IR 05000413/1988003
| ML20148F341 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  |
| Issue date: | 03/10/1988 |
| From: | Decker T, Sartor W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148F316 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-413-88-03, 50-413-88-3, 50-414-88-03, 50-414-88-3, IEIN-83-28, NUDOCS 8803280132 | |
| Download: ML20148F341 (14) | |
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't UNITED STATES g
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
- REGION 11 101 MARIETTA ST N.W.
ATLANTA. GEORGIA 30323 e,,,,
11AR 141988 Report Nos.:
50-413/88-03,50-414/88-03 i
Licensee: Duke Power Company 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 l
Docket Hos.: 50-413, 50-414 License Nos.:
Catawba Inspection Conducted:
February 17-21, 1988 Inspector: hNA
W. M. Sartor Jr.
V Date ned Accompanying Personnel:
R. T. Hogan J. M. Witi (Battelle)
i Approved by:
J//O/80 T. R. Decker, Section Chief Da'te Signed
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Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection involved the observation of the annual emergency response exercise. This full participation exercise (with the exception of Mecklenburg County and the State of North Ctrolina) was initiated at 6:00 p.m. on February 19, as an unannounced exercise.
Follcwing the staffing and activation of licensee, State, and county emergency facilities, the exercise was suspended until 9:00 a.m. on the next day. The exercise then resumed and was terminated at 2:40 p.m.
Results:
Five exercise weaknesses were identified involving the failure to fully meet exercise objectives in the areas of emergency management, accident j
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assessment, protective action recomendations, and the medical drill.
Therefore, the licensee committed to an early demonstration of corrective actions by conducting a site only medical drill; a partial CMC staff table top
exercise using the February 20, 1988, scenario as the training media; and the full manning and participation of the CMC staff in the forthcoming McGuire Emergency Exercise. Although corrective actions are required, the exercise was considered successful in that the licensee developed a plausible and
challenging scenario that identified training weaknesses.
The licensee's timely and aggressive response to securing corrective actions is indicetive of j
management support to an effective emergency preparedness program.
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REPORT DETA1LS 1.
Persons Centacted Licensee Employees
- R. Bowman, Director, Plant Community Relations
- M. Cartwright, General Manager, Media and Comunity Relations
- W. Haller, Manager, Nuclear Tech Services
- J. Hampton, Station Manager, CNS
- R. Harris, System Emergency Planner
- C. Hartzell, Compliance Engineer, ONS i
- J. Leonard, Station Emergency Planner, McGuire
- M. McIntosh, General Manager, Nuclear Support
- D. Simpson, Station Emergency Planner, CNS
- R. Smith, Manager, Admin and Logistics
- T. Smith, Assistant Emergency Planner, CNS
- F. Wardell, Superintendent, Tech Services, CNS Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians,
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operators, security force members, and office personnel.
NRC Resident Inspectors M. Lesser
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a P. VanDoorn
- Attended exit interview 2.
Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were sumarized on fet,ruary 21, 1988, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.
The inspector
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described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection
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findings listed below.
No dissenting coments were received from the licensee.
A separate meeting was conducted with key management personnel imediately following the fonnal exit to determine the scope of early demonstration of corrective actions required in response to the exercise weaknesses noted in this report.
The licensee did not identify as
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proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector j
during this inspection.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspection.
4.
ExerciseScenario(82301)
The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to deternine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major
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portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's Emergency Plan and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appendix E.
Paragraph IV.F and specific ' criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives.
The scenario developed for this exercise was challenging and adequate to exercise the onsite emergency organizations consistent with the licensee's scope and objectives.
The scenario also provided sufficient information to the State and local government agencies for their participation in the exercise.
It was apparent that significant licensee effort had gone into checking the scenario data as no inconsistencies were noted during the exercise.
Some player criticism was expressed regarding the unrelated events that led to the emergency classifications on February 19 and 20, as well as questions concerning whether or not fuel damage would riae occurred from the scenario events.
However, the anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) portion of the scenario for February 20, was considered sufficiently plausible and challenging by the licensee to warrant using it as the scenario for a partial CMC staff table top
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exercise to correct training weaknesses observed during the exercise.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Drill Scenarios (82301)
Scenarios for the medical emergency and fire drills were reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test specific functions in the licensee's Emergency Plan pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance defined in Section II.N of NUREG-0654.
Scenarios developed for the subject drills were detailed, and fully exercised the licensee's emergency response organization and participating offsite support agencies.
The scenarios provided sufficient information to the local support agencies consistant with the scope of their participation in the drills.
Player performance observed during both the medical emergency and fire drills was fully satisfactory with one significant exception.
The exception was the failure of the health physics personnel to respond to the site of the contaminated injured individual until 30 minutes after the simulated medical emergency was reported.
