ML20207A656

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Testimony of T Murley Before Senate Labor & Human Resources Committee Re Plant
ML20207A656
Person / Time
Site: 05000000, Pilgrim
Issue date: 01/07/1988
From: Murley T
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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ML20204C423 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-88-198 NUDOCS 8801080068
Download: ML20207A656 (10)


Text

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l TESTlHONY BEFORE THE SENATE LA30R AND HUMAN RESOURCES COMMITTEE REGARDING THE PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION DR. THOMAS MURLEY, DIRECTOR OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION PLYH0VTH, MASSACHUSETTS JANUARY 7, 1988 Ffr f/fp@M Y 9

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i Thank you, Mr. Chainnan.

In response to the request of the Comittee, I am here 4

to discuss the status of the issues concerning the restart of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. With me today is Mr. William Russell, who is the Regional Administrator of NRC's Region I office.

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As part of its regulatory process, the NRC performs a Systematic Assessment of Licensee Perfomance (SALP).

In early 1986 the NRC staff issued a SALP report i

on Pilgrim covering a 12-month period from October 1984 to October 1985.

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That report brought into focus a number of problem areas at Pilgrim such as a f

l shortage of licensed operators; a large maintenance backlog with a number of 3

management vacancies in the maintenance area; radiological protection program I

weaknesses; et.ergency preparedness program weaknesses; and instances of poor procedural adherence and administrative practices at the plant. These problems-were compounded by a lack of critica' self-assessment on the part of Boston Edison J

and a tendency toward superficial coerective actions. We met with the senior management of Boston Edison in January 1986 and forcefully told them of our conceras.

In February 1986, a special team of inspectors was sent to the plant for several weeks of around-the-clock inspection. We did this to obtain a more l

complete understanding of the underlying reasons for the poor performance.

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team confimed the SALP conclusions.

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On April 12. 1986, a series of plant hardware problems caused the plant to shut i

down. At that time, I issued a Confinnatory Action Letter documenting Boston

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Edison's intent to keep the plant shut down. Later in the susener of 1986. I i

revised and extended the Confinnetory Action Letter to confim that Boston Edison would keep Pilgrim shut down until resolution of those management deficiencies l

identified in the SALP report and by the special team inspections.

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Our most recent SALP review covered the period from November 1985 to January 4

1987, and was issued April 8, 1987.

This report identified five areas that j

exhibited recurring program weaknesses. These are:

radiological controls I

surveillance of safety related equipment i

fire protection i

physical security and safeguards assurance of quality i

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Over the past few years the NRC has devoted considerable resources to monitor f

y the Boston Edison efforts to address these weaknesses. For example, the NRC has three full-time resident inspectors at Pilgrim, whereas most single-unit fact 11 ties j

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have two residents. Furthermore, we have supplemented these resident inspectors j

with an extensive region based inspection effort and have connitted additional i

headquarters resources to review and evaluate Pilgrim issues. This includes a dedicated assessment panel composed of NRC managers to overview and consolidate

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the NRC approach to Pilgrim activities, q

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Let i:e sumarize the current status of major Boston Edison end NRC activities l

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regarding the Pilgrim facility. The facility remains shut down. The NRC has f

j met frequently with Boston Edison, members of the public, and with the I

j Comonwealth of Massachusetts, as well as with local officials to discuss j

issues regarding Pilgrim. Boston Edison has developed a restart plan that t

describes the programs, plans, and actions considered necessary by the company I

to restart and safely operate Pilgrim. Although Boston Edison has not reached a position where it would request that NRC consider a restart decision, the 1

l utility has completed a number of plant improvements.

The reactor was refueled

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in October and several major systems tests on the reactor coolant system and l

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containment structure have been completed.

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As part of its Safety Enhancement Program (SEP), Boston Edison has proposed a number of modifications intended to improve plant performance in the event of an t

accident at Pilgrim.

The NRC staff reviewed these modifications in August 1987 and concluded that eight of the modifications were appropriate for implementation.

These include containment spray nozzle modifications, the installation of a third l

emergency diesel generator, modifications to fire protection systems, and features l

to respond to an anticipated transient without scram.

The SEP modifications are i

designed to mitigate the effects cf abnornal conditions that could develop 1

in containment in the event of an unlikely accident. These modifications are 1

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in consonance with NRC goals to enhance contaiteent performance under severe l

accident conditions. We have not made them formal requirements for restart 3

of Pilgrim. We are, however, ensuring that these modifications do not result

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in lessened safety for the plant, i

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I Questions have been raised regarding the Mark I containment at Pilgrim and the i

Direct Torus Vent modification being considered by Boston Edison.

The Direct Torus Vent would provide a hardened path from the containment torus

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structure to the plant stack and would be used to relieve containment l

i pressure in certain severe accident situations. During staff review of this l

i proposed modification a number of questions were asked of Boston Edison regarding the use of the Direct Torus Vent.

These questions must be resolved l

l before this system is placed into service, i

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q Regarding the management area, Boston Edison has made a number of changes that i

we believe are improvements.

In early 1987 Mr. Ralph Bird was hired as the 1

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-4 Senior Vice President - Nuclear. He has extensive nuclear navy and management experience. Changes have been made in the onsite organization, additional personnel have been hired and programs for improvement are being implemented.

The NRC staff will assess the effectiveness of these programs and management changes in the coming months.

The NRC has a special progranmatic approach for assessing the Boston Edison progress at Pilgrim. Our activities are being coordinated by an Assessment Panel that is chaired by a senior staff member from Region I and includes representatives from the region and headquarters. Once the Pilgrim restart plan has been reviewed by NRC and after Boston Edison has stated it is ready to' restart Pilgrim, this Panel will assess restart readiness.

