ML093451395

Summary of Telephone Conference Call on 10/29/09, Between the USNRC and Florida Power Corporation, Concerning Licensee Response to a Request for Information Related to the Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant License Renewal Applic

ML093451395
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	01/04/2010
From:	Robert Kuntz License Renewal Projects Branch 2
To:
KUNTZ R, NRR/DLR, 415-2989
References
Download: ML093451395 (8)

Text

January 4, 2010 LICENSEE: Florida Power Corporation FACILITY: Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant

SUMMARY

OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL HELD ON OCTOBER 29, 2009, BETWEEN THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION, CONCERNING APPLICANT RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATED TO THE CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the staff) and representatives of Florida Power Corporation (FPC, the applicant) held a telephone conference call on October 29, 2009 to discuss the licensees response to a request for additional information (RAI) concerning the Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant (CR-3) license renewal application (LRA). The telephone conference call was useful in clarifying the applicants RAI response.

During the teleconference the staff sought clarification on responses to RAIs B.2.21-1, B.2.21-2, B.2.3-1, and B.2.30-4 provided in a letter dated October 13, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No.

ML092890155), and RAI B.2.4.1-1 provided in a letter dated September 30, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML092790150)

The main issues discussed during the teleconference are summarized below.

LRA Aging Management Program (AMP) B.2.21 One-time Small Bore Piping Program Program Issue:

The staff noted that the Generic Aging Lessons Learned (GALL) Report recommends the use of a plant-specific small bore AMP, as CR-3 has already experienced cracking in its small bore piping. The LRA did not include a small bore piping AMP. However, the applicant stated it will incorporate the small bore piping periodic inspection in its Inservice Inspection (ISI) program. In addition, it provided a small bore piping one time inspection program in the LRA. The staff indicated during the call, as well as during the on-site audit, that the GALL Report only provides guidance. An applicant is allowed to deviate from the format as long as adequate technical justification is provided.

Sample Size of Small Bore Piping Welds:

The applicant does not have a separate small bore piping one-time inspection AMP as recommended by the GALL Report, but chooses to incorporate the inspection of small bore piping in its ISI program instead.

Florida Power Corporation The staff raised a question that the sample size may not be adequate. The applicant stated, in its response, that in its current ISI interval it selected, based on its risk-informed ISI, 24 Class 1 small bore welds for volumetric examinations out of a total of 539 Class 1 welds. The selection is part of the ISI program but the applicant actually proposed to take credit for the samples in the small bore piping one-time inspection. The sample size is selected to provide a 90%

confidence that 90% of the population will not display degradation (90/90 approach),

methodology provided by EPRI Report TR-107514. Small bore welds in the one-time small-bore program are those that have not experienced cracking, those welds that have experienced cracking are managed by the ASME Section XI ISI IWB, IWC, and IWD Program.

The staff stated that it will reconsider the applicants response and the adequacy of the 90/90 approach, and the fact that it will take credit for examinations required as part of their ISI program.

Small Bore Socket Welds Not Addressed:

The applicant stated its position on socket welds in the RAI response to RAI B.2.21-2. The licensees response is based on a call summary between the NRC and the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) and VT-2 visual examinations performed per ASME Code Case N-578-1. The staff discussed the GALL Report recommendations. The GALL Report does not limit the scope of the program to exclude socket welds. The staff indicated that the resolution of the scope of small-bore piping will be discussed generically with the industry and will not make a determination on the adequacy of the applicants approach until that time.

The staff stated that it will make it an open item for the time being until it is fully addressed.

LRA AMP B.2.3 Reactor Head Closure Studs Program In the response to RAI B.2.3-1, the applicant stated that for reactor head closure studs the 90-day inspection reports for the last 5 outages were reviewed and all examination results were acceptable and that the lubricant selected is a nickel based, anti seize lubricant. The staff sought clarification on the inspection results and if any acceptable degradation had been noted on the reactor head closure studs. The staff also sought clarification on the use of the selected lubricant in the environment proposed. The applicant stated that during operations, wetted conditions are not applicable to the reactor head closure studs and during outages, seal plugs prevent wetted conditions of the reactor vessel flange bore threads.

LRA AMP B.2.30 Structures Monitoring Program In RAI B.2.30-4, the staff noted that during a plant walkdown, various degredation mechanisms were observed on the walls of the Tendon Access Gallery at the 75 foot elevation. RAI B.2.30-4 requested that the applicant describe how the effects of aging will be adequately managed for this area so that the intended function of protecting the tendon anchorage hardware against corrosion will be maintained. In response to RAI B.2.30-4, the applicant described their aging management program for the area including previous Structures Monitoring Program inspection results. The RAI response included a discussion of samples taken from several types of deposits and stated that the sample from the stalactite deposit tested high for chlorides,

Florida Power Corporation 1300 parts per million (on page 65 of Enclosure 1 of the previously referenced October 13, 2009 letter). The staff sought input from the applicant on likely causes for the high chloride results in that sample.

Also in response to RAI B.2.30-4, the applicant stated that The degree to which concrete will provide satisfactory protection for embedded steel reinforcement depends in most cases on the quality of the concrete and the depth of concrete over the steel. The staff sought clarification on how that statement is affected by the degradation mechanisms noted both in the audit walkdown and previous Structures Monitoring Program inspections.

