IR 05000387/1995016
| ML17158A926 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 09/25/1995 |
| From: | Laughlin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17158A925 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-95-16, 50-388-95-16, NUDOCS 9510100218 | |
| Download: ML17158A926 (11) | |
Text
Report/License No.:
Licensee:
Facility Name:
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CONNISSION
REGION I
'0-387/95-16/NPF-14, 50-388/95-16/NPF-22 Pennsylvania Power and Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101 Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Units
& 2 Inspection At:
Berwick, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted:
August 14-17, 1995 Inspectors:
J.
a g li Emergency Preparedness Specialist M. Banerjee, Senior Resident Inspector, Susquehanna B. McDermott, Resident Inspector, Susquehanna J.
Lusher, Emergency Preparedness Specialist N. Stinson, Emergency Preparedness Specialist G. Smith, Senior Safeguards Specialist R. Mogle, Contractor, Battelle PNL L
Approved by:
. Keimig, Ch'
Emergency Preparedness Section Area Inspected:
An inspection of the licensee's performance in its biennial, full-participation emergency preparedness exercise was conducted.
Activities in all emergency response facilities, except the New Media Center, were observed.
Results:
Implementation of the Emergency Plan during the exercise showed that adequate on-site protective measures can be taken in an emergency.
Exercise strengths were the command and control in the Simulator Control Room and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).
An exercise weakness identified was the inability of the EOF staff to use field survey data to redefine the radiation source term for updating off-site radiation dose projections.
There were also several areas for potential improvement identified.
An exercise weakness from a previous inspection was closed.
95fOi002i8 950'725 PDR ADGCK 05000387
DETAILS 1. 0 INDIVIDUALS CONTACTED The following individuals attended the exit meeting at the Susquehanna Training Center, or by video conference from Allentown, PA, on August 17, 1995.
1.1 PRINCIPAL LICENSEE EHPLOYEES T. Dalpiaz, Hanager, Nuclear Haintenance W. DiDomenico, Unit Supervisor J.
Edwards, Hanager, Nuclear Department Support H. Friedlander, Hanager, Outages D, Hagan, Health Physics Supervisor R. Halm, Nuclear Operations Support Coordinator R. Jensen, Senior Project Engineer G. Jones, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering J. Kearny, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing A. Hale, Supervisor, Assessment Process Service G. Hiller, Hanager, Nuclear Technologies J. Hiltenburger, Hanager, ISES C. Hyers, Project Hanager E. Panella, Senior Public Information Specialist A. Price, Supervisor, Nuclear Emergency Planning H. Rochester, Senior Health Physicist J. Scopelliti, Senior Public Information Specialist K. Shank, Supervisor, Environmental Services G. Stanley, Vice President, Nuclear Operations H. Woodeshick, Special Assistant to the President 1.2 NRC EHPLOYEES H. Banerjee, Senior Resident Inspector J. Laughlin, Emergency Preparedness Specialist B. HcDermott, Resident Inspector R. Hogle, NRC Contractor N. Stinson, Emergency Preparedness Specialist B. Whitacre, Reactor Engineer The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel during the inspection.
2.0 PURPOSE OF INSPECTION The purpose of this inspection was to evaluate the licensee's performance during the biennial, full-participation emergency preparedness exercise conducted on August 15, 1995, from 3:30 p.m. to 9:30 OTHER EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS 4.0 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the two risk counties, Columbia and Luzerne, also participated in the exercise and were evaluated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region III office.
A report of FEMA's observations will be issued by that agency in the future.
SCENARIO REVIEW 5.0 The licensee submitted the exercise objectives on May 26.,
1995, and the scenario on June 23, 1995, for NRC review.
This was nine days less than recommended for the submittal of objectives and seven days less than recommended for exercise scenarios.
The recommended timeframes are to ensure adequate time for NRC review.
The inspector discussed the late submittals with a licensee representative, who stated that he was unable to meet the recommended submittal deadlines.
Although the lateness of the submittals, in this case, did not adversely affect their review, the inspector assessed the timeliness of the submittals as an area for potential improvement.
After reviewing the scenario, the inspector discussed its contents with licensee representatives and concluded that it adequately tested the major portions of the Emergency Plan (the Plan)
and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures-(EPIPs),
and also included a demonstration in an area previously identified by the NRC as a weakness.
The NRC evaluation team attended a licensee conducted scenario briefing on August 14, 1995.
The final scenario was discussed in depth and licensee staff answered NRC questions concerning the scenario.
The licensee stated that certain emergency response activities would be simulated and that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent deviations from the scenario, and to ensure that normal plant operations were not disrupted.
ACTIVITIES OBSERVED The NRC inspection team observed the activation and augmentation o'f the Emergency Response Organization (ERO), activation of emergency response facilities (ERFs),
and the actions of other emergency response personnel.
The following specific activities were observed:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Selection and use of control room procedures.
Detection, classification, and assessment of scenario events.
