DC system.
My answer is yes.
8 MR. BEARD:
Right.
9 MR. HEBDON:
But now, I would carry that one 10
- step farther.
Crystal River comes along.
Crystal River 11 is very clearly a load-side fault.
And the NRC came back
~
12 out and said, go back and re-evaluate 7927 in light of Crysta:
13
- River, f~'d 14 Now, did you perceive'that to mean or to imply 15 that you are now supposed to look at all the things that 16 were asked in 7927, including the perspective of load-side 17 faults.
Is (Off the record.)
19 MR. HEBDON:
We're on the record.
20 MR. DANIELS:
This is inverter S-lC or S-lD, 21 class one inverter supplies the ICS, and it feeds the 22 transfer switch.
See what happens, that transfer switch 28 really serves as two functions.
One, it actually does
~
24 flip'-flop power back and forth; but it only flip-flops power 25 hacE and forth at 120 voll., AC system.
~
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1 The transfer swiEch doeci.not-flip ' flop the oower
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3 m.-;
2 to the plus or minus 24-vQlt sy3 en.
The.plus or-Utinus
~
~
3 24-volt systems have two independent power supplies.
They 4
are auctioneered and out.tfiey go.
L:
5 1"think your question is, when the bulletin came 6
out, what we did is we looked at this.
7 MR. HEBDON:
That'S right.,
8 MR. DANIELS:
And what I really want to say is, 9
in your response and our response to the bulletin, we looked 10 at loss of inverter and loss of this breaker.
And that's 11 how the response is worded.
12 MR. BEARD:
I was just going to say, just for 13 the sake of the transcript when you say, "we looked at this",
O
'4 v = *ere re stri=9
= the "1ecx' era to the i=verter-15 MR. DANIELS:
Yes.
16 MR. HEBDON:
You looked at the 120-volt part, 17 the power-supply part of the system.
18 M'R. ~DA' NIELS:
Right.
But the light bulb incident, 19 which occurred before your bulletin came out, you were look-20 ing at loss of inverter and loss of these power supplies. __
21 So we had already instigated an investigation that was analyz-22 ing the impact of the loss of this 24-volt power supply.
25 MR. HEBDON:
But the point that I keep getting 24 back to is, if 7927 had come ont and that had been the end
~
25 of it, then I wouldn't have any problem.
I understand the (L)
PETERS SHDHTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE. butte A SACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 95325 TELEPHONE (916) 972 3394
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/
1 way you perceive it and the way I read it, I read it the 2
same way.
The thing that tends to muddy the water an awful 3
lot is this Crystal River event.
The Crystal River event 4
was not a supply-side event, it was a load-side event.
5 The problem--the fault that they had--the short 6
that they had was in the 24-volt power supply.
- Now, 7
admittedly the 24-vcit power supplied NNI, but it's still 8
a load problem.
9 Did you feel that when you saw the Crystal River 10 discussion in the documentation that came out on the Crystal 11 River that said go back and re-evaluate 7927 from the 12 perspective of Crystal River, did you feel that that then 13 necessitated reviewing or re-doing the responses to 7927 (m,)
14 and including the load-side problems?
15 MR. DANIELS:
I can't answer that question.
I 16 can tell you that when the Crystal River event occurred, 17 we gave you the updated March 12th letter, what we submitted 18 in our response was our investigation that we had done of 19 faults on the plus or minus 24-volt system, based upon our 20 light bulb incident.
~
21 I think what what we're disconnecting is that 22 we were already looking at faults here before Crystal River.
23 MR. HEBDON:
See, the problem that I have--and 24 I'm just trying to understand this, the purpose of this 25 is just fact-finding, is that if you go through and you l O l
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1 look at the 7927, it says, for example, to develop procedures,
v 2
to assist the operator in the event of a loss of power.
3 If you look at it purely from a supply-side problem, your 4
answer is that we can't have a loss of power on the supply-5 side, because we've got two independent power supplies and 6
they go through this auctioneering, therefore, we don't 7
need to write procedures.
