ML20004D122

Forwards Matl in Response to Request by Containment Sys Branch for Completion of Input to Ser.Matl Will Be Included in Amend 19 to FSAR

ML20004D122
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	06/04/1981
From:	Maurin L LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
W3P81-1318, NUDOCS 8106080417
Download: ML20004D122 (21)

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1 142 DELARONDE STREET P O W E R & i. I G H T[ P O BOX 6008

• NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA 70174 * (504) 366-2345 g g UTiutiES SYSTEM JUN 4 1981 W3P81-1318 3-Tl Q-3-A29.18.19 Mr. Robert L. Tedesco Assistant Director for Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT:

Waterford Steam Electric Station. Unit-3 Docket No. 50-382 Containment Systems Branch (CSB)

Dear Mr. Tedesco:

Please find enclosed material requested by the CSB needed to complete their input to the Waterford Safety Evaluation Report. This material will be included in Amendment 19 to the Waterford FSAR, presently scheduled for submittal by early June.

Very truly yours, l$clu L. V. Maurin Assistant Vice-President Nuclear Operations \'  %

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WSES-FSAR-UNIT 3 Containment Hydrogen Monitor 14 See revised FSAR Subsection 6.2.5.1.

Containment Pressure Monitor Response 17 Waterford-3 will comply with this requirement.

A continuous recording of containment wide range (0-200 psia) pressure will be provided in the control room. This recorded range will be greater than four times the design pressure of Waterford-3's steel containment.

Containment wide range pressure monitoring instrumentation will consist of 2 redundant Class IE channels. Esch channel will consist of a pr essure t ransmitter, physically mounted outside the containment buildit.g. The pressure transmitter output signal will be processed by a procees analog 17 control system (PAC) which in turn will furnish signals for the recorder in the main control room and the plant conputer. Re entire range af 0-200 psia will be recorded by ona pen of the recorder and a visual indicator is part of the recorder.

Qualification is in accordance with the qualification criteria f or Class IE t ransmitters located outside the containment building.l sE F, INS CIT Ml 15 Containment Water Level Monitor

Response

Waterford-3 will comply with this requireitent. I Two redundant Class IE channels of instrumentation will be provided to monitor containment surp level (narrow range). Each channel of instrumentation will consist of the following:

SE E WSE:RT Bl a) A level transmitter with a range of 0 - 30', located inside the containment sump. The total depth of the containment sump is 29.5'. he 17 measurement will be taken from 0.5' from the bottom of the sump to 30.5',

thus, total range wit.1 be 0 to 30'.

b) A process analog cor. trol system (PAC) to monitor level transmittal signal and to develop output signals to the plant computer and recorder.

c) A recorder / indicator, mounted on the main control board, for registering the containment sump level.

Two redundant Class IE channels of instrumentation will be provided to monitor containment Each channel of instrumentation will ficod consist of the level (wide following: range).k SE E INSERT C Technical Specification revisions, as appropriate, reflect ing Waterford-3's 18 compliance to this requirement will be developed and submitted approximately six months prior to scheduled Operating License.

1.9-35f Amendment No. 18, (5/81)

REVISIONS TO FSAR SECTION 1.9.29 INSERT A The Containment pressure transmitters will meet the requirements of Appendix B to NUREG-0737.

INSERT Q_

The narrow range monitcrs will meet the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.89.

INSERT C The wide range monitors will meet the requirements of Appendix B to NUREG-0737.

INSERT D This level is calculated asr;uming that 100 percent of the refueling storage water poal volume (600,000 gallons), four safety injection tanks (56,000 gallons) and 100 percent of the Reactor Coolant System empty into the containment.

INSERT E The accuracy of both the narrow and wide range containment water level monitors, from transmitter to indicator / recorder is + 4 percent of calibrated range.

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-' TABLE 6.2-2 l

CALCULATED VALUES FOR CONTAINMENT PARAMETERS Parameter Design Basis Accident Calculated Value 2

Peak Containment Atmosphere 9.82 ft DESLS 43.1 psig Pressure (LOCA) (max. .

