IR 05000387/1989022

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Insp Repts 50-387/89-22 & 50-388/89-20 on 890710-14.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Licensee Action on Previous NRC Items & Plant Procedures
ML17156B313
Person / Time
Site: Susquehanna  Talen Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/23/1989
From: Blumberg N, Oliveira W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML17156B312 List:
References
50-387-89-22, 50-388-89-20, IEIN-83-70, IEIN-86-013, IEIN-86-13, NUDOCS 8908300076
Download: ML17156B313 (13)


Text

U.

S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report Nos.:

50-387/89-22 50"388/89-20 Docket Nos.:

50-387 50-388 License Nos.:

NPF-14 NPF-22 Licensee:

Pennsylvania Power 6 Light Company 2 North Ninth Street Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101 Facility Name:

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Inspection at: Berwick, Pennsylvania Inspection Dates:

July 10 - 14, 1989 Inspector:

Approved by:

W. Oliveira Reactor Fngi er Operational Programs Sect on Operations Branch, DRS N. Blumberg, C ief, Operatio al Programs Section, Operations Branch, DRS Date p/~~/rV Date Ins ection Summar:

Routine, announced inspection on July

14, 1989, (Report Nos.

50-387/89-22 and 50-388/89-20).

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dures.

Results The Plant Procedures Program was reviewed and found to be well docu-mented, administered, and implemented.

The program is adequately monitored by Quality Assurance

{QA) to ensure compliance to the Technical Specification and regulatory requirements.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted J.

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  • R.
  • A.

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  • R.

wD wR Blakeslee, Assistant Plant Superintendent Breslin, Maintenance Group Supervisor Byram, Plant Superintendent Dominquez, Senior Results Engineer Operations Figard, Maintenance Supervisor Graham, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA) Operations Iorfida, Instrument and Control (I&C) Supervisor Kuczynski, Technical Supervisor Mar kowski, Dayshift Supervisor - Operations Matthews, Senior Analyst, NQA McGann, Compliance Engineer Nork, Plant Engineering Group Supervisor (Systems)

Prego, Quality Control Supervisor Roth, Senior Compliance Engineer Mehry, Power Production Engineer - Compliance United States Nuclear Re viator Commission

  • S Barber, Senior Resident Inspector
  • Denotes those attending the exit meeting, July 14, 1989.

The inspector also contacted other administrative and technical personnel during the inspection.

2.0 Licensee's Actions on Previous NRC Items 2.1 (Closed) Violation (387/85-06-10 and 388/85-06-10).

Updated in Inspection Report 387/89-09; 388/89-09; Fire dampers were not func-tionally tested.

A violation was issued because the licensee failed to comply with the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards for function-ally testing fire dampers every 12 months.

The licensee's formal response stated that the standard only applies to acceptance testing.

Acknowledging this fact, the inspector requested the initial accept-ance tests and test methodology for review during the follow-up inspection 387/89-09 and 388/89-09.

The licensee, at that time, was not able to provide the initial acceptance tests and test method-ology.

During this inspection, the licensee provided the inspector with the initial acceptance tests" and test methodology which was requested during the 387/89-09; 388/89-09 Inspection.

The test data and method-ology confirmed that the fire dampers were functionally tested,

2.2

'h following installation as required.

Two subsequent 18 month surveill-ance inspections performed in accordance with procedure SM-013-009,

"18 Month Inspection of Fire Window/Oampers" were also reviewed by the inspector.

The results indicate that the dampers are visually inspected in accordance with the surveillance requirements of the T.S.

and found to be in satisfactory condition.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (387/86-02-02; 388/86-02-02):

Squibb valve drawing deficiencies review was not completed.

Information Notice (IN) 86-13 alerted addressees to a potential problem with explosive Squibb valves used in Standby Liquid Control Systems (SLCS).

Since the licensee used the suspected Squibb valves, corrective actions were initiated.

All the corrective actions had been completed, except the review of Squibb valve drawing deficien-cies.

