Letter Sequence Other |
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Results
Other: 05000267/LER-1982-007, Forwards LER 82-007/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl, 05000267/LER-1982-007-01, /01T-0:on 820222,control Rod Pairs for Regions 7 & 28 Did Not Insert Automatically Following Manual Scram. Possibly Caused by Binding or Sticking of Control Rod Drive Mechanism.Control Rods Exercised to Eliminate Sticking, 05000267/LER-1984-012-01, :on 841105,reserve Shutdown Hopper of CRD & Orifice Assembly Discharged 40 Lb Reserve Shutdown Matl During Testing.Caused by Formation of Boric Acid Crystals. Absorber Matl to Be Replaced, 05000267/LER-1985-001, :on 850126,scram Occurred on Neutron Flux Rate of Change High from wide-range Channels on Scram Channels a & C.Caused by Welding Machine in Close Proximity to Flux Detectors.Weld Machine Turned Off, ML20084C589, ML20084Q444, ML20092P626, ML20093K194, ML20094D774, ML20096C032, ML20098B305, ML20099K727, ML20100H112, ML20106B531, ML20106B533, ML20112G463, ML20117M059, ML20126B629, ML20127J822, ML20127K637, ML20127L885, ML20127N695, ML20132C948, ML20132E623, ML20132G502, ML20134E865, ML20138Q922, ML20206J841, ML20209E899
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MONTHYEAR05000267/LER-1982-007-01, /01T-0:on 820222,control Rod Pairs for Regions 7 & 28 Did Not Insert Automatically Following Manual Scram. Possibly Caused by Binding or Sticking of Control Rod Drive Mechanism.Control Rods Exercised to Eliminate Sticking1982-03-0808 March 1982 /01T-0:on 820222,control Rod Pairs for Regions 7 & 28 Did Not Insert Automatically Following Manual Scram. Possibly Caused by Binding or Sticking of Control Rod Drive Mechanism.Control Rods Exercised to Eliminate Sticking Project stage: Other 05000267/LER-1982-007, Forwards LER 82-007/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl1982-03-0808 March 1982 Forwards LER 82-007/01T-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl Project stage: Other ML20084C5891984-04-16016 April 1984 Provides Advance Notification of Intent to Propose Tech Spec Changes to Circulation speed-high Trip Setting Listed in Table 4.4-3 & Surveillance Requirement SR 5.3.7 for Secondary Coolant Monitoring Project stage: Other ML20084Q4361984-05-10010 May 1984 Application to Amend License DPR-34,revising Tech Specs to Change Circulator speed-high Steam Trip Setting.Change Would Increase Circulator Availability While Providing for Initiation of Protective Actions Project stage: Request ML20084Q4221984-05-10010 May 1984 Forwards Application to Amend License DPR-34,revising Tech Specs to Change Circulator speed-high Steam Trip Setting (Table 4.4-3).Change Would Increase Circulator Availability While Providing for Initiation of Protective Actions Project stage: Request ML20084Q4441984-05-10010 May 1984 Proposed Tech Spec Table 4.4-3, Instrument Operating Requirements for Plant Protective Sys,Circulator Trip. Significant Hazards Considerations Encl Project stage: Other ML20092P6261984-06-26026 June 1984 Confirms Util Commitment to Fully Investigate 840623 Event in Which Six Control Rod Pairs Failed to Insert Into Core Under Automatic Velocity Limited free-fall Sys.Nrc Approval of Resolutions Will Be Obtained Prior to Reactor Startup Project stage: Other ML20090C5261984-07-0606 July 1984 Responds to NRC Concerns Re Fire Protection Review,Bldg 10 Licensing Requirements,Control Rod Failure to Scram, Documentation of Disciplinary Actions,Clearance Tags & Radiological Emergency Exercise Scenario,Per 840625 Meeting Project stage: Meeting ML20094D7741984-07-18018 July 1984 Informs of Control Rod & CRD Insp & Testing in Response to NRC 840709 Insp.Major Power Consumption & Scram Verification of All 37 CRD & Orifice Assemblies Completed & Insp Underway.Plan for Further Action Described Project stage: Other ML20096C0321984-08-21021 August 1984 Provides Findings & Positions Re Investigation of 840623 Failure of Six Control