IR 05000387/1997099
| ML17158C319 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 09/26/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17158C318 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-97-99, 50-388-97-99, NUDOCS 9710020208 | |
| Download: ML17158C319 (13) | |
Text
ENCLOSURE SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE (SALP)
SUSQUEHANNA STEAM'ELECTRIC STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 REPORT NOS. 50-387/97-99 AND 50-388/97-99 1.
BACKGROUND The SALP Board convened on August 28,
'I 997, to assess Pennsylvania Power and Light (PP&L) Company's nuclear safety performance at the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station during the period August 6, 1995, through August 16, 1997.
The Board was conducted pursuant to NRC Management Directive (MD) 8.6, "Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance."
Board members were Charles W. Hehl, (Board Chairman), Director of Reactor Projects, NRC Region I (Rl), Larry E. Nicholson, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Rl, and John F. Stolz, Director, Project Directorate 1-2, NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
The Board developed this assessment for the approval of the NRC Region I Administrator.
The performance ratings and the functional areas used below are described in NRC MD 8.6 (See NRC Administrative Letter 93-20)
~
II.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS-OPERATIONS Overall performance in operations was good.
A strong and conservative approach to operation of the plant was demonstrated by management and staff decisions in response to plant challenges.
Operations department initiatives resulted in improvements in the clarity and thoroughness of shift turnovers, and verbal communications between operators and control room supervision.
However, some significant failures of licensed and non-licensed nuclear plant operators, to perform and document required equipment checks and inspec'tions raised fundamental questions about the adequacy of supervisory oversight and communication of management expectations.
In the latter half of the assessment period, increased operations management oversight of control room and plant activities resulted in improved adherence to procedures, field communications, and Nonlicensed Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO) performance.
Operating configuration control was not consistently effective as evidenced by the failure to maintain adequate equipment status control over safety related equipment in four instances.
The misalignment of the "A" emergency diesel generator (EDG) Woodward governor, the misalignment of the "E" EDG auxiliary supply breaker and the improperly controlled plenum door in the control room emergency outside air supply system were significant events, resulting in degraded safety related systems.
In addition, a jet pump.
flow transmitter misalignment resulted in a loss of jet pump flow indication.
These problems were largely a result of human performance deficiencies.
97i0020208 970926 PDR ADOCK 05000387
Licensed operator performance was generally good and demonstrated a strong safety perspective.
Licensed operators were experienced, knowledgeable, and in general, well trained.
Plant evolutions were performed with good regard to safety and operators displayed a conservative approach to plant operations during events.
Notable instances of excellent operator response were: a Shift Supervisor made quick, conservative decisions in response to a system particulate iodine noble gas alarm avoiding an unnecessary entry into an emergency action level, and a Plant Control Operator reduced power in response to a reactor recirculation pump controller failure avoiding a more significant plant transient.
However, a number of performance related errors have occurred.
These errors mainly reflected inattention to detail, although some knowledge deficiencies were identified.
The errors included: failing to recognize TS requirements, completing a mode change outside the requirements of the TS, manipulation of an incorrect control rod, inadequate responses to alarmed conditions, impacting a reactor vessel flange cover with a blade guide, configuration control errors, and a failure to adequately respond to an accumulation of hydrogen gas in the offgas system.
Nonlicensed Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO) performance was generally adequate, but performance problems were identified for several activities.
An example of these activities was the inadequate verification of the "E" emergency diesel generator (EDG) electrical breaker TS surveillance alignment.
White evaluating NPO errors, significant weaknesses regarding individual performance, training, and licensed supervisory oversight were identified.
Plant operations review committee (PORC) activities and the condition report (CR) process supported the safe operation of the units.
The PORC conducted indepth reviews of operating activities and made conservative recommendations to Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) management.
There is strong site and Pennsylvania Power and Light Company (PPSL) corporate management response to significant issues identified in CRs.
Improvements were made to the corrective action process during this period, but the quality of initial operability determinations was mixed.
The licensee's performance in the area of self assessment was mixed.
Some operations self assessment initiatives were insightful and aggressive; such as an operations industry benchmarking effort. Other efforts were weak.
For example, the operations self assessment process, Nuclear Assessment Service (NAS) audits, and Independent Safety Evaluation Services surveillances failed to identify and resolve the NPO performance issues prior to the "E" EDG event.
The licensee conducted a generally good licensed operator qualification program with high quality examinations, complex simulator scenarios, and a high standard of evaluations.
However, several performance errors raised questions regarding specific areas of knowledge throughout the period'thereby questioning the effectiveness of the training programs in the associated areas.