2.3 The completed drawing reviews performed by the licensee were provided to the inspector during this inspection.

The inspector verified that the drawing reviews resulted in the revision of wiring diagrams Ml-C41-36, Sheet 3 (Unit 1),

and MI-C41-29, Sheet 3 (Unit 2) to indicate the correct pin orientation discussed in the information notice.

The inspector also verified that maintenance test procedure MT-053-012 was revised and that a

new maintenance test procedure MT-053-004 had been developed.

Additionally, it was determined that all of the Squibb valves were replaced and satisfactorily tested in accordance with surveillance procedures.

The inspector found the drawing review and the resulting corrective actions to be acceptable.

(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (387/86-09-01 and 388/86-09-01):

Licensee's Action to Restore the Emergency Service Water System (ESW) and Provide Failure Analysis Results and Corrective Action.

In May 1986, a failure of the "C" ESW pump was discovered.

Investi-gation showed the fai lure to have resulted from cavitation.

An examination of the "A" ESW pump revealed a similar condition.

A decision to shut down both units was made immediately following the discovery of the damage to the "A" ESW pump.

The ESW system supplies cooling for the diesel generators, the RHR pumps, the ECCS room coolers, in addition to providing backup supply for various heat exchangers.

The licensee performed evaluations of the failures and implemented a

number of changes.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's evaluations and corrective actions.

A new end bell design was installed in accordance with Plant Modification Record (PMR) 86-9073 for the "A" and "C" pumps (9/87),

and for the "B" and "0" pumps (11/88).

The failure analysis also led to the removal of the auto transfer between the ESW loops in accordance with PMR 88-30161.

This allowed both loops to supply the emergency diesel generators.

This action is

intended to improve the "B" loop operating characteristic and mini-mize pump cavitation.

Other documentation reviewed by the inspector included the inservice test performed in accordance with operations surveillance procedures SD-054-003 and Test Procedures TP-054-057, 062, 065, and 076.

Those tests were conducted to obtain pump and flow data.

The inspector found the failure analysis and the correct-ive action to be acceptable.

2.4 (Closed) Deviation (387/86-10-07 and 388/86-10-07):

Meteorological monitoring program tolerance limits and calibration procedure for delta-temperature measurements were inadequate.

2.5 The meteorological monitoring program requires daily channel checks and semiannual calibrations'n two procedures, however, the toler-ance limits for instrument calibrations were found to exceed the FSAR commitment.

Additionally, the calibration procedure for delta"temper-ature measurements did not include an actual sensor calibration (i.e ~

, water bath to test accuracy of thermistor).

Licensee's corrective action included upgrading the meteorological monitoring program by replacing instrumentation on the towers and installing data loggers which meet the accuracy commitment of the FSAR.

The licensee has included linearity checks of the delta-temp-erature elements in their preventive maintenance program.

The design change package (DCP) and the affected documentation, including the revised procedures in question, were reviewed by the inspector, and the corrective actions were found acceptable.

(Closed)

Inspector Follow Item (388/86-14-02):

An evaluation of a damaged fuel mast was not completed.

Defueling was suspended on August 21, 1986, due to damage to the Unit 2 fuel mast.

The Unit 1 fuel mast could not be used because the mast had also been damaged during the Unit 1 second refueling outage.

An evaluation of the damaged fuel masts was being performed by General Electric.

The inspector reviewed the completed evaluation and its recommenda-tions.

The Unit 2 mast problem was most probably due to the mast hitting a fixed object.

The Unit 1 mast problem was most probably due to the failure to operationally check the mast following mainten-ance to straighten bent members.

The inspector verified corrective actions had been taken by the licensee for several of the recommenda-tions.

Actions which were verified included revising the procedure for operating the mast, Procedure OI-A-46, revising the Maintenance Procedure MT-OB1-001, which outlines the steps for repairing a

damaged mast, and the issuance of engineering work requests and work authorizations to correct problems identified which existed in the air hose retrieval assist system and the takeup reel for the mast electrical cable.

