ML17156B360

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Insp Rept 50-387/89-26 on 890807-08.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Chronology of Events & Reasons That Led to Starting Up Plant W/Potentially Unacceptable Ultrasonic Indications in Reactor Vessel
ML17156B360
Person / Time
Site: Susquehanna 
Issue date: 09/19/1989
From: Kaplan H, Oliveri M, Strosnider J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML17156B358 List:
References
50-387-89-26, NUDOCS 8909260114
Download: ML17156B360 (7)


See also: IR 05000387/1989026

Text

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report

No.

50-387/89-26

Docket No.

50-387

License

No.

NPF-14

Licensee:

Penns

lvania Power

and Li ht

Com an

2 North Ninth Street

Allentown

Penns

1 vania

18101

Facility Name:

Sus

uehanna

Steam Electric Station Unit

1

Inspection At:

Berwick

Penns

lvania

I

C

d:.~A7-8

89

Inspectors

J.

Kaplan,

Reactor

Engineer

date

. Oliveri,

NDE Technician

7 /i/H

date

Approved by:

trosnider,

Chief,

MPS,

EB,

DRS

date

Ins ection

Summar

Announced Ins ection

on Au ust 7-8

1989

Re ort No.

50-387/89-26

Areas Ins ected:

Review of chronology of events

and reasons

that led to plant

start

up with potentially unacceptable

ISI ultrasonic indications in the

vicinity of a longitudinal

seam weld in the reactor vessel.

Results:

The inspectors

determined that the plant was started

up with potentially

unacceptable

ultrasonic indications in the reactor vessel

because

of inadequate

procedural

controls regarding

the disposition

and evaluation of ISI ultrasonic

indications.

The problem

stemmed

from the lack of timely evaluation resulting

fr'om poor communication

between

the licensee

and the ISI subcontractor.

The

licensee failed to maintain appropriate

surveillance of the subcontractor's

activities and the latter failed to formally notify the licensee of the final

disposition of a complex pattern of ultrasonic indications in a timely manner.

Subsequently (after startup),

the licensee's

ISI and

NDE Level III concurred

8e09260114

":9091

PbR

ADOCK 0~000387

9

PDC

with GE's evaluation;

however,

the licensee

determined that additional informa-

tion from Engineering

was necessary

to verify the acceptability of the indi-

cations.

The indications were ultimately attributed to segregated

streaks

of

nonmetallic inclusions,

which are not considered

relevant

by ASME Section XI/V.

Also, the licensee

had

a fracture mechanics

analysis

performed of two groups of

indications which potentially could be construed

to be rejectable.

The analysis

indicated these

indications are acceptable

by code

and should not experience

significant crack growth or challenge

reactor vessel integrity.

DETAILS

1.0

Persons

Contacted

Penns

lvania

Power

and Li ht

David S.

Borge, ISI Engineer

Ross A. Beckley,

QC Supervisor

George J.

Kuczynske,

Technical

Supervisor

Robert A. Baker,

NDE Level III

James J.

Graham,

Operations Assistant

Manager

D.

F.

McAnn, Compliance

Engineer

S.

L. Denson,

Outage Supervisor

T.

C. Dalpiaz,

Maintenance

Outage Supervisor

T.

K. Stiengass,

ISI Supervisor

Dale

R. Roth,

SR Compliance

Engineer

Jerry Blakeslee,

Asst. Superintendent

of Plant

Genie Stanley,

Asst. Superintendent

of Outages

General Electric Nuclear Ener

ZB

Michael

Stamm,

Project Manager

K.

R. Loll, Site .Services

Manager

~Back round

On April 22,

1989,

General Electric completed inservice inspection of weld

BA in the reactor vessel utilizing an automatic ultrasonic

system.

The

presence

of numerous indications led to

a series of events

as

shown in

the chronological tabulation in Exhibit A regarding the evaluation

and

final disposition of the subject indications.

The details of these

events

are discussed

below.

Weld BA is

a longitudinal

seam located in

the lower shell

course

(Ring ¹1).

The shell, (6.44" thick) was

fabricated

from SA-533 Gr B, Class

I rolled plate.

3.0

~Findin

a

During the recent Inservice Inspection of the reactor

vessel

General

Electric, the ISI subcontractor,

found ninety six (96) ultrasonic

indications in the vicinity of Weld BA, using the

GERIS automatic

system.

Thirty-four indications were recorded

in this area during the preservice

inspection

(PSI).

On April 4,

1989, the

GE technician questioned

the

significance of these indications because

of their complexity and

number

in terms of ASME XI flaw characterizations

requirements.

The indications

appeared

to be confined to the heat affected

zone of Weld BA and adjacent

base metal.

The raw data

was submitted to GE,

San Jose for evaluation

without notifying the licensee.

After the grouped indications were

bounded

in a rectangle

and characterized,

preliminary analysis of the data

indicated

two possible flaws, identified as ¹32 and ¹73.

Upon reanalysis,.

flaw ¹73, originally considered

to be

a rejectable

planar flaw, was

evaluated

as

an acceptable

laminar flaw.

Flaw ¹32 which consisted

of

fourteen (14) individual indications

was initially characterized

as

a

rejectable

laminar flaw because it exceeded

the

maximum area

requirements

of Section XI.

