IR 05000413/1988013
| ML20151B348 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1988 |
| From: | Lesser M, Peebles T, Van Doorn P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151B342 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-88-13, 50-414-88-13, NUDOCS 8804080181 | |
| Download: ML20151B348 (9) | |
Text
e Riog UNITED STATES g
'o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION J 'i
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REGION 11 h
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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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Report Nos.
50-413/88-13 and 50-414/88-13 Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, N.C.
28242 Docket Nos.:
50-413 and 50-414 Liconse Nos. : NPF-?5 and NPF-52 i
Facility Name:
Catawba 1 and 2
9 pbruary 26, 1988 - March 25, 1988 Inspection Conduct d F
Inspectors:d2 y/M( [#
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'P.K.,VanJoorn /
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Approved byg' A.' Peebles, Sepf. ion Chief jd/fff IXWt' z
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Da n Signed Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, urannounced inspection was conducted on site inspecting in the areas of review of plant operations; surveillance observation; main-tenance observation; review of licensee nonroutine event reports; followup of previously identified items and startup activities (Unit 2).
Results: Of the six (6) areas inspected, one apparent violation was identified in one area.
(Failure to Follow Technical Specification Administrative Requirements for Approval of Modifications paragraph 3.b.)
8804080181 880331 PDR ADOCK 05000413
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l REPORT DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
't Licensee Employees
- H. B. Barron, Operations Superintendent
W. F. Beaver, Performance Engineer
- W. H. Bradley, QA Surveillance S. W. Brown, Reactor Engineer R. N. Casler, Unit 1 Coordinator
R. H. Charest, Station Chemistry Supervisor S. S. Cooper, Operating Engineer
- M. A. Cote, Licensing Specialist
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l J. W. Cox, Training Manager i
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- T. E. Crawford, Integrated Scheduling Superintendent W. P. Deal, Health Physics Supervisor
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C. S. Gregory, I. & E. Support Engineer
- C. L. Hartzell, Compliance Engineer
- T. P. Harrall, Design Engineering
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- F. N. Mack, Project Services Engineer
W. W. McCollough, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
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W. R. McCollum, Station Services Superintendent C. E. Muse, Unit 2 Coordinator
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T. B. Owen, Station Manager F. P. Schiffley, II, Licensing Engineer
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- G. T. Smith, Ma;c+enance Superintendent l
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- J. M. Stackley, I. & E. Engineer
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D. Tower, Shift Operating Engineer
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- R. F. Wardell, Technical Services Superintendent
- R. L. White, Catawb4 Safety Review Group
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J. W. Willis, Senior QA Engineer, Operations
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Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, j
mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
- Attended exit interview.
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Exit Interview
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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 25, 1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the
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i areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.
No
dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not I.
identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. The following new items were identified:
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Violation 413,414/88-13-01: Failure to Follow Technical Specification Administrative Requirements for Approval of Modifications.
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l Unresolved Item 413,414/88-13-02:
Evaluation of Corrective Action l
Regarding Control of Sliding Links and Jumpers.
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Unresolved Item 414/88-13-03: Evaluation of Inoperable Equipment due j
to an Open Sliding Link.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters (92702)
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a.
(CLOSED) Unresolved Item 414/85-56-03: Evaluation of Human Enginaer-
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ing Discrepancies in Control Room.
The remaining discrepancies had i
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been identified by the licensee but were not corrected as required during a previous outage. These discrepancies were relatively minor and therefore a violation is not being issued, b.
(CLOSED)
Unresolved Item 413/86-50-01,- 414/86-53-01:
Station Manager's Approval of Nuclear Station Modifications.
Technical
Specification (TS) 6.5.1.3 requires that "proposed modifications to nuclear safety-related structures, systems, and components shall be approved prior to implementation by the Station Manager" or his designated superintendent.
Past practice has been to approve the
modification concept rather than the final modification.
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licensee review of the intent of this TS has confirmed the intent to be that this approval is to occur as part of the final approval of the modification.