. 9.82 ftSj)ESLS D 43.2 psig ' ,f (min. SI) 2 2

Peak Pressure (MSLB) 7.4765 ft MSLB, 75% 43.76 psig  !

Power, Containment *!

Cooling Train Failure j Peak Containment , 9.82 ft2 DESLS 268.7 F Atmosphere Temperature (max. S .N (LOCA) 9.82 ft{)DESLS 269.3 F j 4 m (min. SI) ij 2

Peak Temperature (MSLB) 7.87 ft MSLB, 413.5 F 102% Power, I, Containment Cooling l' Train Failure Peak Subcompartment 6

_/ Pressure Reactor Cavity 350 in DLS 130.3 paid 2

Steam Generator 592 in SLG 21.9 paid

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Pressurizer Double Ended Surge 6.4 psi? 17 k Line Guillotine I External Pressure Containment Inadvertent operation 0.33 paid i of the Containment i Heat Removal System I 2

Shield Building Inadvertent operation 6 paid jl of the Containment I Heat Removal System T L

i Minimum Pressure DEDLG See Subsection l 6.2.1.5  ;

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6.2-96 Amendment No. 17, (4/81)

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. . 'l WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 i TABLE 6.2-3 O l g i PRINCIPAL CONTAINMENT DESIGN PARAMETERS Parameter Design Margih.

Containment .j

- Internal . design pressure, psig (LOCA) 44.0 1.9%

. (MSLB) 44.0 0.55% ,

-- - - External design pressure, paid 0.65 97%

Net free volume, 100 ft3 2.677 Not applicable ,

Design leak rate, percent free volume 0.5 Not applicable per day at 44,0 psig .

Shield Building External design pressure, psig 3.0 M 2 Subcompartments Reactor cavity design wall ioading, paid 240.0 84% i 2 '

O: Steam generator compartment design wall 55.5 153%

V loading, paid i Pressurizer compartment design wall 10.0 56.25%

loading, paid 17 NOTES:

(1) Margin (%) = 100 design value peak calculated value peak calculated value i 1

Actual margin, i.e. the margin between design values and peak ' cal-culated values when using realistic or median parameter values would i be much larger. l l3 i

6 2-97 Amendment No. 17, (4/81)

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TABLE 6.2-11 (Cont' d) -

Item Assumed Value Containment Vacuum Breakers (Cont'd)

Setpoint differential pressure to open Vacuum Breakers 0.3 paid g_

Delay time to start opening f Vacbum

• Breakers 1.0 sec. (0.25 sec. actual) 1 ,

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-- - - - - - - - . Vacuum Break System flow area 325 in 2

' 1 Loss coefficient 3.1 1 Shield Building -

., l Initial temperature, F 1 Initial pressure, psia -8.0Mn H 2O less than

% pressure 17 I -

Qcontainment t\

Relative humidit',c, 100 U q

l Net free volume (minimum), ft 550000 Passive heat sinks ignored for conservatism Ambient Atmosphere 17 Assumed pressure, psia 14.7 t

1 6.2-121 Amendment No. 17, (4/81) e

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P Ko / --- CONTAINMENT = 14.25 PSIA SHIELD BLDG = 13.9612 PSIA 0.1 -

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6.2.4.2.2 Instrument Lines The only fluid instrument lines penetrating containment are the containment vacuum relief pressure sensing lines through Penetrations 53 and 54 for redundant systems SA and SB respectively. Each penetration contains two inst 2.ument lines. One line senses differential pressure across the containment vessel and provides a signal to actuate the Vacuum Relief Valves; the other line monitors this differential pressure and provides an input to the plant computer. The actuation line is considered essential and is therefore provided with an excess flow check valve as recommended by Regulatory Guide 1.11. The monitoring line is provided with an excess flow check valve and will be provided with a solenoid operated valve, closed on a containment isolation signal.

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WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 1

, valve located inside the containment upstream of the header. System actu-

{- ation, including the isolation valves, can be initiated from the remote control panel within 30 minutes following a LOCA.

