IR 05000387/1999007
| ML17146B220 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1999 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17146B219 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-387-99-07, 50-388-99-07, NUDOCS 9910050307 | |
| Download: ML17146B220 (18) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION REGION I
Docket Nos:
License Nos:
50-387, 50-388 NPF-14, NPF-22 Report No.
50-387/99-07, 50-388/99-07 Licensee:
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 19101 Facility:
Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Location:
P.O. Box 35 Berwick, PA 18603-0035 July 20, 1999 through August 28, 1999 Inspectors:
Approved by:
S. Hansell, Senior Resident Inspector J. Richmond, Resident Inspector A. Blarney, Resident Inspector J. McFadden,. Radiation Specialist Curtis J. Cowgill, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects 99i0050307 990930 PDR ADOCK 05000387
EXECUTIVESUMMARY Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES), Units 1 8 2 NRC Inspection Report 50-387/99-07, 50-388/99-07 This integrated inspection included aspects of Pennsylvania Power and Light Company's (PP8L's) operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support at SSES.
The report covers a six week period of routine resident inspection activities and the input from a regional health physics inspector.
I
~Oerations Reactor water chemistry on both units has improved since the plant modifications on the condensate water filtration and hydrogen water chemistry systems have been completed.
(Section 01.1)
On August 5, 1999, PP&L did not perform a Technical Specification required safety
'unction determination for out of service primary containment isolation instruments because the requirement to perform a safety function determination for out of service primary containment isolation instruments was not contained in the procedure that controlled the Safety Function Determination Program.
PP8L's failure to maintain adequate procedures for the control of the Safety Function Determination Program is a violation of Technical Specification Section 5.4, "Procedures."
This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is documented in PP8 L's corrective action program as condition report 194180.
(Section 03.1)
Maintenance
~
PP8L did not effectively plan scheduled-maintenance and scheduled-testing activities on
.
the reactor core isolation cooling and high pressure coolant injection systems.
Specifically, the reactor core isolation cooling system was unavailable longer than PP8L initiallyplanned during repair of a vacuum pump seal and the high pressure coolant injection surveillance test was performed at a time when suppression pool cooling was less efficient. (Section M1.1)
~
PP8L improperly packaged radioactive waste that was shipped to a low-level waste disposal facility. Upon identification, PP&L reviewed the circumstances of these shipments, entered the occurrences into their corrective action program as condition report 188042, and initiated corrective measures to prevent recurrence.
This Severity Level IVviolation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (Section R8.1)
TABLEOF CONTENTS I. Operations
Conduct of Operations
.
01.1 Unit Operations and Operator Activities
.
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
.
02.1 Operational Safety System Alignment
Operations Procedures and Documentation
.
03.1 Safety Function Determination of RCIC Primary Containment Isolation Valve
Miscellaneous Operations Issues 08.1 Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) Review
1
1
2
3 II. Maintenance
M1 Conduct of Maintenance...3
'M1.1 Surveillance and Pre-Planned Maintenance ActivityReview.........
III. Engineering E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues..
E8.1 Licensee Event Report (LER) Review..
IV. Plant Support
.
R8 Miscellaneous RP&C Issues......................
R8.1 Packaging and Shipment of Radioactive Waste..
V: Management Meetings X1 Exit Meeting Summary
.
INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
.
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED LIST OF ACRONYMS.USED
...5
6
6
...7
.7
..10
Re ort Details Summa of Plant Status Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) Unit 1 operated at 100% power throughout the inspection period, except for the following power reduction.
On August 14, power was reduced to 85% for a control rod pattern sequence exchange, then returned to 100%.
SSES Unit 2 operated at 100% power throughout the inspection period, except for the following power reduction.
On August 28, power was reduced to 92% for a control rod pattern sequence exchange and scram time testing, then returned to 100%.
Conduct of Operations
'1.1 Unit 0 erations and 0 erator Activities (71707)
The inspectors determined routine operator activities were satisfactorily established, communicated, and conservatively performed in accordance with SSES procedures.
Control room activities were well performed.
Control room logs accurately reflected plant activities.
Problems related to Reactor Building ventilation damper slow stroke times resulted in the entry into a Technical Specification (TS) required plant shutdown limiting condition for operation (LCO). The problem was corrected satisfactorily prior to the expiration of the TS LCO.
