ML20107A647
| ML20107A647 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron, Braidwood, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 02/15/1985 |
| From: | George Alexander COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 9765N, GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8502200067 | |
| Download: ML20107A647 (19) | |
Text
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Commonwealth Edison
- One Fir;; Natenal Pt;ta. Chicago. lilinois Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 February 15, 1985 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Braidwood and Byron Stations Supplemental Response to Generic Letter No. 83-28, " Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events" NRC Docket Nos. 50-454/455 and 456/457 References (a): Generic Letter No. 83-28 D. G. Eisenhut letter to All OLs and cps dated July 8, 1983 (NL-83-0D03)
(b): P. L. Barnes to H. R. Denton letter dated November 5, 1983 (NL-83-0520)
(c): P. L. Barnes to H. R. Denton letter dated February 29, 1984 (NL-84-0254)
(d): P. L. Barnes to H. R. Denton letter dated June 1, 1984 (e): G. L. Alexander to H. R. Denton letter dated October 10, 1984
Dear Denton:
Reference (e) contained a commitment to respond to thirteen generic questions regarding the shunt trip attachment modification for the reactor trip breaks at Byron Station. Since the same modification will be done at Braidwood, please find attached the responses for both Braidwood and Byron Stations.
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Please address any questions that you or your staff may have concerning our response to Generic Letter No. 83-28 to this-office.
Respectfully, s
- G. L. Alexande Nuclear Licensing Administrator Attachment cc: US NRC, 00cuement Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 L. N. Olshan - LB1 J. G. Keppler - RIII RIII Inspectors - BY/BW 9765N 9
r ATTACHMENT PART I BRAIDWOOD STATION
- 1. Request for Drawings
" Provide the electrical schematic / elementary diagrams for the reactor trip and bypass breakers showing the undervoltage and shunt coil actuation circuits as well as breaker control (e.g.
closing) circuits, and circuits providing breaker status information/ alarms to the control room".
CECO. Response to Question No. 1 Attached for your review are two prints of the requested electrical schematic diagrams. (Sargent & Lundy Drawings 6/20E-1-4030RD06 Rev. L, 6/20E-1-4030RD07 Rev. M, 6E-1-4030EF29 Rev. D and 6E-1-4030EF73 Rev. D).
- 2. Request for Class lE Power with Indication and Overvoltage Capability
" Identify the power sources for the shunt trip coils. Verify that they are Class 1E and that all components providing power to the shunt trip circuitry are Class lE and that any faults within non-Class lE circuitry will not degrade the shunt trip function. Describe the annunciation / indication provided in the control room upon loss of power to the shunt trip circuits.
Also, describe the overvoltage protection and/or alarms provided to prevent or alert the operator (s) to an overvoltage condition that could affect both the UV coil and the parallel shunt trip actuation relay".
CECO. Response to Question No. 2 The power sources for Reactor Trip Breaker A (RTA) and Reactor Trip Breaker B (RTB) shunt trip coils are 125 Vdc Buses 111 (211) and 112 (212), respectively. These redundant Class lE power sources are electrically isolated and physically separated so that any failure involving one source will not jeopardize the other source. Each power supply to the shunt trip coil is made up of Class 1E components (distribution center, battery charger, battery, cabling, etc.). Non-lE circuits are isolated from Class lE circuits as described in Appendix A (Reg. Guide 1.75) to the FSAR so that they will not degrade the shunt trip function.
Each Class lE 125Vdc system has its own independent instrumentation and alarms as described in Section 8.3.2 of the FSAR (copy of pages 8.3.24 and 8.3.25 are attached). The listed instrumentation and alarms provide reliable supervision of the condition of each d-c system.
In addition, each Reactor Trip Breaker is provided with " Closed" and " Tripped" breaker position lights located at Main Control Panel 1PM05J. These li source (branch circuit)ghts asare powered used for closing from the andsame 125Vdc tripping each Reactor Trip Breaker. The " Tripped" light indicates that the breaker is open and de control power is available. The " Closed" light is connected so as to monitor / supervise the shunt trip coil and a breaker "a" auxiliary contact. The " Closed" light thus not only indicates that the breaker is closed, but also indicates that de control power is available to the shunt trip coil and that there is circuit continuity via the shunt trip coil.