18 The remote panel location (main control room) is accessible during the postulated LOCA.

In the Hydrogen Analyzer System, the sample is dehumidified to avoid con-densation in the detector, analyzed, recorded and returned to the contain-ment when sampling is completed at one point. An automatic sequencer closes the. sampling valve and opens the next sampling valve to begin measuring hydrogen concentration at the next sample location.

The hydrogen analyzer determines the percentage of hydrogen in the contain-ment and enables rate of change of hydrogen concentration calculations to be made.

Containment atmosphere hydrogen analysis can also be conducted via the grab sample cylinder. The latter is a manual operation and not remote manual like the hydrogen analyzer. The hydrogen analyzer is relied upon oss the primary means of sampling following a LOCA.

The hydrogen analyzer has a range of 0-10 percent hydrogen with an accuracy 14 of + 2.0 percent of full scale and a minimum sensitivity of 0.2 percent hyd7 ogen by volume. The hydrogen concentration is recorded during sampling and an alarm is actuated in the main control room if the concentration at any sample point exceeds three percent by volume.

Sample pumps, draw the sample through the cooler and sample cylinder or analyzer and return it to the containment. The pump has a rated capacity of 2.0 cfm and is capable of pumping the sample back into the containment following an accident 9

The isolation valves for the Hydrogen Analyzer System are normally locked '

closed. The Saf2ty Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) can be overridden for 9 analyzing after a LOCA.

The Hydrogen Analyzer System piping, from the sample points within the con-tainment, and piping returning the sample to the containment up to and in- 7 cluding all containment isolation valves are designed and fabricated in accordance with ASME Section III, Class 2 (1974) and N-Stamped. In accor-dance with Appendix 8 of NUREC-0737 and the intent of Regulatory Guide 18 1.97, the Hydrogen Analyzer System instrumentation and controls are Class IE and conform to IEEE 323-1971, IEEE 344-1975, and IEEE 279-1971. 7 6.2.5.2.2 Hydrogen Recombiner Subsystem The Hydrogen Recombiner System consists of two stationary thermal (electric) recombiners. Two recombiner units are located inside the containment on the operating floor at elevation +46 rt MSL. Each recombiner unit is provided vith a power supply located outside the containment in an area which is accessible following a LOCA. Operation of each unit is manually initiated at one day post LOCA from a control panel located in the main control room. The operation of one stationarv thermal unit processes 100 scfm of containment air,which is 6.2-73 Amendment No. 18, (5/81)

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9.4.5.8.2 System Description P00R BRl8IIM The system consists of two 100 parcent capacity exhaust fans (E-19), arranged in parallel, connected to a single duct system which penetratas the Shield Building and discharges into the stack. Componant design data are given in Table 9.4-20.

Tha operator salects the operating fan and the standby fan by means of switches in the main control room. The controls are arrangad so that neither fan een start until both Shield Butiding isolation vaivas (3ny-8175 and 3HV-8176) and inlet dampers D-24 are open. Initistion of tha fan start.ng  ;

segunoca first opans these valvas and dampers. The standby fan la automs- i tically started upon lose f air flow from the operating fan after a time t delay. An pressure alarm is provided in the main control room when the negative drops to less than 5 inches water gage.

A negative pressure of -8 in. WC is maintained in the annulus by the modu-Lation of daarar D-25, throughd ' ifferential pressure control.

Automatic fan inlet dampara and fan gravity discharge dampers permit fan isolation the for fan.

standby maintenanca purposes and prevent. air recirculation enrough j The system operates centinuously during normal operation until a SIAS closes the isolation tha respective valva valves causing shutdown of the system fans thuugh limit switches. .

I 9.4.5.8.3 Safaty Evaluation l'

The two Igalation valvas and interconnected piping penetrating the Shield  !

i Operationare Building of dasigned tha to safety class 3 and seismic Category I require.ments.

j remaining portion of the Annulus Negativa Prassure System serves no safety funceton and consequently is not danigned to safaty or setemic requiremants. Tha function thereafter. system la isolated by a CIAS or SIAS and serves no System radundancy is providad for tha fans which have. motora powered from saparate safety buses, trains A and B.

to either bus, tha fan is autcmatically triopad.If there is a loss During of offsite normal power ahutdown coincident with a Ic.s of offatta power, the control room operator can t

manually rastart the fans (rafer to Table d.3-1).

