IR 05000413/1988004

Insp Repts 50-413/88-04 & 50-414/88-04 on 880112-15.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Snubber Surveillance Program,Refueling Activities & Licensee Action on Previous Insp Finding

ML20149M386
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	02/17/1988
From:	Jape F, Lenahan J, Scott Sparks NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20149M381	List: IR 05000413/1988004 ML20149M379
References
50-413-88-04, 50-413-88-4, 50-414-88-04, 50-414-88-4, NUDOCS 8802260008
Download: ML20149M386 (7)

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' UNITED STATES f /ynn afog,q%',.

. NUCLEAR CEGULATORY COMMisslON 7,

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. Report Nos.: '50-413/88-04 and 50-414/88-04

Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte.NC 28242

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Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52

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Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2

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Inspection Conducted: January 12-15, 1988 Inspectors: b.I MM 2 -17 - 88'

p*- J. J. Lenalan

' Date Signed bN. k 1 - f 7 08 S. E. Spa ds Date Signed Approved by:

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//F Jape, Chief Date Signed Test Progrims Section Division of Reactor Safety SUMKARY Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was in the areas of the snubber surveillance program, refueling activities, and licensee action on a previous inspection finding.

Results: No violations or deviations were identified.

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REFORT DETAILS

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Persons Contacted l

Licensee Employees 1

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• W. L' Anfin, Jr., Mechanical Maintenance Support Engineer'

L. Benjamin, Fuel Handling Supervisor

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• C.- R. Cauthen, Snubber Engineer

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• M. A. Cote', Compliance Specialist J. Gilreath, Mechanical Engineer i

• J. W. Hampton, Station Manager

• J. Smith, Maintenance Support

Other licensee employees contacted included three mechanics.

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NRC Resident Inspectors

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• P. K.-VanDoorn, Senior Resident Inspector L

• M. Lesser, Resident Inspector

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' Attended exit interview 2.

Exit Interview

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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on January 15, 1988,

with those persons indicated in paragraph I above.

The inspectors

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described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection i

findings No dissenting cemments were received from the itcensee.

The

t following new item was identified during this inspection:

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Unresolved Item 413/88-04-01, Requirements for Functional Testing of i

L Snubbers, paragraph 5.c.

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The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided

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to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection.

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Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters

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(closed) Unresolved Item 413/85-55-02 and 414/85-68-02, Evaluation of

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Operability Requirements Relative to Hangers and Supports.

In order to

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address the operability status of systems, subsystems, components, etc.,

t the licensee prepared Catawba Nuclear Station Directive 3.1.14,

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Operability Determination, Revision 0, dated May 18, 1987. This directive

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establishes the policy for determining operability status and provides a l

means of documenting operability reviews.

The inspector examined the i

directive and noted that evaluation of operability of hangers, supports I

and restraints is clearly stated. The directive also addresses numerous i

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other situations concerning operability determination, e.g.

results of chemistry sampling, missing or deficient documentation, failure to perform surveillance tests, failure to meet performance test requirements, mispositioned valves, and various other potential problems. The inspector has no further questions at this time. Unresolved items 413/85-55-02 and 414/85-68-02 are closed.

4.

Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation or deviation.

One unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 5.c.

5.

Snubber Surveillance Program, Units 1 and 2 (Module 70370)

The inspector examined procedures and quality records related to the snubber surveillance program and witnessed functional testing of selected Unit 2 snubbers.

Acceptance criteria utilized by the inspector are specified in Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.7.8.

a.

Review of Snubber Surveillance Procedure The inspector examined the following procedures which control the snubber surveillance activities:

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Procedure number MP/0/A/7650/85, Visual Inspection of Snubbers and Corrective Maintenance (2) Procedure number MP/0/A/7650/86, Functional Testing of Mechanical Snubbers (3)

Procedure number MP/0/A/7650/85, Post Transient Piping and Hanger Inspection b.

Functional Testing of Mechanical Snubbers l

The inspector witnessed functional testing of mechanical snubbert from Unit 2 hanger numbers CF-1526, 1573, and 1601 and NC-1684.

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l These snubbers, which were model PSA 10, were subjected to l

acceleration and drag testing per the requirements of Procedure MP/0/A/7650/86 and TS 4.7.8.f.

The four snubbers tested met the licensee's functional test acceptance criteria, c.

Review of Quality Records The inspector reviewed quality records documenting surveillance of Unit I and Unit 2 mechanical snubbers.

Records examired were as follows:

(1) Results of visual inspection of Unit 1 inaccessible snubbers performed in August - October 1986 and October - November 1987

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L (2) Results of visual inspection of Unit 1 accessible snubbers performed April - May 1987 (3) Results of functional testing performed on Unit 2 mechanical snubbers during the current Unit 2 outage.

Test results reviewed were those performed on initial sample of 37 snubbers tested in accordance with TS 4.7.8.e.2.

Three of the 17 model PSA 1/2 snubbers tested failed the functional test.

The licensee was in the process of testing additional snubbers because of these test failures.

(4) Results of functional testing performed on Unit 1 mechanical October 1986 and in October snubbers in September

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December 1987.

Review of the Unit 1 ftnctional test results disclosed the following unresolved item:

During performance of functional testing on the initial sample of 37 Unit I snubbers in 0ctober 1987, two PSA 1/2 and one PSA 3 snubbers failed to meet the functional test acceptance criteri;..

The licenses then selected a random sample of 54 additional snubbers for functional testing per the requirements of TS 4.7.8.e.2 and Figure 4.7-1.

This random sample was selected from the general population of snubbers, anc included PCA 1/2

- PSA 25 snubbers.