The UV Coil and the parallel shunt trip actuation relay for each Reactor Trip Breaker is powered from the 48Vdc system which is furnished by Westinghouse as part of the solid state protection system. These (Westinghouse specified) regulated 48Vdc power supplies are provided with voltage and current adjustments. The overvoltage protection point is factory adjusted for 115% of rated output voltage. A malfunction of the regulator circuit will cause the overvoltage circuitry to operate (open) the 48Vdc power supply output breaker and thus remove all loads including the UV coil and parallel shunt trip actuation relay. This in turn will trip the Reactor Trip breakers. In addition, opening the power supply output breaker will actuate the " Solid State Protection Cabinet General Warning" alarm in the main control room. Westinghouse has qualified the components of the added shunt trip circuitry to perform their intended function at 115%
of nominal voltage.
- 3. Request for Information on Added Relays
" Verify that the relays added for the automatic shunt trip function are within the capacity of their associated power supplies and that the relay contacts are adequately sized to accomplish the shunt trip function. If the added relays are other than the Potter & Brumfield MDR series relays (P/N 2383A38 or P/N 955655) recommended by Westinghouse, provide a description of the relays and their design specifications."
CECO. Response to Question No. 3 It has been verified that the relay contacts are adequately sized for the shunt trip function and are within the capacity of their associated power supplies. The added relays specified in the generic design are the Potter and Brumfield MDR series relays (P/N 2383A38 (125 VDC) or P/N 955655 (48 VDC)).
Engineering data for the selected Potter Brumfield MDR relays is attached (Figure 2).
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- 4. Request for Test Procedure Proposed by WOG State whether the test procedure / sequence used to independently verify operability of the undervoltage and shunt trip devices in response to an automatic reactor trip signal is identical to the test procedure proposed by the WOG. Identify any differences between the WOG test procedure and the test procedure to be used and the test procedure to be used and provide the rationale / justification for these differences."
CECO. Response to Question 4:
Braidwood commitment 20-85-015 has been issued to confirm that the procedure used to independently verify the operability of the under voltage and shunt trip devices in response to an automatic reactor trip signal will be essentially identical to the test procedure proposed by WOG. The WOG procedure will be used as a basis for the station procedure, and any deviations will be due to site-specific design and/or installation consideration.
- 5. Request for Class lE Shunt Trip Function Verify that the circulty used to implement the automatic shunt related) an tripfunctionisClasslE(safet(ion, testing,dthatthe procurement, installation, opera and maintenance of this circuitry will be in accordance with the quality assurance criteria set forth in Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50".
CECO. Response to Question 5:
Circuitry used to implement the automatic shunt trip function is Class lE. Since the modification is safety-related, procurement, installation, operation, testing and maintenance will be done in accordance with CECO. QA requirements which satisfy Appendix 8 to 10 CFR Part 50.
- 6. Request for Seismic Qualification
" Verify that the shunt trip attachments and associated circuitry are/will be seismically qualified (i.e., be demonstrated to be operable during and after a seismic event) in accordance with the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.100, Revision 1 which endorses IEEE Standard 344, and that all non-safety related circuitry / components in physical proximity to or associated with the automatic shunt trip function will not degrade this function during or after a seismic event".
. I CECO. Response to Question No. 6 WOG is working with Westinghouse to obtain s'eismic qualification of the shunt trip attachment and the automatic shunt trip panel. CECO. will review whether non-safety related circuitry / components could degrade the automatic shunt trip function.
- 7. Request for Environmental Qualification
" Verify that the components used to accomplish the automatic shunt trip function are designed for the environment where they are located".
CECO. Response to Question 7 WOG is also working with Westinghouse to environmentally qualify the shunt trip attachment and the automatic shunt trip panel.
The initial tests have been completed and a test report was recently issued. After we review the report, we will be able to respond to this question.
- 8. Request for Separation "De ibe the usebckomanualShy$nS$kakeparationprovidedbetweenthecircuits y
i e the shunt trip attachments of the redundant reactor trip breakers. If physical separation is not maintained between these circuits, demonstrate that faults within these circuits can not degrade both redundant treind."
CECO. Response to Question No. 8 The Reactor Trip switches used to manually initiate the shunt trip attachments of the redundant reactor trip breakers are dual section switches with metal barriers between redundant train switch desks. Where a six inch (6") air gap is not maintained between wiring for Train A and Train B, metal braid is used to enclose wiring. Field cabling from different sections of the panels are routed as ESF Div. 1 (Train A) and ESF Div. 2 (Train B) and are physically separated in accordance with IEEE Standards 279-1971, 317-1972 and 284-1974.
