ML20198B212

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Advises of Planned Insp Efforts Resulting from Licensee Irpm Review.Historical Listing of Plant Issues & Details of Insp Plan for Next 6 Months Encl
ML20198B212
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 12/09/1998
From: Eselgroth P
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To: Roche M
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
References
NUDOCS 9812180107
Download: ML20198B212 (15)


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1 December 9,1998 l

Mr. Michael B. Roche Vice Fresident and Director  !

GPU Nuclear, Inc.

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station P.O. Box 388 l Forked River, New Jersey 08731

SUBJECT:

Mid-Year Inspection Resource Planning Meeting - OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR l GENERATING STATION l

Dear Mr. Roche:

1 l

On November 10,1998, the NRC staff held an inspection resource planning meeting 3 (IRPM). The IRPM provided a coordinated mechanism for Region I to adjust inspection schedules, as needed, prior to the conclusion of the Plant Performance Review cycle in May 1999.

Enclosure 1 contains a historicallisting of plant issues, referred to as the Plant issues )

Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this IRPM process to arrive at an integrated view  ;

of licensee perfonnance trends. The PIM includes only items from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and GPU Nuclear, Inc.. The IRPM may also have considered some predecisional and draft material that does not appear in the attached PIM, including observations from events and inspections that had occurred since the last NRC inspection report was issued, but had not yet received full review and consideration. This material will be placed in the Public Document Room as part of the normal issuance of NRC inspection reports and other correspondence.

This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the Oyster Creek

.o Nuclear Generating Station IRPM review. It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite. Enclosure 2 details our inspection plan for the next 6 months. Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.

We will inform you of any changes to the inspection plan. If you have any questions, please contact me at (610) 337-5234.

Sincerely, Original Signed By:

Peter W. Eselgroth, Chief f 9812180107 981209 Reactor Projects Branch 7 PDR ADOCK 05000219 ...

O PDR Division of Reactor Proj.ects j

.1 O O v ~ s Docket Nos. 50-219

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Enclosures:

1) Plant issues Matrix
2) Inspection Plan t , _

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, Mr. Michael B. Roche : 2 l-o L

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M. Laggart, Manager, Licensing and Vendor Audits

G. Busch, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing

, - State of New Jersey 1

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i Mr. Michael' B. Roche 3 '

' Distribution w/ encl:

Region i Docket Room (with concurrences)

  • Nuclear Safety information Center (NSIC) - ,

PUBLIC .

' NRC Resident inspector

  • H. Miller, RA/W. 'Axelson, DRA P. Eselgroth,- DRP N. Perry, DRP <

C.- O'Daniell, DRP M.- Oprendek, DRP DRS Director, Region i DRS Deputy Director, Region i Distribution w/enci (VIA E-MAIL): l B. McCabe, OEDO'

. C. Thomas, PD1-3, NRR R. Eaton, PD1-3, NRR

.T. Colburn, FDI-3, NRR -

R. Correia, NRR DOCDESK Inspection Program Branch, NRR (IPAS) l l

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. To receive a copy of this' document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment / enclosure "N"= ,

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, NAME.. NPerry/gf PE!GSWRth DATE. 12/09/98 ' 12/1/98 12/ /98 12/ /98 12/ /98

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OYSTER CREEK PLANT ISSUES MATRIX -

Date I Code g,g Type Source g M , Hem Desc@on 8/26/98 Positive IR 98-05 N 1-OPS 1A Control room operators responded appropriately to a failure of a containment isolation valve to 613 3A fully stroke while isolating the reactor water cleanup system on two occasions. The chemistry SA department provided good support to evaluate chemistry parameter action levels and to provide recommendations conceming continued operation without the reactor water cleanup systec..

8/26/98 Positive IR 98-05 N 1-OPS 1A Operators demonstrated good technical specification (TS) awareness, property documented 612 3A applicable limiting conditions for operation, and met all TS requiremen's curing periods of diesel inoperability.

8/26/98 Positive IR 98-05 N 1-OPS SA The Independent Onsite Safety Review Groun conducted a thorough Technical Specification 611 review, identified sevt ral value-added improvements, and promptly initiated corrective actions.

8/26/98 Positive IR 98-05 N 1-OPS SA The General 05ca Review Board demonstrated a good safety focus and promptly engaged the 610 at:hs correction action process to address their safety concems.