Direction and coordination of emergency response.
Notification of licensee personnel and off-site agencies.
Communications, information flow, and record keeping.
Assessment and projection of off-site radiological doses, and issuance of protective action recommendations.
Provisions for in-plant radiation protection.
Provisions for communicating information to the public.
Accident analysis and mitigation.
Accountability of personne.0 ll.
Licensee post-exercise critique.
CLASSIFICATION OF EXERCISE FINDINGS Emergency preparedness exercise findings are classified as follows:
Exercise Stren th:
a strong positive indicator of the licensee's ability to cope with abnormal plant conditions and implement the Emergency Plan.
Exercise Weakness:
less than effective Emergency Plan implementation which did not, alone, constitute an overall response inadequacy.
Area for Potential Im rovement:
an aspect which did not significantly detract from the licensee's response, but which merits licensee attention and evaluation for corrective action.
7.0 EXERCISE OBSERVATIONS Activation and utilization of the ERO and ERFs were generally consistent with the Plan and EPIPs.
The inspector noted the presence of the Senior Vice President, Nuclear and the Vice President, Nuclear Operations in the ERFs during the exercise.
This showed management's attention to the licensee's Emergency Preparedness (EP) program.
SINULATOR CONTROL ROON (SCR)
The Shift Supervisor (SS) clearly announced that he was assuming the role of Emergency Director (ED) when he was required, due to the emergency situation, to enter the Plan.
His classification of the Unusual Event (UE) and the Alert were correct and timely.
He exercised very good command and control by providing frequent briefings to SCR staff on event status, leading mitigation efforts, and looking ahead for the potential consequences of the UE an intruder in the plant protected area.
The inspectors assessed this as an exercise strength.
The SS/ED also activated the Technical Support Center (TSC) at the UE to ensure the availability of adequate response. resources, and kept plant personnel aware of and away from the intruder's location.
The SCR Communicator effectively used his flowchart to complete the notification of offsite officials in the required time.
He was forceful and demanded repeat backs to ensure accurate information flow.
However, the event classification scheme used by the SCR Communicator and offsite officials was not the same as the one used by the SS/ED.
This resulted in confusion because the SS/ED declared an Alert "per Emergency Action Level (EAL) 16.2.8",
and the SCR Communicator's version of the scheme only indicated
"EAL 16.2".
The licensee stated that they had identified this discrepancy and that procedures (schemes)
would be revised to correct it.
Although communication between the SCR and TSC was good initially, it degraded after the TSC assumed control of the emergency respons.2 Information regarding the offsite releases, protective action recommendations, fuel damage assessment, and damage control team actions were communicated to the SCR late, or not at all.
This affected the licensee's response, in that entry into one of the Emergency Operating Procedures was not timely.
The licensee's EPIPs do not assign the SCR Communicator continuing communications duties with the TSC after the TSC assumes control of the emergency response.
Therefore, while the SCR Communicator was available to carry out this function, he was not utilized and personnel in the TSC had to place a telephone call to the SS in the SCR each time it was necessary to pass on information.
This was time consuming.
Inadequate SCR/TSC communication and the lack of a dedicated SCR Communicator after turnover were assessed, in the aggregate, as an area for potential improvement.
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER 7.3 The TSC was staffed conservatively at the UE level in a timely manner.
The ED exercised good command and control.
Facility briefings were informative, concise, and timely.
Information flow between the TSC and the Emergency Operations Facility, General Office Engineering Support Center, and Operations Support Center was good.
However, the Security Coordinator (SC) in the TSC had difficulty obtaining information from the Security Shift Supervisor (SSS)
in the Alternate Security Control Center because the SSS was directing the security response to the UE and had little time to keep the SC updated.
This was assessed as an area for potential improvement in the Alternate Security Control Center (see Section 7.5).
Additionally, the Meteorological Information Data Acquisition System (MIDAS) sometimes froze during calculations, resulting in a lack of dose projection information.
This was also assessed as an area for potential improvement.
Overall, TSC personnel performed expected actions well.
There were no specific strengths or weaknesses observed by the inspector.
OPERATIONS SUPPORT CENTER (OSC)
At the Susquehanna plant, the OSC is essentially a mustering point for damage control team (DCT) personnel that are subsequently given assignments and briefed in the TSC.
The OSC Coordinator (OSCC),
who coordinates the activities of the DCTs, initially provided good briefings to OSC personnel following SS updates.
He also provided good transition briefings to incoming TSC staff, including the Operations Coordinator and Damage Control Team Coordinator (DCTC) in the TSC.
The DCTC effectively tracked DCTs using a status board.
Teams were briefed and debriefed, and given health physics support when needed.
Radio communication with the DCTs was routinely checked.
A DCT was assigned to inspect the steam tunnel blowout panels for steam leakage to determine whether these might be the source of an unmonitored
7.4 release path for radioactivity to the environment.