Reactor water chemistry on both units has improved since the plant modifications on the condensate water filtration and hydrogen water chemistry systems have been completed.
Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment 02.1 0 erational Safet S stem Ali nment (71707)
During routine plant tours, the proper alignment and operability of various safety systems, engineered safety features, and on-site power sources were verified. Partial walkdowns were performed for the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system, the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system, residual heat removal (RHR) system, and the emergency service water (ESW) system.
Minor equipment problems were corrected promptly.
'Topical headings such as 01, MS, etc., are used in accordance with the NRC standardized reactor inspection report outline.
Individual reports are not expected to address all outline topic Operations Procedures arid Documentation 03.1 Safet Function Determination of RCIC Prima Containment Isolation Valve
~
771707, The inspectors reviewed PP8L's reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system configuration during preplanned maintenance to verify compliance with Technical Specification (TS) requirements.
b.
Observations and Findin s On August 5, 1999, the Division 2 RCIC room high temperature isolation instruments and the Division 2 RCIC steam supply line low pressure isolation instruments were disabled for planned maintenance.
With these instruments disabled, the outboard (Division 2)
primary containment isolation valve (PCIV) for the RCIC steam supply line would not have automatically closed on a high room temperature or a low steam line pressure condition.
Afterthe instruments had been disabled for approximately three hours, PP8L manually closed both the inboard and outboard RCIC steam line PCIVs.
When a system (e.g., a PCIV) cannot perform its function solely due to a support system being inoperable, TS 3.0.6 allows the system to remain operable provided, in part, that an evaluation is performed to determine ifa loss of safety function (e.g., primary containment penetration automatic isolation capability) has occurred.
The required evaluation is performed by the Safety Function Determination Program, which is controlled by TS 5.5.11. The isolation instruments, disabled during maintenance, were a support system for the outboard RCIC steam line PCIV, which is required to automatically close, per TS 3.6.1.3, to isolate the primary containment penetration for the RCIC steam line. PP&L did not perform a Safety Function Determination (SFD), as required by TS, for this planned maintenance.
Although a SFD was not performed, the safety significance of this issue was low because the RCIC steam line PCIVs were manually closed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
The inspectors reviewed NDAP-QA-0312, "Control of Limiting Conditions for Operation, Technical Requirements for Operation, and Safety Function Determination Program,"
revision 2 dated April6, 1999, arid concluded that the station procedure did not require a safety function determination to be performed for instruments which provide isolation trip signals to primary containment isolation valves. The failure to maintain adequate procedural control of the Safety Function Determination Program is a Severity Level IV violation of Technical Specification Section 5.4, "Procedures," and is being treated as a
'on-Cited Violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is documented in PP8L's corrective action program as condition report 194180.
(NCV 50-387, 388/99-07-01)
c.
Conclusion On August 5, 1999, PP&L did not perform a Technical Specification required safety function determination for out of service primary containment isolation instruments because the requirement to perform a safety function determination for out of service primary containment isolation instruments was not contained in the procedure that controlled the Safety Function Determination Program.
PP&L's failure to maintain adequate procedures for the control of the Safety Function Determination Program is a violation of Technical Specification Section 5.4, "Procedures."
This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is documented in PPBL's corrective action program as condition report 1941 80.
Miscellaneous Operations Issues 08.1 Ins ector Follow-u Item IFI Review (71707,92700)
Closed IFI 50-387 388/98-04-05-Control of Emer enc 0 eratin Procedure Su ort Procedures This item related to the inconsistent control of emergency operating procedur'e (EOP)
support procedures.
The inspectors reviewed PPKL corrective actions which included the revision of administrative procedures NDAP-QA-0330, "Symptom-.
Oriented EOP and EP-DS Program and Writer's Guide," NDAP-QA-0331, "Verification Program For SSES EPG and Symptom Based EOPs and EP-DSs," and NDAP-QA-0332, "Validation Program for Symptom Oriented EOPs."
The procedures were revised to include the emergency support (ES) procedures in the EOP program and to require controls similar to the EOP flowcharts.
The inspectors concluded that the corrective actions were appropriate.
No violations were identified. The IFI is closed.