8/26/98 Positive IR 98-05 N i-OPS 3A Operations properly planned and effectively implemented a transition to a new electron:c control 609 room narrative log format.

8/26/98 Positive IR 98-05 N 1-OPS 1A Operations conducted safe and high quality fuel handling activities in preparation for the refueling 608 3A outage. In addition, management provided good oversight.

7/17/98 Positive IR 98-03 N 1-OPS 18 Control room operators responded promptly and appropriately following a reactor feedwater pump 592 trip while operating at full reactor power.

7/17/98 Positive IR 98-03 N 1-OPS SA General Office Review Board members constructively evaluated station activities and asked 591 probing questions focused on plant safety.

7/17/98 Negative IR 98-03 N 1-OPS 3B Senior reactor operators continued to demonstrate a knowledge weakness relative to technical 590 SC specification requirements for offsite power sources. Operations management initiated action to address this deficiency.

7/17/98 Negative IR 98-03 N 1-OPS 3A Senior reactor operators demonstrated good critical self-assessment when they identified that they 589 5A had inadvertently entered a 30-hour shutdown limiting condition for operation while conducting a containment spray surveillance with the redundant train's emergency diesel out of service. Senior reactor operators and reactor operators did not demonstrate good technical specification awareness as they missed opportunities to prevent the occurrence prior to commencing the surveillance. Operations initiated prompt corrective actions to address this deficiency.

1 of 12

OYSTER CREEK PLANT ISSUES MATRIX -

Date I Code .

  • *"* FA item Description Rec # D ,

7/17/98 Positive IR 98-03 N 1-OPS SA An operations training instructor demonstrated a goed questioning attitude in identifying a potential 588 SC operability concern involving the control rod drive (CRD) pump breakers. Operations and maintenance responded promptly to ensure that the CRD pump breakers would perform as designed.

7/17/98 Positive IR 98-03 N 1-OPS SA Operations demonstrated good awareness to minimize unmonitored releases by identifying and 587 documenting a degraded condition in the EF 1-6 Reactor Building Ventilation fan housing. Minor discrepancies were appropriately addressed.

6/3/98 Positive IR 98-02 N 1-OPS SA The management team effectively implemented the new corrective action process (CAP) and 575 5B affected a smooth transition to the CAP system. Plant personnel initiated CAPS at a low threshold and operations promptly reviewed the CAPS to assess plant impact. The multi-disciplined Management Review Team engaged in active discussions conceming operability, reportability, and safety significance and initiated appropriate corrective actions.

6/3/98 Positive IR 98-02 N 1-OPS SA Nuclear Safety Assessment conducted safety-focused and performance-based quality assurance 574 assessments. Assessments provided timely, critical, value-added insight of station performance to plant management. Nuclear Safety Assessment appropriately used the corrective action process to address identified deficiencies.

6/3/98 Negative IR 98-02 N 1-OPS 3B Senior reactor operators did not demonstrate a high level of knowledge conceming fire protection 573 3A program requirements goveming the redundant fire pump. Operators did not exercise a questioning attitude and did not ensure adequate fire protection system availability prior to removing a diesel-driven fire pump from service.

6/3/98 Negative IR 98-02 N 1-OPS 1A Operators did not use a questioning attitude to identify several operating procedure deficiencies.

572 3A Once identified, operators effectively used the corrective action process to address the SC deficiencies.

6/3/98 Negative IR 96-02 N 1-OPS 1A Senior reactor operators did not demonstrate a good awareness conceming technical specification 571 limiting conditions for operation while shutdown.

6/3/98 Positive IR 98-02 N 1-OPS 1B Operators responded appropriately to a reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) high 570 SA temperature condition that resulted in a water hammer in the RBCCW system. Operations management demonstrated a good safety focus and corrective action commitment in identifying several process weaknesses that contributed to the occurrence.

6/3/98 Positive IR 98-02 N 1-OPS 1B Operators responded promptly and appropriately to an off-site induced electrical transient.

569 Senior reactor operators demonstrated good command and control and effectively controlled recovery actions.

2 of 12

OYSTER CREEK PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date I Code .

item Description Type Source y SFA Rec # ,

4/2/98 Positive IR 98-80 N 1-OPS SA Deviation Reports (DVR) reflected appropriate operability determinations, and management 553 5B attention necessary to identify causes and put into place effective corrective actions. The 3B Corrective Action training process was acceptable and staff members were generally knowledgeable of the corrective action process. The trending of DVRs was adequate and provided meaningful information to management. Although not all management expectations were met conceming the program issues, industry operating experience was adequately used at the plant.