Rods to Automatically Insert Upon Scram.Summary of Work on Four CRDs & Description of Tests Encl.Corrective Actions Listed Project stage: Other ML20098B3051984-09-0707 September 1984 Ro:On 840904,while Removing CRD & Orifice Assembly,Motor Overcurrent Condition on Auxiliary Transfer Cask Shutters Occurred,Preventing Full Closure.Caused by One Control Rod String Not Fully Retracted.Work Temporarily Discontinued Project stage: Other ML20093K1941984-09-24024 September 1984 Submits Info Re Status of Damaged Control Rod Removal on Fuel Deck.Related Info Encl.Possibly Caused by Absorber Strings Not Fully Retracted,Despite Full Retract Limit Switch Indication Project stage: Other ML20099K7271984-11-0808 November 1984 Provides Status of Control Rod Drive & Orificing Assembly (Crdoa) Refurbishing Efforts.Further Investigation of Crdoa Determined That Cause of Inability of Absorber String to Fully Retract Was Cable Failure Project stage: Other ML20112C0491984-12-27027 December 1984 Responds to NRC 841025 Request for Addl Info Re 840510 Application for Amend to License DPR-34,revising Tech Spec Re Helium Circulators Overspeed Trip Setpoint.Analysis Value Encl Project stage: Request ML20112G5061985-01-0404 January 1985 Forwards Status of Planned Audit Response to NRC July 1984 Audit of Plant Operations,Per Denton .Repts Covering Technical Details of Listed Subjs Will Be Provided by 850131,per 841128 & 29 Meetings Project stage: Meeting ML20106B5311985-01-25025 January 1985 Advises That Util Will Perform Turbine Load Rejection from Full Load Test at End of Cycle 4.Tech Spec Amend Will Be Submitted Project stage: Other ML20106B5331985-01-31031 January 1985 Forwards Investigation Into Sources of Chloride in Fort St Vrain Primary Circuit. Rept Re Investigations of Effects of Chlorides on Major Components in Primary Circuit Will Be Sent by 850228 Project stage: Other 05000267/LER-1985-001, :on 850126,scram Occurred on Neutron Flux Rate of Change High from wide-range Channels on Scram Channels a & C.Caused by Welding Machine in Close Proximity to Flux Detectors.Weld Machine Turned Off1985-02-25025 February 1985
- on 850126,scram Occurred on Neutron Flux Rate of Change High from wide-range Channels on Scram Channels a & C.Caused by Welding Machine in Close Proximity to Flux Detectors.Weld Machine Turned Off
Project stage: Other 05000267/LER-1984-012-01, :on 841105,reserve Shutdown Hopper of CRD & Orifice Assembly Discharged 40 Lb Reserve Shutdown Matl During Testing.Caused by Formation of Boric Acid Crystals. Absorber Matl to Be Replaced1985-02-28028 February 1985
- on 841105,reserve Shutdown Hopper of CRD & Orifice Assembly Discharged 40 Lb Reserve Shutdown Matl During Testing.Caused by Formation of Boric Acid Crystals. Absorber Matl to Be Replaced
Project stage: Other ML20132G5021985-03-12012 March 1985 Evaluation of CRD Mechanism & Reserve Shutdown Sys Failures & Pcrv Tendon Degradation Issues Prior to Fort St Vrain Restart Project stage: Other ML20112G4631985-03-18018 March 1985 Forwards Ga Technologies,Inc Rept 907838, Investigation Into Sources of Chloride in Fort St Vrain Primary Circuit, Re Effects of Chloride on Major Components in Primary Circuit.Final Review & Clearance to Be Forwarded by 850326 Project stage: Other ML20100H1121985-03-26026 March 1985 Forwards Evaluation of Fort St Vrain Metallic Components Exposed to Primary Coolant Chloride Contamination, Per 850318 Commitment Project stage: Other ML20117M0591985-04-26026 April 1985 Expresses Appreciation for Opportunity to Discuss Quality Aspects of CRD & Orifice Assembly (Crdoa) Refurbishment Program on 850424 in Arlington,Tx.Discusses 850418 Audit to Confirm 18 Crdoas Completed W/High Quality Project stage: Other ML20132C9781985-05-17017 May 1985 Safety Evaluation Re CRD Instrumentation Project stage: Approval ML20126B6291985-05-20020 May 1985 Responds to Commitment Log Item CL-1055 Re Verification of Operability of Surge Diodes on CRD Brake & Limit Switch Relays.Diodes & Functions Listed.Action Request DCAR-704 Initiated to Provide Relocation of Diodes Project stage: Other ML20127J8221985-06-0707 June 1985 Informs of Acceptability of Devcon 5-minute Epoxy for Use in Cementing Resistance Temp Detector Temp Sensors to CRD Cavity & Motor,Based on Test & Inservice Exposure of Epoxy to High Temps Project stage: Other ML20127K6371985-06-0707 June 1985 Forwards Interim Tech Specs for Control Rods for Use During Plant Startup.Specs Describe Program to Assure Control Rod & Reserve Shutdown Sys Reliability.Operating Limit of 250 F Max on Control Rod Motor Temp Anticipated Project stage: Other ML20127L8851985-06-13013 June 1985 Forwards Results of Engineering Evaluation of Design Changes Introduced in CRD & Orifice Assembly Bearings.Physical Comparison Testing of Original & Replacement Shim Motor Bearings Underway to Establish Operating/Design Margins Project stage: Other ML20127N6951985-06-14014 June 1985 Elaborates on Util Commitments to Listed Plant Activities, Including CRD Mechanism Temp Recording,Requalification, Surveillance & Preventative Maint,Backup Reactor Shutdown Procedure,Tendons & Pcrv Integrity & Electrical Sys Project stage: Other ML20209E8991985-06-25025 June 1985 Discusses Status of CRD & Orificing Assembly (Crdoa) Refurbishment Efforts.First 37 Crdoas Refurbished & Installed.Summary of Design Changes & Test Results Encl Project stage: Other ML20132C9481985-07-0101 July 1985 Evaluation of CRD Orifice Assembly Bearing Rept from Public Svc Co of Co Project stage: Other ML20132E6231985-07-0303 July 1985 Forwards Interim Tech Specs for Reactivity Control Sys.Tech Specs Will Provide Basis for Program to Assure CRD & Reserve Shutdown Sys Reliability.Specs Include Change to Criteria for Insertion of Reserve Shutdown Matl Project stage: Other ML20132C9391985-07-12012 July 1985 Forwards Eg&G 850701 Evaluation of CRD Orifice Assembly Bearing Rept from Public Svc Co of Co, Per Util 850613 Submittal.Installed Bearings Acceptable Replacements for Original Design.Review of 850607 Submittal Also Encl Project stage: Approval ML20134E8651985-07-17017 July 1985 Issue 1 to Procedure SR-TE-9-X, Inserted Rod Position Verification Project stage: Other ML20134E8601985-07-31031 July 1985 Forwards Issue 1 to Procedure SR-TE-9-X, Inserted Rod Position Verification, in Response to Concerns Discussed at 850221 Meeting & in Project stage: Meeting ML20138Q9221985-12-19019 December 1985 Informs of Inability to Meet 851230 Completion Date of High temp,300 F,Crd Mechanism Test & Preliminary Evaluation,Due to Difficulties,Including Orifice Valve on Mechanism.Final Rept Will Be Submitted by 860331 Project stage: Other ML20199D3411986-06-11011 June 1986 Forwards Evaluation of Util Response to 851003 Review of Performance Enhancement Program.Method Should Be Provided to Confirm Functional Acceptability of Equipment Prior to Return to Svc Project stage: Approval ML20206J7481987-04-0606 April 1987 Forwards Amend 52 to License DPR-34 & Safety Evaluation. Amend Increases Circulator speed-high Steam Trip Setting in Table 4.4-3 of Tech Specs Project stage: Approval ML20206J8411987-04-0606 April 1987 Amend 52 to License DPR-34,increasing Circulator speed-high Steam Trip Setting Listed in Table 4.4-3 of Tech Specs Project stage: Other ML20206J9331987-04-0606 April 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 52 to License DPR-34 Project stage: Approval ML20206B3301987-04-0606 April 1987 Requests Fr Publication of Notice of Issuance of Amend 52 to License DPR-34,increasing Circular Speed High Steam Trip Setting Listed in Table 4.4-3 of Tech Specs Project stage: Approval 1985-02-28
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, public Service Company T OEknade 16805 WCR 19 1/2, Platteville, Colorado 80651 November 8, 1984 Fort St. Vrain Unit #1 P-84460 I
Regional Administrator Region IV 3_0M $ D l
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1.