II. Maintenance M1 Conduct of Maintenance M1.1 Surveillance and Pre-Planned Maintenance Activit Review a.
Ins ection Sco e 617266270740500 The inspectors observed and reviewed selected portions of pre-planned maintenance and surveillance activities, to. determine'whether the activities were conducted in accordance with NRC requirements and SSES procedure Observations and Findin s The inspectors observed portions of the following work activities and surveillances:
Work Authorizations PCW0190855 RIE-96-0158 TP-024-147 P91 987 TP-142-003 TCW01 07653 S 84186 WO-188765 WR 2-99-023
'A 195331 SV-25780B Position Indication Microswitch Replacement Target Rock Microswitch Replacement
"C" EDG Restoration from 2-year Inspection
"C" EDG Protective Relay Calibrations
"C" Circulating Water Pump Motor Initial Start & Run-in Unit 2 RCIC Turbine Barometric Condenser Vacuum Pump Repair
"B" Emergency Service Water Pump Replacement Replace Unit 2 "A" RHR Conductivity Cell Wescosville 500 KVline 5043 Switching HD 27524B Secondary Containment Damper Failed'to Close Within the Required TS Time.
Surveillances SO-273-003 SE-070-013 SO-070-001 SO-234-001 SO-149-B02 SO-249-B02 SO-252-002 SO-250-002 PCIV Quarterly Operability Verification SGTS Outside AirDamper Operability Verification
"B" SGTS Monthly AirFlow Verification Check RB Zone 2 Quarterly Isolation Damper Timing Quarterly RHR System Flow Verification Div. II Quarterly RHR System Flow Verification Div. II Quarterly HPCI Flow Verification Quarterly RCIC Flow Verification In addition, selected portions of procedures, drawings, and vendor technical nianuals, associated with the maintenance and surveillance activities, were also reviewed and determined to be acceptable.
In general, maintenance personnel were knowledgeable of their assigned activities.
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Scheduled Outage The inspectors observed the repair activities on the leaking barometric condenser vacuum pump seal for the Unit 2 reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system on August 6, 1999. RCIC remained out of service for approximately 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Planning for this maintenance task was ineffective in that the leaking barometric condenser vacuum pump seal was not fullyrepaired and RCIC was unavailable for longer than expected.
PP&L originally planned to repack the vacuum pump seal and restore the system to service within seven hours.
Due to the vacuum pump and motor configuration, the maintenance mechanic estimated that it would take approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to complete
the planned pump work. PP8L then changed the plan to add one ring of packing to the vacuum pump seal and return the system to service.
When the RCIC system was returned to service, a small water leak from the barometric condenser vacuum pump seal remained, although the leak did not affect the satisfactory operation of the RCIC system.
In addition, problems with the new plant nuclear information management system computer software and availability of health physics coverage for the post maintenance system test run delayed restoring RCIC to service.
High Pressure Coolant Injection Surveillance Test The inspector observed the Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) quarterly surveillance test on July 30, 1999. The test was performed on day shift during hot weather conditions.
PP8L effectively coordinated and performed the surveillance test to minimize heat input to the suppression pool.
Although PP8L minimized heat input into the suppression pool, the time selected to perform the surveillance test occurred when the suppression pool cooling system was less efficient at removing the added heat.
c.
Conclusions PP8L did not effectively plan scheduled-maintenance and scheduled-testing activities on the reactor core isolation cooling and high pressure coolant injection systems.
Specifically, the reactor core isolation cooling system was unavailable longer than PP8L initiallyplanned during repair of a vacuum pump seal and the high pressure coolant injection surveillance test was performed at a time when suppression pool cooling was less efficient.
III. En ineerin ES Miscellaneous Engineering issues E8.1 Licensee Event Re ort LER Review Closed LER 50-388 99-003-00 Scram Due to Unit 2 Main Transformer Failure A failed main transformer bushing resulted in the automatic reactor shutdown on June 8, 1999. The plant was shutdown safely and all major equipment operated per design.
Based on an in-field review of the issues reported in this LER, including the control room operators'esponse to the transient, plant operation review committee assessment and associated condition report corrective actions, the inspectors found PP&L's corrective actions to be appropriate.