- 9. Request for Test Procedure of Control Board Manual Switches
" Verify that the operability of the control roor manual reactor trip switch contacts and wiring will be adequately tested prior to startup after each refueling outage. Verify that the test procedure used will not involve installing jumpers, lifting leads, or pulling fuses and identify any deviations from the WOG l procedure. Permanently installed test connections (i.e., to allow connection of a voltmeter) are acceptable."
CECO. Response to Question 9:
Based on the descript.*on of the testing features for the Solid State Protection System (SSPS), there are two types of testers the Semi-automatic Logic Tester and the Slave Relay Tester. The Logic Tester uses pulse techniques to avoid tripping the reactor trip breakers as it produces time-sequenced error output signals to check for correctly sequenced responses. Based on the preceding test, current continuity checks are performed through the output relay coils such that the reactor trip output to the undervoltage coils is checked without de-energizing the undervoltage coils (ergo, no reactor trip). Given the monthly surveillance by this test feature of the SSPS and preventative maintenance checks of the manual Reactor Trip Switch (control room) by the EM department every refueling outage, the concerns regarding verification of reactor trip circuitry should be adequately addressed. Braidwood commitment #20-85-013 is tracking the development of the applicable procedure to test the manual reactor trip twitch each refueling outage.
- 10. Request for Bypass Breaker Testing
" Verify that each bypass breaker will be tested to demonstrate its coerability prior to placing it into service for reactor trip breaker testing".
CECO. Response to Question 10:
Braidwood Station will test the reactor trip bypass breakers at each refueling outage. The station agrees with WOG that the l failure of the reactor trip system during testing is unlikely l and bypass breaker testing on an increased frequency is not required.
- 11. Request for Reactor Trip Breaker Operability Indication Test Procedure
" Verify that the test procedure used to determine reactor trip breaker operability will also demonstrate proper operation of t
the associate control room indication / annunciation".
CECO. Response to Question 11:
Braidwood commitment 20-85-015 will ensure that this item is addressed in the appropriate procedure.
- 12. Request for Response Time Testing -
" Verify that the response time of the automatic shunt trip feature will be tested periodically and shown to be less than or equal to that assumed in the FSAR analyses or that specified in the technical specifications".
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l CECO. Response to Question 12:
Test points have been added to the reactor trip circuitry which will enable response time testing of the shunt trip attachment.
This testing may be added in the future to enhance maintenance trending of the reactor trip breakers. However, proposed Tech.
Spec. surveillance requirements will adequately demonstrate the response time of the reactor trip system.
- 13. Request for Technical Specification Changes
" Propose technical specification changes to require periodic testing of the undervoltage and shunt trip functions and the manual reactor trip switch contacts and wiring".
CECO. Response to Question 13:
Braidwood's Technical Specifications are currently in the developmental stage. They are being based on the approved version of Byron Unit 1 Technical Specifications. It is anticipated that these will be submitted for NRC review and approval in the second quarter of 1985.
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F ATTACHMENT PART II BYRON STATION
- 1. Request for Drawings
" Provide the electrical schematic / elementary diagrams for the reactor trip and bypass breakers showing the undervoltage and shunt coil actuation circuits as well as breaker control (e.g.
closing) circuits, and circuits providing breaker status information/ alarms to the control room".
CECO. Response to Question No. 1 Attached for your review are two prints of the requested electrical schematic diagrams. (Sargent & Lundy Drawings 6/20E-1-4030RD06 Rev. L, 6/20E-1-4030RD07 Rev. M, 6E-1-4030EF29 Rev. D and 6E-1-4030EF73 Rev. D).
- 2. Request for Class lE Power with Indication and Overvoltage Capability
" Identify the power sources for the shunt trip coils. Verify that they are Class IE and that all components providing power to the shunt trip circuitry are Class IE and that any faults within non-Class IE circuitry will not degrade the shunt trip functi Describe the annunciation / indication provided in the controSn.room upon loss of power to the shunt trip circuits.
Also, describe the overvoltage protection and/or alarms provided to prevent or alert the operator (s) to an overvoltage condition i
that could affect both the UV coil and the parallel shunt trip actuation relay".
l CECO. Response to Question No. 2 The power sources for Reactor Trip Breaker A (RTA) and Reactor Trip Breaker B (RTB) shunt trip coils are 125 Vdc Buses 111 (211) and 112 (212), respectively. These redundant Class lE power sources are electrically isolated and physically separated so that any failure involving one source will not jeopardize the other source. Each power supply to the shunt trip coil is made i up of Class lE components (distribution center, battery charger, battery, cabling, etc.). Non-lE circuits are isolated from Class lE circuits as described in Appendix A (Reg. Guide 1.75) to the FSAR so that they will not degrade the shunt trip function.