4/2/98 Positive IR 98-80 N 1-OPS SC The assessments and evaluations of the independent Safety Oversight Review Group, the 552 3A General Office Review Group, and Nuclear Safety Assessment staff were effective in providing 3C independent oversight of safety significant activities. The experience of the Independent Safety Oversight members, both industry-wide and site-specific, was a significant comributor to the value of their products. Management appeared to be full supportive of the oversight groups and were responsive to their recommendations.

4/2/98 Positive IR 98-80 N 1-OPS SC The conective action and safety review audits were of high quality. Audit findings received 551 3A appropriate division management attention. The May 1997 safety review process assessment 3C was self-critical and probing. The NSA audit and assessment reports were effective in providing GPU Nuclear management independent identification of significant findings and appropriate recommendations for process improvements.

8/26/98 Positive IR 98-05 N 2- 3A Maintenance properly planned and effectively controlled a diesel generator battery replacement.

616 MAINT SA Maintenance demonstrated a good safety focus in conducting increased monitoring following SC battery replacement and identified an apparent degraded condition on one of the battery cells.

Maintenance took prompt and appropriate corrective action to address the condition.

8/26/98 Positive IR 98-05 N 2- 3A Maintenance performed thorough and well documented troubleshooting following two trips of the 615 MAINT SB 'B' reactor recirculation pump.

8/26/98 Positive IR 98-05 N 2- 3A Planning performed a thorough risk ana?ysis and appropriately adjusted the work week schedule to 614 MAINT support an emergent emergency service water (ESW) pump replacement. Maintenance activities were well-controlled and property documented.  ;

7/17/98 Positive IR 98-03 N 2- 3A Maintenance management demonstrated a commitment to quality through their recognition and 596 MAINT SC corrective measures to address an adverse condition involving job order closeout timeliness.

7/17/98 Negative IR 98-03 N 2- 3A Management did not demonstrate a good safety focus in that they failed to resolve the post 595 MAINT SC maintenance test requirement for a safety-related battery charger in a timely manner.

3 of 12

OYSTER CREEK PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date I Code .

WPe So m y M Itern Description Rec # ,

7/17/98 Positive IR 98-03 N 2- 3A Maintenance, engineering, and operations effectively coordinated to methodically troubleshoot, 594 MAINT 5B evaluate and affect temporary repair to the 'A' feedwater pump 4Kv cable. Permanent corrective SC actions were taken for the recirculation pump undervoltage relay cards. Management provided good aversight of these activities.

7/17/98 Positive IR 98-03 N 2- 3B The ISI program was properly implemented and controlled. The ISI personnel were properly 593 MAINT 4C qualified and knowledgeable of ISI and ASME Code reouirements. The documentation supporting the program and ISI examination was satisfactory and readily available. Observations, indications and the resolutions had been clearly documented, and the results were reviewed and accepted by NDE Level 111 examiners.

6/3/98 Positive IR 98-02 N 2- 3A Maintenance demonstrated effective pr3-job planning, proper work control, and good radiological 578 MAINT worker practices in the conduct of electromatic relief valve pilot valve assembly replacements.

6/3/98 Negative IR 98-02 N 2- 2B Maintenance did not effectively control preventive maintenance (PM) planning and execution 577 MAINT SC which contributed to the PM backlog growth. Management initiated corrective actions to review and address PM program weaknesses.

6/3/98 Negative IR 98-02 N 2- 2A Maintenance ayowed a redundant temperature indicator in the RBCCW system to remain 576 MAINT SB inoperable for a prolongcd duration which adversely affected plant operations.

4/2/98 Positive IR 98-80 N 2- 4A The Containment Spray System (SS) and Emergency Service Water System (ESWS) were 554 MAINT 2B maintained operable and capable of performing their safety functions including during a loss of 3A offsite power and a single active failure. Surveillance testing of system components were conducted in accordance with existing procedures. The CSS and ESWS instruments were properly calibrated and maintained.

8/26/98 NCV IR 98-05 N 3-ENG 4B Engineering demonstrated a good questioning attitude in identifying and documenting a diesel 621 Positive NCV 98-05-02 SA generator switchgear seismic nonconformance. Engineering led the efforts to disposition SB operability issues, analyze and resolve the nonconformance, address reportabihty, and implement SC appropriate corrective actions. (Enforcement Discretion exercised per Vll.B.1 Of the Enforcement Policy.)