The licensee modified Station Directive 4.4.4 to require the appropriate final approval.
Prior to August, 1987 the licensee failed to comply with TS 6.5.1.3 requirements and, there-fore, this is Violation 413.414/88-13-01:
Failure to Follow Technical Specification Administrative Requirements for Approval of Modifications.
Since this issue has relatively minor technical significance and appropriate corrective actions have been imple-mented, no response to this violation is required.
c.
(CLOSED) Violation 413/87-08-02:
Failure to Follow Test Procedure and Inadequate Test Procedure for PORVs.
The licensee responded to this violation on June 11, 1987. The inspector reviewed the response and verified that corrective actions described were implemented.
Corrective actions included procedure improvements, retesting and counseling of personnel, d.
(CLOSED)
Violation 414/87-26-01:
Channel Check on Auxiliary i
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Feedwater Flow Instrumentation Inadequate. Followup of this item was performed and recorded in NRC Report No. 413,414/S7-33.
However, the item was listed in error as 414/87-15-01.
Therefore, this report serves to close the item and correct the error.
e.
(CLOSED)
Unresolved Item 413/87-42-01:
Closed KC Supply Valve to RHR Heat Exchanger in Service. This item involved a valve which was showing closed on the control board but was leaking sufficiently such
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that the heat exchanger associated with the valve was in service.
The inspector was concerned that the valve status was adequately documented and whether the licensee program to document valve status was adequate for this situation.
Further review indicates that licensee programs are in place to cover this situation. The licensee has committed to make better use of existing programs including the Open Item Summary and Turnover Sheet for these type situations and
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has conducted training in this regard.
The safe position for this valve is open.
Licensee actions are considered acceptable.
One violation was identified as described in paragraph 3.b. above.
4.
Unresolved Items Two new unresolved items are identified in paragraphs 5.e. and f.
An Unresolved Item is a matter about which more informaticn is required to determine whether it is ccceptable or may involve a violation.
5.
Plant Operations Review (Units 1 & 2) (71707 and 71710)
a.
The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements. Technical Specifications (TS), administrative controls, control room logs, danger tag logs, Tuhnical Specification Action Item Log, and the l
removal and restoration log were routinely reviewed. Shift turnovers were observed to verify tnat they were conducted in accordance with approved procertures.
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The inspectors verified by observation and interviews, the measures taken to assure physical protection of the f acility met current requirements. Areas inspected included the security organization; the establishment and maintenances of gates, doors, and isolation j
zones in the proper condition; and that access contr01 and badging
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were proper and procedures followed.
In addition to the areas discussed above, the areas toured were observed for fire prevention and protection activities.
These included such things as combustible materias control, fire protection systems and materials, and fire protection associated with mainte-nance activities.
The inspectors reviewed Problem Investigation i
Reports (PIRs) to determine if the licensee was appropriately documenting problems and implementing appropriate corrective actions.
b.
Unit 1 Summary Unit 1 began the period at 98*. power.
On March 1 an Unusual Event was declared due to a chemi :al release to the lake in excess of SARA guidelines for hydrazine.
On March 10 the unit shutdown due to a possible clam fouling problem in Auxiliary Feedwater (CA) from stagnant portions of Nuclear Service Water.
The unit was restarted on March 14 af ter flushing and ended the period at 100*4.
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c.
Unit 2 Summary.
Unit 2 began the period in Mode 4 finishing up the first refueling.
On February 26 discretionary enforcement was granted for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to allow continued testing of the turbine driven CA pump while in Mode 3.
During startup on March 9 the unit tripped on lo-lo S/G level.
Complications developed which included swap of-one train of CA to the
. assured lake water source and subsequent flow degradation due to clam fouling. An AIT was implemented to review the CA fouling event (sce NRC Report 413,414/88-14). The unit was restarted on March 18 after
. extensive testing and corrective actions to resolve the CA fouling problem and ended the period on-line and conducting startup tests, d.
On February 26, 1988, the inspector held discussions with the licensee relative to resetting of the time clock for a Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for the turbine driven CA pump (CATDP).
