IR 05000387/1989033

Insp Repts 50-387/89-33 & 50-388/89-31 on 891106-09. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous NRC Insp Findings

ML17156B575
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	12/24/1989
From:	Baunack W, Blumberg N NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML17156B573	List: IR 05000387/1989033 ML17156B572 ML17156B574
References
50-387-89-33, 50-388-89-31, NUDOCS 9001180306
Download: ML17156B575 (9)

Text

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report Nos.

50-387/89-33 50-388/89-31 Docket Nos.

50-387 5n-P98 License Nos.

NPF-14 NPF-22 Licensee:

Penns lvania Power 5 Li ht Com an 2 North Ninth Street Allentown Penns lvania 18101 Facility Name:

Sus uehanna Steam Electric Station Inspection At:

Berwick Penns lvania Inspection Conducted:

November 6-9 1989 t

W. Baunack, Sr eactor Eng'r 'erational Programs Section,. Operati s

B nch, DRS

/z >~/e date Approved by:

N. Blumberg, Ch ef, Operationa Programs Section, Operations Branch, DRS date Ins ection Summar

Routine Announced Ins ection on November 6-9 1989 Re ort Nos. 50-387/89-33 and 50-388/89-31 Areas Ins ected:

Licensee actions on previous NRC inspection findings.

Results:

One violation was identified.

During performance of inservice testing of pumps, the pump differential pressure of a residual heat removal pump was outside its acceptance range and the pump was not declared inoperable (Paragraph 2.2).

In addition, two unresolved items were identified; one concerning the need to complete repairs of RHRSW pump flow meters; and the other concerning the need to install new containment radiation monitor panels to eliminate primary to secondary containment leakage.

In all, eleven pi ~v iou~ iy openeu i~~i islam~

were correctea oy one licensee.

xn general, one licensee's corrective actions were prompt and acceptabl DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted I

• J. Blakesl ee, Assi stant Plant Superintendent

"M. Golden, Plant Engineering Supervisor, Programs and Support

• G. Kuczyski, Techincal Supervisor

"D. McGann.

l'omnliancp Fnginoor

"H. Palmer, Jr., Supervisor of Operations

"H. Ri ly, HP/Chemistry Supervisor

"D. Ritter, Power Production Engineer

• D. Roth, Sr.,

Compliance Engineer

"G. Stanley, Assistant Superintendent-Outages

• R. Wehry, Compliance Engineer U.S. Nuclear Re viator Commission

"S. Barber, Senior Resident Inspector

"Denotes those attending the exit meeting.

The inspector also contacted other administrative and technical personnel during the inspection.

2.0 Licensee Action On Previous Ins ection Findin s

>>/--

/

This item resulted from an excessive use of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system in the suppression pool cooling mode as well as the Core Spray (CS)

system in the full flow test mode 'to aid in the mixing of the suppression poo'1 water.

An additional concern, for a possible water hammer condition in the event of a LOCA and a loss of offsite power with the RHR and CS systems in suppression pool cooling was also expressed.

Several factors were responsible for the excessive need for suppres-sion pool cooling.

Two principle factors were Excessive Safety Relief Valve (SRV) leakage and the inability to accurately determine bulk pool temperature.

Overhaul of the SRVs has significantly reduced their leakage and improvements have been made in determining suppres-sion pool bulk temperature.

These efforts have substantially reduced the need for operation of the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode as verified by a review of the Unit

RHR Suppression VV S

VvV ~

i hsyI

~ <<<

i S

I Vl>

I C) v LV'JJ

'I

Licensee procedures were verified to have been changed to prohibit the use of both RHR and the CS in full flow test at the same time.

A review of Susquehanna Review Committee meeting minutes shows the committee has been following this issue closely.

The committee feels corrective actions taken (SRV leakage reduction and improved suppression pool temperature measurement)

have made the present mode of operation acceptable.

Long term resolution associated with the wato.r hammer issue.

no lonaer an uraent matter.

is being t~arked bv

.

the committee.

2.2 Closed Unresolved Item 387/86-24-03 388/86-26-01 As a result of Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW)

pump problems which were experienced during 1986, this item'as initiated to further review the licensee's pump testing and analysis of results.

The licensee documented and described the resolution to RHRSW pump problems in significant operating. occurrence reports 1-86-174, and 2-86-152.

The cause of the problems was attributed to impeller suction recirculation cavitation.

Nuclear Plant engineering recommend-ed certain pump modifications be made.

In addition, the RHRSW pump maintenance procedure MT-016-001 was revised to ensure proper impeller to pump casing clearances when pumps are rebuilt.

Subsequent pump inspections have not revealed any similar problems.

Pump Inservice Test ( IST) results show that for the, past 18 months the pumps have met their surveillance test acceptance criteria with one exception which is discussed below.

Based on these findings this item is closed.

During the closeout of the above item, the technical specification required inservice testing of pumps in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boile, and Pressure Vessel Code was reviewed for the RHRSW pumps.

This review showed that on March 28, 1989 RHRSW pump 2PSOGB failed the. acceptance criteria for pump differential pressure established in surveillance procedure S0-216-003, (}uarterly Residual Heat Removal Service Water System Flow Verification.