8 But if you look at that -if y,ou then superimpose 9
Crystal River onto that question or that statement and 10 recognize that Crystal River is a supply side--excuse me--
11 a load-side problem and says go write procedures so the 12 operators know how to deal with this if you lose it, it 13 becomes a different question; because now you can have a
/~T (m) 14 loss of ICS power, if pou consider--if you include in your 15 consideration load-side problems.
16 And then, wouldn't it have seemed appropriate
_s 17 that in response to that question you would now have a 18 different answer, and the answer would be, yes, we can have 19 loss of ICS power due to load-side problems; and therefore, 20 we oug'ht to go prepare procedures and do some of the other 21 things that it says to 'do in the bulletin in order to assist 22 the operators in being able to deal with a loss of ICS power 25 that is a load-side problem, because yes that can happen 24 here.
25 MR. DANIELS: 'Okay.
First of all realize (d
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1 the ICS and NNI have very similar power supplies, as far V
2 as the ABC and auctioneering, they look just alike.
So 3
we made the statement---
4 MR. BEARD:
They look almost alike?
5 MR. DANIELS:
Yes.
There are differences, but 6
they look very similar.
7 So the statement, loss of power supply is not 8
a problem applies both to the ICS and NNI, you only look 9
at the inverter as being lost.
10 MR. HEBDON:
You only look at the supply side, 11 I understand that.
12 MR. DANIELS:
Then you're saying Crystal River 13 came out and you guys go back and relook.
I would say, G(J 14 for the NNI, it's clear the answer has to be yes, because 15 we have procedures.
16 MR. HEBDON:
I understand.
17 MR. DANIELS:
What we have for ICS or why we 18 don't have procedure's or if we do have procedures, that
~
19 part I can't answer; but I think there is evidence on the 20 table that says we at least picked up the fact that we needed 21 to 'have procedures for the NNI, which says we did go back 22 and re-evaluate Crystal River, or at least the NNI, which 23 you re'fer to as the load-side fault.
24 MR. HEBDON:
I understand that.
And as I said 25 all I'm really trying to do is understand it.
The thing
'% )
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i that's really causing me the difficulty and that I'm trying 2
to understand is that we got almost all the pieces, except 3
for the one piece that's relevant to this event.
And that 4
is, we got the supply side problems for both NNI and ICS.
5 We got the load-side problems for NNI.
We wrote procedures 6
for that.
The one piece that seems like maybe it fell through 7
the crack a little bit was the load-side problem on ICS.
8 That was the one thing we didn't prepare the procedure or 9
you didn't prepare the procedures on.
10 MR. DANIELS:
But all I'm saying and--and again, 11 all I want to say if we did or didn't refer to the procedure, 12 because I wasn't involved in the ICS.
I've seen the NNI 13 procedure, so I know it exists.
I haven't seen the ICS 1
14 procedures, that just means I haven't seen them, which means 15 they may or may not exist.
16 One key issue to keep in mind is that there's 17 an absolute need for a unique procedure for loss of NNI.
Because what happens when you ' lose NNI, you lose your indica-18
^
19 tion, you can't tell where you're at.
20 One coul'd put together a good argument and could 21 say, do not and probably should not have a unique procedure 22 to' respond to ICS.
Wh'at you really want to do is you want
~
23 to respond to the symptom.
And you really don't care 24 initially what's caus'ing the problem.
That's the whole 25 issue 'of'this new approach to sol've the problem.
What you
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66 1
do is you say I have an overcooling transient.
All right.
2 What do I do?
I close ADV's, I cut off main feedwater, 3
and once you get the plant stabilized, then.you worry about, 4
okay, now I got the plant under control, everything is safe, 5
now we're going to think about what has caused this 6
7 MR. HEBDON:
But that's fine except you've lost 8
the control or at least you've lost what most operators 9
would consider their first and probably second choice of 10 control of those things.
When you say, well, gee, you go 11 close the ADV's, that's fine, except you don't have control 12 of the ADV's any more.
t i
13 MR. DANIELS:
Don't need to, as long as they O
'4 etar c1osed.
15 MR. HEBDON:
If they don't stay closed.
16 MR. DANIELS:
No.
Once you get--
17 MR. BEARD:
He's getting at the point of the 18 automatic repositioning that have 50-percent demand and 19 the loss of ' hand power.