No violations of NRC requirements were identified. This LER is close IV. Plant Su ort R8 Miscellaneous RP&C Issues R8.1 Packa in and Shi ment of Radioactive Waste Ins ection Sco e 86750-02 The inspector reviewed the shipping manifests for shipments numbered 99-85 and 99-86 and related correspondence."
Observations and Findin s On June 29, 1999 and on July 1,'1999, PP8L shipped dewatered condensate demineralizer bead resin waste, as low specific activity (DOT LSA II) material and with the NRC waste classification of A (unstable), to a low-level waste disposal site. The shipment manifest numbers were 99-85 and 99-86.
In both cases, during the unloading process, the low-level waste disposal facility operators discovered small amounts of loose contaminated resin (100 cubic centimeters or less) on top of the liner/waste disposal container which was inside the shipping cask. The low-level waste disposal facility notified the shipper that the General Pa'ckaging Condition 61 of South Carolina
'adioactive Material License 097, Amendment 47, prohibits loose radioactive waste within shipping casks.
The Agreement State (South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control) notified PP8L that this discrepancy constituted an infraction of the Agreement State regulations.
PP&L generated a condition report (No. 188042) for this issue and took appropriate immediate corrective action.
10 CFR 61.56, "Waste Characteristics," states requirements which are intended to, facilitate handling at the disposal site and provide protection of health and safety of personnel at the disposal site and requires that waste must be packaged for disposal.
CFR 30.41, "Transfer of Byproduct Material," states that no licensee shall transfer byproduct material except as authorized pursuant to 10 CFR 30.41 which includes authorization to transfer byproduct material to any person authorized to receive such byproduct material under terms of a specific license or a general license or their equivalents issued by the Atomic Energy Commission, the Commission, or an Agreement State.
PP8L failed to properly package byproduct material for disposal on June 29, 1999 and on July 1, 1999. The byproduct material was not packaged in accordance with General Packaging Condition 61 of South Carolina Radioactive Material License 097, Amendment 47 and is a violation. This Severity Level IVviolation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Appendix C ofthe NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as condition report 188042.
(NCV 50-387) 388/99-07-02)
C.
Conclusions PP8L improperly packaged radioactive waste that was shipped to a low-level waste disposal facility. Upon identification, PP8L reviewed the circumstances of these
shipments', entered the occurrences into their corrective action program as condition report 188042, and initiated corrective measures to prevent recurrence.
This Severity Level IVviolation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Appendix C of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
V. Mana ement Meetin s X1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of PPB L management at the conclusion of the inspection period, on September 2, 1999.
PPB L acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked PP&L whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary.
No proprietary information was identifie IP 37551 IP 40500 IP 61726 IP 62707 IP 71707 IP 71750 IP 92700 INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED Onsite Engineering Obser vations Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems Surveillance Observations Maintenance Observations Plant Operations Plant Support Activities On Site Followup of Reports
~
~
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
~oened None.
0 ened/Closed 50-387,388/99-07-01 50-387,388/99-07-02 Discussed NCV Safety Function Determination of RCIC Primary Containment Isolation Valve (section 03.1)
NCV, Packaging and Shipment of Radioactive Waste (section R8.1)
None.
Closed 50-387,388/98-04-05 50-388/99-003-00 IFI Control of Emergency Operating Procedure Support Procedures (section 08.1)
LER Scram Due to Unit 2 Main Transformer Failure (section E8.1)
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CFR CR DOT EDG EOP ESW FSAR HPCI IFI ISEG IR LCO LER NCV NDAP NRC PCIV PCO PORC PP8L RHR RHRSW SFD SFDP SSES TRO TS Code of Federal Regulations Condition Report Department of Transportation Emergency Diesel Generator Emergency Operating Procedure Emergency Service Water Final Safety Analysis Report High Pressure Coolant Injection Inspector Follow-up Item Independent Safety Engineering Group
[NRC) Inspection Report Limiting Condition for Operation Licensee Event Report Non-Cited Violation Nuclear Department Administrative Procedure Nuclear Regulatory Commission Primary Containment Isolation Valve Plant Control Operator Plant Operations Review Committee Pennsylvania Power and Light Company Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Residual Heat Removal Residual Heat Removal Service Water Safety Function Determination Safety Function Determination Program Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Technical Requirement for Operation Technical Specification