ML19332E754

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Responds to Emergency Plan Weaknessess Identified by NRC During 1989 Annual Exercise & Insp Rept 50-382/89-24.Util Plans to Conduct Special Problem Solving Seminars in Addition to Regular Emergency Response Training
ML19332E754
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 12/04/1989
From: Burski R
LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
W3P89-2141, NUDOCS 8912120082
Download: ML19332E754 (5)


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, .E . Loulaiene Power & Light Company

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r 317 Baronno Street P. O. Box 60340 New Oricans, LA 70160 0340 Tel 504 595 EF.5 R. F. Burski

[ Nuclear Satoty & Rogulatory Affairs-

, Manager W3p89-2141 O A4.05 k QA L

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December '4, .1989 -

E- U.S. Nuc1 car Regulatory Commission ATTN Document Control Desk

  1. Washington, D.C. .20555

Subject:

-Waterford 3 SES Docket No. 50-382 ,

License No. NPF-38 j NRC' Inspection Report 89-24 Gentlemen:  :

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Louisiana' Power & Light hereby submits, in Attachments 1 through 4, its

> response to the emergency plan weaknesses, identified by the NRC during,the 1989. annual exercise, according to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.F.5.

If there are'anyLquestions concetning this response, please contact

Mr. F.J.-Englebracht, Nuclear Emergency Planning.& Records Manager at

-(504) 464-3155.

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u s .Very truly.yours, l I

.i ir RFB/SEF/pi j

' Attachments -)

cc:: Messrs. R.D. Martin, NRC Region IV  !

'F.J. Hebdon, NRC-NRR  ;

D.L. Wigginton, NRC-NRR I

, E.L.'Blake-W.M. Stevenson ,

NRC Resident Inspectors Office

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ATTACHMENT 1

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LP&L; RESPONSE T0 NRC INSPECTION 89-24-01L

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'  ; 10 CFR PART'50, APPENDIX E.IV.F.5 WEAKNESS' Y',

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  1. - WEAKNESS:(

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-Th'e control-l room staff'did not notify (as required by 10 CFR Part 50,

$50.72[a][3)) NEC.of-a reportable event immediately1after.the state authorities were= notified.

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RESPONSES,

[" Control room staff; personnel are currently. attending. refresher-P training, including ' emergency ? plan notifications.- Correcting the p 2 ' Jabove weakness isLaddressed-during this training;'however,-a notation

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on this weakness _has yet to.be formally-included:in the lesson' plan.;

p) .The lesson plan-will be revised to further stress timely NRC

'?  : notification by: March 1.1990, to -

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. i: , ' i p ;T ATTAClIMENT .;

LP&L RESPONSE TO NRC INSPECTION 89-24-02 '

10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX E.IV.F.5 WEAKNESS WEAKNESS:

The capabilities of the TSC staff to assess plant _ status was degraded by the absence of the primary plant data information flow from the control-room. This shortf all of information lasted 39 minutes and occurred when the systems parameter display system (SPDS) was inoperative.- The TSC staff did not pursue the lack of information flow with sufficient concern.

W The TSC staf f who received plant' information did not provide the applicable Linformation about the extent of fuel cladding damge (0.04 percent)Lto the  ;

n dose assessors.- As a result, the dose assessors based their 9:00 A.M.

off-site dose projections on a def aultLyalue, which greatly exaggerated the consequences of the ongoing release.

! The fact that information flow was degraded is considered to be-an exercise weakness. ,

RESPONSE:-

The' applicable training lesson plans for TSC emergency response personnel _were. revised after the 1988 annual exercise to address a aggressive pursuit of information. Please note that the performance of the TSC personnel in~ this area _has improved over previous ~ drills. '

ilowever. LP&L will continue to emphasize correct response to degraded information flow in the 1990 drill program.

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'To address problems with information flow between the TSC and Dose Assessment Area, LP&L had previously agreed to study the feasibility -

oof a voice and visual communications system between the two areas (re W3P89-1570, dated September 14, 1989),

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. ATTACHMENT 3 LP&L RESPONSE TO NRC INSPECTION 89-24-03 10-CFR PART 50, APPENDIX E.IV.F.5 WEAKNESS w -

WEAKNESS:

The team assigned to reposition valves in order to direct radioactive releases through-filtration units was delayed for more than 10 minutes because the tool room was unmanned. A second delay of the same team occurred because the health ~ physics technician was misinformed about the identity of the team members and had to contact the OSC for clarification.

Other delays- occurred _because the auxiliary operator had to return to the -

- 0SC.to retrieve another drawing. As a consequence, valve manipulations were started two hours after the task was identified.

-Another emergency repair-team sent to investigate the problem with Containment Spray Pump "A" did not have information on preceding actions by.

the operators-and repeated actions.that had already been accomplished. A final' delay occurred because the auxiliary operator was not availabic at the job site. Additionally, the inspectors noted that the wrong drawings were taken to the scene, and that a circuit tester required for the task was not included in the equipment retrieved for this emergency repair.

'The fact that occasional lack of proper coordination and technical direction to in-plant teams resulted in unnecessary delays of vital repair actions is considered to be an exercise weakness.

RESPONSE

Emphasis on proper coordination and technical direction of in-plant team activities will be provided in refresher lesson plans for the OSC -

Supervisor, OSC Communicator, TSC Supervisor, TSC Supervisor's-Communicator, Operations Coordinator, Shift Supervisor and' Emergency '

Coordinator. LP&L.will revise these lesson plans by March 1, 1990.

-LP&L also plans to conduct special problem solving seminars with individuals in these positions, in addition to their regular emergency response training. The seminars should uncover problems with coordination of in-plant teams and allow LP&L to determine whether additional corrective action is necessary. These problem solving -j seminars will be completed by June 1, 1990. j i

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,; . .; ATTACHMENT 4 LP&L RESPONSE TO NRC INSPECTION 89-24-04 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX E.IV.F.5 WEAKNESS w

WEAKNESS:

The inspectors noted that off-site teams properly relayed information to

-the TSC' staff on radiation levels and air sampling data. However, personne1'taking off-site data were exposed to'high radiation fields resulting from the plume and were also exposed to high levels of radioiodine contamination without their having adequate protection (e.g.,

protective _ clothing and respiratory equipment).

The fact that necessary radiological controls were not used to protect- j emergency workers is considered to be an exercise weakness.  !

RESPONSE

Additional procedural guidance on the direction of field team activities including the need to consider proper radiological controls for field monitoring items (e.g., respirators, protective clothing,

. immediate exit of the area) will be provided. - The related procedures .!

will be= revised-by March 1, 1990.- Training lesson plans for health '

physics technicians, field team controllers, and dose assessment coordinators will be revised by April 1,L1990 to incorporate this  ;

additional guidance.:
  • LP&L also plans to conduct special training seminar with individuals i in these positions, in-addition to their, regular emergency response 1

t raining . -- These seminars will be to review and discuss the additional guidance contained in the procedure revisions. These seminars will be completed by September 15, 1990, i li i

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