1 20 MR. DANIELS:
The issue would be for the ADV's, 21 how you quickly get the closed.
~
22 MR. HEBDON:
Exactly.
23 MR. DANIELS:
And there's a switch installed 24 on the panel that is--we time the operators on how 'long
~
25 it takes them to get there--and that switch forces the ADV's O
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67 I
to go close and they stay closed and come to the ICS.
2 MR. HELDON:
That's the switch on the remote 3
shutdown pass.
4 MR. DANIELS:
Right.
5 MR. HEBDON:
The problem was the operators didn't 6
have a procedure and'they forgot about that switch.
- Now, 7
if they had had something to remind them that on loss of 8
ICS power you need to shut the ADV's and you need to shut 9
the turbine bypass valves, and the easiest way to do that 10 is to go to shutdown panel and throw the two switches, we 11 probably wouldn't even be having this conversation, because 12 there would have been a much more benign event.
13 MR. DANIELS:
Probably would argue that the 14 operators need to be told is, when you see you have an over-15 cooling transient, you can't tell the status of the ADV's.
16 There's a problem getting the guy running around trying 17 to figure out if h'e has an ICS loss of power, because he's 18 not paying attention to what he shoul'd be, and that's where 19 he--where is he--his curve and what should he be doing to 20 get'back there.
Turn the power on the ICS may make the 21 problem worst.
That'may b'e a philosophical difference of 22 opinion we may have.
23 MR. HEBDON:
I understand.
24 MR. DANIELS:
I don't think the issue should 15 be getting power back to the ICS.
N.)
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68 (V')
1 MR. HEBDON:
Well in fact, getting power back 2
to the ICS may be a bad idea because appears--
3 MR. DANIELS:
How do you power up secondary?
4 MR. HEBDON:
Well, it appears, too, that when 5
you put power back to the ICS, at least in the interim, 6
all the--those valves then get 100 percent demand signals, 7
and they try to go wide open.
8 MR. DANIELS:
You probably couldn't predict what 9
happens in every case, where the valves go.
10 MR. HEBDON:
I understnad.
11 MR. BEARD:
Let me ask this.
Let me try to portray 12 a situation, hypothetically, on the board with you and say, 13 if someone were to--tell me why this is wrong, okay?
We O
14 send'out a bulletin that has to do with loss of power on 15 a bus.
I'll s'how you what I mean by a bus.
Go out in the 16 plant, and I don't have to tell you this, but you go out 17 in the plant and there's a strong line right here between 18 the inverter and this thing up here we call the distribution 19 panel or the bus.
This is the bus.
20 MR. DANIELE:
In our plan, that's why I drew 21 it like that.
That line does not exist for our inverters.
~
~
22 MR. BEARD:
Okay.
But at any rate, this bus, 23 if I can draw the hard lines, this bus with supply coming 24 in and loads going out, is the bus that was being referred 25 to in 7'927.
~
Okay?
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1 All right.
What we were trying to say there C/
~
there's no power there, for whatever 2
was, hey, postulate, 3
reason tell.us how your plant is going to deal with that 4
situation.
Now, maybe we weren't as clear as we could have, 5
because the event at Acony involved the loss of the supply 6
to it.
7 But at any rate, the intent of the bulletin was 8
clear to say, if I lose the bus, which we know you're going 9
to do sooner or later, tell us how you deal with it.
10 Come along down here and you say, okay, at Crystal 11 River what exactly happened was, coming off this 24-volt--
12 almost not like a bus but it is, there are several loads 13 coming down here.
And one of them develops a fault.
Several 14 loads on the 24-volt system.
One of them develops a fanit.
15 Because of that fault, I've got a box up here 16 that's looking at this thing.
This is the now infamous 17 power monitor and it trips the S-1 and S-2 switches and 18 Okay?
kills the whole 24-volt system.
19 Th'at's basically wh'at happened at Crystal River.
20 Suppose someone comes along, GAO or somebody, 21 Energy Commission, State of California, and says, uh-huh, 22 they' wrote you out a fault down here, on the load-side of 23 the distrib'ution thing, asked you to look into it, and you 24 said or the company says, hey, that's very similar to what 25 we had before, a light bulb--
All right?