The operations area is rated Category III.
PERFORIVIANCE ANALYSIS-MAINTENANCE Overall performance in the maintenance area was good.
Safety system reliability and plant material condition continued to be strengths at Susquehanna.
However, maintenance performance errors resulted in several plant transients, including two plant scrams.
The increased affect on the plant from maintenance errors and the continuing nature of performance weaknesses are considered an indication of a decline in performance from the previous period.
PP5L maintenance processes and procedures generally provided adequate control over maintenance activities, but weaknesses exist.'PKL depended heavily on the training and experience level of its work force in addition to field engineer designated maintenance assurance acceptance testing to assure the quality of performed maintenance.
These weaknesses resulted in the destruction of a diesel generator firing circuit due to an inadequately controlled maintenance activity and numerous less significant work plan errors.
Human performance and the quality of work were typically good, however, an increased number of maintenance related errors adversely affected plant operation.
The root causes for maintenance problems during this SALP were similar to those identified in the previous SALP. Personnel errors resulted from weaknesses in attention to detail, conformance with procedures, and implementation of station work practices.
Corrective actions to address these weaknesses have not been effective in precluding several significant plant events.
On two occasions, errors during non-safety related maintenance activities resulted in reactor scrams.
In other instances, maintenance errors resulted in a reactor recirculation system runback and an inoperable stack monitoring system.
Management oversight and involvement in followup to high profile maintenance activities were effective and resulted in excellent performance.
However, management oversight in the field during routine activities was not consistently effective.
Examples include a nonsafety related floor plug excavation that resulted in a reactor scram and a control rod drive mechanism that was detensioned without proper supervisory controls.
Maintenance backlog of safety related and nonsafety related equipment was effectively managed.
This was demonstrated by good equipment performance and reliability.
Equipment returned to the operations department following maintenance evolutions consistently performed well in service.
PPRL established an emergency work authorization maintenance crew to respond to high priority maintenance associated with safety related components or maintenance intended to prevent plant transients.
Coordination and communications between the emergency work authorization maintenance crew and operations were a strength.
This special maintenance crew was successful in responding to and correcting a number of significant plant conditions.
The licensee continued to implement an effective surveillance program.
Surveillance tests were well controlled and executed, with appropriate consideration for ongoing plant activitie Licensee self assessment activities provided valuable insights into specific maintenance performance weaknesses.
Management response to these weaknesses were primarily
'targeted at improving the training of the work force and improving supervisory oversight.
Mainteriance training was excellent and provided the appropriate certification training for the tasks that maintenance technicians performed.
Maintenance personnel received a
considerable amount of technical training over a broad range of initial, advanced and specialty maintenance tasks.
The extensive training and experience levels of PPSL maintenance personnel appear to be a significant factor in the high safety system reliability, the excellent plant material condition, and the identification of work plan errors in the field prior to implementation.
The Maintenance area is rated Category 2.
IV.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS-ENGINEERING Overall performance in the engineering area was good.
Management involvement and oversight in engineering activities was evident in the good resolution of the electrical breaker issues and review of plant issues documented in condition reports.
However, the quality of the engineering product was at times not consistent as evidenced by occasional weak operability determinations and an initial poor quality Technical Specification amendment submittal relative to response time testing.
Engineering support to operations and maintenance was mixed.
The material condition of the plant was good.
Several significant issues, such as the redesign of the reactor vessel level keep fillsystem and the calibration of the feedwater flow instrumentation, were resolved in an aggressive manner.
A suppression pool cleanup program was implemented ahead of problems found at other plants.
However, lower profile issues were not always adequately resolved.
Examples included problems with ventilation, condensate transfer system, and the reactor core isolation cooling steam line drain pot.
The quality of some operability determinations was weak.
For example, the evaluation of anomalous performance of a High Pressure Coolant Injection valve did not adequately consider the full impact on system operability and the initial technical basis to support an operability determination for a degraded power supply was very weak.
Responses to industry operating experience were good but follow through was not'always completed in a timely manner.
For example, a review of the control room ventilation system for single failure vulnerabilities, recommended from an evaluation of NRC Information Notice 88-61, had not been performed.
In general, modification activities were performed effectively and drawings, procedures, and other design basis documents were revised appropriately.
The approach to reduce the number of mechanical snubbers was thorough; the design guide used was comprehensive and provided detailed criteria for pipe support analyses, However, several instances occurred in which safety evaluations to support maintenance work were not performed as required.