Although the MEDTEC personnel responding to the event properly provided for the emergency medical care of the injured, there was an excessive delay in both establishing contamination control and evacuating the injured. An additional negative observation included the lack of rubber gloves in the MEDTEC response kit to assist in contamination control.
The licensee determined that the delayed HP response was primarily due to the HP team going to the wrong location.
The inability to provide timely HP support to the site of the medical emergency following repeated requests by the MEDTEC team was
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identifled as an area requiring corrective action. The licensee committed
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to conducting a remedial onsite medical drill with emphasis on timely HP
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support.
Exercise Weakness:
Failure to provide timely HP support to the site of a
contaminated medical emergency (50-413, 414/88-03-01).
I No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)
The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to determine that the responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously.
defined, that adequate staffing was provided to insure initial facility -
accident response in key functional areas at all times, and that the interfaces were specified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2),10 CFR 50, Appendix E.
Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.B.
The inspector verified that the licensee made specific assignments to the
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emergency organization.
The inspector observed the activation, staffing.
and operation of the emer Technical support Center (gency organization in the Control Room, theTSC), and I At each of these centers, the assigned responsibilities of emergency staff personnel appearel to be consistent with the licensee's Emergency Plan.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)
This area was observed to determine that arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources had been made and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response were identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E. Paragraph IV.A.
and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.C.
The licensee's Radiological Emergency Plan provided for emergency response support.
State liaison personnel were provided adequate working space in the CMC.
No violations or deviations were identified, j
8.
Emergency Classification System (82301)
This area was observed to assure that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the nuclear facility licensee i
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), Paragraph IV.C of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, specific guidance promulgated in Section II.D of NUREG-0654, and guidance recommended in IE Information Notice 83-28.
An Emergency Action Level (EAL) matrix was in place to promptly identify and clussify an emergency.
Licensee actions were adequate during the
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exercise to. ensure that timely classifications were made, with one exception.
The exception was the failure to classify the Gcneral-Emergency (GE) at 9:44 a.m. based on the loss of fission product barriers; instead a GE was declared at 9:57 a.m. based on a high radiation reading at the site boundary.
Exercise Weakness:
Failure to meet exercise objective one "Demonstrate the ability to declare emergency classification in accordance with procedures" (50-413, 414/88-03-02).
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)
This area was observed to assure that procedures were established for notification of Stata and local response organizations and emergency personnel by the licensee, and that the content of initial and followup.
messages to response organizations were established.
This area was further observed to assure that means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway were established pursuant to 10CFR50.47(b)(5), Paragraph IV.D of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific guidance promulgated in Section II.E of NUREG-0654.
The inspector observed that notification methods and procedures were established and available for use in providing' information regarding the simulated emergency conditions to federal, State, and local response organizations, and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization, if required.
However, there were observations that prevented the licensee from fully meeting two exercise objectives that affect the notification methods and procedures.
The two exercise objectives not fully met were Numbers 20 and 24 respectively.
- Demonstrate the ability to develop offsite dose projections in accordance with procedures.
Demonstrate the ability to p)rovide timely and appropriate protective action recommendations (PARS to offsite officials in accordance with station procedures or the Crisis Management Plan.
The observations included:
Although the release started at 9:37 a.m. when the airlock door did
not seal, the first followup message to reflect any dose projections or field measurement data was not transmitted until 11:05 a.m.
This was quite significant in consideration of a 40,000 millirem measurement provided in a Corporate Press Bulletin at 10:20 a.m.
The initial PnR provided by the CMC did not agree with the flowchart
contained in Crisis Management Implementing Procedure CMIP-7 Radiological Assessment Grou m
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Exercise Weakness:
Dose projections and field measurement data was not provided in a timely manner to offsite agencies, and the PAR made did not agree with the licensee's PAR flowchart (50-413, 414/88-03-03).
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Emergency Communications (82301)
This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt communications among principal response organizations and emergency
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personnel pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6), Paragraph IV.E of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and guidance promulgated in Section II.F of NUREG-0654.
The inspector observed communications within and between the licensee's Control Room and emergency response facilities (TSC, OSC, and CMC),
between the licensee and offsite agencies, and between the offsite monitoring teams and TSC/ CMC.
Although the necessary hardware and procedures appeared to be in place to provide for adequate emergency comunications, observations revealed that utilization of this equipment i
by players did not ensure the flow of required emergency comunications.
Observations to support this finding include:
The downgrading of the emergency classification from a General Emergency to a Notification of Unusual Event was neither discussed
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with nor comunicated to the TSC from the CMC at the time of the I
reclassification.
The TSC learned of the downgrading during an
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update briefing some fifteen minutes after it had occurred.