8/26/98 Positive IR 98-05 N 3-ENG 4B Engineering demonstrated good involvement in eva.aating a problem with a reactor water cleanup 620 SB isolation valve. Engineering root cause evaluation continued at the end of the report period. (URI 98-05-01)  ;

8/26/98 Positive IR 98-05 N 3-ENG 4B Engineering led a well-controlled and effectively coordinated troubleshooting effort to evaluate a 619 SB main condenser degraded vacuum condition.

4 of 12

OYSTER CREEK PLANT ISSUES MATRIX -

Date I Code Rec # *"* Des @ on D s 8/26/98 Positive IR 98-05 N 3-ENG 4B Engineering provided good support and evaluation of the data, following troubleshooting of the 'B' 618 SB reactor recirculation pump trips.

8/26/98 Positive IR 98-05 N 3-ENG 3A The ESW system engineer demonstrated good system ownership anc. .ed the efforts to promptly 617 SC address degraded performance on an ESW pump.

7/17/98 NCV IR 98-03 L 3-ENG SA Engineering properly identified, doct.mented, evaluated, and reported a fire protection duct 600 Positive NCV 98-03-02 5B detector test deficiency. Engineering took prompt and appropriate corrective actions to address SC this deficiency. (Enforcement Discretion exercised per Vll.B.1 Of the Enforcement Policy.)

7/17/98 Positive IR 98-03 N 3-ENG 3A The Maintenance Rule Coordinator performed a high-quality, value-added, and thorough periodic 599 SA assessment of maintenance program effectiveness. In addition, the Coordinator demonstrated a good safety focus in identifying negative trends involving power cable failures and material control issues and initiated corrective action via the approved process.

7/17/98 Positive IR 98-03 N 3-ENG 3A The Operating Experience Coordinator and Core Engineering demonstrated a good safety 598 SB perspective in promptly evaluating an industry concem involving potential fuel channel bowing to ensure that Oyster Creek took appropriate and timely corrective actions.

7/17/98 VIO IR 98-03 N 3-ENG SA Maintenance and engineering identified the root cause of emergency diesel generator 2's failure to 597 VIO 98-03-01 5B start. In addition, they adequately determined the most probable cause of emergency diesel generator 1's failure to start. During troubleshooting activities, maintenance and system engineers failed to exercise a questioning attitude with regards to an installed jumper on a replacement starter and failed to comply with the receipt deficiency reporting requirements. (Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XV) 7/2/98 Positive IR 98-07 N 3-ENG SA GPUN conducted a thorough and self-critical assessment of the Oyster Creek GL 89-10 MOV 586 58 program. Deficiencies identified by the self-assessment team were addressed adequately.

SC 7/2/98 Negative IR 98-07 N 3-ENG 4C in evaluating the operaoility of containment spray valves V-21-5 and V-21-11, GPUN used an 585 inadequately validated method to reduce perceived conservativisms in the Electric Power Research Institute MOV Performance Prediction Methodology. However, the licensee adequately l justified current MOV functionality by other means. j l

5 of 12

OYSTER CREEK PLANT ISSUES MATRIX liate Source i

M Code Itern Description y,y Type g ,

7/2/98 Negative IR 98-07 N 3-ENG 2A Although action plans were tracked and scheduled, the licensee had not yet adequately venfied 584 4B the design basis capability of approximately two-thirds of the valves in its GL 89-10 program. This included all of the twelve risk-significant high energy line break isolation valves at Oyster Creek.

However, current MOV functionality is acceptable, based on independent evaluation of industry data. GPUN performed acceptable technical evaluations of load sensitive behavior, stem friction coefficient, and dynamic unwedging thrust requirements.

6/3/98 NCV IR 98-02 L 3-ENG 4A Equipment reliability engineering demonstrated a good design basis awareness in identifying and 580 Positive NCV 98-02-02 SC documenting a degraded condition involving Old Radioactive Waste building ventilation.

Management promptly initiated actions to restore operability, address reportability, and implement appropriate corrective measures.

6/3/98 NCV IR 98-02 L 3-ENG 4A Structural engineering conducted a thorough review of the shutdown cooling piping design basis 579 Positive NCV 98-02-01 SC and identified that several pipe supports did not meet design basis requirements. Engineering appropriately dispositioned operability, addressed reportability, and initiated appropriate corrective actions.