Each Class lE 125Vdc system has its own independent instrumentation and alarms as described in Section 8.3.2 of the FSAR (copy of pages 8.3.24 and 8.3.25 are attached). The listed instrumentation and alarms provide reliable supervision of the condition of each d-c system.
-7 In addition, each Reactor Trip Breaker is provided with " Closed" and " Tripped" breaker position lights located at Main Control Panel 1PM05J. These lights are powered from the same 125Vdc source (branch circuit) as used for closing and tripping each Reactor Trip Breaker. The " Tripped" light indicates that the breaker is open and dc control power is available. The " Closed" light is connected so as to monitor / supervise the shunt trip coil and a breaker "a" auxiliary contact. The " Closed" light thus not only indicates that the breaker is closed, but also indicates that de control power is available to the shunt trip coil and that there is circuit continuity via the shunt trip coil.
The UV Coil and the parallel shunt trip actuation relay for each Reactor Trip Breaker is powered from the 48Vdc system which is furnished by Westinghouse as part of the solid state protection system. These (Westinghouse specified) regulated 48Vdc power supplies are provided with voltage and current adjustments. The overvoltage protection point is factory adjusted for 115% of rated output voltage. A malfunction of the' regulator circuit will cause the overvoltage circuitry to operate (open) the 48Vdc power supply output breaker and thus remove all loads including the UV coil and parallel shunt trip actuation relay. This in turn will trip the Reactor Trip breakers. In addition, opening the power supply output breaker will actuate the " Solid State Protection Cabinet General Warning" alarm in the main control room. Westinghouse has qualified the components of the added shunt trip circuitry to perform their intended function at 115%
of nominal voltage.
- 3. Request for Information on Added Relays
" Verify that the relays added for the automatic shunt trip function are within the capacity of their associated power supplies and that the relay contacts are adequately sized to accomplish the shunt trip function. If the added relays are other than the Potter & Brumfield MDR series relays (P/N 2383A38 or P/N 955655) recommended by Westinghouse, provide a description of the relays and their design specifications."
CECO. Response to Question No. 3 It has been verified that the relay contacts are adequately sized for the shunt trip function and are within the capacity of their associated power supplies. The added relays specified in the generic design are the Potter and Drumfield MDR series relays (P/N 2383A38 (125 VOC) or P/N 955655 (48 VDC)).
Engineering data for the selected Potter Brumfield MOR relays is attached (Figure 2).
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- 4. Request for Test Procedure Proposed by WOG State whether the test procedure / sequence used to independently verify operability of the undervoltage and shunt trip devices in response to an automatic reactor trip signal is identical to the test procedure proposed by the WOG. Identify any differences between the WOG test procedure and the test procedure to be used and the test procedure to be used and provide the rationale / justification for these differences."
CECO. Response to Question 4:
Byron Station has reviewed the proposed WOG procedure and determined that the Station procedure will be the same in intent as the WOG procedure. The procedure will be implemented following the installation of the automatic shunt trip modification and will be verified on a frequency required by the Technical Specifications.
- 5. Request for Class lE Shunt Trip Function Verify that the circulty used to implement the automatic shunt trip function is Class lE (safety related), and that the operation, testing and maintenance procurement, of this circuitryinstallation,in will be accordance with khe quality assurance criteria set forth in Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50".
CECO. Response to Question 5:
Circuitry used to implement the automatic shunt trip function is Class lE. Since the modification is safety-related, procurement, installation, operation, testing and maintenance will be done in accordance with CECO. QA requirements which satisfy Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50.
- 6. Request for Seismic Qualification
" Verify that the shunt trip attachments and associated circuitry are/will be seismically qualified (i.e., be demonstrated to be operable during and after a seismic event) in accordance with the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.100, Revision 1 which endorses IEEE Standard 344, and that all non-safety related circuitry / components in physical proximity to or associated with the automatic shunt trip function will not degrade this function during or after a seismic event".
CECO. Response to Question No. 6 WOG is working with Westinghouse to obtain seismic qualification of the shunt trip attachment and the automatic shunt trip panel. CECO. will review whether non-safety related circuitry / components could degrade the automatic shunt trip function.