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The CMC dose assessment staff was unaware of the radiological release pathway being the air lock door not sealing for approximately one hour after it was known.
- The fact that Unit I had been manually tripped as a result of a reactor coolant pump (RCP) seizure, resulting in an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS), was not common knowiedge. During the critique it was noted that most personnel believed the RCP tripped with normal coastdown; this misconception was undoubtedly a factor in numerous discussions questioning how any fuel damage could have occurred.
- During the fuel handling event on the evening of February 19, some personnel in the TSC were trying to find out what had caused the reactor to trip, when in fact a reactor trip had not occurred.
The above observations were sumarized into an exercise weakness finding as follows:
The overall management of the casualty was hampered by an incomplete flow of information - sometimes between the ERFs and sometimes within an ERF (50-413, 414/88-03-04).
No violations or deviations were identified.
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11. Public Education and Information (82301)
This area was observed to determine that information concerning the simulated emergency had been made available for dissemination to the public as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.
Paragraph IV.D and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.G.
Information was provided to the media and public in advance of the exercise within general guidelines to protect the confidentiality of the starting time.
The licensee promptly established its news center in Charlotte, NC.
Incorrect information provided to the news center from an emergency response facility resulted in the failure to fully meet exercise objective 13 "Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate information to the news media in a timely manner..."
Specifically, the 10:20 a.m.
Bulletin reported an incorrect radiation level of 40,000 millirem at the station boundary; the same information was again used in the 11:20 press conference.
The significance of a 40,000 millirem reading at the site boundary; the fact that the reading was incorrect as reported and out of context with all other radiological information reported; and the lack of any noted attempt to determine the correctness of this reading are indicative of an exercise weakness.
Exercise Weakness:
Failure to ensure accurate news media infonnation to the public (50-413, 414/88-03-05).
No violations or deviations were identified.
12.
Exercise Critique (82301)
The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to determine that shortcomings identified as part of the exercise, were brought to the attention cf management and documented for corrective action pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E, 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria promulgated in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.
A player critique was held foilowing the termination of the exercise. A formal critique was held on February 21, 1988, with key exercise controllers and observers, licensee management, and NRC representatives.
The licensee's critique was detailed, and addressed both substantive deficiencies and indicated improvement items.
Following the licensee's critique, the NRC inspector provided the findings indicated in this report.
The inspector noted that although the findings would require an early demonstration of corrective action to correct the exercise
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weaknesses, the overall emergency response observed would have been i
adequate to protect the health and safety of the public.
It was also
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noted that the onsite performance appeared to be significantly improved from the previous year.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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13.
InspectorFollowup(92701)
a.
(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-413,414/87-07-02:
Provide
additional training for site ERO principals and designated alternates regarding timing of emergency declarations and followup of initial notifications.
Emergency response principals made firm emergency declarations and actively managed the notifications thereof.
b.
(Closed) IFI 50-413, 414/87-07-03:
Failure to demonstrate effective command and control of the OSC required to assure initiation and completion response activities.
The inspector observed that the OSC appeared to be effectively commanded and controlled during the exercise.
14.
Federal Evaluation Team Report The report by the Federal Evaluation Team (Regional Assistance Committee and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV Staff) concerning the activities of offsite agencies during the exercise will be forwarded by separate correspondence.
Attachment:
Scope and Objectives and
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Event Sequence
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SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
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A.
Scope The Catawba exercise, to be conducted on February 19-20, 1988, is designed to meet the exercise requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix E,
Section IV.F.
The 1988 exercise will involve full participation by York County, South Carolina, Gaston County, North Carolina and the State of South Carolina.
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina and the State of North Carolina will participate on a partial basis.
The Duke Power Crisis Management Center will participate.
Limited drills will be held on February 18, 1988. A separate medical drill will be held to involve transportation of a contaminated, injured patient to the hospital.
A separate fire drill will involve support by the off-site fire department.
A formal critique involving Duke Power, NRC, and interested observers (FEMA, State and Counties) will be held on February 21, 1988 at 1:00 P.M.
This critique will be closed to the public and will be held in the O.J.
Miller Auditorium in the Duke Power Electric Center Building, 500 South Church Street in Charlotte, N.C.
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B.
Exercise Objectives (Duke Power Company Emergency Organization)
Emergency Management 1.
Demonstrate the ability to declare emergency classification in accordance with procedures.
2.
Demonstrate the ability to notify the State and the counties within
minutes after declaring an emergency or after changing the emergency classification.
3.
Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify, and staff the TSC and OSC facilities after declaring an Alert or higher emergency class.
4.
Demonstrate the ability to notify NRC not later than 1hourafterdeclaringoneoftheemergencyclasses.
5.
Demonstrate assembly of station personnel within 30 minutes in a
simulated emergency and provide accountability for any not present at the assembly locations.