For example, changes to the facility involving blocking high energy line barrier doors, increasing DC float voltage, installing test equipment on the emergency diesel
generators and cross-connecting the fire protection systems were made without adequate safety evaluations.
Poor design of the supplemental decay heat removal system resulted in the rupture of a section of plastic pipe and minor injury to a plant worker.
Design and licensing basis were generally well maintained and discrepancies were being identified and corrected through the Improved Technical Specification project and the Current Licensing Basis Review project.
However, these efforts were not consistently comprehensive as evidenced by additional discrepancies identified during subsequent NRC review.
For example, the Design Basis Review project failed to identify that the Residual Heat Removal System annunciator panel did not meet the requirements of the appropriate design standard.
The Engineering area is rated Category 2.
V.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS-PLANT SUPPORT r
The plant support functional area covers activities related to radiological controls, effluent and environmental monitoring, security, emergency preparedness, fire protection, and housekeeping controls.
Overall performance in radiological controls was excellent as evidenced by extensive planning and effective implementation of radiological controls for outage work. The outage planning drywell coordinator effectively coordinated ALARAcontrols into the daily drywell schedule, and the staff maintained good oversight of outage work. Health physics controls for key outage activities including prejob briefings, radiation work permit controls, video and audio monitoring of work activities, and communications were excellent.
Radioactive waste and transportation programs were effectively implemented.
Although deficiencies were identified in radiological posting and contamination'ontrols, there were no significant associated consequences (e.g., unplanned exposures)
and response to these deficiencies was very good, especially in the area of contamination controls.
The radiological environmental monitoring and effluent control programs continued to exhibit excellent performance, and were effective in ensuring that the impact on'ublic health and safety and the environment was minimal.
The security program was very effective and continued to exhibit high quality performance.
Management support was evidenced by the completion of an assessment aid upgrade, procurement of training aids to add realism during contingency response training, and by the allocation of resources for hiring four additional security officers. The access authorization program provided high assurance that individuals granted unescorted access were trustworthy and reliable.
Controls for identifying, resolving, and preventing security program problems were effective.
The emergency preparedness (EP) program was determined to be overall effective although performance weaknesses were identified.
Emergency response plans and procedures were effectively implemented, facilities were maintained in a good state of readiness, overall performance during drills was good, and excellent relations with off-site emergency I
r response agencies were maintained.
Performance weaknesses were identified during emergency drills including communication difficulties, equipment problems that prevented timely offsite dose assessments, and field survey data were not used by the emergency offsite facility to redefine source term and update dose projections.
The fire protection and prevention program performance was generally good with some deficiencies including the cross connection of the normal and backup fire protection systems without an adequate safety evaluation and. the discovery of a diesel tanker truck parked approximately 20 feet from a diesel generator building wall and air intake.
Overall housekeeping observed during this period was excellent.
Plant support was rated Category PLANNED NRC INSPECTIONS Au ust 3 1997 - Au ust 3 1998 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION IP - NRC Inspection Procedure Core Procedure - NRC Inspection Program Mandatory Inspection TBD - To Be Determined Procedure Number IP 81700 IP 64704 Target Date 09/08/97 10/20/97, 11/03/97 TITLE Physical Security Program (Visit 1)
Fire Protection Functional Inspection Core Procedure Headquarters Team IP 82301 IP 83750 IP 83750 10/27/97 12/01/97 03/09/98 EP Exercise Occupational Radiation Exposure (Core)
(Focus - HP evaluation of Hydrogen Injection)
Occupational Radiation Exposure (Radcon Outage)
Core Procedure Core Procedure Core Procedure IP 84750 IP 84750
, IP 86750 04/13/98 06/22/98 07/20/98 Radioactive Waste Transportation Core Procedure Radwaste Treatment and Effluents (Visit 1)
Core Procedure Radwaste Treatment and Environment (Visit 2)
Core Procedure
L
PLANNED NRC INSPECTIONS Au ust 3 1997 - Au ust 3 1998 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION IP - NRC Inspection Procedure Core Procedure
- NRC Inspection Program Mandatory Inspection TBD - To Be Determined Procedure Number Target Date TITLE IP 93809 IP 37001 IP 40500 10/20/97 2098 07/06/98, 07/20/98 Atrium Fuel Inspection Maintenance Rule Baseline Team Engineering Focus Inspection 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Program Licensee Self Assessment Initiative Regional Team Core Procedure IP 73753 IP 71001 04/13/98 1098 Inservice Inspection Licensed Operator Requalification Core Procedure Core Procedure