ML20054H722

Forwards Draft Evaluation of SEP Topic III-4.A, Tornado Missiles, Per NRC 820518-19 Site Visit.Some Sys at Site Not Adequately Protected from Tornado Generated Missiles.Exam of Facts Upon Which NRC Based Evaluation Requested

ML20054H722
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	06/21/1982
From:	Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Fiedler P JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
References
TASK-03-04.A, TASK-3-4.A, TASK-RR LSO5-82-06-072, LSO5-82-6-72, NUDOCS 8206240366
Download: ML20054H722 (21)

Text

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June 21, 1982 Docket No. 50-219 .

LS05-82-06-072 -

!!r. P. B. Fiedler Vice President and Director Oyster Creek Huclear Generating Station Post Office Box 388 Forked River, New Jersey 08731

SUBJECT:

SEP TOPIC III-4.A. TORNADO HI5SILES OYSTER CREEK Enclosed is our draft evaluation of SEP Topic III-4.A. The evaluation is based on information available on Docket No. 50-219 and on a site visit conducted by the staff on May 18 and 19,1982.

The evaluation concludes that some systems at your site are not adequately protected from tornado generated missiles.

You are requested to examine the facts upon which the staff hes based its evaluation and respond by confirming that the facts are correct or by identifying errers and supplying the corrected information. We encourage you to supply any other information that might affc::t the staff's evales-tion of this topic or be significant in the integrated assessment of your facility. Your response is requested within 30 days of receipt of this letter. If no information is received in that time, we will assume you i have no comments or corrections.

l Sincerely,

$ Y Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 5 @ us6 Division of Licensing ,

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Mr. P. B. Fiedler ,

cc G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire Resident Inspector Shaw, Pittnan, Potts and Trowbridge c/o U. S. NRC l 1800 M Street', N. W. Post Office Box 445  !

Washington, D. C. 20036 Forked River, New Jersey 08731 o .

J. B. Lieberman, Esquire Commissioner

• Berlack, Israels & Lieberman New Jersey Department of Energy Eo Broadway 101 Commerce Street l New York, New York 10004 Newark, New Jersey 07102

'- Ronald C. Haynes, Regional Administrator- ~

- - Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region I -

631 Park Avenue - -

King of Prussia, Pennsyl.vania 19406 J.,Xnuber .

BWR Licensing Manager GPU Nuclear 100 Interplace Parkway '

Parsippany, New Jersey 07054

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Deputy Attorney General' '

State of New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety

• 36 West State Street - CN 112 '

Trenton, New Jersey 08625,

' Mayor Lacey Township 818 Lacey Road Fo.rked fiver, New Jersey __08731 -

U. S. Environmental Prctection Agency Region II Office .

ATTN: Regional Radiation Representative 26 Federal Plaza

. New York, New York 10007 Licensing Supervisor

- Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Post Office Box 388 '

Forked River, New Jersey 08731 e

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OYSTER CREEK TOPIC III-4.A - TORNADO MISSILES I. Introduction Tornado generated missiles could cause sufficient damage to a plant so o that the actual safety of the plaht is reduced. Topic III-4.A ,is intended ,

to review the plant design to assure that those structures, systems and components important to safety can withstand 'the impact of an appropriately

. postulated spectrum of tornado _ generated missiles. , , ,

Thesa include these required to assure: ,' ~

1. The integrity of the reactor coolant pres'sure boundary,

2. The capability to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, and

3. The capability to prevent accidents which could result in unacceptable offsite exposures.

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Scope of Review The scope of the review is as outlihed in the' Standard Review Plan (SRP)

' Section 3.5.1.4, " Missiles Generated By Natural Phenomena."

An assessment of the adequacy of a plant to withstand the' impact of tornado missiles includes:

1. Determination of the capability of the exposed systems, components and I

structures to withstand key missiles (including small missiles with penetrating characteristics and larger missiles which result in an overall structural impact); and 1

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2. Determination of whether any areas of the plant require additional protectlon. ,

' II . Review' Cri teria 2 The plart' design was reviewed w.ith regard to Gener;1 Design Critirion 2 .

" Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena" which requires that structures, systems, and components esse'nti,a1 to safety be designed to withstand the effects of na'tural phenomena such as tornadoes and General .,

Design Criterion 4. " Environmental and Missile Design Bases" which requires that these same plant features be protected against missiles. The plant was also reviewed against the guidance contained in Regulatory Guide 113

" Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Bases," 127. " Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Power Plants," 1.117 " Tornado Design Classification", and i -).76, " Design Basis Tornado for Nuclear Power Plants" with regard to plant protection against tornado missiles.

III. Related Safety Topics Topic II-2-A, " Severe Weather Phenomena" describes the tornado characteristics for the plant. Topic III-2, " Wind and Tornado Loadings" reviews the capability of the plant structures, systems and components to withstand wind loadings. Topic VII-3, " Systems Required for Safe Shutdown" reviews thos'e systems needed to achieve and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition.

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IV. Review Guidelines The review was performed in accordance with Standard Review Plan (SRP) 3.5.1.4, " Missiles Generated by Natural Phenomena," Revision 1. This SRP states that the assessment of possible hazards due to missi16s generated I by the natural phenomena is based on the applicantlaving ' met the require- .

ments of General Design Criteria 2 and 4 byr (1) meeting Regulatory Guide 1.76 Positions C-1 and C-2 and (2) meeting Regulato.ry Guide 1.117,

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- Positions C-1 and C-3. SRP' 3.5.1.4 .further states that plants which were ,

not required at the construction permit stage to design to the missile spectrum in Revision 0 to the SRP should show the capability to with-stand the two postulated missiles discussed below.

The following missiles are described in SRP 3.5.1.4 as being appropriate for evaluating OL applications for plants which were'not required to be protected against the full tornado missile spectrum during the CP stage:

1. Steel Rod,1" dia., '3' long, 8 lbs, horizontal velocity 0.6 x total tornado velocity.

2. Utility Pole,131/2" dia., 35' long,1490 lbs. horizontal velocity -

0.4 x total tornado velocity.

The systems, structures, and components required to be protected because of their importance to safety are identified in the Appendix to Regulatory

_ Gui de,1.117.

V. . Evaluation

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A. Tornado Event Description In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.76, the Oyster Creek Plant is in Tornado Region I. Accordingly, the design basis tornado is character-

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ized by a maximum wind speed of 360 miles per hour with an occurrence frequency of no greater than 10-7 per year. The tornado characteris-tics described in SEP Topic II-2.A for the Oyster Creek site are of

. less severity, r.amely, a windspeed of 250 mph. The results of SEP -

Topic II-2.A will be used as the basis for this review.

Therefore, in accordance with SRP 3.5.1.4, Revision 0, the total

. horizontal velocities for the two postulated missiles are: , .

1. Steel Rod, 220 ft./sec.

2. Utility Pole, 147 ft./sec.

These missiles are considered to be capable of striking in all directions with vertical speeds equal to 80% of the horizontal speeds listed above.

B Structural Considerations In our evaluation, we have considered the adequacy of the following structures for tornado missile protection:

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1. Reactor Building; '

2. Turbine Building;

3. Office Building (Control Room and Cable Spreading Room);

4. Radwaste Building;

6. Intake Structure; and

- - - .7. , Reactor Building Exhaust Structure.

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In order to assess the adequacy of tornado missile protection of these structures, we have compared their wall and roof thicknesses to the current NRC requirements for the two postulated missiles for

] the Region I design basis tornado (360 mph windspeed).' For a concrete .

strength of f'c = 4000 psi, the required concrete thicknesses are as stated below: ,

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MISSILE REQUIRED WALL THICKNESS (INCHES) ,

REQUIREDRdOF' THICKNESS (INCHES)

Telephone pole 12 ' 12 1" steel rod 8 8 These wall thicknesses will be used as a guide in performing this review.

t All systems and components found to be adequately protected are housed within structures having thicknesses equal to or greater than above.

Those systems and components not found to be adequately protected are

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not housed inside structures or were identified by the licensee as not being adequately protected.