6.
Demonstrate notification to all on-site personnel of
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major changes in the emergency situation (emergency class, TSC or OSC activation, etc.).
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Demonstrate access control measures to the plant site, CMC, the Electric Center Phase I noom 230 (News Center) and the O.J.
Miller Auditorium (Media Center).
8.
Test communications equipment among on-site emergency facilities including plant extensions, the intercoms, and the on-site radio system.
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9.
Test off-site communications equipment to the county and state warning points, county and state emergency operations centers and to NRC including the Selective Signaling System, outside telephone lines, and the NRC Emergency Notification System.
10.
Test the adequacy and operability of emergency equipment / supplies.
11.
Demonstrate precise and clear transfer of responsibility from the Shift Supervisor in the Control Room to the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC, and from the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC to the Recovery Manager in the CMC.
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12.
Demonstrate proper use of the message format and
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authentication methodology for messages transmitted to states and counties.
13.
Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate information to the news media in a timely manner and to provide effective rumor control according to the Crisis Management Implementing Procedures.
14.
Demonstrate the ability to alert, notify, and staff the CMC after declaring a Site Area Emergency or higher emergency class (or af ter a decision by the Recovery Manager during an Alert).
15.
Demonstrate the ability to enter into recovery, establish a
recovery organization, and notify members of emergency response organizations (i.e.
CMC, TSC, control room, states, counties, and NRC)
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in accordance with the Crisis Management Plan.
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Accident Assessment 16.
Demonstrate the ability to transmit data using the Crisis Management Data Transmittal System in accordance with station procedures and to distribute this data throughout the CMC according to the Crisis g
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Management Implementing Procedures.
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17.
Evaluate the adequacy of the following assessment tools:
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Drawings 2.
Data Display Boards 3.
Maps 18.
Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.
19.
Demonstrate the ability to determine on-site radiation levels and airborne radioiodine concentrations.
20.
Demonstrate the ability to develop off-site dose projections in accordance with procedures.
21.
Demonstrate adequate radio communications between the off-site monitoring teams and the TSC/ CMC.
22.
Demonstrate the ability to collect air, soil, water, and vegetation samples in accordance with procedures.
23.
Demonstrate the ability to locate a simulated, radioactive plume and to measure the off-site s
radiation levels.
Protective Action Recommendations 24.
Demonstrate the ability to provide timely and appropriate protective action recommendations to off-site officials in accordance with station procedures or the Crisis Management Plan.
Plant Operations 25.
Demonstrate the ability to assess the incident and provide mitigation strategies in accordance with station procedures.
Medical Drill 26.
Demonstrate proper response to a simulated medical emergency involving a contaminated patient in accordance with station procedures.
Fire Drill 27.
Demonstrate proper response by the on-site fire brigade to a simulated fire in accordance with station procedures.
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Demonstrate the ability to request and obtain l
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CONFIDENTIAL
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Catawba Exercise Event Sequence
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February 19-20, 1987 Actual Scenario Time Time Event Tfff9)
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1800 1800 Unit I at 100% power and 80 EFPD.
Unit 2 is in a refueling outage with 350 EFPD at shutdown.
Maintenance work is in progress on the upper
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containment inner air lock door on Unit 1.
1805 1805 Fuel handling accident in Unit 2 Fuel Building.
ALERT SHOULD BE DECLARED.
2000 2000 Suspend exercise until 0900 on 02/20/88.
(2/20)
(2/20)
0900 0900 Resume exercise.
0915 0915 Unit 2 radiation monitors (EMF's)
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reading background.
0930 0930 Reactor coolant pump seizure on Unit 1.
No scram on low flow following reactor coolant pump seizure, resulting in an Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS).
pressure builds past the safety valves setpoint.
The safety valves open but one of them sticks open causing a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) through the safety valve.
Transient yields 10%
clad damage.
0932 0932 Operators should manually scram.
0932:15 0932:15 Containment isolates due to low primary system (NC) pressure.
Safety injection (NI) initiates.
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0935 0935 The pressurizer relief tank rupture disk blows open.
0937 0937 Maintenance workers Jn containment exit i
through the outer upper containment air lock door.
Air lock door fails to seal,
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integrity.
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Catawba Exercise Event Sequence February 19-20, 1988
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Page 2 Actual Scenario
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Time Time Event L
0950 0350 GENERAL EMERGENCY SHOULD BE DECLARED due to loss of fission product barriers.
1100 1100 Release stops due to negative
containment pressure.
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1200 1200 Maintenance /I&E repairs failed seal on upper containment air lock door.
(2/23)
1330 1330 Time jump of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Rccovery phase begins.
1430 1430 Exercise ends.
Rev. 7
/ 11-20-87
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