4/2/98 eel IR 98-80 N 3-ENG 4A Engineering failed to verify that the field installation of the EMRV solenoid voltage was 567 eel 98-80-03 4C representative of the EQ documentation as required by 10 CFR 50.49, Environmental SC Qualification. Further, when the NRC identified discrepancies with the EQ program, GPUN was untimely at performing the program required determination of operability. (Apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.49.)

4/2/98 VIO IR 98-80 N 3-ENG 4A Engineering did not establish adequate methods to ensure compliance with some Tec.hnical 566 VIO 98-80-01 4B Specification requirements associated with the ADS. While the ADS functionahty was not affected, 4C an instance that resulted in a violation r< fechnical Specification was identified. The instance involved the failure, on October 6,1996, to perform the required High Drywell Pressure Channel Check in accordance with TS 4.1.1, '.o ensure the ADS was operable during the reactor pressure vessel test as required by Teciscal Specification 3.4.B.1, ADS. (Violation of TS 3.4.B.1) 4/2/98 Negative IR 98-80 N 3-ENG 4A While initial conditions and the basis for some assumptions were not always obvious, calculations 565 4B and safety analysis adeauately supported implemented CSS and ESWS modifications. The team SC identified that some pertinent design information in the UFSAR required updating. The licensee was aware of this and already had efforts ongoing to update the UFSAR. However, with regard to the resolution of seismic deficiencies, there was unt;mely follow up and reporting to the NRC the status of SQUG outliers.

6 of 12

OYSTER CREEK PLANT ISSUES MATRIX -

Date I Code Rec #

D

  1. s ite Dsscription 4/2/98 Positive IR 98-80 N 3-ENG 4A Apart from EQ and available voltage issues, the ADS was maintained well. System modifications 564 4B were properly implemented. The discharge piping vacuum breakers were adequately tested to the 4C IST requirements and the acceptance criteria was consistent with the des;gn basis.

Instrumentation and control design for the ADS and pressure relief function was consistent with the design basis and licensing documents.

4/2/98 Positive IR 98-80 N 3-ENG 3B Overall, the quality of the 10 CFR 50.59 training program for certification of RTR and ISR was 563 3A excellent. The contents of the training were appropriate and supported the OCNGS review 4C process that is being implemented. Safety evaluations were prapared and reviewed by individuals who had received trair:ing regarding the preparation and review of SEs in accordance with the facility procedure.

4/2/98 eel IR 98-80 N 3-ENG 4A Engineering failed to establish adequate design control measures to verify or check the adequacy 562 eel 98-80-02 4B of design voltage required for the ADS EMRV solenoid valves as required by 10 CFR 50, 4C Appendix B, criterion lil, Design Control. (Apparent violation of 10CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterbn 111.)

4/2/98 eel IR 98-80 N 3-ENG 4A Failure to maintain ADS operable as of March 19,1938, as required by Technical Specification 561 eel 98-80-04 4B 3.4.B.1, ADS. (Apparent violation of TS 3.4.B.1.)

4C 4/2/98 VIO IR 98-80 N 3-ENG 3A Engineering failed to comply witn their procedure for Safety Evaluations on several occasions as 560 VIO 98-80-05 4C required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, instructions, Procedures, and Drawings. (This is a Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.)

4/2/98 VIO IR 98-80 N 3-ENG 3A Engineering failed to submit the required changes, test, and experiments reports in 1983,1986, 559 VIO 98-80-07 4A and 1998 as required by 10 CFR 50.59(b) and 10 CFR 50.71(e). (This is a violation of 10 CFR 4C 50.59(b) and 50.71(e).)

4/2/98 Positive IR 98-80 N 3-ENG 4A 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations (SEs) were of good quality and performed in accordance with 558 3B the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 and the applicable procedures by qualified and certified 3A personnel. However, some SEs exhibited a lack of thoroughness and attention to detail that was expected by the facility procedures.

4/2/98 Positive IR 98-80 N 3-ENG 4C in the 10 CFR 50.59 program area, procedures were found to be comprehensive and detailed in 557 providing guidance and assigning responsibility for implementing the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 and updating the UFSAR. The procedures were also up to date in incorporating revised industry and NRC 10 CFR 50.59 guidance and GPUN self assessment findings.