All corrective actions, which were reviewed, have been satisfactorily complete.6 (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (387/86-24-01):

Inadequate control of air operated valves when used as blocking valves.

During the routine processing of liquid radioactive waste, the waste mixing tank room was flooded.

The flooding resulted when system pressure raised an air-operated valve slightly off its seat.

An operator had isolated the valve in accordance with Blocking Guide-lines For Air-Operated Valves.

The P8 ID, M-162, which the operator referred to when positioning the valve as a blocking valve, in-correctly indicated that the valve would fail closed when the air supply is removed.

The valve actually fails as is when the air supply is removed and fails closed on loss of power.

2.7 The licensee evaluated the event in SOOR ¹1-86-297, The SOOR made certain recommendations to prevent recurrence of this and similar problems.

The inspector -verified that certain of these recommenta-tions had been implemented.

PAID's, which show air-operated valves, we",e reviewed to insure representation for air-operated valves is correct.

Also, Procedure AD-gA-103, Protective Permit and Tag System, and Procedure OI-AD-050, Protective Blocking Practices, were revised to more clearly discribe blocking requirements.

(Closed) Violation (387/87-12-03; 388/87-12-02):

Valve anti-rotation device nonconformances, reported in 1982, have not been p> omptly corrected.

The licensee failed to:

( 1) Complete corrective action on 14 valves which had identified problems with anti-rotation devices, and (2)

take action to preclude recurrence by including instructions in plant maintenance procedures.

2.8 The inspector reviewed documentation which verified action had been taken to correct the deficiencies which had been identified with the valve anti-rotation devices.

Documentation reviewed included the SOOR which documented the problem and its resolution, and Work Author-izations (WAs) which were written to correct the problem.

'Also reviewed was a revision to a maintenance procedure which addressed the issue, as well as documentation which showed the valves had been entered into the Preventative Maintenance Program.

In addition, the Nuclear Power Engineering Review of the WAs, in light of the NRC's Information Notice No. 83-70, "Vibration-Induced Valve Failures" was reviewed for completeness.

The inspector found the licensee's corrective actions to be complete and acceptable.

(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (387/87-18-01):

There was a lack of long-term corrective action for liquid radwaste (LRW) filter valve problems.

LWR filter valves have been the cause of several spills in the Rad-waste Building (see paragraph 2.5).

Although short term corrective

actions taken were adequate, the inspector requested that the licen-see consider other potential long-term corrective actions which may be appropriate.

The cause of the spill was attributed to operator error, i.e., fail-ure to follow up on an automatic action.

Licensee's actions to prevent recurrence included incorporation of a procedure change to instruct the operators not,to operate the LRW Filter system with a low control air failure alarm annunciated.

The event was also reviewed by Operations personnel as part of a Supervisor of Opera-tions training session.

A long-term, corrective action in the form of a minor modification has been approved.

The minor modification will change the valve actuator to fail closed on loss of instrument air and also add a manual reset upon restoration of air pressure.

The inspector reviewed the procedure change and the project funding request for justifying the modification.

The corrective actions were found acceptable.

3.0 Plant Procedures 42700 3.1

~Pco e

The licensee's plant procedures were reviewed to ascertain whether the procedures are in accordance with regulatory requirements, tech-nically adequate, and changed in accordance with the technical speci" fications (TS)

requirements'.2 P!ant Procedures Pro ram 3.2. 1 Pro ram Administration The principal procedures for administering the plant proce-dures program are AD-gA-OOO, "Procedure Changes" and AD-gA-101, "Procedure Program."

These procedures exclude the use of temporary procedures.

The Document Control Center (DCC) is primarily responsible for administering the program.

DCC's responsibilities include: initiating periodic reviews of controlled procedures; issuing a weekly status of administrative procedures; and providing the plant with copies of changes to the latest procedures.