) When one system fan is shut

'ov.s due to powar failura and the power has baan c rastored to the division bus, tne operator muet manually restore powar to the nonsafety portion of the motor control center befora 1

the fan is restarted.-

9. 4. 5. 8.4 Inspection and Testing Raquirements Each to component of the Annulus Hagative Pressura System is inapected prior installation.

Tne components are accessible for pariodic inspection.

All snetrumentation and controls are tested and calibrated, fans era stati-colly and dynsmically balanced, ductwork is leak testad, and the system is balanced, adjusted, and tested for performance during preoperational testing. .

I 9.4-31

Question No.

480.23 A Technical Specification to maintain the Shield Building annulus pressure at the negative pressure assumed as the initial annulus pressure in the Shield Building annulus pressure analysis will be required as a limiting condition for operation.

Response _

See revised FSAR Subsection ] 6. 3. 6. 8.2 for this Technical Specification.

Also see revised Subsection 9.4.5.8.2 which indicates t'

a at an alarm is provided in the control room when the negative pra3sure in the annulus drops to less than -5 inches water gage.

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Question No.

480.36 Information provided in response to Question 022.9 regarding the containment leak testing program is deficient in the following respects:

a. No justification is given for Penetrations 53 and 54 (Instrument H&V) remaining fluid-filled (i.e., not being vented and drained) during

. Type A tests. Provide justification.

b. The justification given in Table 6.2-43 for not including Penetrations 53 and 54 in Type C lesk tests is inadequate. Show that containment isolation valves associated with these penetrations do not constitute potential centainment,

c. FSAR Subsection 6.2.6.3 does not provide evidence to show acceptability of testing the valves listed in Table 6.2-44 with pressure applied in the reverse direction. Provide evidence in the form of test results or design descriptions of

, the applicable valves.

Response

a. Penetrations 53 and 54 do not require venting or draining as they are constantly exposed to the containment atmosphere .

b. Penetrations 53 and 54 each contain two instru-ment lines. One senses differential pressure across the containment vessel and provides a signal to actuate the vacuum relief system; the other monitors this differential pressure and provides an input to the plant computer. The actuation line contains an excess flow check valve outside containment; the monitoring line has an excess flow check valve and will be provided

. with a solenoid operated valve, closed on a containment isolation signal. The excess of flow

f Q480.36 (cont' d) check valve is designed to close on excess flow and reopen when conditions return to a specified normal state. Both of these lines form a closed system outside containment, are seismically qualified and terminate in an area exhausted by the filters of Controlled Ventilation Area System. A Type C test is, there fore , not required or performed on these lines.

c. The respective butterfly type valves seat equally well regardless of which side the pressure is applied upon.

The globe valves will be tested in scope of containment-leak testing program.

Re fe rence See revised Section 6.2.4.2.2 and revised Table 6.2-32, i

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WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 Question No.

480.43 Concerning containment isolation of the chemical and volume control charging line (Penetration No. 27).

A.- Provide the justification for locking open the outside isolation valve (2CH-F1529A/B). Describe how the valve will be locked open and how quickly it can be isolated if leakage is detected from this line outside containment.

B. Specifically describe the provisions for detecting possible leakage from this line outside containment.

C. Provide the justification that failing open is the " safe" position for the outside isolation valve (2CH-F1529A/B).

Response

A. Charging isolation valve 2CH-F1529A/B is locked open to ensure the availability of boric acid to Reactor Coolant System at all plant operation modes.

To close the valve the operator must obtain a key and insert it in the key switch in the control room. It is estimated that less than ten minutes is required to close the charging valves from the control room.

B. The charging lines have higher pressure than the Reactor

,i Coolant System by means of positive displacement pumps and f;"b' therefore leakage frora the radioactive reactor coolant system cannot exist in the charging lines. Leakage from the CVCS in the Reactor Auxiliary Building is collected in the building sumps from where it can be pumped to the waste management system.