In performance of functional testing on these 54 snubbers, five additional snubbers (three PSA 1/2, one PSA 1 and one PSA-3) failed to meet functional test acceptance criteria. As a result of these failures, tests were performed on a sample of 36 additional snubbers selected from the general population, during which two more PSA 1/2 snubbers failed to meet the functional test acceptance criteria. At that point in time, the licensee concluded that the model PSA 1/2 size functional test failures were the result of a generic problem associated with the PSA 1/2 snubbers and categorized the failures into a f acto.' mode group based on design and/or manufacturing per a Draft of Revision 2 of ANSI O&M 4, Examination and Testing of Dynamic Restraints (Snubbars). The number of snubbers tested and number of test failures is summarized in the Table below.

TABLE Total Adjusted Snubber Total Number of Number of Number of Size h ej Size (Type) Tested Test Failures Test Failures PSA 1/2

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PSA 1 - PSA 35

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127

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The licensee then performed functional tests on all Unit 1 PSA 1/2 (total approximately 600) snubbers.

Sixty-eight (68)

additional PSA 1/2 snubbers failed to meet the functional test acceptance criteria. All snubbers that failed the functional test were either repaired, if possible, or were replaced with new snubbers.

In order to meet the requirements of TS 4.7,0.e.2, the licensee counted the initial 7 PSA 1/2 functional test failures as one failure since these test failures had been established as a test i

failure mode group. This one failure plus the three additional failures (1 PSA 1 and 1 PSA 3) were counted as a total of four failures.

For C=4, TS Figure 4.7-1 (total number of test failures) requires testing a minimum of 109 snubbers.

The licensee had tested 127 snubbers prior to declaring the PSA 1/4 ano PSA 1/2 as one type and electing to test 100 percent of t51s type.

The licensee wrote a TS interpretation pertaining to T3 4.7.8.e and g. which documents this method of failure an61ysis and the basis for establishing the total number of test failures. This interpretation was discussed with the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation on November 10, 1987.

However, review of TS 4.7.8.e.2 disclosed that C is defined as the total number of snubbers of a type not meeting the functior.at test acceptance requirements. ~ Based on design and manufacturing, the licensee counted model PSA 1/2 as one type, and the remaining nodel PSA (size PSA-1 through PSA-35) as another type.

Therefore, to comply with Figure 4.7-1, for C=3 (one PSA 1 and two PSA 3 functional test failures), the itcensee was required to test a minimum of 91 snubbers of this type. However, the license had only tested 71 of this type. Therefore, it appears that the licensee may have violated this TS requirement and is required to test additional PSA 1 through PSA 35 snubbers from Unit 1.

Since there is no clear NRC guidance pertaining to the licensee's method of failure analysis and grouping of snubber functional test failures, and since the licensee has discussed their method of analysis with NRR, additional review of the licensee's TS interpretation will be conducted by Region II.

Pending completion of this review, this matter was identified to I

the licensee as Unresolved Item 413/88-04-01, Requirements for Functional Testing of Snubbers.

Review of the results of functional tests perforned on the Unit 1 snubbers in September

- October 1986 disclosed that or.e of the snubbers from the initial sample of 37 f ailed the functional test. The licensee performed functional tests on 18 additional snubbers with no additional failures. On the basis of TS Figure 4.7-1, for C=1, 18) snubbers tested, complies with the TS N 55 (37

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repirements.

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified, i

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Refueling Activities, Unit 2(60710)

l The inspector witnessed refueling activities. During the inspection, fuel movement was stopped due to mechanical eroblems with the inner mast roller

on the manipulator crane. The manipulator crane was temporarily repaired, and the inspr, tor verified that proper load testing was performed prior to resuming manipulator crane operations in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) surveillance requirement 4.9.6.1 and Duke performance test procedure PT/2/A/4550/01B, Reactor Building and Fuel Transfer Refueling Component Test. The inspector verified from the control room, reactor building, and spent fuel pool that refueling activities were being

accomplished in accordance with TS, licensee procedure PT/2/A/4150/17, Total Core Unloading, and NRC requirements.

The inspector observed refueling activities to verify the following:

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Direct communication was established between the control room and the

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reactor building.

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Staffing requirements were in accordance with TS.

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Control of personnel. access to the spent fuel pool areas was established.

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Changes to procedures were made in accordance with NRC requirements.

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The licensee maintained good housekeeping in the refueling areas.

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Radiological controls were maintained in accordance with approved procedures.

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Appropriate procedure steps and QA hold points were signed off,

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In addition, the inspector verified that functional testing of the j

operability of the following refueling related equipment and systems was

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performed as required by TS and Duke Power Performance Test procedures i

PT/2/A/4550/01A Preparation for Refueling, and PT/2/A/4550/01B Reactor

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Building and Fuel Transfer Refueling Component Test:

Fuel Transfer system

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Reactor building manipulator crane

Spent fuel pool manipulator crane i

Fuel handling tools

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New fuel elevator

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No violations or deviations were identified in the area inscted.

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7.

Temporary Instruction (TI) Closecut

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(Closed) TI 2500/16 - ?nspector to Determine if a Potential Seismic Interaction Exists Between Movable Incore Flux Mapping System and Seal Table at Westinghouse Designed Facilities or Facilities with 'Similar Designs (Units 1 and 2). This TI defined the NRC inspection requirement for IE Information Notice 85-45. The resident inspectors completed these inspection requirements during an inspection conducted April 26 - May 25, 1986 (See Inspection-Report number 50-413/86-19 and 50-414/86-22).

TI 2500/16 is closed.

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