The panels are visible from outside the Reactor Building, but the DCT did not go to a
location from which the panels could be observed, but rather simulated the inspection of the panels.
The failure to physically inspect the panels was considered by the inspector to be over-simulation for an exercise and was assessed as an area for potential improvement.
The inspector also observed that exercise controllers did not have any simulated radiological survey data to provide to DCTs for areas outside of plant buildings.
This resulted in not considering the radiological hazards to DCTs, and was assessed as an exercise-related area for potential improvement.
A second exercise-related area for potential improvement was the excessive communications among controllers and players in the TSC and on the DCTs.
For example, when the DCTC attempted to send a repair team to the blowout panels without an adequate task assessment, a controller directed the DCTC to first send out a supervisor to assess the work.
Licensee drills require this type of communication for effective training, but exercises are evaluated activities and controller-player interaction must be kept to a minimum.
Instructions should only be given to prevent deviations from the scenario, to ensure personnel and plant safety, to avoid disruption of normal plant activities, or as otherwise stipulated for good reason.
There were no strengths or weaknesses in the OSC.
EHERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF)
The EOF was staffed and activated in a timely manner.
After a thorough briefing, the Interim Recovery Hanager turned over control of the EOF to the Permanent Recovery Hanager (RH), which was clearly announced to the facility staff.
Command and control by the RH was excellent and was assessed as an exercise strength.
The RH conducted timely and thorough briefings via conference calls with other ERF managers, ascertained priority issues, and issued clear orders to his managers to accomplish those priorities.
Ke also demanded procedural compliance and expeditious implementation of assignments by his staff.
Kowever, the radiological support management team was hesitant and indecisive when making protective action recommendations (PARs),
even though the radiological data that they had was correctly obtained and accurate.
This was assessed as an area for potential improvement.
Additionally, the initial PAR was appropriate for the plant conditions, and was verbally c'ommunicated to the Commonwealth by the RH, but was not formally documented on a Radiological Assessment Form in a timely manner.
The same situation occurred with a subsequent PAR update.
Prompt documentation of information provided to offsite officials is essential to avoid subsequent confusion and possible misinterpretatio.5 8.0 When field team radiological data was observed to be much higher than projected data, the radiological support management team did not use the field data to redefine the source term and update dose projections.
The licensee's HIDAS program is capable of this calculation, and procedures existed to do it, but radiation support personnel were not trained on the method.
This was assessed by the inspector as an exercise weakness (IFI 50-387, 388/95-16-01).
Other than that problem, dose assessment functions were performed adequately.
The licensee deployed five offsite monitoring teams to track the plume.
Communication between the Environmental Sampling Director and the teams was excellent.
The inspector observed that the EOF Priorities Status Board was not kept current.
Only three items were posted on the board during the exercise.
This did not adversely detract from the response, but did slow the flow of current information available to responders in the EOF, since the information had to be obtained from other sources.
This was assessed as an area for potential improvement.
ALTERNATE SECURITY CONTROL CENTER (ASCC)
The exercise scenario started with a significant security event.
The SSS in the ASCC demonstrated effective command and control of the security response.
Detailed contingency procedures, checklists, and drawings of all plant areas were available and used, resulting in appropriate and timely actions.
Security personnel were observed to be knowledgeable of plant operations and familiar with plant systems.
However, because of his involvement in directing the response to the security event, the SSS had little time to communicate with and update the SC in the TSC.
Other functional coordinators in the TSC were able to receive updates on the security event from their personnel in and around the plant who were monitoring the security radio broadcast channel.
This information was passed on to the functional coordinators in the TSC by radio but could not be verified by the SC.
The SSS in the ASCC apparently was too involved with directing the security force in its response to the event to provide information to the TSC, even though he had ample staff to accomplish this.
This was assessed by the inspector as an area for potential improvement.
LICENSEE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED ITEMS (CLOSED) IFI 50-387,388/93-03-01 During the previous exercise, the radiological assessment function in the TSC was not thoroughly implemented for the unmonitored release pathway.
During this exercise, TSC radiological support staff promptly recognized the unmonitored release as a result of the disparity between dose projections and field team radiological data.
Radiological assessment in the TSC was adequate and this item was close I 9.9 ~99
The NRC inspectors attended the licensee's exercise critique on August 17, 1995.
Lead controllers summarized observations for their areas of responsibility.
The critique was appropriately self-critical and identified most items noted by the NRC.
The NRC team assessed the critique as good.
10.0 EXIT NEETING Following the licensee's critique, the NRC team met with the licensee personnel denoted in Detail 1.0 to discuss the inspection findings.
The licensee was informed that:
~
Overall, the on-site response to the exercise scenario was good;
~
There were two exercise strengths, one weakness, and multiple areas for potential improvement; and
~
One open item (IFI 50-387, 388/93-03-01)
from the previous exercise was closed.
The licensee acknowledged the findings and indicated that they would evaluate them for appropriate corrective actions.