This assessment will be a comprehensive evaluation that considers the general readiness of the plant and personnel to resume safe operation and will include a comprehensive i

onsite team inspection.

In addition, as we indicated to Senator Kennedy and Congressman Studds in Chairman Zech's letters of November 20, 1987, we will conduct several public i

meetings to ensure opportunity for public participation and input to the Assessment i

Panel regarding the Boston Edison restart plan.

These meetings will be forval, transcribed.essions at which the public's testimony will be heard by NRC senior staff. After the NRC staff has ccepleted the restart readiness assessment, there will be a public meeting at NRC headquarters at which the staff will brief the NRC Comnissioners on our findings and recommendations so that the Commission itself can make the ultimate restart decision.

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If restart is authorized, NRC would increase its inspection coverage for the startup program to provide around-the-clock coverage of startup and site activities. A number of "hold-points" will be instituted and Boston Edison would not be permitted to proceed without NRC authorization. These decisions would be based on the on-site inspection team's evaluation of Pilgrim operation.

In addition to the areas previously discussed, a number of emergency preparedness concerns have been raised at Pilgrim since the Confirmatory Action Letter was issued in April 1986. On July 15, 1986, State Senator William B. Golden and otheis filed a Petition with the NRC, requesting that hRC order Boston Edison to show cause why Pilgrim should not remain closed or have its operating license

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suspended. That request was based, in part, on emergency preparedness concerns.

On December 22, 1986, the Secretary of Public Safety of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts sent FEMA a copy of an Office of Public Safety report entitled, "Report to the Governor on Emergency Preparedness for an Accident at the Pilgrim Nuclear Po.er Station," dated December 1986.

In a memorandun to NRC dated March 31, 1987. FEMA stated that it was also conducting a self-initiated review of the overall state of emergency preparedness at Pilgrim Station.

FEMA subsequently committed to prepare, on a priority basis, a consolidated evaluation that would address the Petition issues, the report submitted by the Office of Public Safety, its self-initiated review, and other relevant available information.

On August 6, 1987. FEMA sent its report to NRC.

It is entitled, "Self.!niticted I

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Review and Interim Finding for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Plynouth.

Massachusetts." In this report FEMA listed the following six areas of concern in the Comorwealth of Massacitusetts emergency plans for the ten-mile emergency planning zone surrounding Pilgrim:

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Lack of evacuation plans for public and private schools and day care I

centers.

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Lack of a reception center for people evacuating to the north.

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Lack of idertifiable public shelters for the beach population.

4 Inadequate planning for the evacuation of the 'pecial needs population.

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Inadequate planning for the evacuation of the transportation-dependent l

population.

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Overall lack of progress in planning and apparent diminution in emergency i

preparedness.

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On August 18, 1987, the NRC transmitted the FEMA report to loston Edison and i

requested that the utility provide an action plan and schedule for assisting the Comonwealth of Massachusetts and local governments in addressing the FEMA l

identified emergency planning issues.

Boston Edison submitted its Action Plan t

on September 17, 1987. This action plan details Boston Edison's plans te

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assist the Connonwealth of Massachusetts and local governments as well as describing resources and a schedule for completion.

l Over the past few months Boston Edison, the Comonwealth, and the local i

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governments in the Pilgrim area have comitted considerable resources and effort toward resolving these concerns.

Current status is as follows:

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- Draf ts of local plans were complete November 1,1987.

These currently are in review in the respective towns.

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- Drafts of Iccal procedures are in preparation. These address issues su:h as buses and sheltering.

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- The Draft Massachusetts Civil Defense Authority Area II Plan is complete and under review by the Comonwealth.

i The draft of the Commonwealth Plan for Pilgrim is naaring c wpletio'.

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- A training program has been developed by Boston Edison and provided to the Massachusetts Civil Defense Authority.

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- On December 17. 1987 the NRC received the "Report on Emergency I

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Preparedness for an Accident at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station," from the Comonwealth of Massachusetts, NRC and FEMA will consider this k

report in their ongoing reviews, l

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i Additionally, Boston Edison submitted an exemption request to NRC on the requirements for conducting its Biennial Full Participation Exercise. The request was based on the need to make improvements in emergency plans.

NRC approved that exemption request, stipulating that the exercise be conducted no later than June 30, 1988.

The NRC agrees that emergency planning deficiencies do exist at Pilgrim and further agrees that corrective actions are needed.

However, considering the shutdown status of the plant and the progress that is being made to address emergency planning issues, we have not needed to take enforcement action regarding emergency planning.

The NRC will not permit the facility to resume operation until corrective actions satisfactory to NRC have been taken to address the emergency planning deficiencies identified by FEMI.. We will give special attention to the improved evacuation plans for schools and day care centers as well as the improved evacuation plans for special-needs and transportation-dependent populations in the ten-mile emergency planning zone.

We will require some demonstration of the critical aspects of these evacuation plans before we ce decide that Pilgrim is ready to resume operation.

However, it may be that restart can be authorized with some emergency planning issues not fully resolved. Under the NRC's regulatory framework, whether an outstanding emergency planning deficiency must delay restart will depend upon considerations of the gravity of the deficiency, the nature of any compensatory actions, and progress toward correction of the deficiency.

For Pilgrim this decision will be made ultimately by the Comission itself.

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In conclusion, there has been and will continue to be a high level of NRC management attention to Pilgrim. The NRC staff has adopted a unique approach for monitoring the performance of the utility as it it.1plements needed improvements. This approach includes opportunities for public input to the process.

I want to assure the Comittee that Pilgrim will not be permitted to restart until the NRC staff has reviewed carefully the plant improvements, the management improvements, and the offsite emergency preparedness improvements and has concluded that the plant will be operated safely.

This concludes my testimony. Mr. Russell and I would be glad to answer questions.

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