- 7. Request for Environmental Qualification
" Verify that the components used to accomplish the automatic shunt trip function are designed for the environment where they are located".
CECO. Response to Question 7 WOG is also working with Westinghouse to environmentally qualify the shunt trip attachment and the automatic shunt trip panel.
The initial tests have been completed and a test report was recently issued. After we review the report, we will be able to respond to this question.
- 8. Request for Separation
" Describe the ohysical separation provided between the circuits used to manually initiate the shunt trip attachments of the redundant reactor trip breakers. If physical separation is not maintained between these circuits, demonstrate that faults within these circuits can not degrade both redundant trains."
CECO. Response to Question No. 8 The Reactor Trip switches used to manually initiate the shunt '
trip attachments of the redundant reactor trip breakers are dual section switches with metal barriers between redundant train switch decks. Where a six inch (6") air gap is not maintained between wiring for Train A and Train 8, metal braid is used to enclose wiring. Field cablin panels are routed as ESF Div.g from different 1 (Train sections A) and ESF Div. 2of(Train the B) and are physically separated in accordance with IEEE Standards 279-1971, 317-1972 and 284-1974.
- 9. Request for Test Procedure of Control Board Manual Switches
" Verify that the operability of the control room manual roactor trip switch contacts and wiring will be adequately tested prior to startup after each refueling outage. Verify that the test procedure used will not involve installing jumpers, lifting leads, or pulling fuses and identify any deviations from the WOG procedure. Permanently installed test connections (i.e., to allow connection of a voltmeter) are acceptable."
CECO. Response to Question 9:
Byron Station has found that the WOG procedure does not provide for testing the reactor trip breakers via the control room manual reactor trip switch contacts. A new procedure that will be used by the Station will provide for verification of control room annunciation for the manual trip. The new procedure will use the test jacks installed with the breaker modification and will not cycle the trip breakers. The procedure will be performed once every 18 months.
- 10. Request for Bypass Breaker Testing
" Verify that each bypass breaker will be tested to demonstrate its operability prior to placing it into service for reactor trip break testing".
CECO. Response to Question 10:
Byron Station tests the reactor trip bypass breakers at each refueling outage. The procedure to test the bypass breakers currently requires and will continue to require jumpers as the bypass breakers are not being modified. The Station agrees with WOG that the failure of the reactor trip system during testing
.s unlikely and bypass breaker testing on an increased frequency
.s not required.
- 11. Request for Reactor Trip Breaker Operability Indication Test Procedure
" Verify that the test procedure used to determine reactor trip breaker operability will also demonstrate proper operation of the associate control room indication / annunciation".
CECO. Response to Question 11: \b Byron Station will include verification of associated control room indication / annunciation in the procedures that verify reactor trip breaker operability.
- 12. Request for Response Time Testing
" Verify that the response time of the automatic shunt trip feature will be tested periodically and shown to be less than or equal to that assumed in the FSAR analyses or that specified in the technical specifications".
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.,.r CECO. Response to-Question 12:
Byron Station currently tests the response time of the trip breakers to an undervoltage' trip in accordance with Technical LSpecifications. 'The Station is in agreement with WOG that shunt
, trip response time testing should be deferred until completion of the life cycle testing of the reactor trip breakers.
- 13. Request for Technical-Specification Changes
" Propose technical specification changen to require periodic testing of the-undervoltage and shunt trip functions and the manual reactor trip switch contacts and wiring".
CECO. Response to Question 13:
Byron Station technical specifications already have a requirement to independently ~ verify operation of the undervoltage and shunt trips of the reactor trip breakers once every'18 months. No changes to the technical specifications are currently required.
9765N '
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B/B-FSAR AMENDMENT 38 MAY 1982 The primary sources. of Class 1E d-c power system are the battery chargers. Every , battery charger is rated to supply its .
associated d-c loads while fully recharging the battery. Each !
battery charger is fed from a 480-Vac ESF switchgear' bus of the same division.
The 125-Vdc batteries are sized to carry the loads sh$wn in Table '
8.3-5 for the indicated time periods. During a loss-of-offsite power accident, the diesel-generators will provide a-c power to -
the associated battery chargers and thereby reduce the drain on the battery system.
The batteries are located in separate rooms. The rooms 'are described in the Byron /Eraidwood Fire Protection Report, subsection 2.3.5 (Reference 1) . The. ventilation r'quirements e for these battery rooms are satisfied as follows:
- a. To purge the room of hydrogen gas libera'ted f rom the battery, each room ventilation system limits the hydrogen concentration to less than 25 of the total volume of the room.