All completed surveillance, test, and maintenance procedure records are also maintained by the DCC.

.2 The inspector selected a sample of operations, abnormal (alarm), maintenance, and administrative procedures for review.

All the procedures reviewed were in compliance with the Technical Specifications (TS), approved, current, filed properly, and readily accessible.

The documents and

procedures reviewed during the conduct of this inspection are listed in Attachment A.

The inspector verified program implementation by reviewing the following types of procedures with the responsible personnel:

Nine Operations procedures such as the inservice test of the emergency service system pumps (ESW) performed in accordance with Operations quarterly surveillance procedure S0-054-003.

Six alarm procedures, such as reactor core isolation cool-ing system

{RCICS) alarm procedure OP 250-001.

These procedures were verified in the Control Room.

Five maintenance procedures, such as MT-081-001 for repair-ing a damaged mast.

Six Instrument and Control (ILC) surveillance procedures, such as meteorological monitoring program procedure SI-099-318 for performing semiannual calibration of delta-temperature loops.

Five test procedures, such as TP-054-057 for performing flow analysis on DG "E" ESW Loop A.

Six administrative procedures, such as AD-QA-422 for the Surveillance Test Program.

The technical content of three procedures were reviewed by the inspector, Maintenance Procedure MT-053-002, e.g.,

was reviewed with emphasis on the concerns identified in IE Information Notice (IN) 86-13.

Changes to the procedure addressed the concerns of IN 86-13.

(See also paragraph 2.2).

The inspector reviewed the Form AD-QA-410 used to identify system operating procedures affected by a Design Change Package (DCP)/modification.

The form for DCP 87-7005 provided the required information.

Procedure Change Approval Forms (PCAFs) were reviewed by the inspector.

PCAF No. 1-89-0377 was prepared in accordance" with procedure AD-QA-000 and reviewed by the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC).

The PCAF contains questions regarding the changes affected on the T.S.

CFR 50.59, Inservice Test and Acceptance Criteri Four QA audit reports and three QA surveillance reports (see Attach-ment A) were reviewed by the inspector.

The reports are comprehen-sive, and all findings have been corrected, except for QA Audit Report No.88-078.

This audit report has an open finding dealing with acceptance criteria in the maintenance procedures and the main-tenance surveillance procedures.

Maintenance is committed to review the acceptance criteria during their biennial reviews.

QA, through its Corrective Action Tracking System (CATS), is monitoring the status of the finding.

Additionally, a QA Audit Report 84-013 find-ing led to the deviation discussed in paragraph 2.4.

3.4 Conclusion The plant procedure program is well documented, administered, and implemented.

The procedures and procedure changes are technically adeouate, clear, current, and available.

The program is also audited and monitored by QA to ensure compliance with the regulatory and TS requirements.

No violations or deviations were observed.

4.0 Mana ement Meetin s

Licensee management was informed of the scope and purpose of the inspec-tion at the entrance interview on July 10, 1989.

The findings of the inspection were discussed with licensee representatives during the course of the inspection and presented to licensee management at the July 14, 1989 exit interview (see paragraph 1 for attendees).

At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector.

The licensee did not indicate that proprietary information was involved within the scope of this.inspectio.1

~Sco e

Techni ca 1 Speci ficati ons 3.2.1 Pro ram Administration ATTACHMENT A Administrative Procedure (AP) AO-QA-OOO, "Procedure Changes,"

Rev.

6, AP AD-Q-101, "Procedure Program,"

Rev.

17,

.2.

~P Technical Specifications Operating Procedure (OP) 153-001,

"Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS),"

Rev.

10.

OP 250-001, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling, Rev.

9, OP 054-601, Emergency Service Water,* Rev.

11, OP 211-001, Service Mater System

'0-253-002,

"18 month surveillance of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)," Rev.

5, S0-253-004,

"Quarterly Surveillance RCIC," Rev.