Upon final analysis

both ¹32 and ¹73 flaws were judged to

be irrelevant as permitted by Section

XI and Section

V since they were

considered

to be due to segregated

streaks

of nonmetallic inclusions which

are usually found in plate of this grade

and thickness.

This conclusion

which was subsequently

concurred

in by the licensee's

metallurgist,

was

supported

by the following facts:

(1) the indications found by straight

beam technique

were oriented in a parallel direction relative to the

length of the plate; (2) the indications

were located in the center of the

plate thickness

and extended

approximately

5" outboard

from the weld; (3)

angle

beam examination did not reveal

any indications associated

with

these

laminar oriented indications;

and,

(4) no reduction in back reflec-

tion was found associated

with indications.

The increase

in the

number of

indications

between

the ISI and

PSI data

was attributed to the implementa-

tion of Regulatory Guide

1. 150 which resulted

in an increased

search unit

overlap (.2" maximum step

size

used in the ISI vs.

.75" maximum step size

used in the PSI).

On July 24,

1989,

subsequent

to plant restart

on June

10,

GE formally

submitted their final report

+o the licensee,

but failed to provide an

independent

review of the subject indications,

On receipt of report the

licensee's

NDE Level III concurred with GE's evaluation

and,

per procedure,

forwarded the report to Engineering for their concurrence.

Licensee's

management

decided to treat flaw ¹32 as

a rejectable

flaw and requested

that Engineering

perform

a fracture analysis.

Flaw ¹73 was classified

as

laminar and determined to be acceptable;

however,

the fracture mechanics

analysis conservatively

bounded flaw ¹73 as well as ¹32.

NRC was notified

of the problem on July 28,

1989.

On August 11,

1989

NRC received the

fracture mechanics

report that concluded

flaw ¹32 (a worst case)

did not

exceed

the crack growth and fracture criteria of ASME XI.

The licensee

provided the inspector with a certified mill test report for

the subject shell plate (Lukens Steel

Heat C0814).

Although the test

report did not include ultrasonic results,

the licensee

reported that the

shell plate

had

been ultrasonically inspected

by Chicago Bridge 5 Iron

before field fabrication, followed by ultrasonic inspection of the weld

after completion with acceptable

results.

Licensee

review of nonconfor-

mance records

indicated

a problem during welding of the upper portion of

the weld at the 3/4" thickness

level in which preheat

was inadvertently

dropped.

No problem was reported at the mid-level, the location of the

ultrasonic indications.

The licensee

indicated that they will continue to

search

CBKI's process

sheets

for additional information regarding fabrica-

tion of the vessel.

The licensee

also reported that they possess

a nozzle

dropout which they

may use to determine

the quality of the subject plate

particularly with respect

to the type and severity of the nonmetallic

inclusions.

4. 0

~Summa r

The licensee's

actions

subsequent

to being informed of indications ¹32

and ¹73 were appropriate.

However, these actions

should

have

been

completed prior to returning the plant. to service.

Returning the plant

to service without appropriate

evaluation

and review of potentially code

rejectable

indications is

a serious

concern.

The inspector determined that the basic

reason for the licensee starting

up the plant with potentially rejectable

ultrasonic flaws in the reactor

- vessel

was due to inadequate

procedural

controls,

both within the licensee's

and ISI subcontractor'

organization.

The under lying fault appears

to be

due to the licensee's

failure to maintain appropriate

surveillance of the

subcontractor's

inspection activities

and subsequent

evaluation

process

to

assure

conformance to ASME XI requirements.

Fai lur'e to provide adequate

control of ISI activities is a violation of 10

CFR Appendix B, Criterion IX

(50-387/89"26-01).

I

0

Although the preponderance

of evidence

including metallurgical

and

ultras. nic factors

supported

the licensee'

and subcontractor'

opinion

that the indications were due to segregated

streaks

of nonmetallic inclu-

sions in the plate material,

the licensee

opted to take

a conservative

approach

and treat the two groups of indications

as significant flaws.

The flaws were subjected

to

a Section

XI fracture mechanics

analysis

and

found to be acceptable.

The licensee

indicated that they will reinspect

Weld BA and adjoining plate in the next outage

and will keep

NRC informed

of their ongoing search of fabrication records

and the results of any

metallurigcal

studies

regarding the subject plate.

5.0

Exit Interview

An exit interview was held

on August 8,

1989 with members of the

licensee's

staff noted in Paragraph

1.

The inspector discussed

the

scope

and findings of the inspection.

At no time during this inspection

was

written material

provided to the licensee

by the inspector.

Time Line

UT Inspection of weld "BA" completed

GE technician

questions

indications,

PP&L not notified

GE summary

sheet

prepared,

weld "BA" acceptable

but no independent

review performed

and

PP&L not notified

GE ISI crew departs site

Plant start

up

GE issues final report evaluating

weld "BA" indications acceptable

PP&L issues

ISI notification form 54 (INF) sent to

NDE Level III to

receive his concurrence.

After'concurring INF 54 sent to plant

engineering for their concurrence

Engineering replies

"May take

some time to concur with INF 54"

NCR 89-0459 issued

by ISI supervisor - requests

more information to

characterize

indications ¹32 and ¹73

Management notified, Engineering notified to treat indications

as

valid flaws for conservatism - initiate fracture analysis

NRC notified

Results of fracture mechanics

analysis

indicate indications ¹32 and

¹73 acceptable

by code.

0