--a light bulb O
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failure.
So we'll give them our light bulb answer.
The J
2 implication being this situation and the impact over here 3
through.the power monitor and the whole thing was not studied 4
afresh.
5 It's the kind of situation where--there's an 6
old joke about, you know, no matter what the question is,
'7 give them answer 39.
8 MR. DANIELS:
Okay.
9 MR. BEARD:
We have to answer questions like 10 this.
11 MR. DANIELS:
I think the answer to that is, 12 don't--maybe I made it sound simpler than it was, when Crysta:.
13 River came out, we said all righ't, we had the light bulb Ov 14 incident.
What I was trying to say is that the Crystal 15 River information came out, we did analyze it.
I think 16 we did analyze it afresh.
And one of the things that came 17 out is that a lot of the light bulb incident applied.
18 As you can see from our letter, there is more 19 in this response than just the light bulb incident.
Maybe 20 80 percent of this letter, the March 12th letter--maybe 21 60 percent of it is the light bulb incident.
It's not the 22 entire response.
28 So I think our esaeback would be, we did look 24 at it afresh.
That doesn't mean I have to go back and re-25 creat the wh' eel.
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1 MR. BEARD:
I understand.
()
2 I guess the biggest problem I have is trying 3
to understand that if a fresh look was taken how one would 4
conclude that this single little box over here called the 5
power monitor that can wipe out everything and put a B&W 6
plant through a transient as severe as this, a single failure 7
point, number one, and number two, industry experience sort 8
of suggests that it's not a very rare type failure either.
9 You can have it from time to time.
That I would not have 10 come--I don't think I would have come to the conclusion 11 that the configuration of the 24-volt scheme is what your 12 words say is the best.
13 And therefore, it suggested that maybe it wasn't 14 looked at' carefully.
Now, maybe, you know, it was looked 15 at very, very thoroughly, by very competent people.
And 16 they just came to a different conclusion.
17 I don't want you to get the wrong idea, but do 18 you see the flavor of what I'm trying to say?
19 MR. DANIELS:
Yes.
20 MR. BEARD:
In retrospect--
21 MR. DANIELS:
I think for us to resolve that 22 in your mind, we would have to get--we would have to actually 23 get the circuit for that box.
Maybe the box is subdivided 24 and there are three independent items in the box.
23 MR. BEARD:
They're not.
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MR. DANIELS:
I don't kow what the circuit looks
]v 2
like or how it functions.
3 MR. BEARD:
They're not.
4 I think I've gone about as far as we can go, 5
but I would like to ask, I guess, Bob, you're the--as far 6
as our contact on this event, at least the most senior 7
person in the company here, I presume you ar'e.
Could you 8
carry back the message to Dan Whitney, who I guess arranged 9
this meeting, that there is a continuing need to get more 10 of the appropriate people together.
As we said earlier, 11 we don't have some of the people here.
12 MR. DIETERICH:
I think, in particular--in fact, 13 while I was gone for a while, Dan Whitney has the trip AO 14 report for that January trip.
He himself is probably the 15 Person to talk to.
16 MR. HEBDON:
It seems like there are a couple 17 of People that would be helpful, if we could talk to them.
13 There's a question of possibly the supervising mechanical 19 engineer was in fact Dan Whitney.
An'd if he is or if 20 Culla is, it would--McColligan, it would be good if we could tal'k to them, since they are available.
Also the gentleman 21 22 who 'actually wrote the response, I can't think of his last 23 name, his'f'irst name is Pierre, if he's available or if he could recall who work'ed on that and could indicate some 24 25 People who are'available that we could talk to, I think p
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1 we'd still very much like to get into what they did under-U/
2 stand and what question was it that they were trying to 3
answer with the responses that they provided to that par-4 ticular bulletin.
5 MR. BEARD:
Along that same line, Norm Brock 6
has already told us that he provided a great deal of the 7
engineering input that went into these responses.
I think 8
it would be appropriate that we did talk to him on this 9
subject.
10 MR. DIETERICH:
Okay.
11 MR. HEBDON:
And the other one I would think, 12 if it is separate from the people we just talked about, 13 are the people who actually decide whether or not procedures A.