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611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 NOV I 9 08d Arlington, TX 76011 1
i ATTN: Mr. E. H. Johnson i
Docket No.:
50-267
SUBJECT:
Status of Fort St. Vrain Control Rod Refurbishment
REFERENCE:
PSC Letter Gahm to Johnson l
Dated 09/24/84 (P-84370)
This letter is to provide you with the status of Fort St. Vrain control rod drive and orificing assembly (CR00A) refurbishing efforts.
Further investigation of CRDOA #25 from Region 7 has determined that the cause of the damaged absorber string to not fully retract can be attributed to a cable failure.
In order to determine this, it was necessary to disassemble the CR00A and remove a portion of the remaining cable and the cable seal.
Upon removal of the cable seal a single strand of the cable (7 wires per strand, 19 strands per cable) was found to have failed and become entangled around the cable in the cable seal area. Apparently, as the control rods were being retracted in the mechanism, the failed strand became jammed in the seal, thus increasing the tension on the cable and causing it to fail approximately one foot above the seal.
1 The upper portion of the failed cable then became entangled between the cable drum and gear train housing causing it to sever into five separate sections when the drive system was later activated.
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8411290536 841108 PDR ADOCK 05000267 s
8 PDR db 62)W 21.W 9 klV g
Startins from the end of the cable, attached to the cable drum, a 38 inch section (including the anchor) was found to be wrapped around the drum.
The next section, 116 inches in length, was entangled around the drum and jammed in the cable channel at the bottom of the drum.
It was observed that one end of this long section matched to the 38 inch section. The other end of the 116 inch section had a 5 inch section of the outer strands missing. The inner strands were still intact.
A 5 inch section, which had fallen while the 200 Assembly was raised, consisted of the outer strands and fit around the inner strands of the 116 inch section.
Another 5 inch
- section, fully intact but slightly distorted, matched the end of the inner strands from the 116 inch section and the outer strands of the other 5 inch section.
Finally a 12 inch section, found on the orifice motor plate, matched the end of the 5 inch section.
The other end of the 12 inch section matched the end of the remaining cable stuck in the cable seal.
Figure 1 shows the five different sections and the manner in which they were pieced back together.
Including the remaining cable still attached to the control rod, all cable has been accounted for.
An examination of the intact sister cable on CRD0A #25 revealed another single strand failure. This strand was not frayed, but had two failures separated by approximately one inch along the cable axis.
No radially protruding ends were observed at this point.
The discovery of a second strand failure initiated an extensive investigation into the possible mechanisms causing the failures.
In addition to the removal of the failed cable, the sister cable of CRD0A #25 was also removed for detailed testing and examination.
CRDOA #25 was then reassembled using new cable that was swaged onto the remaining cables attached to the control rods.
This enabled the two absorber strings to be fully retracted for removal from the hot service facility and temporarily stored in an equipment storage well.
Refurbishment of the CRD0A will be completed at a later date in order to expedite additional cable examinations.
Examinations of other CRD0A's that have been refurbished have revealed one other failed wire on a cable from CRD0A #11.
To determine the exact mechanism of these failures the failed cable from CRDOA #25 has been subjected to various tests and examinations.
Thus far, examinations have consisted of optical metallography (including microbardness testing),
scanning electron microscopic exams and chemical analysis of surface corrosion products.
In addition, samples of the failed cable and a section of unused cable have been sent to Los Alamos National Laboratory, as requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, for independent analysis.
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i The results of these tests and examinations are preliminary. Public Service Company will provide the Nuclear Regulatory Commissioi with the results and conclusions of this analysis as soon as it is
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completed.
The reserve shutdown hoppers of CRD0A's #26 (20 weight % boron) and #21 (40 weight % boron) have been functionally tested, and material samples have been collected for physical examination.
Preliminary reports indicate that the material is in good condition, but the functional test of CRD0A #21 revealed that only approximately i
33 pounds of the 80 8 pounds was recovered in the " catch" canister after blowing the rupture disk. The functional test of CRD0A #26 was 1
successful.
Investigations have been initiated to determine the reason for only 33 pounds of reserve shutdown material being expelled during the functional test of CRD0A #21.
As always, Public Service Company will keep the Nuclear Regulatory Commission abreast of the existing conditions.
If you have any questions please contact Mr. Frank Novachek, of my staff, at (303) j 785-2224, extension 201.
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i Sincerely, i
d J. W. Gahm Manager, Nuclear Production l
JWG:dr Attachment 3
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