- b. Filtered air is provided to maintain each battery area at an annual average temperature of approximately 770 F with a minimum temperature of 650 F. The battery is sized to. provide adequate capacity at 778 F plus sufficient margin to allow for the expected temperature variations.
The 125-vdc batteries, racks, chargers, distribution panels, and
- hattery room ventilation equipment are classified as safety Cate gory I and meet Byron /Braidwood seismic requirements.
Each 125-Vdc system has its own independent instrumentation:.
- a. d-c voltmeter at the MCB to measure the voltage at the 125-Vdc distributicn center .bu.3; ,
- b. d-c voltmeter with a selector switch to measure the
'. d-c output voltage of the battery charger and the bus voltage;
- c. d-c ammeter to measure the d-c output current of the tattery charger
- c. d-c am. meter to measure the d-c current of the.
battery;
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- e. power f ailure alarm relay which indicatIs a loss of a-c power to the tattery charger (alarms at the main control room) ;
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8.3-24 a
, B/B-FSAR AMENDMENT 29 FEBRUARY 1981
- f. charger d-c output failure alarm relay (alarms at the main control room) ; '
- g. charger low'.d-c voltage alarm relay (alarms at the -
main cont'rol room) ;
- h. charger high d-c voltage shutdown relay;
- i. recording ground-detector voltmeter and alarm (alarms at the main control room) ;
- j. breaker trip alarms on the battery and battery charger breakers and an alarm indicating that the bus tie breaker is closed (alarms at the main control room); and .
- k. 125-vdc bus undervoltage alarm relay (alarms at the main control room) .
The instrumentation (and the related alarms) provides reliable supervision of the condition of the overall d-c system, but does not (by itself) provide adequate information on the condition of the bctuery (a component) . The condition of the battery is testeo initially as noted in Chapter 14.0 and periodically monitored and tested as noted in subsection 16.3/4.8. The time
- schedule for perfcraing inspections, measurements, and tests is established in accordance with the requirements of IEEE Standard 450-1975 (as mo'dified by the proposed 1978 revision issued for comments on November 7, 1977) and 308-1971.
The following protection is provided against overcharging: *
!.- A high-volta'ge shutdown relay opens the main supply '
breaker to the charger when the d-c output voltage of
' the charger rises to approximately 15% over the battery float voltage.
- b. A d-c voltmeter provides a visual check on battery voltage.
"The tie between buses 111 and 211 and the tie between buses 112 and 212 (d-c buses for Unit 1 and Unit 2) are each'provided with two normally open, manually operated circuit breakers. The ties are provided so that the nonredundant d-c buses of Unit 1 and Unit 2 can be interconnected during maintenance of the batter _y -
associated with either bus elli or 211 and bus 112 or 212. No l
. interlocks are provided since the interconnected buses are not redundant. ;However, administrative control will be provided .
during operation of the tie breakers. Tie breaker closed '
. alarms are provided.
During normal" operation, the? batteries are kept fully charged by the battery chargers. Periodically, the voltage is raised for equalization of the charge on the individual battery cells.
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requiremems.of military specmcations. MDR series rotary r,.- relays. Thef have two sets of coils are provide a latcr mg,two-- .
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C .' g p-E 167 forvbraterr aria MIL S.907 for snocer. The contacts wiE not enas. .
ter whert relays are subjected ter higrwimpact snocit blowe of 200G -
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+ 90*C are avantacle on special order. Please consult factory.
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Th3 base cor struction et me conventional MDR relay consets of a. .
rotary ac:uator meenanamwm tne comact seenons rncumed erin.
sutaeng nngs err ten. The actuator mecriansm erneodes a sensor- Wh*'t cod 121s energued. contacts A B. D E G H and K.L cione:
assefttiy ort whicrt two relay coils are rnountee. The two coins ar, The indicator line ort me cor shaft anc trte two cats on the ten arer
- connec:ectin senes nsace me relay. When me coils are v-.W e not We angnment .., '
rotor tume mrougar an arc of approximatofy 30 cogrees, tnerooy %%en coil 12 has beerr c" %.2ed and. coa 3-4 is energzed.
operatrigme cor*act secuan tnrougn the er ensen et the rotor shaft. comacts B C Ef. N and L M close: The inacator Ine ancthe tact The trave 6 of me rotor is confined t::r a 37 cepee are totweert1he. oots are signee.
stator faces and the stop rmg. Tw;r sormgs retum the rotor to me slog The armature a held by poemve sormg acdort rt its last u . , C ring when me coils are de-energtzedQ:s amo retums me comacts posmort wherr Octre costs are oognerg2ad. Coits must be energzed D mer fcfmal positens. Thus, me convemenet nordissenrig senes asemass%7iorsimuttaneous% .
provide art energand* ane oe energzed" posmon.