(/
14 should or shouldn't be written associated with a particular 15 subject.
The key, from my perspective at least, is the 16 question of the loss of ICS procedure, whether or not, either 17 just based on the experience that you had had, why you decided 18 not to write a procedure on that particular subject, and 19 also from the prospective of the bulletin, as modified by 20 the Crystal River event, the perspective of the need for 21 a procedure.
22 MR. DIETERICH:
I'll do the best I can.
A lot 23 of this, of course, has been lost over the years.
24 MR. HEBDON:
Oh, I understand.
25 MR. DIETERICH:
I think everybody in this room Ov PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVEM DRIVE EUITE A i
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74 1
appreciates the fact that in 1979, pre-TMI especially, V]
(
2 we didn't go on the root cause analyses and so forth, what 3
wo do today.
You know, that January '79 incident, we 4
contacted B&W and they said the overcooling was of no 5
consequence, have the plant back up in three days.
6 MR. HEBDON:
I understand.
7 MR. DIETERICH:
You know, and people didn't give 8
things a second t,hought back then what they do now.
9 MR. EDISON:
You thought Whitney was the 10 mechanical engineering supervisor?
11 MR. DIETERICH:
I think it would be McColligan, 12 Possibly, not Dan Whitney.
13 MR. EDISON:
I think it's McColligan, because (3
v 14
'we have--
t 15 MR. DIETERICH:
At that time, Dan Whitney reported 16 to McColligan.
17 MR. EDISON:
We have an' April 1980 inspection 18 reports that lists McColligan as the mechanical engineering 19 supervisor, Dan Whitney'as a nuclear engineer.
20 MR. DIETERICH:
McColligan had a nuclear and 21 a mechanical reporting to him, and Dan was the nuclear.
22 I think McColligan's civil service title was supervising 23 mechanical e'gineer.
n 24 MR. HEBDON:
Fine.
If he was the one that par-25 ticipated, what we're really trying to do is get at the O)
PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CDRPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE, SulTE A BACRAMENTO, CALlFORNIA 95535 TELEPHONE (916) 973*S894
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75
(]
1 people who were involved with this that might be available v
2 and we can still talk to.
3 MR. BEARD:
I would like to say, before we go 4
that while we didn't have maybe the key actors that wrote 5
up the documents that we're looking at, this meeting has 6
been very productive.
I want to thank you for your time.
7 MR. DIETERICH:
I apologize somewhat, because 8
it has been a long time ago.
And as I say, I was Mr.
9 licensing back then, but all during this timeframe, there 10 were a couple of us over in the federal building in hearings 11 and haven't even seen the office for about a year.
12 MR. BEARD:
Realize we're not criticizing you 13 folks at all, but we're trying to give you a flavor of the (n) 14, iciisds of things that we're required to look int.
We're 15 going to be required to come up with answer to these.
16 The intent of that is so that with a better under-17 standing of where we're coming from, we'll get better informa-18 tion from you folks.
19 MR. DIETERICH:
Very good.
20 MR. DANIELS:
Maybe I'm beating a dead horse, 21 but you've given me a problem and it's why do we have one 22 powei supply monitor.
Let me paint the other side of the 23 issue for'you.
I say we have two.
Now, the question is, 24 how do'you initiate the trip when you have two.
Well, what 25 you do is you make sure both of them indicate a need and e
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76
/3 1
trip.
U 2
MR. BEARD:
If one fails, then they don't.
3 MR. DANIELS:
If one fails, then you don't get 4
the trip when you need it.
5 MR. BEARD:
I know, it's the same old classic 6
double-barrel question.
7 MR. DANIELS:
It's a rough one.
And I think 8
that was probably the thought process.
Then you get to 9
where you really need then'three of them, then you get a 10 two out of three logic.
Is And even then it probably wouldn't work with 12 the system.
13 MR. BEARD:
You really--the design objective fh*
V 14 would be to have a system that you come close to satisfying 15 something like the single-failure criteria in both 4
16 directions, up and down.
And that's right, that's right.
17 But that question has been around for 100 years.
18 MR. HEBDON:
See, I come at it from the other 19 direction.