The buildings of interest were constructed of 3500 psi concrete, but it is assumed that the strength of this concrete after aging is at least 4000 psi.

C. System Considerations The following structures, systems and components as listed in the Appendix to Regulatory Guide 1.117 were evaluated to determine their susceptibility to the postulated tornado generated missiles.

1. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary The reactor coolant pressure boundary, up to the outboard main

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steam isolation valves and containment isolation valves, is located in the reactor building. The portion of the reactor

- coolant system inside the drywell is completely enclosed by a five foot thickness of reinforced concrete. The reactor building ,

walls enclosing the remainder of the reactor coolant system up to the outboard containment isolation valves are reinforced concrete 18 inches to 30 inches thick. The drywell enclosure and reactor ... _

building provide adequate tornado-missile protection for the reactor coolant pressure boundary because the concrete thicknesses are greater than the 12 inch minimim requirement.

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2. Reactor Core

• The reactor vessel which houses the core constitutes a portion b

Ms of the reactor core pressure boundary which is discussed in Item 1 fr4 -

above. The fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel are adequately T-protected from tornado missile damage by the drywell enclosure and reactor building structure surrounding the drywell.

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3. Systems or Portions of Systems Recuired for Safe Shutdown As previously stated, those systems, structures, and components required to be protected because of their importance to safety are identified in the Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.117.

- However, for the SEP Evaluation, SEP Topic VII-3, " Systems Required for Safe Shutdown" covers those systems or portions of .

systems required for safe shutdown. Therefore, in this portion .

of our review, we examined those systems identified in SEP Topic VII-3.

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a. Automatic Pressure Relief System The automatic pressure relief system valves are located within the drywell.

Tornado missile protection is provided by the drywell enclosure and reactor building structure surrounding'the drywell

• as discussed in Item 1 above. We have concluded that these structures provide adequate protection for the automatic pressure relief valves against damage.from tornado missiles because the reactoi building ' ~

walls are reinforced concrete at least eighteen inches thick and the drywell enclos'ure is a five foot thick concrete barrier.

b. _Feedwater Coolant In.iection System

• The major components in this system are the condensate pumps, and reactor feed ptsnps.

One feedwater triin is needed for safe shutdown and includes one cundensate pump, and one feedwater pump. These pumps take suction fmm the condenser hot well and deliver water to the reactor vessel -

for shutdown. Makeup to the condenser is from the condens' ate storage tank (see Condensate Storage Tank).

All of the pumps in the'feedwater coolant injection system

- are located at the lowest elevation of'the turbine building The turbine building walls are reinforced concrete and ,

. , .. are, at least,12 inches thick. The turbine building roof structure above elevation 119 feet is not designed to withstand tornado generated missiles. However, the refueling floor is reinforced concrete and is at least 12 inches thick. Finally, since the feedwater coolant system pumps are located at the lowest elevation of the turbine building they are protected by multiple berriers

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of reinforced concrete (walls and floor slabs). We conclude that the feedwater coolant injection system is adeovately protected against tornado missiles.

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c. Service Water and Emeroency Service Water Systems -

The service water pumps and emergency service water pumps i are used for safe shutdown of the plant. All of the pump motors located at the -intake structure are open to the ~ ~ - -

atmosphere. We conclude that the water hnd emergency service water pumps are unprotected against both horizontal and vertical tdrnado missiles.

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d. Low Pressure Coolant Infection / Containment Spray System 4

The LPCI/ Containment Spray system pumps are located in the -

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F3 reactor' building. Piping and valves for this system are located in the reactor building and inside the drywell.

l Protection for this system is the same as described in l

l Item 1. We conclude that the tornado missile protection for tfie'LPCI/ Containment Spray System is adequate. based on the reactor. building walls being at least 16 inches thick of-reinforced concrete. .