One of the' steam supply valves (SA2) was leaking and required repair.
l This was discovered in Mode 3 where the LCO applies.
Governor problems forced the licensee to take the unit'to Mode 4.
The TS does
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not restrict entrance to Mode 3 if the CATOP is inoperable, however, the inspector was concerned whether it was prudent to enter Mode 3, resetting the LCO time without having completed repairs on the valve.
The licensee indicated that it was not normal practice to enter a i
lower mode just to reset an LCO time clock and then go back to the
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mode which required the equipment.
In this case a different problem had forced the mode change. The governor problem required reentry l
into Mode 3 where steam was available to retest the pump.
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governor problem was considered a more significant problem than the steam valve. Only one of two steam sources was inoperable with the defective valve isolated and Mode 3 was required to verify the valve i
was repaired. The issue was discussed with licensee and NRC manage-I ment and it was agreed that the licensee's actions were acceptable.
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e.
The inspectors reviewed PIR No. 2-C87-0380 to determine if appro-
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priate evaluation was done to determine past operability and
reportability.
This PIR identified an open sliding link. If Unit 2 switchgear 2ETB was aligned to tha alternate shared auxiliary transformer SATB via the alternate incoming breaker, this open link would have prevented a degraded voltage breaker trip.
Equipment could be damaged or could trip on overcurrent if operated with sustained undervoltage.
Although site personnel were informed by design engineering that tnis could be a problem if power was aligned to the alternate breaker the licensee failed to determine if alternate alignment had occurred in the past until prompted by the NRC inspector. The licensee determined that alternate alignment had occurred in December, 1987 and has initiated further evaluation of this problem. NRC Branch Technical Position PSB-1 indicates that degraded voltage protection is appropriate.
The licensee had
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apparently failed to recognize a reportable operability problem, however, further evaluation is appropriate to determine technical significance.
Therefore,.this is Unresolved Item 414/88-13-03:
Evaluation of Inoperable Equipment due to an Open Sliding Link,
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f.
The above sliding link problem in addition to other problems recently identified involving sliding links and jumpers indicates a possible generic problem in control of links and jumpers. Other problems have been identified by the licensee as follows:
l LER 413/87-45 a) Jumper left installed rendered B train VP inoperable
b) Use of fused jumpers inadequately controlled PIR 1-C88-015 Numerous sliding links found open causing flow
(IIR C88-016-1)
isolation valves for H: monitor to fail closed PIR 2-C88-0067 Numerous sliding links found open during
performance of retest on Unit 2 ASP
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PIR 1-C88-0111 Numerous sliding links found open on Unit 1 ASP after startup after refueling
a PIR 2-C88-0113 Sliding link found open on Unit ASP for shield wire on Boric acid tank level PIR 1-C87-0320 Jumper found between ISKPC-22 and KPW-3 PIR 1-C88-0081 Jumper found on overcurrent relay in 6.9KV 2TB-7 l
Further review is necessary to determine whether the licensee is i
adequately addressing this issue.
This is Unresolved Item 413,414/
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88-13-02:
Evaluation of Corrective Action Regarding Control of Sliding Links and Jumpers.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Surveillance Observation (Units 1 & 2) (61726)
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a.
During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations
were in compliance with various TS requirements.
Typical of these
requiremer,ts were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor i
i coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, emergency power systems, safety injection, emergency safeguards systems, control room
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ventilation, and direct current electrical power sources.
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inspector verified that surveillance testing was performed in
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accordance with the appruved written procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting conditions for operation were met, appro-priate removal and restoration of the affected equipment was
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accomplished, test results met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.
b.
The inspectors witnessed the following surveillances wholly or in
part:
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PT/2/A/4250/03C Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump #2 PT/2/A/4250/02D Turbine Trip Test No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Maintenance Observations (Units 1& 2) (62703)
a.
Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with requirements.