The acceptance criteria for pump differential pressure at test conditions was 65 to 71 psid.

The actual differential pressure obtained was 77.86.psid.

This increase in differential pressure indicates an improvement of pump performance by about 400 gpm.

In accordance with the surveillance procedure, the pump was declared inoperable.

Later the same day the pump was declared operable based on revised IST acceptance criteria established by an engineering

Section XI of the ASME Code in IWP-3230(b) states, if deviations fall within the required action range (outside the acceptance criteria of the surveillance procedure)

the pump shall be declared inoperative and not returned to service until the cause of the deviation has been determined and the condition corrected.

The code further states in IWP-3230(c), correction shall be either replacement or repair or an analysis that the pump will still fulfillits function, with a new set of reference value~ established, The analysis noted t~o cause could have been possible reduction in test system leakage or a change in test instrument indications.

The analysis indicated further investigation will be needed for the determination of the exact cause.

The pump was returned to service without the cause of the deviation being identified as required.

A check of instrumentation was performed on March 30, 1989 with no significant error identified.

No further investigation of the cause was conducted until this in-spection.

The failure to identify the cause of the deviation from established acceptance criteria is considered to be a violation (388/89-31-01).

Discrepancies with'

loop RHRSW system flow indication have been noted since 1986.

Differences in flow indication of as much as 600 GPM with flow meters in series have been identified.

On December 16, 1988 an Engineering Work Request (EWR) M81530 was written to resolve this disparity in flow indications of both units RHRSW sys-tems.

The EWR is still open.

Since these instruments are used in the performance of IST of the RHRSW pumps this item is considered unresolved until the EWR is closed (388/89-31-02).

2.3 Closed Unresolved Item 388/86-26-03 This item deals with leakage identified at containment radiation monitor (CRM) panels.

This leakage would allow containment atmos-phere to leak to the secondary containment.

The leakage was identi-fied as coming from the CRM blowers which are not leak-tight.

Suitable replacement blowers could not be obtained.

Two Non-Conformance Reports (NCRs) 86-0835 and 0836 were initiated to identify the non-conforming condition of the blowers.

Senior management approval has been given to a

CRM project which will design and install new CRM panels that will resolve the problem of primary to secondary contain-ment atmosphere leakage.

The open NCRs have become the tracking mechanism for the closure of this long term item.

As a result of procedure changes, which have been made, the units are presently aligned in a safe configuration to prevent post-accident El III QCvll1VVQI~ YIIL4ILIIDCldkvppdlMV&vJ I VIWUGyysv IC>OGI 'CIPLVQ 144 tion JNPE-SE-011.

The safety aspect of this item is considered corrected.

Long term corrective actions are being tracked by the licensee's corrective action system.

This item (388/86-26-03) is considered close The final resolution of the issue will occur when NCRs 86-0835 and 0836 are closed upon installation of the replacement panels.

The closure of the NCRs will be tracked by unresolved item 388/89-31-03.

2.4 Closed Unresolved Item 388/87-09-01 2.5 On April 16, 1987, after a reactor scram caused by a Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSJV) closure, two independen't exces~ivo >>srtn~

coolant system heatup transients occurred.

As required by technical specifications the licensee performed an engineering analysis of the effect of these heatup events on the reactor coolant system struc-tural integrity.

Region I specialists reviewed the licensee's an-alysis and determined that the analysis performed was conservative in demonstrating that the heatup transients did not result in conditions exceeding allowable code requirements.

Brittle fracture was deter-mined not to be a concern, and the contribution of the transients to the fatigue usage factor was'mall.

Region I has no further questions relating to this matter.

Closed Unresolved Item 387/87-16-04 As a result of temporary scaffolding interfering with the movement of a check valve handle a spill of approximately 1300 gallons of water resulted in a core spray pump room.

This item was opened to review the licensee's corrective action to prevent recurrence.

The licensee initiated significant operating occurrence report SOOR 1-87-275 to track the resolution of this item.

This item was resolved by pro-viding training to the individuals involved with the construction of scaffolding.

Attendance records show that on October 29, 1987 train-ino was provided that identified the need to maintain adequate clear-ance between any scaffold and operational equipment, valves, etc.

2.6 Closed Violation 387/88-04-01 and 388/88-03-01 Ouring a tour. of the facility it was noted that the front standards of the turbines had no high radiation area postings even though the area behind the front standard is a high radiation area during power operation.

A violation was issued for the failure to post this high radiation area.

The inspector verified the licensee's corrective actions were accomplished.

These actions were to remove the ladders which allowed access to the areas and to properly post the areas.

In addition, Health Physics Procedure HP-HI-020, "Startup and Scram Actions for HP. Techs" was changed to reflect posting requirements for these areas.

2.7 Cl osed Violati on 388/88-06-01 This violation consisted of three parts A. 1, A.2, and A.3.

These parts are addressed separately as follows:

A.l An operator failed to'follow an operating procedure while securing a fuel pool cooling pump.