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e. Emergency' Power System - Switchgear There are four 4160V switchgear bus sections, two are powered from normal or startup sources (1C and 1D). The latter are normally fed from the'1A and 1B buses with emergency power being supplied from the emergency diesel generators. They are located inside the turbine building in a seismic /

fi reproo f , enclosure.' There are no openings in the turbine building. that would allow a tornado inissile to impact a

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• l I safe shutdown system or safety related system. Because the turbine building walls and floor slabs are at least 17 inches thick, these barriers are adequate to withstand

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tornado missiles. Finally, because of the switchgear location, they are protected by multiple barrier.s. Based on our evaluation we conclude that the switchgear is adequately protected against tornado missiles. -

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i f. Station Batteries ,

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The 125 volt batteries supply power for operation of vital control circuits without interruption. The batteries e and DC switchgear are installed in areas enclosed by reinforced concrete walls and meet requirements for Class I equipment. The redundant DC power supply cables to 4KV and 480 volt switchgear, and motor control centers, are physically separated by a floor. slab in the turbine building and the reactor buildir.g. Because the turbine l

and reactor building walls are greater than the minimum I

i- . requirement of 12 inches as specified on page 5 of this report, we conclude that t'he station batteries are adequately protected and/or separated within the reactor and turbine building to preclude damage by tornado missiles. ,

Emergency Diesel Generators g.

The emergency diesel generator (s) provide onsite emergency power and one unit is assumed to be adequate for safe shut-down in the event of a tornado. They are housed in a rein-

forced concrete building with separation between the two dia' ' generators. The oil tank is in a separate enclosure

. internal to the diesel generator building. By letter dated

. . April 30, 1982, the licensee submitted,a design evaluation .

memorandum relevant to tornado missile protection. In this design evaluation, the licensee stated that the walls and

- roof structure .are not designed to withstand either the . . . .

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tornado wind load or the tornado missiles, lhe roof panels were identified as the weakest element in the building structure.

Based on our evaluation of this information and the site visit, we conclude that the diesel generator building and the fuel oil tank are unprotected against tornado missiles coming from any direction,

h. Instrumentation and Control for Safe Shutdown Equipment Instrumentation and control for safe shutdown equipment is locateiinthecontrolrcom. The majority of the cables are routed from the control roam through the cable spreading room and into the reactor building. Other cables are routed through the turbine building to the switchgear.

We conclude that the reactor building and turbine building enclosure walls provide adequate tornado missile protection for the cables located in these two structures because the wall thickness is at least 18 inches. The control room and cable spreading room also provide adequate tornado missile protection because the walls are reinforced concrete at

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least 18" thick except for the south wall. The south wall is masonry block, but is enclosed by other masonry block

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walls such that multiple block walls will provide adequate

. protection. ..

1. Space Coolers The space coolers serving safe shutdown . equipment are located within compartments housing the safe shutdown .

equipment and would have the same protection afforded n;3 the safe shutdown equipment as discussed above. We therefore conclude that the tornado protection provided

~[p these units is adequate.

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$mii j. Reactivity Control System yM The reactivity control system consists of a control rod Sp drive system end the standby liquid control system.

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Essential components for these systems are located in the reactor building and drywell. These components are adequately protected by the 18 inch thick reactor building walls and the drywell enclosure. All cables for the reactivity control systems are routed from the control room through the cable spreading room' directly below and through the reactor building directly adjacent to the cabkes room. See Item 3.h and 4.e for the protection afforded cables /

eouipment in these areas. Based on the above considerations, we conclude that the reactivity control systems are ade-d cuately protected adainst the effects of tornado missiles.

k. Control Room The control room is adequately protected against the effects of tornado missiles as discussed in Item 3.h above.

. However, the control room HVAC system is vulne,rab_le to ,

damage from tornado missiles (see' Item'4).

4. Systems or Portions of Systems Not Reouired for Safe Shutdown But Safety Related ,

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a. HVAC Systems , .

Both the reactor building and the turbine building HVAC systems are located on the office building roof and open to the outside environment. Therefore, no tornado. missile protection is provided except that the office building roof elevation {above 30 feet) precludes the assumption of a telephone pole type tornado missile. The intake for the control room HVAC system is located in the reactor building l

wall and is not protected against tornado missiles. Should a missile strike the control room HVAC air intake, then the HVAC system would be disabled because the air handling unit is positioned at the wall.