AVAILABLE IN SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZES; s:r" MDR rotary relays are off ered irt two base stres, smas and moeum.
[O [C
!, ROTCIP hI 4) 0 Ob Eactr of these s available in convermonal nontstenrig anclat::ririg-two 90siten verserts. The smal norklatcring MDR is fumisned wnry IN DE- , A\ - ROTOR' ire AC corts to 12PDT and wetri DC colts t 8PDT. The smas latenrig: '.
DfERGIZID 1 Vas % * @ EMR3t2I3 renay wnri AC or DC coils is equroped witry contacts a BPDT. The P03mCrb
~g
24PDT. wrtne tattriing versen fea:ures AC or DC coils witri contacts '
Q g(] go aj g( jej
- tch PDT. All contact arrangements are Form C (break before-4 g
.2'- % ess cer- Mpc coor,. ;qne 'ssM A4stss~ GF40&
n % una wine. cw a muy avr.. A.ur .
36 -
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F/GUMa~ Z ~
- - - ~
TYPICALCPERATE AND RELEASE TIMES -
b>. M *~..A.
- . AT NOMINAL COIL VOLTAGE AT.4 25*C t
f .,g-[ 7 a - -
CPERATE TIME RELEASE TIME C s_. , TYPE IN MILL 1 SECONDS IM MILLISECONDS
'7 SMALL AC I.ATCH!NG 6 B 12 .
5 SMALL CC LATCHING 10 D16 N/A 4 1- .
4 I MECIUM AC NCN-LATCHINC 6 to 12 6to20 j . MECIUM DC NCN- LATCHING 65 to 90 10 n 30
, : MEDIUM AC LATCHING 8 to i & N/A MECIUM CC LATCHINC 30 D,INI N/A 1
~ ~ *~ Coll CHARACTERISTICS OF SMALL NCM-i.ATCHING MON ROTAR RELAYS guaLL OC Com. BBEAKDOWN NO3.LATDW8G - SERIES. CONTACTS COELVOLTAGE COL CURRENT RESISTANCE COL POWER ee Mr ter Ac AMPEAts OMMS WAT1s- VOLTS RMS i
MDR137-1 4PDT 115VAC 0.21 5 SRs .94. 1237
. MDR1312 4PDT 440VAC 0.045- 1256 5.1 1880
- MDR1351 -
-4PDT 2rVDC 0.362 75 . 10.0 .
- 1 308 -
MOR137 8 4PDT 125VCC 0.082. - - 1523 10.3 2375 4 MCR134 8PUT 131.VAC:. 0 215 _ jfL. 65- 1230 MOR134 2, SPOT 440 VAC 0.045 1256 5.1 1880 -
MDR1361 . .8PDT- 23VCC 0.362 76 10.3 1308' .
- MDR135.& 8PDT 125 VCC 0.C82 1523 10.3 . 2375
- MCR1631 12PDT 115 VAC Q.230 $Z 6.9 1237 MDR163 2' 12PDT 440 VAC 0.CT.'.- 94G 6.2 1880 . +
- Atmae6 Wagneur readngs, e,_
CCIL CHARACTARISTICS OF MEDIUM NOM-LATCHING MDR ROTARY RELAYS ,
-N OC CC8- BREAMDOWM NOst-LATCHING; SERIES. ' CONTACTS " CCILVOt.TAGE CCEL CURREN1" RESISTANCE COL POWER es Mz for AC AMPEftE S OMMS WATTS
- VOLT 5 RMS .
MCR170 f 16PDT 115 VAC. 0.627 S.A. 17.7 1233 '
. MDR170.Z
- 16PDT 44Q VAC- ,
0.160, 107 17.CL 1880 MDR1711- .16PDT ,.
2SVDC 0.667* ,
'42- . .- 18.7 1308 ' ,
MDR177-t 16PDT 125 VCC ,0.125' 1024 . 18.3 2373
_ MCR141 1 24PDT , 115 VAC ' O.620- E4 17.G. 1230:. .