RAI 2.4-1 Response In RAI 2.4-1, dated August 31, 2009, the staff stated that, LRA Section 2.4 excludes several types of fire barrier components that appear in the Safety Evaluation Report, dated July 27, 1979. These fire components are listed below:

• Table 2.4.1-1, fire doors, fire barrier penetration seals, and interior fire hose stations

• Table 2.4.2-9, fire barrier assemblies, and interior fire hose stations

• Table 2.4.2-10, fire barrier penetration seals, and interior fire hose stations

• Table 2.4.2-12, fire barrier assemblies, fire doors, fire barrier penetration seals, and interior fire hose stations

• Table 2.4.2-14, fire barrier assemblies, fire barrier penetration seals, and interior fire hose stations

• Table 2.4.2-18, fire barrier assemblies The staff requested that the applicant verify whether the above fire barrier assemblies and components are in the scope of license renewal in accordance with 10 CFR 54.4(a) and subject to an AMR in accordance with 10 CFR 54.21(a)(1). If they are excluded from the scope of license renewal and not subject to an AMR, the staff requested that the applicant provide justification for the exclusion.

In its response, dated September 30, 2009, the applicant stated that:

• As identified in Table 2.4.1-1, there are no fire doors, fire door penetration seals or interior fire hose stations in the Reactor Building. There are fire barrier assemblies which include Thermo-Lag fire barriers on conduits, junction boxes, transmitters, and penetrations encapsulated by stainless steel as discussed in response to RAI 2.3.3.36-3.

• As identified in Table 2.4.2-9, there are no fire barrier assemblies or interior fire hose stations in the Diesel Generator Building.

• As identified in Table 2.4.2-10, there are no fire barrier penetration seals or interior fire hose stations in the EFW Pump Building.

• As identified in Table 2.4.2-12, the Fire Service Pumphouse contains no fire barrier assemblies, fire doors, fire barrier penetration seals, or interior fire hose stations.

Florida Power Corporation

• As identified in Table 2.4.2-14, the Machine Shop contains no fire barrier assemblies or fire barrier penetration seals. A fire hose station component was added to the Machine Shop based on the response to RAI 2.2-06. See CR-3 to NRC letter, 3F0909-03, dated September 11, 2009, for the response to RAI 2.2-06.

• As identified in Table 2.4.2-18, there are no fire barrier assemblies in the Turbine Building.

The staff sought clarification on the applicants RAI response and what components within each of the identified tables were within the scope of license renewal.

The enclosure provides a listing of the participants.

The applicant had an opportunity to comment on this summary.

/RA/

Robert Kuntz, Sr. Project Manager Projects Branch 2 Division of License Renewal Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-302

Enclosure:

List of Participants cc w/encl: See next page

ML093451395 OFFICE LA:DLR PM:RPB2:DLR BC:RPB2:DLR PM:RPB2:DLR NAME SFigueroa RKuntz DWrona RKuntz DATE 12/14/09 12/15/09 12/18/09 01/04/10

Letter to Florida Power Corporation from Robert F. Kuntz dated January 4, 2010

SUMMARY

OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL HELD ON OCTOBER 29, 2009, BETWEEN THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION, CONCERNING APPLICANT RESPONSE TO A REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATED TO THE CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION DISTRIBUTION:

HARD COPY:

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RKuntz DBrittner AJones, OGC LLake, RII MSykes, RII TMorrissey, RII RReyes, RI

Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant cc:

Mr. R. Alexander Glenn Senior Resident Inspector Associate General Counsel (MAC-BT15A) Crystal River Unit 3 Florida Power Corporation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 14042 6745 N. Tallahassee Road St. Petersburg, FL 33733-4042 Crystal River, FL 34428 Mr. James W. Holt Mr. Jack E. Huegel Plant General Manager Manager, Nuclear Oversight Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA2C) Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA2C) 15760 W. Power Line Street 15760 W. Power Line Street Crystal River, FL 34428-6708 Crystal River, FL 34428-6708 Mr. William A. Passetti, Chief Mr. David T. Conley Department of Health Associate General Counsel II - Legal Dept.

Bureau of Radiation Control Progress Energy Service Company, LLC 2020 Capital Circle, SE, Bin #C21 P.O. Box 1551 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1741 Raleigh, NC 27602-1551 Attorney General Mr. Michael P. Heath Department of Legal Affairs Supervisor, License Renewal The Capitol Progress Energy Tallahassee, FL 32304 8470 River Road, 2E Southport, NC 28461 Mr. Ruben D. Almaguer, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness Mr. Mark Rigsby Department of Community Affairs Manager, Support Services - Nuclear 2740 Centerview Drive Crystal River Nuclear Plant (SA2C)

Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 15760 W. Power Line Street Crystal River, FL 34428-6708 Chairman Board of County Commissioners Mr. Robert J. Duncan II Citrus County Vice President, Nuclear Operations 110 North Apopka Avenue Progress Energy Inverness, FL 34450-4245 P.O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602-1551 Mr. Stephen J. Cahill Engineering Manager Mr. Brian C. McCabe Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA2C) Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs 15760 W. Power Line Street Progress Energy Crystal River, FL 34428-6708 P.O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602-1551 Mr. Daniel R. Westcott Supervisor, Licensing & Regulatory Mr. Jon Franke, Vice President Programs Crystal River Nuclear Plant (NA1B)

Crystal River Nuclear Plant ATTN: Supervisor, Licensing &

15760 W. Power Line Street Regulatory Programs Crystal River, FL 34428-6708 15760 W. Power Line Street Crystal River, FL 34428-6708

TELEPHONE CONFERENCE CALL CRYSTAL RIVER UNIT 3 NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION LIST OF PARTICIPANTS October 29, 2009 PARTICIPANTS AFFILIATIONS Robert Kuntz U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Kimberly Green NRC Bart Fu NRC Seung Min NRC Madhumita Sircar NRC Naeem Iqbal NRC Mike Heath Florida Power Corporation Chris Mallner Florida Power Corporation Wayne Bichlmeir Florida Power Corporation Mike Fletcher Florida Power Corporation Jeff Lane Florida Power Corporation Bob Reynolds Florida Power Corporation ENCLOSURE