Based on our review, we conclude that the control room HVAC system and its air intake are not adequately protected against tornado missiles. We also conclude that the reactor building and turbine building HVAC systems are unprotected against tornado missiles.

b. Condensate Storage Tank The condensate storage tank provides an alternate makeup water source to the condenser which is in turn the source

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I of water for the feedwater coolant injection system for safe shutdown. The tank is located in the yard at grade and is fully exposed to the outside environment.

j While we understand that this tank. wilt provid'e a'n alt'ernate .

makeup water source to the condenser and in turn to the feedwater coolant injection. system we b.elieve it would

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be prud'ent to' consider its protection from tornado missiles

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during the integrated assessme'nt of the O'y ster Creek Nuclear Plant. '

c. Torus Water Storage Tank __

The torus water storage tank is positioned in the open at grade level and, therefore, is not protected against tornado missiles. We understand that the torus water storage tank is not required for safe shutdown. However, we believe it would be prudent to consider its protection from tornado missiles during the integrated assessment of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Plant,

d. Reactor'Buildingdxh'austSystem The reactor building exhaust system includes the fan motors /

blowers and a 394 foot elevated exhaust stack. The exhaust system components are vulnerable to tornado missiles because they are open to the atmosphere at grade level. The elevated exhaust stack is not designed to withstand a tornado wind load. Its ability to withstand this load is being performed

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in SEP Topic III-2. The utility pole will not penetrate the stack below 30 feet above grade because the stack walls are greater than 12" thick at these elevations.

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Penetration

] by the rod may occur in the upper elevations, tut-is not ,

a concern since the stack is not required for safe shutdown.

It is the staff's judgement that should such a penetration

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occur i'n the up'per elevation of the stack, radioactive releases would not significantly increase at site boundary.

It is the staff's judgement that gross stack failure will not occur if struck by either of these missiles. Because the reactor building exhaust system is not required for safe.

shutdown, we conclude that the reactor building exhaust structure is adequate regarding tornado missile protection, e, Reactor Building Railroad Doors Two metal air lock doors are located, at grade level, in the reactor building for the purpose of railroad car access.

These~ double leaf doors are not tornado missile resistant, Possible missile targets just inside these high bay doors include; .one bank of CRD scram accumulators, a containment spray system supply pipe, and several cable trays / conduits, Only one bank of the CRD scram accumulators are located within " view" of the reactor building railroad doors. How-ever, a massive reinforced concrete column is located b'etween the doors and the CRD scram accumulator location, The projected net area of this column is sufficient to screen the CRD accumulators against any incoming tornado missiles.

Based on our onsite inspection of this area, we conclude that l

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.: these CRD scram accumulators are not vulnerable to tornado missiles. .

The containment spray supply header is exposed and vulnerable to a tornado missile. However, this supply header is not -

required for safe shutdown and is not normally functioning, Therefore, we conclude that no tornado missile protection is

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required for the containment spray supply header and that. ,

R ;; the current plant arrangement is acceptable.

Finally, there are safety related cable trays and condutis JZ in this area that could be struck by a missile entering

~ via the railroad doors. During our site visit, we rD ascertained that no redundant safe shutdown cables / conduits 5 existed in this area, and, hence, safe shutdown would not Q ^~

=3 be compromised. Therefore, no further missile protection

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is required and the plant arrangement is acceptable.

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5. Systems Whose Failure May Result in the Release of Unacceptable Amounts of Radioactivity

a. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System The spent fuel poo.1 cooling system removes residual heat from the spent fuel stored in the pool. The spent fuel pool cooling system is designed to clarify the pool water and to remove the residual heat produced by the stored spent fuel elements while maintaining the pool water temperature at or less than 125 F. The spent fuel pool l

cooling system consists of two cooling pumps and two heat

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5 - j exchangers. The spent fuel pool pump draws water from the pool, circulates it through the heat exchangers, and returns it to the pool. Service water cools the spent fuel pool heat exchangers. The spent fuel pool is located

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   ]                on the reactor building refueling floorrwhich'is~ enclosed         .

by the metal siding. starting at the 119 foot elevation.