7 of 12

OYSTER CREEK PLANT ISSUES MATRIX Date I Code item Description

      • D Rec # s 4/2/98 VIO IR 98-80 N 3-ENG 4A Engineering failed to verify design calculations that supported the seismic adequacy of safety 556 VIO 98-80-05 4B related equipment as required by procedure 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, 4C Procedures, and Drawings. (This is a violation of 10CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteron V.)

4/2/98 VIO IR 98-80 N 3-ENG 4A Engineering failed to adequately correct a seismic deficiency with a containment spray heat 555 VIO 98-80-06 4C exchanger as of February 26,1998, as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, SC Corrective Actions. (This is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.)

8/26/98 Negative IR 98-05 N 4-PS 3A The annual review of the radiation protection program was adequate. Weakness in the scope and 626 depth of the summary self-assessment for 1997 was noted; however, the sum total of se!f-  ;

assessments and safety assessments met the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1101.

8/26/98 Positive IR 98-05 N 4-PS 3B The presentation of continuing training to radiation protection technicians was appropriate with 625 regard to scope and depth of presentation for two classes reviewed during the inspection period.

8/26/98 Positive IR 98-05 N 4-PS 3A Appropriate controls for high, hcked high and very high radiation areas were established. Control 624 of radiological work for the shipnient of a radwaste liner, receipt of radioactive materials (new fuel),

and spent fuel pool work were also effective.

8/26/98 Negative IR 98-05 N 4-PS 4C The licensee established an adequate program for the sampling, analysis and assessment of 623 personnel exposure to airbome radionuclides. A programmatic weakness was identified regarding the lack of reverification of the basis documents for this area since 1993. (IFl 98-05-03) 8/26/98 Positive IR 98-05 N 4-PS 3A Radiological controls effectively supported refueling activities. In addition, management provided 622 a good oversight.

7/17/98 Positive IR 98-03 N 4-PS 3A The licensee met their notification requirements in response te the turbine generator ewiter fire on 607 August 1,1997.

7/17/98 Positive IR 98-03 N 4-PS 3A The response to the fire in the 'A' motor generator set, on June 27,1997, was appropriate and the 606 fire bumed for sess than ten minutes. The fire brigade response to the fire was enhanced by improvements to the fire brigade tumout area.

7/17/98 VIO IR 98-03 N 4-PS 2A The licensee failed to maintain adequate communications capability for fire fighting and safe 605 VIO 98-03-04 5C shutdown activities during the turbine generator exciter fire on August 1,1997. (Violation of Fire Protection License Concition 2.C.3) 7/17/98 Negitive IR 98-03 N 4-PS 3B Operations displayed a weakness with regard to the manual operation of fire suppression systems.

604 The specific cause of the main generator exciter fire was unrelated to the other fire events during the period.

8 of 12

OYSTER CREEK PLANT ISSUES MATRIX y Type Source f SFA

  1. f item Description 7/17/98 VIO IR 98-03 N 4-PS 3A The licensee failed to provide adequate fire watches when the fixed CO2 fire protection systeni 603 VIO 98 was disabled. (Violation of Fire Protection License Condition 2.C.3) 03b 7/17/98 ViO IR 98-03 N 4-PS 3A A fire watch failed to conduct an adequate watch tumover. (Violation of Fire Protection License 602 VIO 98 Condition 2.C.3) 03a 7/17/98 Positive IR 98-03 N 4-PS 3A The fire brigade response to a fire drill scenario met the drd! objectives end the fire brigade leader 601 executed effective command and control of the brigade.

6/3/98 VIO IR 98-02 N 4-PS 1C The licensee was conducting its security and safeguards activities in a manner that protected 583 VIO 98-02-03 public health and safety. Security personnel maintained an effective security program and management competently administered the program. The licensee met their cs.mitments and NRC requirements, with the exception of the performance of the required backg aund checks of the Fitness-For-Duty (FFD) personnel. Security personnel failed to perform background checks on the personnel administering the FFD program at least once every 3 years, as required by 10 CFR

26. (Violation of 10 CFR 26. Appendix A, Section 2.3(2))

6/3/98 Negative IR 98-02 N 4-PS SC The licensee's pursuit of corrective actions, related to identified EP problems, is inconsistent, as 582 evidenced by the aggressive pursuit of corrective actions for some ider.tified problems and slow pursuit of corrective actions for other equally significant problems.