The inspector verified licensee
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conformance to the requirements in the following areas of inspection:
i the activities were accomplished using approved procedures, and j
functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to
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returning components or systems to service; quality control records i
were maintained; e.ctivities performed were accomplished by qualified personnel; and materials used were properly certified. Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure
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that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance
which may effect system performance.
b.
The inspectors witnessed the following maintenance activity in part:
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Trouble Shooting Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump #t.
c.
The licensee experienced three separate problems during this i
inspection period with Main Feedwater control valves not working
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properly in automatic.
Previous problems have also occurred.
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J problems appear to involve failed Process Control Circuit Boards in the control cabinets.
The licensee indicated that 125 boards have i
failed since initial operation and the plant utilizes 2100 boards.
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I The vendor (Westinghouse) has an upgrade program which is implemented
as boards are returned for repair. The licensee indicated that the failure rate is not considered abnormally high but higher than
optimum temperature in the control cabinets may
'.e a contributing factor. The temperature problem has been evaluated for approximataly j
two years.
Although this time appears lengthy, the licensev
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indi :ated that parts are now available and modifications approved for adding fans to the cabinets,
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8.
Review of Licensee Nonroutine Event Reports (Units 1 & 2) (92700).
The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to determine if the information provided met NRC requirements.
The determination included: adequacy of description, verification of compliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements, corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems, reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety significance of each event. Additional inplant reviews and discussion with plant personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for those reports indicated by an (*).
The following LERs are closed:
- LER 413/87-43 TS Violation due to Inoperable Reactor Coolant System Temperature Instrumentation due to Design Deficiency (This issue addressed in Report 88-07)
LER 413/87-44 Rv.1 TS Violation due to Management Deficiency and Personnel Error (Violation issued - See Report 87-44)
LER 413/88-01 Missed Hourly Fire Watches due to Personnel Error and M)nagement Deficiencies LER 413/88-03 TS Violation due to Wide Range Temperature Monitoring Instrumentation Inoperable due to Installation and Design Deficiencies (This issue addressed in Report 88-07)
- LER 413/88-04 Reactor Trip Breakers Open During Shutdown due to a Fuse Failure LER 413/88-05 Cold Leg Accumulator Discharge Isolation Valve Motor Operators with Non-Environmentally Qualified Terminal Blocks (This issue addressed in Report 88-07)
LER 413-88-06 Nuclear Service Water Swap to the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond due to a Management Deficiency
- LER 413/88-07 Safety Injection During Unit Heat-Up due to a Personnel Error (Violation issued - see Report 88-08)
- LER 413/88-08 One Train of Control Room Area Ventilation System Inoperable due to a Personnel Error.
- LER 413/88-09 Failure to Maintain Environmental Qualifications of Limitorque Valve Actuators due to Construction and Management Deficiency (see Report 88-07)
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- LER 413/88-10 Unmonitored Release of Liquid Radwaste due to Personnel Error
"LER 414/86-35 Rv.1 Limitorque Valve Motor Operators Wiring not Environmentally Qualified (This issue addressed in Report 88-07)
- LER 414/87-23 Rv.2 Unusual Event Because of Unisolable Containment Valve due to a Management Deficiency
- LER 414/88-02 TS Violation Because of Steam Generator Tube Degradation due to a Personnel Error and Manage-ment Deficiency (Violation issued - see Report 88-09)
- LER 414/88-03 Safety Injection due to Personnel Error (Violation issued - see Report 88-08)
- LER 414/88-04 Foreign objects on Steam Generator Tubesheet
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Result in Tube Damage due to a Manufacturing Deficiency (see Report 88-09)
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No violation or deviations were identified in this report (see notes above for additional reports covering selected LERs).
9.
Plant Startup from Refueling (Unit 2) (71711)
The inspecturs observed startup from refueling to ascertain that startup, heatup, approach to criticality and testing was well controlled and conducted in accordance with approved procedures.
Tests witnessed included rod swap testing (PT/2/A/4150 /21) and turbine trip testing (see paragraph 6).
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No violations or deviations were identified.