    ,,              Of the two postu, lated missiles, only the' one inch steel   .           . . , ,

rod could be expected to' impact the top of,the spen t fuel - - pool. Utility poles are assumed to reach heights no greater than 30 feet above the maximum grade elevation within one-half mile of the plant. The 18 inch thick reactor building walls provide protec-tion against utility pole impact up to an elevation of 119 feet. It is possible for the one inch steel rod to penetrate the spent fuel pool area through the metal-sided roof or walls. above tie 119 foot elevation. However, the effects of :..- . the one inch steel rod have been evaluated in pre-vious analyses (e.g., within staff testimony and responses i to interrogations on spent fuel pool protection against l tornado missiles for North Anna and Palisades). The results indicate that the potential offsite radiological ~ consequences are well within 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines. In view of the above considerations, we conclude that the Oyster Creek spent fuel pool is acceptable regarding tornado missile protection.

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I The spent fuel pool cooling system consists of two pumps, two heat exchangers, filters, piping, valves and instru-mentation. Most of this equipment is loca~ted in the reactor building and is protected by the 18 inch thick reinforced

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I concrete structure. Thespentfuelpoo1coolingsystem

• is cooled by the reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) system. All RBCCW system cceponents are located in the reactor building. We therefore conclude that ade- .

quate tornado missile protection is afforded the spent fuel pool cooling system RBCCW. However, the RBCCW heat exchangers reject spent fuel heat to the service water system which is not adequately protected (see Item 3.c). _ In our judgement, failure of these systems because tornado missiles will not result in significant radiological consequences.

b. Radwaste Treatment Systems

1. Off Gas System This system processes and disperses radioactive was'te gases from the main condenser steam jet air ejectors, the turbine gland seal exhauster and mechanical vaccuum pump and discharges them via a stack to the atmosphere. <

i l -. . In case of breaks, the offgas system can be isolateu by isolation valves inside the reactor building. The ! licensee has analyzed the radiological consequences of failure of the off-gas treatment system. The results of this analysis yield doses well below 10 CFR 100 limits.

5 In our judgement, failure of the gaseous radwaste systems will not result in significat radiological consequences.

2. Liquid and Solid Radwaste Systems The liquid and solid radwaste systems are loca'ted in

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two radwaste buildings. These radwaste buildings are constructed of metal siding and would b.e vulnerable to a tornado. Although the liquid and solid radwaste ' ~ systems are not identified in'the'Appendii to Reg Guide 1.117. we believe it is noteworthy that these systems could produce a radiological consequence given a torn' ado event. We conclude that the liquid, 'and solid radwaste systems are unprotected against the effects of tornado missiles }V. CONCLUSIONS Based upon our evaluation of the infonnation provided by the licensee, we conclude that the following portions of the Oyster Creek are adequately ~ protected from the effects of tornado missiles:

1. Reactor coolant pressure boudary;

2. Reactor and individual fuel assemblies located within the core;

3. Automatic pressure relief system; '

4. ~ Feedwater coolant injection system

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5. Low pressure coolant injection / containment spray system;

6. Safe shutdown cables (control room, cable vault, reactor buildings;  ;

7. Spent fuel pool;

8. Emergency power system switchgear

9. Station batteries

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I 10. Spent fue'l pool cooling system; .

11. Reactor building closed cooling water system;

12. Reactivity control system; ,

    -        13. Control room; and        '

14. Space coolers ,

            .15. Offgas Treatnent Systen

16. Reactor Building Exhaust System Therefore, the above features meet the requirements of General Design Critera 2 and 4 with respect to missiles and environmental effects.

Ibwever, we have concluded that Dyster Creek does'not meet the current criteria for tornado missile protection in the following areas:-

1. Condensate storage tank;

2. Torus water storage tank; l 3. Service water and emergency service water pumps;

4. Buergency diesel generators and fuel oil day tank;

5. Control room, reactor building and turbine building HVAC system;

5. Radwaste treatment buildings

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The need for providing additional tornado missile protection to these systems should be evaluated during the integrated assessment of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant. 4 F}}