It doesn't really make a lot of difference to me, because I see the prob'em of you put one, you put two.
l 20 21 My concern is, if you recognize that there is susceptibility 22 in the system and as a result of ICS power is a viable 23 transient, then my concern is that, hey, we better make 24 sure that the operators know what to do if they have one and we better m'ke sure that they have the procedures and 25 a
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77 1
training available to them to be able to deal with it as 2
expeditiously and as easily as possible, so that they can 3
get the plant back under control as quickly as possible, 4
_because we know they are going to be faced with a fairly 5
substantial transient.
6 MR. BEARD:
Let me give you one last thought.
7 I guess we're about to conclude here.
8 MR. HEBDON:
I hope so.
9 MR. BEARD:
I hope so too.
10 The response at the other end of the stick, you 11 know, to this letter that you folks--company provided, the 12 March 12, whatever it was, which said, we alt. said, in effect 13 we don't have to worry about loss of power on this bus, O
V 14 the ICS or what not, because we have an inverter, a. backup 15 inverter and an ADV between it.
16 If you go back and actually read the bulletin, 17 it said a loss of the first inverter, which meant the bus 13 went down,'and the transfer mechanism failed.
That was 19 the circumstances that were presented.
That's what took l
P ace at Acony.
20 21 We itave to come back and say, we 've got an inverte:-
22 and a transfer mechanism, therefore, we won't lose it was not well re'eived back in the Bethesda, because that was, c
23 24 in eff'e'ct, saying, what happened at Alcony ain't going to 25 happen to us,'you know.
lO PETERS SHORTHAND REPORTING CORPORATION 3433 AMERICAN RIVER DRIVE. SulTE A SACRAMENTO. CAUFORNIA 95555 TEL.EPHONE (916) 9*/3 5994
78 rs 1
I only bring that up to give you a flavor of
()
2 the other side of the reviewer's point.
I've looked at 3
some of these things and asked myself those kinds of 4
questions, why did this guy say that, that's what we told 5
them to look out for.
6 MR. DIETERICH:
Well, at lot gets lost in written 7
correspondence.:
8 MR. HEBDON:
We understand.
9 MR. BEARD:
Sure it does.
That's why I'm not 10 criticizing, but I think it is important that you understand di the other side of it.
12 MR. HEBDON:
That's why we're trying to meet 13 with the people and get an understanding of what was meant, o
()
14 and give an understanding of what was behind the words.
15 MR. BEARD:
I would like.to suggest if there 16 are no further urgent matters, that we adjourn.
17 MR. DANIELS:
One last comment.
Realize that 18 on the NNI, even though we made that comment, we installed 19 a long laundry list of instruments--
20 MR. BEARD:
Separate.
21 MR. DANIELS:
--separate.
22 MR. HEBDON:
And you wrote a procedure.
23 MR. DANIELS:
Maybe the letter may have been 24 a little curt, but I don't think the implementation was 25 as' curt as the letter.
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79 m
1 MR. BEARD:
That's exactly why we're here talking (d
2 about it.
I can go back and read these things again in 3
my office, and I'll come to the same conclusions I came 4
to years ago.
But we want, while we're here, to take advantage 5
of our being at your place and talk to the horse's mouth, 6
to to speak and get a better feel for the flavor, so we 7
get it in the proper context.
It's a whole objective.
8 MR. DANIELS:
I would agree, if you read the 9
response, it's kind of curt, but I think in context, it's--
10 I don't think it was meant as curt as it came across.
11 MR. HEBDON:
Okay.
Anything else?
12 Okay.
Fine.
Thank you very much.
13 (Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned.)
Ov 14
--o0o--
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 O
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80 1
CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER p
v 2
I, HELEN NAD0LSKI, an Electronic Reporter, 3
do hereby certify:
4 That I am a disinterested person herein; that 5
the foregoing Nuclear Regulatory Commission interview was 6
recorded and'thereafter transcribed by me into typewriting.
7 I further certify that I am not of counsel or 8
attorney for any of the parties to said hearing, nor in 9
any way interested in the outcome of said hearing.
10 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand 11 this 7th day of January 1986.
12
/
/
15 l
.. A n
Helen Nadolski C
14 Official Reporter 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 3
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