MDR141.Z . 24PDT 440 VAC 0.160- 107 17.0" *
- 1887 i MCR1671 24PUT 23VDC 0.667 4Z
- 18.7 1309 MDR142.t 24PDT 125 VCC 0.125 1C24 16.0 2375
, *Acans Wenneur renegs
=*
CCIL CHARACTERISTICS OF SMALL LATCHING MDR ROTARY RELAYS *
.l
,; sa4ALL. DC COL BREAKDOWS LATCMamG. SERIES CONTACT 3' COLVCLTAGE 3 COR.CURREN1* MESLSTANCE COIL POWER VQLTS RMS- r
. 80 Hz for AC AMPERES OMus WATT 5 ..
MOR67.Z 4PDT 115 VAC O.150 212. 5.5 1230 -
MDR4091
- 4PUT 44aVAC 0.020' 4500. . ~ll[5' 1880-
. MOR67 3 4PDT 23VCC 0.30t 91 - 8.9 , 1309 MCK5060 4PDT 125 VO C 0.104. 1200. 2375 .
MOR4075 8PUT T"" .1150 21 0 4.71.f.13.0 JJL. 1230 MOR4092- 8PDT 44Q VAC . 0.020.- 45E 3.0 188a -
MOR5035 8PDT . -- 21VDC 0.3CP 9t 8.8- 1308.-
MOR5067 8PDT 125 VDC 0.104. 120C - 13.0 2375 COtt. CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDIUM LATCHING MDR ROTARY RELAYS.
MEDem DC COL BREAKDOWM LATCHING. sERaS- CONTACTE COL VOLTAGE CCtkCURRENT REstSTANCE COIL POWER 60 Ma for AC VOLTS RMS AMPERES OMMS WATTS MDR6064. 12PDT 115 VAC 0.380 24 12.0 1230 MDR6065 12PDT 440 VAC 0.055 540 5.7 1880 MOR7020 12PDT 2KVCC 0.316 88.6 8.8 1308 MDR7035 12PDT 125 VDC 0.083 1500 10.4 2375 MOR664 16PDT 115 VAC 0.380 24 12.0 1230 MDR6066 16PDT 440 VAC 0.055 540 5.7 188a MDR7025 16PDT 28 VOC 0.318 88.6 8.5 1308 MDR7036 16PDT 125 VCC 0.063 1500 10.4 2375 97 f*g 4 IA sti 1._ _-
i .
o .
B/B FSAR AMENDMENT 38 MAY 1982 The primary sources. of Class 1E d-c power system are the battery ,
chargers. Every battery charger is rated to supply its .
associated d-c loads while fully recharging the battery. Each !
bettery charger is fed from a 480-Vac ESF switchgear' bus of tne same division.
The 125-Vdc batteries are sized to carry the loads sh'~wn o in Table
- 8.3-5 for the indicated time periods. During a loss-of-offsite power accident, the diesel-generators will provide a-c power to the associated battery chargers and thereby reduce the drain on the battery system.
The batteries are located in separate rooms. The rooms'are described in the Byron /Eraidwood Fire Protection Report, subsection 2.3.5 (Reference 1) . The. ventilation r'quirements e for these tattery rooms are satisfied as follows:
- a. To purge the room of hydrogen gas libera'ted f rom the battery, each room ventilation system limits the hydrogen concentration to less than 2% of the total volume of the rvom.
- b. Filtered air is provided to maintain each battery area at an annual average temperature of approximately 770 F with a minimum temperature of 650 F. The battery is sized to. provide adequate capacity at 770 F plus sufficient margin to allow for the expected temperature variations.
The 125-Vdc batteries, racks, chargers, distribution panels, and tettery room ventilation equipment are classified as safety Cate gory I and meet Byron /Braidhood seismic requirements.
Each 125-Vdc system has its own independent instrumentation:,
- a. d-c voltmeter at the MCB to measure the- voltage at the 125-Vdc distributicn center . bus; _ ,
- b. d-c' voltmeter with a selector switch to measure the
- d-c output voltage of the battery charger and the bus
! voltage;
- c. d-c ammeter to measure the d-c output current of the tattery charger;
- d. d-c ammeter to measure the 'd-c current of the' i
battery;
- e. power failure alarm relay which indicates a loss of a-c power to the tattery charger (alarms at the main control room) ;
l 1
l .
^ 8.3-24 e