10, Operating Procedure, Quarterly Surveillance Operating (SO 054-003,

"Insezvice Test of Emergency Service Water (ESW) Pumps,"

Operating Instruction (OI)-AD-046, Operations Conduct Outage,"

Rev.

4, OI-AD-050, "Protective Blocking Practices,"

Rev.

1.

Alarm Response (AR) Procedure AR-207-001,

"Standby Liquid Control System (SLCS),

Rev. 3, AR-208-001,

"Reactor Core Isolation Cooling, Rev.

9, AR-016-001,

"Emergency Service Mater," Rev. 3, Off Normal (ON) Procedure 211-001, Loss of Service Mater, Rev.

4, ON 218-001,

"Loss of Instrument Air," Rev.

2, ON-054-001,

"Loss of Emergency Feedwater,"

Rev.

5,

Maintenance Procedure MT-081-001, "Refuel Platform Mechanical Inspection,"

Rev.

1, MT-054-001,

"Emergency Service Water Pump Disassembly Reassembly,"

Rev.

1, MT-053-002,,SLCS Explosive Valve Removal and Replacement, Rev.

3, MT-053-004, SLCS Explosive Valve Batching Qualifying, Rev.

1, MT-GM-003, Valve Disassembly, Reassembly and Rework, Rev. 8, Instrument and Control (I&C) Surveillance Procedure SI-099-313,

"Semi-annual Calibration of Wind Speed Instrument Loop X-03701 (60 Meters),"

Rev.

5, SI-099-314 Rev.

S1-099-315 S1"099-317 Rev.

S1"099-318 Rev.

x"03702 x-03704 (10 meters)

x-03703 (10 meters)

x-03707, Channel

(10-60 meters)

x-03708, Channel

(10-60 meters)

Test Procedures (TP) 054-057 and 062,'ump Curve and Flow Data for "E" Diesel Flow Balance, Rev.

0, TP 054-065,

"Pump Curve and Flow Data for A&C ESN Pump,"

Rev.

1, Chg.

1, TP 054-066,

"Pump Curve and Flow Data for B&D Diesel Flow Balance,"

Rev.

1, TP 054-076,

"ESW Loop A&B Flow Balance,"

Rev. 0, Administrative Procedure AD-QA-OOO, "Procedure Changes,"

Rev.

6, AD-QA-101,. "Procedure Program,"

Rev.

17, AD-QA-103, "Protective Permit and Tag System,"

Rev. 7, AD-QA-410, "Plant Modification Program,"

Rev.

11, AD-QA-422, "Surveillance Testing Program" AD-QA-423, "Station Pump and Valve Testing Program,"

Rev. 7, Design Change Package 87-7005,

"Meteorological Monitoring Systems Upgrade."

3. 3 gAA/

I QA Audit Report 0-84-13-01,

"Meteorological Program Audit (1984)."

QA Audit Report 88-034,

"NQA Audit of Plant Operations."

QA Audit Report 88-078, "Instructions, Procedures, IOMs and Drawing Control."

QA Audit Report 88-082,

"ASME Section XI Repair and Replacement Program.

QA Audit Report 88-101,

"Test Control Program."

QA Audit Report 88-108, "Electric Maintenance and Relay Testing."

QA Surveillance Report 87-223,

"NRC Information Notice No. 87-38."

QA Surveillance Report 88-050,

"Bypass Control."

QA Surveillance Report 88-056,

"Onsite Support:

Transformer Oil Spill Response."

NRC Information Notice 86-13,

"Standby Liquid Control System Squibb Valves Failure to Fire."

Procedure Change Approval Form (PCAF) 1-87-0719,

"Pump Curve and Flow Data for A&C ESW Pumps for Test Procedures 054-065."

PCAF 1-87-0847, "Liquid Radwaste Filter B Alarm Response for Proce-dure AR-RW-006."

PCAF 1-89-0678,

"Auto Transfer for Procedure ON-054-001."

PCAF 1-89-0377,

"Tolerance Changes for Procedure SI-099-315."