The licensee's corrective action for this event was to revise applicable operating procedur'es.

The inspector verified Operating Procedure, OP-235-001,

"Operating Procedure for Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System" was revised to reflect changes recommended by the Nuclear Safety Assessment Groups investigation of the event.

Also verified was a change to Alarm Response Procedure, LA-0207-001, to include direction to shut the filter demineralization inlet and outlet valves should flow control be lost.

A.2 NRC was not provided timely notification of a press release being made.

A.3 The licensee's corrective action was to revise applicable procedures.

The inspector verified procedure NDI-16. 1. 1, Significant Occurrences of Public Concern was revised to include shift supervision review of news releases and the requirement to report the event to the'RC.

A corporate procedure was also revised to require corporate communications to transmit a hard copy of news releases to the shift supervisor.

Contrary to the requirements of a work authorization, an IEC technician improperly removed a temporary installed jumper.

The licensee's corrective action was to review the event with all I&C personnel reemphasizing the need for paying close attention to detail.

The inspector reviewed documentation which showed the incident was reviewed with all IKC personnel.

2.8 Closed Yiolation 388/88-06-02 This violation consisted of two parts B. 1 and B.2.

These parts are addressed separately as follows:

B. 1 Failure to perform an adequate review of a station procedure.

The licensee's corrective action was to perform training of operations and technical staff personnel to reinforce the importance of properly bounding recovery plans when placing equipment back in service following unexpected transients.

The 1 ll I

I

~ -l I l p JA

'

[

I I

~

/

g

~

~ ~" Iles vvvsc asi

~ vi 9 v

)Is> t wht

~

~

I

~

~ 4U

~ %

~

v s I a is)

had been performed at the June 20, 1988 monthly Technical-Section/Safety Meetin.2. Failure to correctly identify a fuse on a blocking permit.

The licensee's corrective action was to revise applicable admin-istrative procedures and instructions to require specification of the system designator and 'fuse number, location and position on all requests for safety tagging involving fuses in GE panels.

The Inspector Verified Instruction OI-AD-037, Fuse Control, pvnrodurp AO-OA-]03, protective Pc rmit and Tag System and Maintenance Planning Guide MI-PS-001 were revised to provide for complete fuse identification on all requests for tagging.

2.9 Closed Violation 388/88-06-03

Failure to properly post a turbine building door while in the open position.

The licensee's corrective actions for this event were to (1) provide training for HP technicians regarding this event and (2) review turbine building ingress/egress point controls.

The training for HP technicians on the posting procedure for open doors was conducted on May 19, 1988.

Health physics has conducted a review of the access and egress of personnel and material from the turbine building.

As a result of this review five design change packages have been issued.

These changes include adding. alarms, improving locks, and adding a key card system.

Records show three of the modifications have been completed and two have had physical work begun.

2. 10 Closed Unresolved Item 388/88-09-OI On Ao il 25, I988 a license electrician received flash burns to this eyes and face when he accidently shorted an energized bus bar to ground.

It was determined the electrician was taking several prescribed drugs, and it was felt these drugs may have affected his judgment.

This item remained open pending the licensee's investiga-tion of the matter.

The licensee has completed an investigation of the incident.

One of the findings of the investigation was that a major contributor to the accident was the combination effect of the prescribed drugs which the worker had taken that day.

To prevent recurrence the licensee conducted training for all personnel informing them that prescribed medication may affect their ability to perform certain tasks and that it is their responsibility to inform supervision of the type of medication prescribed or illness that may exist.

Al.so, supervisors v si e:

ail i cv v i c>>'

c>pvnsib i I i vp vy cn>UI e eiiip iupcc plight I(.a i illness and/or prescribed medication receive proper and thorough evaluation relative to their work assignment '

2. 11 Closed Violation 388/88-10-01 A Nonconformance Report (NCR) was not issued to document the cause and corrective action associated with foreign material (small block of wood) that was found lodged in the suction bell of a Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) pump.

Than 1 '

r ter

'

~ etna hfI 0 00 llgPA ev as I

>>>>

~ 0

~ e vvvv eU 4Cwe

~ em

~ alt

>I

~.Ie~ C, ~

el t 1~

Mals 4cvOC a va mall LJ avl of wood being present.

The block probably chipped off cribbing used to support the pump during installation.

Inspection and cleaning of inlet screens and pump bays for all ESW and RHRSW pumps was completed.

Maintenance procedures were revised to incorporate pump bay cleaning and cleanliness inspection of inlet bays during pump overhaul.

Preventive maintenance procedures were prepared to conduct pump bay inlet screen inspections periodically.

Also, station personnel were reminded of the importance of properly recognizing and reporting noncomforming conditions through an article published in the station news.

3.0

~Mana ement

~eetinces Licensee management was informed of the scope and purpose of the inspection at the entrance interview on November 6, 1989.

The findings of the inspec-tion were discussed with licensee representatives during the course of the inspection and presented to licensee management at the November 9, 1989 exit interview (see paragraph 1 for attendees).

At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector, nor did the licensee indicate that areas co.ere" by ";.'.s inspection contained proprietary information.