6/3/98 MISC IR 98-02 N 4-PS 2B Despite some minor discrepancies in the surveillance procedures, the major licensee emergency 681 response facilities were adequately maintained. The existence of discrepancies in two surveillance procedures warrants additional oversight by the emergency preparedness (EP) organization of the surveillance activities performed by other licensee organizations.

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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN PIM TABLE ADS Automatic Depressurization System ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achieveable AOG Augumented Off Gas CSS Containment Spray System DVR Deviation Report EMRV Electromatic Relief Valve EQ Environmental Qualifications ESWS Emergency Servic e Water System GPU General Public Utilities IR inspection Report ISR independent Safety Review IST In-Service Testing MDRG Multi-displinary Review Group NRW New Rad Waste NSA Nuclear Safety Assessment OCNGS Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station RMS Radiation Monitoring System RTR Responsible Technical Reviewer SEs Safety Evaluations TS Techncial Specification UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report 10 of 12

J GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PIM TABLE COLUMNS The actual date of an event or significant issue for those items that have a clear date of occurrence (mainly LERs), the date the source of the information i was issued (such as for EALs), or the last date of the inspechon period (for irs).  ;

Type The categorization of the item or finding - see the Type / Findings Type Code table, below.

Source The document that describes the findings: LER for Licensee Event Repotts, EAL for Enforcement Action Letters, or IR for NRC Inspection Reports. >

ID Identification of who discovered issue: N for NRC; L for Licensee; or S for Self Identifying (events).

SFA SALP Functional Area Codes: OPS for Operations; MAINT for Maintenance; ENG for Engineering; and PS for Plant Support. ,

i Code Template Code - see table below.  !

"s of NRC findings on LERs that have safety significance (as stated in irs), findings described in IR Executive Summaries, and amplifying infonnation item Description  ;

conta.ined in EALs. ,

i i

TYPE I FINDINGS CODES TEMPLATE CODES ED Enforcement Discretion - No Civil Penalty 1 Operational Performance: A - Normal Operations; B - Operations During Transients; and C - F% grams and Processes Strength Overall Strong Licensee Performance Wcakness OverallWeak Licensee Performance 2 M<erial Condition: A- Equipment Condition or B - Programs and Processes eel

  • Escalated Enforcement item -Waiting Final NRC Action 3 Human Performance: A - Work Performance; B - Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities /

" "9 -

VIO Violation Level I,11,111, or IV 4 Engineering / Design: A - Design; B - Engineering Support; C - Programs and Processes

NCV Non-Cited Violation DEV Deviation from Licensee Commitment to NRC 5 Problem identification and Resolution
A-Identification; B - Analysis; and C - Resolution Positive individual Good Inspection Finding NOTES:

Negative Individual Poor Inspection Finding Eels are apparent violations of NRC requirements that are bemg considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and LER Licensee Event Report to the NRC Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action'(Enforcement Policy). NUREG-1600.

However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues URI" Unresolved item from Inspection Report identified by the Eels and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are Licensing Licensing issue from NRR made. Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, the licensee will be provided with an opportunity to either (1) respond to the apparent violation or (2) request a MISC Miscellaneous - Emergency Preparedness Finding (EP)- predecisional enforcement conference.

Declared Emergency, Nonconformance issue, etc. The type of all MISC findings are to be put in the item " URis are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine Description column. whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modtfied when the final conclusions are made.

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Enclosure 2 ,

OYSTER CREEK INSPECTION PLAN FOR DECEMBER 1998 THROUGH MAY 1999 Inspection No. Program Area / Title Planned Dates ,

Type Licensee Self-Assessment Related to Area-of-Emphasis IP 40501 12/14/1998 3 RI inspections IP 83728 Maintaining Occupational Exposures ALARA 1/25/1999 1 Rl Radioactive Waste Treatment, and Effluent and

  • IP 84750 2/1/1999 1 Core Environmental Monitoring - Environmental IP 62706 Maintenance Rule inspection Procedure - Follow-up 2/1/1999 1 OA  !

IP 86750

  • * * " 9 " * ""I "" '""*P'*" "

05/10/99 1 Core Radioactive Matenal -

t Legend:

IP -

Inspection Procedure Number Ti -

Temporary Instruction Program / Sequence Number Core - Minimum NRC Inspection Program (mandatory at all plants)

OA -

Other Inspection Activity RI -

Additional Inspection Effort Planned by Region i Si -

Safety initiative inspection 12 of 12

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