C. One charging pump is used during normal plant operation.

The other two charging pumps are automatically started by pressurizer level control or by SIAS. The fail open position of valve 2CH-F]529A/B assures that a flow path for makeup and boron injection remain after a CIAS or an SIAS. Operation of the charging system is taken credit for in the small break IDCA analysis. The fail open position of this valve therefore assures availability of the charging system after the small break LOCA event. If the safe position of this valve is closed, and this valve f ails to the open position, then the fail closed isolation valves inside containment (see Figure 9. 3-6) will maintain containment isolation.

Reference See revised Table 6. 2-32 (Penetration 27) .

480.43-1 Amendment No. 17, (4/81)

Question No.

480.44 Table 6.2-32 states that the component < .coling water inlet valve (2CC-F146A/B) and outlet valves (2CC-1147A/B and 2CC-F263A/B) for the reactor coolant pumps and CEDM fail open. Provide the necessary justification this'is the " safe" position as opposed to failing closed.

Response

These valves are closad automatically on an 5'IAS to ensure that there is sufficient water supply to the essential cooling water systems post-LOCA.

However, if offsite power is available, the operator may manually override the SIAS in order to open these valves and provide cooling water to the Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP). The valves fail open to ensure that a single active failure will not preclude availability of the RCP's. The fail open position is the safe posit .on for the following reasons:

Inlet Valves For the post accident period, the valve is positioned Dy the operator in the sa fe position. If that position is open, then a failure to the open position is a trivial case. It should also be noted that the RCP's have been tested to demonstrate that they can operate acceptably without component cooling water for thirty minutes (see response to Question 010.15) . If the safe position is closed, a failure to the open position does not compromise containment isolation because of the check valve inside containment. It is therefore, neither necessary not desirable for the isolation valve outside contalnment to fail closed or "as is."

Return Valves There are two power operated valvec, one inside containment and one outside. The inside valve is powured by the SA channel plus a DC redundant source. ,

The outside valve is powered by the SB channel plus j a DC redundant source. If the sare position is closed, '

and a valve should fail open, the other independent valve would remain closed.

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Q480.44 (cont'd)

The inlet isolation valve and both return isolation valves are each provided with seismically qualified air accumulators to preclude a comon mode failure from moving these valves into an undesired position.

Re ference See revised Table 6.2-32 (Penetrations 23 and 24).

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l WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 i PIAt.T SYSTEMS

( $, CONTROLI.ED VENTIIATION AREA I?TTEGRITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.8.2 CONTROLLED VENTILATION AREA INTEGRITY SHALL BE MAIWAINED APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

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Without INTEGRITY, restore CONTROLLED VEhTILATION AREA INTEGRITY within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />' 18 i

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SURVEILIANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.8.2 CONTROLLED VENTILATION AREA INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated at least once per 31 days by :

1) verifying that each door in each access opening is closed except, when the access opening is being used for normal transit entry and exit, then at least one door shall be closed;

2) verifying the proper functioning of the mechanical interlock.

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I WSES-FSAR-UNIT-3 TABLE 6.2.32 (Cont'd) k)

Portions of the system open to containment atmosphere and part of the }

reactor coolant pressure boundary will be vented and/or drained for Type "A" test.

1) System required to maintain plant in safe shutdown condition.

a) ESF system for which fluid flow and/or water seal is needed for post-LOCA. 4 n) System not open to containment during post-LOCA.

o)

Testing arrangement as shown in Figures 6.2-65, 6.2-66, 6.2-67 and 6.2.68.

p)

Operators will manually isolate these valves on high radiation alarms.

q) Manual override provided. O r) These valves are leak tested in order to ensure leaktight integrity in accordance with GDC 32.

s) These valves fail open to ensure that single active failure will not preclude availability of the RCPs. In the event that the safe position is closed, a failure to the open position will not compromise isolation because of the isolation valves inside containment (see j response to Question 480.44).

I t) Operation of L.te charging system is taken credit for in the small break LOCA analysis. The fail open position of the outside isolation valve assures of the availability of the charging system af ter the small break LOCA event.

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6.2-211a Amendment No. 8, (2/80)

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